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O rzekomej iluzoryczności jaźni i wolnej woli

Bremer, Józef

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  <identifier identifierType="DOI">10.5281/zenodo.827361</identifier>
      <creatorName>Bremer, Józef</creatorName>
      <affiliation>Instytut Filozofii, Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie</affiliation>
    <title>O rzekomej iluzoryczności jaźni i wolnej woli</title>
    <subject>illusion - everyday intuitions - self - compatibilism - neuroscience - free will</subject>
    <date dateType="Issued">2017-07-14</date>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="Text">Journal article</resourceType>
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    <relatedIdentifier relatedIdentifierType="DOI" relationType="IsVersionOf">10.5281/zenodo.827360</relatedIdentifier>
    <rights rightsURI="">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International</rights>
    <rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess">Open Access</rights>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">&lt;p&gt;Many philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists argue for the thesis that both the self and free will - as commonly understood by us - are illusions created by our nervous system. An example of such a line of argument can be found in Bruce Hood’s book `The Self Illusion: How the Social Brain Creates Identity'. I first consider the main ideas put forward by Hood in support of the view that the self and free will are illusions. Then I turn to criticisms of his arguments regarding the illusoriness of the self, citing arguments from philosophy and neuroscience. In criticizing his arguments for the illusoriness of free will, I advocate compatibilism and seek to focus on the elucidation of research into our everyday intuitions relating to free will.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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