
Löwith's Nietzschean Return to the Ancient Conception of Nature

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Abstract: This paper assesses Löwith's conception of Antiquity. For him Antiquity is opposite in meaning to Christianity, and not to Modernity. That is to say, Modernity would be included in the Christian times, and Antiquity, for its part, would be primarily considered as a polytheist culture, contrasting with the Christian worldview. As I will show, the scheme motivating such a conception of Antiquity is the Nietzschean antichristian philosophical program.

Keywords: Löwith, Nietzsche, Antiquity, Modernity, Christianity, Nature

1. Antiquity versus Christianity

It was only when Karl Löwith wrote *Meaning in History* (1949) that he first outlined a general theory on Antiquity. This theory was further developed in his work *Wissen, Glaube und Skepsis* (1955) and finally summarized in *Gott, Mensch und Welt in der Metaphysik von Descartes bis zu Nietzsche* (1966). Nonetheless, Löwith was indeed interested in the ancient world from the early stages of his work. His interest in Antiquity may not have been straightforward, but, as it will be argued in what follows, the roots of his thought can be traced back to Nietzsche, since for both philosophers Antiquity is opposite in meaning to Christianity, and not to Modernity. That is to say, Modernity would be included in the Christian times, and Antiquity, for its part, would be primarily considered as a polytheist culture and a way of thinking, contrasting with the Christian worldview. To that extent, Christianity, as the crucial event of the Western, is the main concern of Löwith's thought, as well as of Nietzsche's.

It is well known that from *Also sprach Zarathustra* on, but not before, Nietzsche took Christianity (and not the history of metaphysics, like many heideggerian scholars use to claim) as the decisive, wicked event in the cultural history of the Western civilization. Some popular examples that illustrate this stance are the following:

The symbol of this struggle, inscribed in letters legible across all human history, is 'Rome against Judea, Judea against Rome': — there has hitherto been no greater event than *this* struggle, *this* question, *this* deadly contradiction (Genealogie der Moral, 16) This eternal indictment of Christianity I will write on all walls, wherever there are walls — I have letters to make even the blind

see. I call Christianity the one great curse, the one great innermost corruption, the one great instinct of revenge, for which no means is poisonous, stealthy, subterranean, small enough — I call it the one immortal blemish of mankind (Der Antichrist, 62).

Ecce Homo concludes:

'Have I been understood? — *Dionysus versus the Crucified...*'¹

Nietzsche remained for Löwith the essential philosopher and he assumed his antichristian philosophical program². In 1914, at the age of 17, he joined the German Army after his intense reading of Nietzsche; in 1923 he wrote his thesis on Nietzsche, in a period when the philosopher from Röcken was barely been taken into account by scholars; from 1928 to 1934, he taught his philosophical thinking in Marburg on several occasions; in 1935 he wrote a book about Nietzsche's philosophy, *Nietzsches Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen*, when he was expelled from Germany; in 1941, he published in Japan a history of the revolutionary German thought entitled *Von Hegel bis zu Nietzsche*. Without doubt, Nietzsche plays a crucial role in both *Meaning in History* (1949) and *Gott, Mensch und Welt in der Metaphysik von Descartes bis zu Nietzsche* (1966), and during the 1960s Löwith put Giorgio Colli and Massimo Montinari in touch with the publishing house De Gruyter, which finally published the *Kritische Studienausgabe* (KSA) including the findings of Colli and Montinari in the *Weimar Archiv*. In short, Nietzsche was the main reference of the whole work of Löwith from the very beginning. And Löwith himself acknowledged it³. He accepted the Nietzschean diagnosis⁴ and attempted to overcome Christianity in order to find a way out to the Western civilizational crisis.

Although Nietzsche attempted to be as antichristian as possible, Löwith contended that such an undertaking ended in failure. Claiming himself to be an antichristian, Nietzsche remained Christian, all too Christian⁵. Löwith considered that *Zarathustra* could be read as an inverted Gospel and was convinced that the inversion of something makes this movement subordinate to what is attempted to be overcome. Nietzsche could have written some kind of *Iliad*, *History of the Peloponnesian War* or *De Rerum Natura*, but he wrote a Gospel. Although antichristian, it remains a Gospel⁶. Moreover, Löwith emphasized that the Nietzschean idea of *Wille zum Macht* is not compatible with the idea of the eternal recurrence of the same⁷. Löwith rejected the idea of *Wille zum Macht* but he

claimed that Nietzsche's idea of the eternal recurrence of the same, if not fully and coherently exposed, can only be understood in the context of this Nietzschean battle against Christianity, because the eternal recurrence of the same is essentially an antichristian idea. This is why Löwith, following and surpassing Nietzsche, enhanced this idea and claimed a new world image, which is the same of the ancients⁸, without the overenthusiastic and unconsciously christian-based Nietzschean impulse and prophetic writing.

2. The Idea of *Sattelzeit*

Being a disciple of Löwith, Reinhart Koselleck translated *Meaning in History* into German in 1953. In his early writings⁹, he showed that there was a period of *Sattelzeit* in the European history from 1750 to 1850. By this time, all socio-political concepts underwent both a paradigm shift and a process of resemantization. This methodological caution motivates us to take distance from the concepts to be found in the texts preceding that date. Even if the word we find remains unchanged, the semantics and the whole paradigm in which the concept once made sense are now different. These concepts must be therefore translated into our modern language. Consequently, the first task of the researcher is to keep in mind the several layers of meaning behind the concept. Since continuity in words does not entail any persistence in the meaning, a difference is to be faced and understood as such, being therefore suspicious about the tale of continuity of ideas.

Koselleck made an attempt at explaining the profound changes relating to the period 1750-1850 through the concept of *Sattelzeit*. According to Löwith, and even if he did not use that word, Christianity introduced a *Sattelzeit* in history. Concepts such as history, atheism, belief, faith, wisdom, philosophy, world, divineness or scepticism do not convey the same meaning in the pre-Christian world and in the Christian and post-Christian one. Despite the fact that the word is the same, the general axiological frame displaces the meaning. For these concepts refer to another context of meaning we should be aware of it in order to avoid projecting our common understanding of these words into those texts on Antiquity. I will offer some examples on the basis of Löwith texts:

History. In *Meaning in History*, Löwith distinguishes between *logos of the cosmos* and *Lord of the history*, being polytheistic Greeks and Romans concerned with the former and monotheistic Jews and Christians with the latter¹⁰. For Greeks and Romans, history means political history, but for Jews and Christians, the same terms refers to the history of salvation. Greeks and Romans understand the past as an everlasting foundation, whilst Jews and Christians as a promise to the future. The intellectual figure for Greeks and Romans is the political historian; for Jews and Christians, the prophet. In short, the ancient world did not develop a philosophy of history, which relies completely on the history of salvation¹¹. The modern philosophy of history goes for the *Lord of the history*¹².

Religion. Religions in Antiquity did not speak the language of belief. The correctness of religion was practical (orthopraxis), not theoretical (orthodoxy). Here

Löwith agrees with the etymology of the word religion offered by Benveniste¹³. Cicero's etymology corresponds to a polytheistic world; Lactantius' one, to a monotheist world. The fact that Antiquity did not speak the language of belief explains why the gods were a tool of communication between the different peoples¹⁴. When two human communities approached each other (because of the war, conquest or commerce), they usually translated their pantheons. The basic assumption until the emergence of the monotheistic religions was then that a translation of the gods was always available. On the contrary, Yahweh, God and Allah could not and cannot be translated; unlike Zeus, Jupiter, Tinia or Amun, they are not mutually translatable. Many philosophies of the Antiquity, specially those of the platonic tradition, aim to the one God, but they do allow the translation. Due to this polytheistic background, they do not defend monotheism, but the unity of God; they do not deny the existence of many Gods, while the monotheistic religion does. The following motto summarizes the differences: "polytheism sometimes aims to the one God; monotheism always aims to the only God". Furthermore, Löwith stated that he discovered Greek and Roman polytheism during his exile in Japan. There, in Japan, he found the worship of the everyday phenomena, like the sun, the moon, the nature, the sexuality, etc¹⁵. Löwith held that the Japanese *kami* can be put at the same level of the Roman *superiori*. Thus, the general comparison is not made exclusively between Antiquity and Christianity, but between, on the one hand, a polytheism distanced from our tradition (Japan) and a polytheism close to us (Greece and Rome), and, on the other hand, the Jewish and Christian monotheism.

The debates between reason and faith. This question surmises that reason needs to relate to faith. But where there is neither faith nor belief, as it was in the ancient Greece or Rome¹⁶, no pertinent question regarding the superiority of reason over faith could be raised. This conflict, believed to be the essential conflict of the Western history, is not so decisive for Löwith, precisely because the two contrasting elements are not equal. Athens did not need Jerusalem to understand itself until it was defeated by monotheism. Conversely, the prosperous monotheism of Jerusalem always needed Athens to attain self-understanding. Because of the role played by Athens and the Antiquity during centuries within the Christian and Jew traditions, the comparison is unfair. In other words, Greece and Rome do not compare themselves with the Jew and Christian traditions¹⁷. To the best of my knowledge, there was and there is no platonic Church, sovereign in a philosophical State, having embassies in foreign countries, enjoying tax privileges and resorting to platonic texts as the ultimate source of authority in politics, science, gender policies and religion. Monotheistic religions, and specially the Catholic Church, do. In order to understand the dialectics between Athens and Jerusalem, a focus on the institutions needs to be done. Athens and the Antiquity played, and still do, a role within the current institutions. When considered historically and by itself, Athens was not aware of the tensions, fractures and depths of Jerusalem. Athens's main concern was not the relationship between faith and reason, but the differences between doxa, episteme, pistis, skepsis, etc.¹⁸

Atheism means in Antiquity distance of the community from the religious ground, and it relates to social and political issues. As a matter of fact, the early Christians were found guilty of atheism, because they did not recognise and worship the gods of the Roman Empire. Only after the emergence of Christianity, atheism acquires a completely different meaning. Orthodoxy emerges, and consequently heresies, believers, true believers, false believers, non believers and atheists –a new form of atheism¹⁹–. The religious difference in relation to belief, which creates heresies, cannot be found in the polytheistic world. Thus, a new form of atheism enters in the world history through this religious difference in relation to belief, namely the one we “naturally” understand. Here a striking example: Diogenes Laërtius in his *Lives and Opinions* uses the word heresies in the title to describe the numerous philosophical groups that simply held different opinions.

Greek philosophy does neither seek to prove the existence of the gods nor to rationally justify the religious beliefs. The aim of Greek philosophy is rather to know the divineness better than the popular religion of the communities²⁰. If one attempts to picture the ancient philosophers, they should look more like the Indian wise men²¹ than like the medieval and modern philosophers linked to the universities and dedicated to commentary and analysis of texts. It is not just a coincidence that the ancient world was essentially an oral culture that did not “invent” the separation of words. The wisdom was not proved through the depths of the soul, but through the serenity of the old wise men.

Scepticism in the ancient world means examination, investigation, search for the truth. Scepticism, as a way of life, was not a method of thinking or the systematic and epistemological doubt about the human capacity of knowing the truth. Scepticism was condensed by a doctor, Sextus Empiricus, whose main concern was not theoretical or epistemological, but practical. The ancient sceptic searched for the truth, and did not use scepticism as a tool in the search for certainty, conviction or belief.

Those distinctions and this precomprehension of the *Sattelzeit* can be tracked in many modern philosophers. In *Religion within the Boundaries of the Mere Reason*, Kant differentiated the religion of the mere cult and observances from the religion of the good life conduct. Hegel, for its part, differentiated in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* the determine religions from the consummate religion. Nietzsche differentiated the slave and master moralities in *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Kant and Hegel positively assessed this historical change, whilst Nietzsche assessed it negatively. At all events, the philosophy of Löwith, following the line of Nietzsche’s thought, can be understood as a warning to keep the differences and not to project the common meaning of our words onto Antiquity. We see the same words and we assume the continuity between the philosophy of Plato and our time, but in Antiquity concepts such as atheism, belief, heresy, philosophy of history, religion, monotheism, scepticism or even philosophy, in the way we spontaneously understand them, are nowhere to be found. The axiological references and the context of meaning is completely different. After the triumph of the Christian faith, the concepts of the Greek and Roman philosophy need to

be translated and we need to keep the Antiquity at a distance so that it can be properly understood.

3. The Critique of Modernity and the Concept of Nature

The examples outlined above allowed Löwith for warning us against the sharp separation between Antiquity and us. Moreover, he postulated that modern philosophy does not imply breaking away with Christianity²², and thus returning to the ancient philosophy, but that modern philosophy from Descartes to Heidegger ambiguously continues to pursue the *Lord of the history*, and not the *logos of the cosmos*. In this regard, religion is understood as orthodoxy, not as orthopraxis; the relationship between faith and reason still galvanizes the debates; scepticism describes a method of thinking, not a way of life... Modernity can be seen as a prolongation of the Christian world-image. In this process, the idea of *Sattelzeit* helped us to note the differences between the ancient and the Christian worlds. This could be described as a triviality suitable for a degree student. But Löwith is interested in showing that our conceptual constellation comes from the break that Christianity introduced in history²³. Since then, philosophy has no longer resorted to the ancients. Modern philosophy is both Christian and antichristian. It is Christian because it does not break up with the main themes of Christianity, namely the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the divisions reason/faith, eternal/temporary, etc. And it is at the same time antichristian because it attempts to prove them using no religious means at all²⁴. The key point for Löwith is that modern philosophy does not resort to the classical topics of ancient philosophy. According to him, the main topic of ancient philosophy was nature²⁵. Nature was considered by the ancients as the highest object of thinking²⁶ and for that philosophy should be understood in the same way as it was when it was born in Greece: that is, as physiology. The ancients, from the pre-Socratics to Pliny, could still think that there was nothing highest or more divine than nature; but the moderns, having lived in a monotheistic tradition for so many centuries (since Augustine at least), are not able any more to be amazed by the divineness and the simplicity of the natural world. From Augustine to Heidegger, the most striking object is not the world itself, but the self. According to Löwith, the world for the ancients is not the creation of a transcendent god or the making of the human mind, but “als das Ganze des Seienden ist die Welt immer schon vollständig und vollkommen selbständig und die Voraussetzung aller unselbständigen Existenzen”²⁷. The world is not just an idea (Kant), an horizon (Husserl) or a projection (Heidegger), but the highest, the only existing and the divine world. Therefore, Modernity can be defined as the time of the forgetfulness²⁸ of nature.

From Descartes to Heidegger, no philosopher was capable to fully develop a suitable conception of nature²⁹. Löwith’s critique of the close relationship between philosophy and theology could be understood as a rejection of the survival of the latter in the former, in such a way that the permanent appropriation of theological concepts by the modern philosophy stopped it from conceiving nature close to the ancient philosophy. In that way, the his-

tory of modern thought shows that the ancient conception of nature, with the exception of some philosophers like Spinoza, Goethe or Nietzsche, has been long forgotten.

Any form of systematic and consistent atheism needs a new conceptualization of the world and the nature. It is not by chance that the most furious contemporary atheist, Michel Onfray, has recently published a book entitled *Cosmos* (2014). Every attempt to overcome Christianity and monotheism in general bumps into the necessity of drawing a new image of the cosmos and nature. An atheist ontology seeking to exclude the afterlife and the tricks of religion demands a new image of the world, a new world image. The great danger for atheism is falling into the chains of Christianity, as evidenced by the example of Nietzsche and probably Onfray.

Plessner, Leo Strauss and Gadamer among others have strongly criticized Löwith's historical explanations. Plessner claims that it would bear a resemblance to the Heideggerian one³⁰. Leo Strauss in *Notes on Lucretius*³¹ and Gadamer in *Wahrheit und Methode*³² hold that attempting to return to the ancient conception of the nature at the peak of Modernity would be totally inappropriate. I also agree with the idea that it is impossible to return to the ancient idea of nature in the present³³. But the central and still valuable idea of Löwith is that we have to keep in mind the gap between the ancients and the moderns and that the human being cannot find a solution to the contemporary political problems unless a new relationship with the nature is established³⁴.

Löwith's defense of the superiority of the ancient conception of the nature only began after the exile and the Second World War. Before that time, in his early writings, there was no sign of pointing to the development of a concept of nature. Nonetheless, we can surely find continuity in Löwith's philosophy from the twenties to the seventies in a concern that will easily drive him after the exile to the ancient world: the Nietzschean concern about the body, the Earth and the nature. That is, Löwith's main philosophical interest did not change because of his forced stay in Japan and in the United States (1936-1952). However, considering that it had a Nietzschean origin, which can be traced both before and after the exile in 1936, these concerns led him to oppose the ancient and the Christian worlds — after the exile.

Notes

¹ All quotations are from Walter A. Kaufmann's English translations: F. Nietzsche, *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, Modern Library, New York, 2000; F. Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, Penguin, London, 1982.

² J. Chytry, "Zur Wiedergewinnung des Kosmos. Karl Löwith contra Martin Heidegger", in D. Papenfuss & O. Pöggeler (Hrsg.), *Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers. Band II: Im Gespräch der Zeit*, Klostermann, Frankfurt, p. 94.

³ K. Löwith, *Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933. Ein Bericht*, J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart, 1992, pp. 7-8.

⁴ E. Donaggio, *Una sobria inquietud. Karl Löwith y la filosofía*, Katz, Buenos Aires, p. 39; R. Wolin, "Karl Löwith: The Stoic Response to Modern Nihilism", in R. Wolin., *Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2015, pp. 74-75; M. Bormuth, "Ereignis und Geschichte. Karl Löwith kritisiert Martin Heidegger", in M. Bormuth & U. von Bulow (Hrsg.), *Marburger Hermeneutik zwischen Tradition und Krise*, Wallstein, Göttingen, 2008, p. 89.

⁵ K. Löwith, "Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)", in K. Löwith, *Sämtliche Schriften VI: Nietzsche*, J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart, 1987, p. 406: "But when Nietzsche went mad, he signed some of his letters 'Dionysos the Crucified', confusing himself with the dismembered Dionysos Zagreus

and with the crucified Christ. This double signature reveals not only an accidental confusion but an ultimate problem, the problem of Nietzsche's anti-Christian Christianity."

⁶ K. Löwith, "Nietzsches antichristliche Bergpredigt", in K. Löwith, *Sämtliche Schriften VI: Nietzsche*, J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart, 1987, p. 468.

⁷ K. Löwith, "Nietzsche nach sechzig Jahren", in K. Löwith, *Sämtliche Schriften VI: Nietzsche*, J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart, 1987, p. 460.

⁸ J. Chytry, "Zur Wiedergewinnung des Kosmos. Karl Löwith contra Martin Heidegger"... p. 93.

⁹ R. Koselleck, "Einleitung", in O. Brunner, W. Conze & R. Koselleck (Hrsg.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Bd. 1, Klett Cotta, Stuttgart, 1972, pp. XIII-XXVII.

¹⁰ K. Löwith, "Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen. Die theologische Voraussetzungen der Geschichtsphilosophie", in K. Löwith, *Sämtliche Schriften II: Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen. Zur Kritik der Geschichtsphilosophie*, J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart, 1983, p. 14.

¹¹ This idea first appeared in Löwith's thought in K. Löwith, "The Theological Background of the Philosophy of History", *SOCIAL RESEARCH* 13, 1 (Spring, 1946), pp. 51-52: "There would be no search for the meaning of history if its meaning were manifest in historical events. It is the very absence of meaning in the events themselves which motivates the quest. Conversely, it is only within a preestablished horizon of ultimate meaning, however hidden it may be, that actual history seems to be meaningful. This horizon has been established by history, for it is Jewish and Christian thinking that brought this colossal question into existence. [...] The ancients were more moderate in their speculations. They did not presume to make sense of the world or to discover its ultimate meaning. They were impressed by the visible order and beauty of the cosmos, and the cosmic law of growth and decay was also the pattern for their understanding of history."

¹² J. A. Barash, "The Sense of History: on the Political Implications of Karl Löwith's Concept of Secularization", in *HISTORY AND THEORY* 37 (1), 1998, p. 76.

¹³ E. Benveniste, *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes II: pouvoir, droit, religion*, Minuit, Paris, 1969, pp. 267-273.

¹⁴ J. Assmann, "Translating Gods: Religion as a Factor of Cultural (Un)Translatability", in S. Budick & W. Iser (eds.), *The Translatability of Cultures. Figurations of the Space Between*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1996, pp. 25-36; V. Rocco Lozano, "Le dodici tesi di Hegel sulla Romanitas", *Philosophical Readings* VII.3 (2015), p. 10.

¹⁵ F.-R. Hausmann, "Karl Löwiths Sendai - japanisches 'Alt-Marburg' oder nur exotisches Provisorium?", in *INTERNATIONALE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE*, Heft 2/2008, p. 78; K. Löwith, "Curriculum vitae (1959)", in K. Löwith, *Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933. Ein Bericht*, J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart, 1992, p. 187.

¹⁶ E. Benveniste, *op. cit.*, p. 273; K. Löwith, "Atheismus als philosophisches Problem", in K. Löwith, *Sämtlichen Schriften III: Wissen, Glaube und Skepsis. Zur Kritik von Religion und Theologie*, J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart, 1985, p. 333: "Den neutestamentlichen Begriff des Glaubens hat es im griechischen Denken nicht gegeben".

¹⁷ K. Löwith, "Atheismus als philosophisches Problem", in K. Löwith, *Sämtlichen Schriften III...*, pp. 331-332: "Die seit Augustin immer wieder aufgeworfene Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Einsicht und Glaube impliziert, dass die philosophische Einsicht von sich aus ein Verhältnis zum Glauben an Offenbarung habe. Diese Voraussetzung fehlt jedoch der gesamten griechischen Philosophie, von der alle spätere herkommt, die dieses Namens wert ist. Sie trifft nur zu für die Philosophie nach dem Christentum. Die Unterscheidung sowohl wie die Vereinbarung von Vernunft oder Wissen und Glauben ist eine innerchristliche Angelegenheit."

¹⁸ K. Löwith, "Wissen, Glaube und Skepsis", in K. Löwith, *Sämtlichen Schriften III...*, p. 206: "Die klassische Philosophie bewegt sich nicht innerhalb des Entweder-Oder von Wissen und Glaube, sondern innerhalb des Unterschieds von episteme und doxa."

¹⁹ K. Löwith, "Atheismus als philosophisches Problem", in K. Löwith, *Sämtlichen Schriften III...*, p. 334: "Der Unterschied von Rechgläubigen, Irrgläubigen und Ungläubigen hat in der Antike keine Entsprechung. Häresien kann es nur geben, wo es Orthodoxien gibt, und Atheisten nur dort, wo es auch Gläubige gibt. In der Antike ist der Atheismus keine religiöse Differenz zum Glauben, sondern eine politische Art von Häresie im Verhältnis zu den religiösen Grundlagen der polis. Atheismus war asebeia, und diese ein Frevel, die von der polis bestraft wurde."

²⁰ K. Löwith, "Wissen, Glaube und Skepsis", in K. Löwith, *Sämtlichen Schriften III...*, pp. 205-206: "Die antike Theologie ist darum vorzüglich theologische Ontologie und Kosmologie, aber keine Theologie des Glaubens. [...] Die Theologie gehört in der Antike zum wesentlichen Bestand der Philosophie, weil sie ein höchstes Wissen um das höchste

Seiende ist. Die Frage war nicht: kann man Gott wissen oder muss man zuerst an ihn glauben?, sondern: kann man das Göttliche besser wissen, als es in der populären Religion vermeint wird?”.

²¹ L. Dumont, *Essais sur l'individualisme. Une perspective anthropologique sur l'idéologie moderne*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1991, p. 40.

²² Löwith, “Wissen, Glaube und Skepsis”, in K. Löwith, *Sämtlichen Schriften III...*, pp. 207-208; E. Zazo Jiménez, “Cristianismo difuso e islam minoritario en las ciudades europeas”, in *Philosophical Readings VIII.3* (2016), p. 213.

²³ E. Donaggio, *Una sobria inquietud...*, p. 187; K. Löwith, “Mensch und Menschenwelt”, in Karl Löwith, *Sämtliche Schriften I: Mensch und Menschenwelt. Beiträge zur Anthropologie*, J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart, 1981, pp. 302-313.

²⁴ K. Löwith, “Christentum, Geschichte und Philosophie”, in K. Löwith, *Sämtliche Schriften II: Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen. Zur Kritik der Geschichtsphilosophie*, J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart, 1983, pp. 448-449.

²⁵ J. Chytry, “Zur Wiedergewinnung des Kosmos. Karl Löwith contra Martin Heidegger”..., pp. 90-91; E. Donaggio, *Una sobria inquietud...*, p. 193.

²⁶ D. Henrich, “Sceptico Sereno. Rede am 9. 1. 1967”, in B. Hermann & M. Riedel (Hrsg.), *Natur und Geschichte. Karl Löwith zum 70. Geburtstag*, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln/Mainz, 1967, pp. 461-462; K. Löwith, “Gott, Mensch und Welt in der Metaphysik von Descartes bis zu Nietzsche”, in Karl Löwith, *Sämtliche Schriften IX: Gott, Mensch und Welt in der Philosophie der Neuzeit, G. B. Vico und Paul Valéry*, J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart, 1990, pp. 6-7.

²⁷ K. Löwith, “Curriculum vitae (1959)”, in *Mein Leben in Deutschland...*, p. 191.

²⁸ L. Weissberg, “East and West: Karl Löwith's Routes of Exile”, in H. O. Horch, H. Mittelmann & K. Neuburger (Hrsg.), *Exilerfahrung und Konstruktionen von Identität. 1933 bis 1945*, De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston, 2013, p. 175.

²⁹ K. Löwith, “Gott, Mensch und Welt in der Metaphysik von Descartes bis zu Nietzsche”, in Karl Löwith, *Sämtliche Schriften IX...*, p. 12: “Wie verschieden auch immer das *se ipsum* in der nachchristlichen Philosophie von Descartes bis zu Heidegger ausgelegt wird, die Konsequenz für das Weltverständnis bleibt dieselbe: die Welt ist nicht mehr das Erste und Letzte, alles Umfassende und unbedingt Selbständige, sondern über Gott auf den Menschen bezogen, zuerst als Krone der Schöpfung, und sodann als selbstbewusstes Subjekt.”

³⁰ H. Plessner, “Geleitwort”, in B. Hermann & M. Riedel (Hrsg.), *Natur und Geschichte. Karl Löwith...*, pp. 7-9.

³¹ Leo Strauss, “Notes on Lucretius”, in Leo Strauss, *Liberalism Ancient and Modern*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995, pp. 77-141.

³² H. - G. Gadamer, “Hermeneutik und Historismus”, in H. - G. Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke II: Hermeneutik II. Wahrheit und Methode*, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen, p. 414.

³³ E. Zazo, “Reseña de ‘M. Bruni, *La natura oltre la storia. La filosofia di Karl Löwith*, Il Prato, 2012””, in *REVISTA DE LIBROS DE LA TORRE DEL VIRREY*, n. 4, 2014/2.

³⁴ M. Bruni, *La natura oltre la storia. La filosofia di Karl Löwith*, Il Prato, 2012, pp. 123-141; K. Löwith, “Das Verhängnis des Fortschritts”, in K. Löwith, *Sämtliche Schriften II: Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen. Zur Kritik der Geschichtsphilosophie*, J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart, 1983, p. 410: “Und solange wir nicht unser gesamtes Verhältnis zur Welt, und damit zur Zeit, von Grund aus revidieren, sondern mit der biblische Schöpfungsgeschichte und den christlichen Begründern der modernen Naturwissenschaft voraussetzen, dass die Welt der Natur für den Menschen da ist, ist nicht abzusehen, wie sich an dem Dilemma des Fortschritts etwas ändern sollte.”