ILLUSOR BEING OF IDEOLOGY

In this study, the transition of philosophy into its own otherness, that is, the ideology proceeding from the non-identity of thinking and being, is considered. Just as Hegel's logical philosophy reached the form of universality, through a direct denial of the diversity of its historical forms, so post-Hegelian thought was defined through its attitude to ideology as philosophy "overturned" into politics, again appeared in historical forms. On the example of the paradoxical legacy of famous thinkers of the twentieth century, such as K. Mannheim, M. Heidegger and others, the authors establish the extreme point of the fall of philosophy into ideology and the beginning of its release from the functions of political technology in order to return to lost universality.

leaving as reality of thought, but in the reality of National Socialism, formulates two diametrically opposite statements. 1. National Socialism cannot become a new philosophical (!) Principle; and 2. On the contrary, it can become one. 3. Puts forward a condition in which the key is «cognizes, understands».
So, we have two drives of two defining Western thinking forms of being: from politics to philosophy, and from philosophy to politics. The point of their contact is the phenomenon of ideology. How could this happen? What is the cause of this phenomenon?
It should be taken into account that initially K. Marx and F. Engels, using the term «ideology», transferred his sharply negative meaning (distorted consciousness) not only to individual systems of philosophy. «They not only opposed a certain philosophical system, but, in the end, overcome and destroy philosophy in general through their scientific socialism,» emphasizes Karl Korsh. Here, contrary to the founders, he insists on the deep connection between Marxism and philosophy: «It is impossible to abolish philosophy without realizing it» [6]. And under this thesis the Marxist signed? There is some kind of game of meanings. As part of the same teaching, the thesis «shines» (scheinen) in the antithesis and vice versa.
Here is a phrase from Hegel's logic that struck the ideologists of the beginning of the last century so much that it forced him to fully establish himself in the final revision of the alternative «philosophy -ideology». «Objectivity of Appearance» (Die Objektivität des Scheins). What is the meaning of this statement of the German philosopher? «Isn't it the same thought that is objective and illusory, because it contains one of the sides of the o b j e c t i v e world? Not only Wesen (essence), but also Schein (appearance) are objective».
But if someone demands something from someone, then they are clearly in a relationship, in a dialogue, in reflection. This attitude is determined by the very «appearance», behind which some ideologists are forced to recognize an objective, ontological status. But even eight years ago, at the time of the creation of Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1908), they hardly agreed with such a statement. It turns out that none other than Hegel himself in his preface (and, according to many Hegelian experts, was written after the main body of the work had already been written), he laid the «bomb» of reflection into the finished building, a precisely adjusted ladder of the logic of transitions hermeneutic horizon, which so worried F. Schleimacher at that time.
On October 13, 1806, in the vicinity of Yen, two people commit acts that will go down in history and remain for a long time. They are practically peers. The name of one on the lips of half -world, behind the 100 thousandth army and tomorrow a brilliant victory over the Germans. His name is Napoleon. The name of the other is practically not known to anyone. He is German. Iena was taken by the French, and he rushes around the city in search of a refuge. In his pockets he has a manuscript of phenomenology. His name is Hegel.
Where does world history live, or, how did the German philosopher love to express himself, the World spirit? Not in the hat of Napoleon, his horse, and not even on the tip of the bayonets of his soldiers. And even more so, not in his body. We say: worldwide history lives in the actions of thousands of thousands of people acting at this time. What remains after a worldwide event? -Memories. Where does the spirit of the «phenomenology of the spirit» of Hegel live? Not in the letters, sheets and bindings of this book. He is in the meanings that are equal to actions that are born as a result of reading these letters, words, pages, etc. What remains after reading a philosophical text that affects ideologists, and those, in turn, on politicians, etc.? -Interpretation.
Both in reminiscences and in interpretations, the truth of world history, as it were, acquires a second birth. Glory -this is the reward that the participants in the actions of real participants in political deeds receive. The initial silence, nonrecognition and subsequent surprise at the «secret» of the text is the assessment of the participants in the philosophical cognition of reality. On October 13, 1806, the most practical practice -politics and the most theoretical theory -philosophy, apparently had no chance of an organic combination. But exactly one hundred years later, in the form of a strange «centaur» of ideology, they became friends «do not spill water». How could this happen?
Paper main body. Hegel's system was a response to a very serious claim to philosophy, which was constantly expressed in its address almost from the very moment of its emergence. It sounded something like this: «Philosophy first deal with the contradiction of the diversity of its own forms, when every thinker declared himself a representative of absolute truth, and only then count on some kind of recognition.» Therefore, the appearance and disappearance of the great historical philosophical systems from Parmenides to Hegel was an «omen» in the ontological plan of world history, and Hegelian philosophy became a world-historical «event». In this sense, Hegel did not create any new philosophical idea. He voluntarily abandoned his application for the crown of genius, concentrating on solving this problem in Jena (1807). In exactly the same spirit, M. Heidegger defines his destiny in a letter to K. Jaspers (1932). «Since then, I have existed in the role of a gallery keeper, who, in particular, ensures that the curtains on the windows are properly parted or drawn, so that the few great works of the past are more or less well lit for random visitors. Without a picture, I teach and deal only with the history of philosophy (our italics), that is, I try, without regard to lecture time, to state what I consider important for the revival of philosophizing» [7].
In non-notifying a new sake of historical recognition, something in common between two thinkers is clearly traced. But in the management of the «curtains» through which the light that illuminates the great systems of predecessors penetrates, there is a categorical difference between them. Hegel is not episodically (like Heidegger) addresses one or another philosopher of the past, but methodically subordinates their «lighting» by the logic of the transition. Thanks to this, the initial goal -giving unity by diversity, was achieved. The historical era began to listen to the voice of philosophy. But the solution to one problem led to the emergence of a new one. The form proposed by Hegel, a little later, raised a lot of questions, especially as shown above, he himself participated in their occurrence.
As Damocles, a sword over Hegel's teaching, the problem of interpretation of the transition in the «System» of the absolute idea into nature hung. The transition of inorganic matter is lively, and, then-in a reasonable, formal reason was more or less able to put in the school formula «origin». The picture in his imagination was drawn simply: there was no living cage on Earth, billions of years passed -it appeared; There was no conscious activity on the planet, billions of years passedit arose, etc. Voltaire began to laugh at this reason with his understanding of the «transitions» back in the middle of the 18th century. «At first, our imagination enjoys an inconspicuous transition from gross matter to organized matter, from plants to zoophytes, from these zoophytes to animals, from them to man, from man to spirits, from these perfumes, clothed in a small air body, to intangible substances; and … to God himself …» [8]. But as the ideal passes (gives rise to) this reason into the material reason, remembering a visual example of the difference in conceivable and real hundred thalers (Kant), could not understand.
F. Engels frankly admits that «in Hegel, the creation of the world often takes on an even more intricate and absurd form than in Christianity.» [9]. He is echoed by A. D. Vlasov: «Hegel slid, fell and, getting up, moved in a different direction. Immediately after the completion of this first "system" of philosophy, the process of its redevelopment and restructuring began, in our opinion, poorly thought out and justified» [10,[16][17]. Numerous supporters of this point of view can be understood. After all, indeed, if you follow the development of the categories in the «Logic of Being» in the form of a transition, the object is given to itself in immediacy. But for us it also exists, only its givenness is manifested in the appearance of reflexive categories. In addition, development itself is also given only for us. It turns out for an outside observer the subjectivity of this point of view is obvious. Hegel himself explicitly expresses this in paragraph 161 of the Minor Logic. But who said that the «Logic of transition» is a universal key to understanding what is happening. By developing the logic of reflection and the logic of development, does the German philosopher himself provoke a different view of the world?
It was here that Willy Moog suspected Hegel of a methodological «trick». «The non-logical idea as such develops further, since it represents the absolute as a whole, philosophically comprehended in a logical form. But this purely logical way of looking at the absolute is not the only possible way of looking at it, rather, in accordance with its own dialectic, it needs to be supplemented by a way of looking at the idea in its otherness» [11]. We will return to the end of this phrase «an idea in its otherness», but now it should be remembered that Hegel was initially well aware of both types of interpretation of reality: in the form of a transition (ladder), and in the form of reflection (conductor). Therefore, in Phenomenology, he forces all three forms: consciousness, self-consciousness and reason, either to behave directly (on the first steps), then reflexively (on the second step). At the same time, he fulfilled the disclosure of the certainty of the whole of Phenomenology and the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in the horizon of the advantage of the logic of transition. We have already pointed out the reason above: it is logically the first, without it, both objectively and subjectively, the logic of reflection is impossible.
In addition, his logical philosophy itself acted as the first, and, therefore, direct denial of the diversity of historical forms. But the main feature of any historical philosophy was that each of them, creating a new idea, carried it through all the moments of being. There was no question of the independent existence of the sciences of nature -natural sciences, and of the spirit -the humanities. Hegel, therefore, conducts research in his «Lectures» on the philosophy of his predecessors, dividing them sequentially into the corresponding sections: «Theory of knowledge plus logic», «Philosophy of nature» and «Philosophy of spirit». Naturally, here they themselves did not yet have the opportunity to «grab» (Hegel himself often emphasizes the similarity of the words «greifen -to seize» and «der Begriffconcept»), the elements of their own systems in their unity. In this sense, for example, E. Linkov characterizes the historical development of science as «an unconscious prerequisite for philosophical thinking» [12,9]. Here he uses the term «unconscious» exclusively in the context of the absence of the indicated moment «for oneself» of the historical forms of philosophy, which can only be overcome in the logic of the history of philosophy.
For Hegel, the main task was to work from beginning to end the form of transition logic. The total dominance of this category affects the entire array of its system. Only in «Great Logic» (1812) does he use the category of «transition» in the first volume -253, in the second -121 and in the third -139 times. This is several times more than the «reflection» and «development» categories with it. The same thing is repeated in his «philosophy of law» (1821).
The Hegelian version of the «transitions» in the Hegelian system turned out to be so convincing that a hundred years later there was a temptation to designate this whole era, thinking in the horizons of this category «as» modern ", contrasting it with another era -«postmodern». A whole direction is formed in the second half of the twentieth century. There is even a special name -«nomadology». The corresponding images were proposed: «Orchids and bees», «Tree and rhizomes (rhizomes)» (Deleuze and Guattari). And this is all in order to express and understand the «shifts» that occurred in historical thinking at the turn of the nineteenth and xx centuries. Revolutionary transformations in being are instantly reflected in the minds of this being, and, conversely, otherwise the thinking consciousness qualitatively transforms the world around him.
Hegel speaks clearly and definitely about the difference between the three logics: being, essence and concept, and therefore about the difference between the three ways of dialectical consideration, and therefore about the difference between the three ways of behavior of everything that exists. Here he emphasizes: in the first we are dealing with a «transition into another» (Übergehen in Anderes); in the second, with «appearance in another» (Scheinen in Anderes); and only in the third one can one speak of the «development» (Entwicklung) of the concept [13,343]. In these three horizons, opposites 'posit' themselves ('meet' or 'behave') in quite different ways.
The «transition» relationship is the most popular because of its simplicity. Here the dialectical movement is such that «first» is one, and «later» is its opposite. Day follows night. God's creations follow one after the other. From the category of quality arises the category of quantity, and so on.
«Visibility in the other» is not like that. By the swaying of the trees we judge windy weather; on the fall of the body -about the gravitational force; on inflationa crisis in industry, on rampant crime -on corruption in law enforcement agencies, etc. Here the one, by subjecting itself to negation, posits its other, and vice versa, denying the independence of this other, posits itself. Here it is not the direct that dominates, but the mediated, that is, reflection. And if in the horizons of temporality in the sphere of being, succession is decisive, then here, in the sphere of essence, it is simultaneity. Here again we encounter the same simultaneity (Gleichzeitigkeit) that Hegel speaks of in connection with the relationship between historical philosophy and the epoch, and Gadamer speaks of images and reality.
Hegel even names the structural units of the two corresponding Logic: «Being» and «Essence», differently. In the first logic these are categories, in the second they are reflexive definitions. For example, when one follows the dialectic of quality and quantity, one can be considered without the other until it, having completely exhausted itself, passes into its own opposite. This is the dialectic of transition. But the dialectic of essence and phenomenon is completely different. As in the structure of ancient scales, an equal-armed lever (yoke) simultaneously connects any movement of one edge with another, here one reflexive definition (essence, identity, thing, etc.) develops only through its other (phenomenon, difference, property, etc.).
V. Moog «requires additions to the way of considering the idea in its otherness». Until now, we have also considered this problem in the methodological plane. But what if we look at it as an ontological problem? I. Kant in his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals speaks of the «honesty» (Lauterkeit) of philosophy and precisely in the plane of its being, which is far ahead of the Hegelian formulation of the question of the relationship between philosophy and the corresponding historical epoch. «Unrecognized, philosophy cannot cling to anything in heaven, nor be supported by anything on earth. And here she must prove her honesty by observing her own laws, and not acting as the herald of those laws that her inspired feeling or, perhaps, tutelary nature whispers to her» [11].
It is noteworthy that this idea is reproduced by M. Heidegger in his treatise «On the Essence of Truth» (1930). Just at that time, K. Mannheim proposes the principle of «relationalism» in the analysis of total ideologies, and H. Plesner insists on the need for philosophy to «enter the dangerous sphere of political life». Yes, and Heidegger himself spoke unequivocally about «participation in historical action» as the duty of a philosopher» [13,308]. In his study, he cites the words of Kant at the very end, emphasizing the importance of freedom for the knowledge of truth. But there are two important points in them that are directly related to the revolutionary transformations of the twentieth century and even to the personal fate of M. Heidegger [14].
I. Kant speaks about the philosophy of «Unerachten». Z. N. Zaitseva translates this word through «unrecognized», but you can -«not held in high esteem». Hegel in Phenomenology speaks of the «recognition movement» (die Bewegung des Anerkennens) [15]. His dialectic will help clarify what kind of non-recognition of philosophy Kant is talking about. First, for recognition to take place at all, not one, but two self-consciousnesses are needed; secondly, each of them must see itself in the other. This is the moment of identity. But what is even more important, thirdly, that the self-consciousness in which one self-consciousness sees itself must be different, different, moreover, completely different -opposite.
The «Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morality» was published in 1785. Why, according to Kant, is philosophy still unrecognized, not held in high esteem? Let us fix an additional condition for recognition, which is necessary for such a form of knowledge as philosophy, which, in addition, still leads a historical life. To recognize the ontological status of philosophy, another, at least equal in value, form of cognition is needed. Maybe it's art? But for aesthetic taste, the experience of knowing the world in terms free from sensibility is alien by definition. Maybe it's a religion? But faith is jealous, it itself claims to know the absolute truth and philosophy is a «deadly» competitor for it, a hundred times worse than other religions with which it fights for recognition by the people, the state and the historical era.
To answer this question, we need the second plot, which is contained in the above passage from Kant. Philosophy, he says, «must prove its integrity by itself keeping its own laws». Of course, a clarification suggests itself here: not only its own laws, but also the laws of the universe. These are the same laws! Hegel, «closing» one period of the existence of philosophy, the period of its definition through the attitude to its own historical forms of existence, reveals a new one: the definition of oneself through its own other. In its entirety, he explores the key features of this period in his «Logic of essence», demonstrating its power according to all the structural elements of his system, preparing an era when the law «attitude to its other» will fall on a philosophy itself, which has now been an ontological fact.
This form of the absolute other being of philosophy initially, in the root, in its very core, should be permeated with reflection and visibility -non -subservience of being. This is, as it were, a theory, but in fact it is not a theory, but ratherpractice. But, perhaps, and vice versa: this is not a practice, but a theory that first revolutionary remodels reality in thought, and only then carries out this in being. This is, as it were, the fruit of the activity of individual will, while in fact -the result of the activities of the masses. But, even rather, on the contrary, the activities of the masses under the guidance of the will of the individual leaders. Finally, this is a kind of philosophy, which in reality does not tolerate philosophy, or, conversely, not a philosophy, which with all his might wants to seem a real philosophy. This is ideology.
Ideology is philosophy «overturned» into politics, and politics «overturned» into philosophy. There is no need to speak here about any sequence of ideas, when the emergence «removes» the limitations of the previous stage, bringing something new to itself. The Hegelian method of «transitions» to this period of the otherness of philosophy is either not possible here at all, or must be relegated to the background from the very beginning. Therefore, historians of «non-classical» philosophy most often limit themselves to the genesis of ideas within an individual thinker or school, direction and focus on the reflection of existentialism into positivism, phenomenology into ontology, neo-Kantianism into neo-Hegelianism, etc. And they do it right. This is how the object behaves, and they can only follow it. In the rhizome (tuber, rhizome) of social practice, three directions are ripening, each of which defends itself, denying its other. All their forces are spent not on creating something new, but on improving, as K. Mannheim writes, the method of criticism. This method «reduces to the destruction of the enemy's utopia by revealing its conditionality by being» [10]. If these words are clarified in the terminology of K. Mannheim himself, then such criticism demonstrates how each «total» ideology seeks to show that its competitor is in fact not a total, but a «partial» ideology, that is, a false, distorted consciousness [16].
According to all the laws of the «phenomenological genre», a relationship of recognition developed between two self-consciousness: philosophy and ideology. Each sees its own in the other, and the other in itself. If necessary, philosophy easily changes the negative content of the concept of «ideology» (as false consciousness) into a positive one, receiving in return exactly the same dialectic (K. Mannheim).
All three major ideologies of the 20th century at the initial stage not only do not break off relations with philosophy, but, on the contrary, sometimes even curry favor with it. Until now, for example, the ideology of liberalism in Wikipedia is characterized as a «philosophical and socio-political movement.» In response, philosophy immediately declares its practical aspirations. Here is a statement, according to R. Safransky, the founder of philosophical anthropology H. Plesner: «Philosophical thinking «is never as wide as life, and at the same time it is always wider than life» [13]. And here R. Safransky confidently emphasizes that for Plesner «awareness of the radically understood historicity leads to the point of view that philosophy, not only because of the obligation imposed on it from the outside, but also because of the internal logic of its development (our italics) must enter the dangerous sphere of political life». As they say «two in one»: both the Hegelian movement in essence from nothing, through nothing, to nothing, and a statement of the fact of the «fall» of philosophy into politics (F. Lange).
Conclusions of the research. Philosophy, acquiring its otherness in the face of ideology and starting from its non-real (illusory) being, got the opportunity to develop its completely new, now post-historical, forms of existence. As a result, the relationship between philosophy and ideology has consistently unfolded in the historical reality of the last two centuries all three logical forms: the transition (philosophy into ideology), reflection (philosophy into ideology and vice versa), and, finally, the removal of ideology in philosophy.