March 5, 2017 Conference paper Open Access

Christoph Dobraunig; Maria Eichlseder; Daniel Kales; Florian Mendel

MARC21 XML Export

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    <subfield code="a">differential cryptanalysis</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">MANTIS</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">lightweight</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">PRINCE-like ciphers</subfield>
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    <subfield code="d">5-8 March 2017</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">International Conference on Fast Software Encryption</subfield>
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    <subfield code="u">Graz University of Technology</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">Maria Eichlseder</subfield>
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    <subfield code="u">Graz University of Technology</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">Daniel Kales</subfield>
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    <subfield code="u">Graz University of Technology</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">Florian Mendel</subfield>
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    <subfield code="u">Graz University of Technology</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">Christoph Dobraunig</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Practical Key-Recovery Attack on MANTIS-5</subfield>
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    <subfield code="c">644052</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">HARDWARE ENABLED CRYPTO AND RANDOMNESS</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">&lt;p&gt;MANTIS is a lightweight tweakable block cipher published at CRYPTO 2016. In addition to the full 14-round version, MANTIS&lt;sub&gt;7&lt;/sub&gt;, the designers also propose an aggressive 10-round version, MANTIS5. The security claim for MANTIS&lt;sub&gt;5&lt;/sub&gt; is resistance against “practical attacks”, defined as related-tweak attacks with data complexity 2&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt; less than 2&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt; chosen plaintexts (or 2&lt;sup&gt;40&lt;/sup&gt; known plaintexts), and computational complexity at most 2&lt;sup&gt;126−d&lt;/sup&gt;. We present a key-recovery attack against MANTIS&lt;sub&gt;5&lt;/sub&gt; with 2&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt; chosen plaintexts and a&lt;br&gt;
computational complexity of about 2&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt; block cipher calls, which violates this claim. Our attack is based on a family of differential characteristics and exploits several properties of the lightweight round function and tweakey schedule. To verify the validity of the attack, we also provide a practical implementation which recovers the full key in about 1 core hour using 2&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt; chosen plaintexts.&lt;/p&gt;</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">10.5281/zenodo.574265</subfield>
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