Conference paper Open Access

Practical Key-Recovery Attack on MANTIS-5

Christoph Dobraunig; Maria Eichlseder; Daniel Kales; Florian Mendel


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{
  "@context": "https://schema.org/", 
  "@id": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.574265", 
  "@type": "ScholarlyArticle", 
  "creator": [
    {
      "@type": "Person", 
      "affiliation": "Graz University of Technology", 
      "name": "Christoph Dobraunig"
    }, 
    {
      "@type": "Person", 
      "affiliation": "Graz University of Technology", 
      "name": "Maria Eichlseder"
    }, 
    {
      "@type": "Person", 
      "affiliation": "Graz University of Technology", 
      "name": "Daniel Kales"
    }, 
    {
      "@type": "Person", 
      "affiliation": "Graz University of Technology", 
      "name": "Florian Mendel"
    }
  ], 
  "datePublished": "2017-03-05", 
  "description": "<p>MANTIS is a lightweight tweakable block cipher published at CRYPTO 2016. In addition to the full 14-round version, MANTIS<sub>7</sub>, the designers also propose an aggressive 10-round version, MANTIS5. The security claim for MANTIS<sub>5</sub> is resistance against \u201cpractical attacks\u201d, defined as related-tweak attacks with data complexity 2<sup>d</sup> less than 2<sup>30</sup> chosen plaintexts (or 2<sup>40</sup> known plaintexts), and computational complexity at most 2<sup>126\u2212d</sup>. We present a key-recovery attack against MANTIS<sub>5</sub> with 2<sup>28</sup> chosen plaintexts and a<br>\ncomputational complexity of about 2<sup>38</sup> block cipher calls, which violates this claim. Our attack is based on a family of differential characteristics and exploits several properties of the lightweight round function and tweakey schedule. To verify the validity of the attack, we also provide a practical implementation which recovers the full key in about 1 core hour using 2<sup>30</sup> chosen plaintexts.</p>", 
  "headline": "Practical Key-Recovery Attack on MANTIS-5", 
  "identifier": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.574265", 
  "image": "https://zenodo.org/static/img/logos/zenodo-gradient-round.svg", 
  "keywords": [
    "differential cryptanalysis", 
    "MANTIS", 
    "lightweight", 
    "PRINCE-like ciphers"
  ], 
  "license": "http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode", 
  "name": "Practical Key-Recovery Attack on MANTIS-5", 
  "url": "https://zenodo.org/record/574265"
}
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