March 5, 2017 Conference paper Open Access

Christoph Dobraunig; Maria Eichlseder; Daniel Kales; Florian Mendel

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  <identifier identifierType="DOI">10.5281/zenodo.574265</identifier>
  <creators>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Christoph Dobraunig</creatorName>
      <affiliation>Graz University of Technology</affiliation>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Maria Eichlseder</creatorName>
      <affiliation>Graz University of Technology</affiliation>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Daniel Kales</creatorName>
      <affiliation>Graz University of Technology</affiliation>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Florian Mendel</creatorName>
      <affiliation>Graz University of Technology</affiliation>
    </creator>
  </creators>
  <titles>
    <title>Practical Key-Recovery Attack on MANTIS-5</title>
  </titles>
  <publisher>Zenodo</publisher>
  <publicationYear>2017</publicationYear>
  <subjects>
    <subject>differential cryptanalysis</subject>
    <subject>MANTIS</subject>
    <subject>lightweight</subject>
    <subject>PRINCE-like ciphers</subject>
  </subjects>
  <dates>
    <date dateType="Issued">2017-03-05</date>
  </dates>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="Text">Conference paper</resourceType>
  <alternateIdentifiers>
    <alternateIdentifier alternateIdentifierType="url">https://zenodo.org/record/574265</alternateIdentifier>
  </alternateIdentifiers>
  <relatedIdentifiers>
    <relatedIdentifier relatedIdentifierType="URL" relationType="IsPartOf">https://zenodo.org/communities/hector</relatedIdentifier>
  </relatedIdentifiers>
  <rightsList>
    <rights rightsURI="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode">Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 4.0 International</rights>
    <rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess">Open Access</rights>
  </rightsList>
  <descriptions>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">&lt;p&gt;MANTIS is a lightweight tweakable block cipher published at CRYPTO 2016. In addition to the full 14-round version, MANTIS&lt;sub&gt;7&lt;/sub&gt;, the designers also propose an aggressive 10-round version, MANTIS5. The security claim for MANTIS&lt;sub&gt;5&lt;/sub&gt; is resistance against “practical attacks”, defined as related-tweak attacks with data complexity 2&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt; less than 2&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt; chosen plaintexts (or 2&lt;sup&gt;40&lt;/sup&gt; known plaintexts), and computational complexity at most 2&lt;sup&gt;126−d&lt;/sup&gt;. We present a key-recovery attack against MANTIS&lt;sub&gt;5&lt;/sub&gt; with 2&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt; chosen plaintexts and a&lt;br&gt;
computational complexity of about 2&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt; block cipher calls, which violates this claim. Our attack is based on a family of differential characteristics and exploits several properties of the lightweight round function and tweakey schedule. To verify the validity of the attack, we also provide a practical implementation which recovers the full key in about 1 core hour using 2&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt; chosen plaintexts.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </descriptions>
  <fundingReferences>
    <fundingReference>
      <funderName>European Commission</funderName>
      <funderIdentifier funderIdentifierType="Crossref Funder ID">10.13039/501100000780</funderIdentifier>
      <awardNumber awardURI="info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/644052/">644052</awardNumber>
      <awardTitle>HARDWARE ENABLED CRYPTO AND RANDOMNESS</awardTitle>
    </fundingReference>
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