Conference paper Open Access
Christoph Dobraunig; Maria Eichlseder; Daniel Kales; Florian Mendel
{ "publisher": "Zenodo", "DOI": "10.5281/zenodo.574265", "title": "Practical Key-Recovery Attack on MANTIS-5", "issued": { "date-parts": [ [ 2017, 3, 5 ] ] }, "abstract": "<p>MANTIS is a lightweight tweakable block cipher published at CRYPTO 2016. In addition to the full 14-round version, MANTIS<sub>7</sub>, the designers also propose an aggressive 10-round version, MANTIS5. The security claim for MANTIS<sub>5</sub> is resistance against \u201cpractical attacks\u201d, defined as related-tweak attacks with data complexity 2<sup>d</sup> less than 2<sup>30</sup> chosen plaintexts (or 2<sup>40</sup> known plaintexts), and computational complexity at most 2<sup>126\u2212d</sup>. We present a key-recovery attack against MANTIS<sub>5</sub> with 2<sup>28</sup> chosen plaintexts and a<br>\ncomputational complexity of about 2<sup>38</sup> block cipher calls, which violates this claim. Our attack is based on a family of differential characteristics and exploits several properties of the lightweight round function and tweakey schedule. To verify the validity of the attack, we also provide a practical implementation which recovers the full key in about 1 core hour using 2<sup>30</sup> chosen plaintexts.</p>", "author": [ { "family": "Christoph Dobraunig" }, { "family": "Maria Eichlseder" }, { "family": "Daniel Kales" }, { "family": "Florian Mendel" } ], "id": "574265", "event-place": "Tokyo", "type": "paper-conference", "event": "International Conference on Fast Software Encryption (FSE 2017)" }
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