571173
doi
10.5281/zenodo.571173
oai:zenodo.org:571173
user-mils
Wachtmeister, Louis
RWTH Aachen, University
Analysing Cryptographically-Masked Information Flows in MILS-AADL Specifications
Noll, Thomas
RWTH Aachen, University
doi:10.5281/zenodo.571174
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
MILS
AADL
<p>Information flow policies are widely used for specifying confidentiality and integrity requirements of securitycritical systems. In contrast to access control policies and security protocols, they impose global constraints on the information flow and thus provide end-to-end security guarantees. The information flow policy that is usually adopted is non-interference. It postulates that confidential data must not affect the publicly visible behaviour of a system. However, this requirement is usually broken in the presence of cryptographic operations.<br>
In this paper, we propose a formal approach to distinguish between breaking non-interference because of legitimate use of sufficiently strong encryption on the one side, and due to unintended information leaks on the other side. It employs the well-known technique of program slicing to identify (potential) information flows between the data elements of a specification given in a MILS variant of the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL). Moreover, we investigate the relation between our method and an extended notion of non-interference known as possibilistic non-interference, and demonstrate its applicability on a concrete example system.<br>
</p>
Zenodo
2017-03-14
info:eu-repo/semantics/conferencePaper
799695
user-mils
1579537976.762267
268113
md5:749f94473aa47bed24e4109311e5c914
https://zenodo.org/records/571173/files/Noll2017analysing.pdf
public
10.5281/zenodo.571174
Is supplemented by
doi
isVersionOf
doi