Corruption and Democracy: Political Corruption in Post- Soeharto Indonesia

Post-Soeharto Indonesia, known as the era of reform and democracy, has not been able to inhibit corrupt behaviour by state officials at the central and local government levels, in legislative and executive institutions, or in the judiciary as a judicial institution. This article discusses and analyses the corruption process carried out by state officials, especially those occupying legislative, executive, and special judicial institutions at the central government level in interacting with each other and with outside institutions. The public's hope that ongoing democracy will be able to limit political corruption in Indonesia is only an illusion, considering the democracy model that developed in Indonesia post-Soeharto led to a patronage democracy, namely the interaction of power between state institutions which is based on mutually beneficial considerations. Another consideration is that the institution that administers justice which serves as law enforcement agency is involved in corrupt practices.

can harm state finances or the state economy. Form of political corruption incudes accepting or giving bribes with the aim of making decisions according to the will of the bribe giver.
The relationship between corruption and democracy has two views, the first is the pessimistic view and the optimistic view (Qizilbash, 2008). The first argument from the optimistic view, namely that the practice of democracy aims to realize the ideals of preventing corruption and that democracy builds motivation and forms values to deter corruption. (Dreze, J, & Sen, A.K. 2002). Second, democratization presents new institutions for managing corruption and a new civic culture gradually brings about a moral basis for governance. (Gerald E. Caiden, O.P. Dwivedi and Joseph G. Jabbra, (2001). Third, societies that maintain democracy will increase their chances of survival in the future by limiting corruption. (Charles H. Blake & Christopher G. Martin (2006).
As for the pessimistic view, competition in general will not weaken corruption. The egalitarian tendencies in democracy produce conditions in which corruption breeds. (Shleifer, A & Vishny, RW (1998) The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press). The democratic model that provides opportunities for political corruption is liberal democracy, democracy without control by other institutions. (Hay, P.R, 1977) and patronage democracy, namely democracy that develops characterized by buying voters' votes, giving gifts to individuals, and making personal donations to certain groups in return for political support. (Edwar Aspinal & Ward Barenchot, 2019) (Marcus Mietzner, 2020). The implication of such a democratic model is that it is unable to prevent the embedded nature of political corruption, and tends to undermine the cultural and democratic fabric, as is the case in Mexico (Morris, 2018) and in Latin America in general (Alan Gilbert, 2019).
The optimistic view states that democracy can deter corrupt behaviour among state officials with various arguments. The more consolidated democracy can be a factor in inhibiting the practice of political corruption. (Alessandro Pellegata, 2012). Democratization brings forth new institutions to manage corruption and a new civic culture will gradually bring about a moral basis for governance. (Gerald E. Caiden, O.P. Dwivedi and Joseph G. Jabbra, 2001). Societies that maintain democracy will increase their chances of future survival by limiting corruption. (Charles H. Blake & Christopher G. Martin (2006).
The supporting variables of political corruption are related to the psychological aspects of public officials who provide opportunities and plays a role in the practice of corrupt behaviour (Benjamin Melusky, 2018). (Allen Gannet & Chad Rector, 2015). The psychological form of public officials is related to the basic values held by public officials who tolerated corrupt behaviour (Folmer & De Cremer, 2012). Research surveys in the UK show that public officials are more likely to condone corrupt behaviour because it is perceived to have a small impact (Allen & Birch, 2012).
Another variable is the dynamic relationship with outside institutions. The interaction of members of the House of Representatives with entrepreneurs can provide opportunities for corrupt practices (Aspinal, Edward and Berenschot, Ward, 2019). The pattern of the relationship between the two institutions is in the form of mutual benefit, entrepreneurs support campaign funds for candidates, and in return the candidates will provide a number of development projects to entrepreneurs after being elected. (Gabriel Lele, 2020).
Interactions between state institutions such as the interaction between the executive and the legislature (Richaerd Fenno 1973), the interaction between members of the legislature and the constituents (David Mayhew, 1974), the interaction between political parties and members of the legislature (Cox and McCubbins, 2007), the interaction between the judiciary and the legislature (Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, 2015), the interaction of the legislature with interest groups (LaPalombara, Joseph 1974) can take place in a democratic manner (Tom Miles, 2011;717) and a patronage democracy (Edwar Aspinal & Ward Berenchot, 2019). Democratic interactions are interactions between state institutions based on checks and balances in preventing the abuse of power and corruption. The interaction of patronage democracy is the interaction of state institutions in making decisions based on mutual interests, accepting bribes or other rewards.

II.
METHOD This study uses a qualitative approach. The data used are secondary data sourced from reports and documents from the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and reports from Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) through the website. This article analyses 3 corruption cases, the first is the WA Ode Nurhayati corruption case in the allocation of the Regional Infrastructure Development Acceleration Fund (DPID) for the 2010 fiscal year, Aceh Besar district, Pidie Jaya district and Bener Meriah district, Aceh province, second, the corruption case of Miranda Gultom in the nomination process as Senior Deputy Governor of Bank of Indonesia (DSGBI), and third, the corruption case of Akil Mochtar, Chairman of the Constitutional Court (MK), in handling the conflict of the regional head election (Pilkada) in Gunung Mas Regency, Central Kalimantan Province and the conflict of the regional head election in Morotai Island Regency, Maluku Province.
The selection of these cases is based on the consideration that the three cases represent three state institutions, namely the legislature, executive, and judiciary. The WA Ode Nurhayati corruption case represented the legislative body, the Miranda Gultom corruption case represented the executive institution, and the Akil Mochtar corruption case represented the judiciary. The argument IJSSHR, Volume 04 Issue 10 October 2021 www.ijsshr.in Page 2681 of this paper is that the rise of post-Soeharto political corruption in the midst of the euphoric spirit of democracy, is related to the Indonesian democracy format which has the character of patronage democracy.

III. POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA: AN OVERVIEW
According to Transparency International Indonesia's 2020 report, Indonesia's corruption index is in the 102th position out of 180 countries, in 2019 it was ranked 80. This increase is allegedly related to the Covid-19 pandemic, bribes in the procurement of medical devices, and bribes in handling social assistance (nasional.Kompas.com).
According to data released by the KPK, there were 382 corruption cases that occurred in Indonesia in 2004-2020. Members of the DPR, Members of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) at the provincial and district/city levels, who were involved in corruption with 74 cases, ministries/institutions followed with 382 cases, provincial government guilty of 152 cases, district/city governments with 409 cases, State-owned Business Entities (BUMN)/Regional Owned Enterprises (BUMD) with 66 cases, and lastly, judges and prosecutors with as many as 19 cases. (databuka.katadata.co.id).
There State losses due to political corruption committed by state officials in 2015-2012 with details, in 2015 amounting to IDR 732 billion, in 2016 amounting to IDR 164 billion, in 2017 amounting to IDR 310 billion, in 2018 amounting to IDR 385 billion, in 2019 amounting to IDR 6,2 trillion, and in 2020 amounting to IDR 805 billion (databoka.katadata.co.id). According to data from Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), state losses in 2020 amounted to IDR 56.7 trillion, money returned to the state was only IDR 8.9 trillion (nasional.kompas.com/ read).
Ranking of the most corrupt institutions in Indonesia from 2005 to 2007. In 2005, the most corrupt institutions ranked 1st were political parties, 2nd was parliament, 3rd was Police, and 4th was the court. In 2006 1st was parliament, 2nd was police, 3rd was court, 4th was police. In 2007, 1st was the police, 2nd was parliament, 3rd was the court, and 4th was the political parties. The forms of corruption carried out by the actors are budget irregularities, embezzlement, manipulation, bribery, fictitious project activities, extortion, misuse of bad loans, and abuse of authority permits (ICW). The agreement between the DPR and the government on October 11, 2010 approved the allocation of DPID for the 2011 fiscal year amounting to IDR 7.7 trillion -with the provisions for the medium category districts to receive a disbursement of IDR 25 billion, low IDR 30 billion, and very low IDR 40 billion. WA Ode Nurhayati a few days later, at the DPR RI Building, had a meeting with Fachruddin and Hasanuddin, who asked WA Ode Nurhayati to take care of the DPID allocation for Aceh Besar District, Pidie Jaya District, and Bener Meriah District -so that they could be designated as the recipients with a very low category of IDR 40 billion for the DPID fiscal year of 2011. WA Ode Nurhayati then requested Fachruddin to provide funds equal to 5% -6% of the DPID allocation to be received by each region, and Fachruddin agreed. WA Ode Nurhayati then received a proposal from Hasanuddin regarding the DPID allocation area for the 2011 fiscal year for Aceh Besar district of IDR 50 billion, Pidie Jaya Regency of IDR 226.3 billion, and Bener Meriah Regency of IDR 50 billion.

IV. POLITICAL CORRUPTION PROCESS
WA Ode Nurhayati after receiving the proposal, received a total of IDR 5.5 billion from Hasanuddin, the money came from Fachruddin as part of the 5%-6% agreement on the allocation of DPID from the three districts. The "I admit that I have received bribes for the allocation of the Regional Infrastructure Adjustment Fund (DPID) of IDR 120 billion, I did it on the orders of the elites of the PAN faction, as a member of the DPR's Budget Agency (Banggar), I only carried out the orders of the faction. The money went to the PAN elites. I have received my punishment, so I ask the PAN faction to be transparent about what the IDR 120 billion is for?" (https://news.detik.com). The case of Miranda Gultom, who was one of the 3 candidates for the Senior Deputy Governor of Bank of Indonesia (DGSBI) proposed by President Megawati Soekarnoputri to the DPR in 2004. The process of appointing the DGSBI is in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. The DPR implements an election mechanism to determine one candidate to be submitted to the president. The results of the DGSBI candidate election, Miranda Gultom received the most votes. Miranda Gultom's victory is known to have been the result of bribes to members of the DPR who were involved in the election process.
The modus operandi was that before the election, Miranda Gultom took the initiative to meet with a number of DPR members who participated in the election process. Miranda Gultom at the meeting asked members of the DPR to vote for him and promised to reward him for his services as a 'thank you'. The members of the DPR who attended agreed and would notify all the members involved in the election, totaling 52 members. The result of the election in the DPR, Miranda Gultom received the most votes and was the candidate to be proposed to President Megawati Soekarnoputri to be designated as DSGBI. Miranda Gultom then through his envoys gave IDR 24 billion through representatives of the DPR faction to be distributed to all members who supported him. The money is known to have come from a businessman (acch.kpk.do.id).
Akil Mochtar is the chairman of the Constitutional Court (MK) from 2013 to 2018. The Constitutional Court is an institution that has authority related to general election conflicts, presidential elections, and regional head elections. Akil Mochtar's corruption case is related to the conflict court process over the results of the regional head election ( Sahrin Hamid contacted Akil Mochtar, the result of the conversation was that Akil Mochtar asked Ruslia Sibua-Wini R to prepare IDR 6 billion before the decision was made. Rusli Sibua-Wini Hamid only agreed to provide compensation of IDR 3 billion. Akil Mochtar agreed and demanded that the money be deposited into an account in the name of CV Ratu Samagat with a fake deposit of "palm oil transport". Rusli Sibua sent money amounting to IDR 2,989 billion using 3 cash deposits to CV Rati Samagat savings account with details, on June 16 in the amount of IDR 500 million deposited under the name F Djufri, on June 18 in the amount of IDR 500 million deposited under the name Muchlis, on June 20 in the amount of IDR 1.989 billion under the name of Djufri. The Constitutional Court on June 20, 2011 decided on the dispute over the Regional Head Elections for the Regency of Morotai Island, namely canceling the decision of the KPU for the Regency of Pulau Morotai which determined the pair Arsad Sardan-Demianus Ice as the winner and declared that the election results were won by the pair Ruslia Sibua-Wini R (acch.kpk.go.id).
The data above illustrates that a form of political corruption by state officials is to ask for bribes from outside institutional officials who need the services of their power. Decisions are not made on the basis of considerations of applicable procedures and mechanism; but are made based on bribes given. The source of the bribe money in the case mentioned above came from businessmen. Entrepreneurs will also receive development projects in return for their services in supporting funds for the interests of the parties mentioned above. The consideration is that post-New Order entrepreneur politics provided financial support to regional IJSSHR, Volume 04 Issue 10 October 2021 www.ijsshr.in Page 2683 head candidates in regional head elections, in exchange for obtaining all development projects if the candidate pair won the election (Marcus Mietzner, 2020).
The data provides an explanation that members of the DPR representing the legislature play a role as a broker between the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court and the candidate for regent in supporting political corruption. Specifically, for the behavior of DPR members, they receive hidden support from party elites who occupy positions in DPR institutions.
The implication is that the prospect of limiting political corruption in Indonesian democracy for at least the next 20 years will not be able to inhibit corrupt behavior among state officials, as was the case during the authoritarian Soeharto regime. Reasons being, first, judges and prosecutors as institutions that is a central figure in upholding justice, are in fact involved in political corruption. Second, the Indonesian Supreme Court (MA) annually provides a reduction in sentences for corruptors. In 2019-2020, there were 22 corruptors who received a reduced sentence from the Supreme Court (https://www.bbc.com/indonesia). Third, the will of anti-corruption civil society to apply the death penalty for corrupt perpetrators has not received a positive response from state officials (Davidson, Jamie S, 2007).

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The development of political corruption in the era of democratization in Indonesia is related to the model of democracy that occurs, namely the development of patronage democracy. Decision-making and interactions between state institutions are based on bribes. This process is supported by the behavior of party elites who support the process in secret. This phenomenon can be seen in the three cases shown, namely the WA Ode Nurhayati, Miranda Gultom, and Akil Mochtar corruption cases.
The theoretical implication is that this article includes a pessimistic view of the relationship between corruption and democracy. Democracy has failed to limit political corruption, at least in the case of Indonesia. Indonesian democracy which has been started since 1998 or the post-Soeharto period has not been able to prevent political corruption. The prospects for the future conditions and situations that arise will not provide an optimistic direction, considering that judicial institutions such as the Supreme Court tend to give reduced sentences to corruptors. The chairman of the Constitutional Court is involved in corruption, in addition, the demands of the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia have not received a positive response from the state. Opportunities are available, civil society movements such as ICW to continue to provide a number of data and information to the public about the behavior of corruptors with varying types of modus operandi.
The limitation of this article is that it has not discussed political corruption committed by state officials in provincial and district/city governments, both in the legislative, executive and judicial institutions. This phenomenon is an opportunity for other researchers to uncover and discuss cases of political corruption in Indonesia with different theoretical perspectives.