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One or two? A Process View of pregnancy

Meincke, Anne Sophie

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  <dc:creator>Meincke, Anne Sophie</dc:creator>
  <dc:description>AbstractHow many individuals are present where we see a pregnant individual? Within a substance ontological framework, there are exactly two possible answers to this question. The standard answer—two individuals—is typically championed by scholars endorsing the predominant Containment View of pregnancy, according to which the foetus resides in the gestating organism like in a container. The alternative answer—one individual—has recently found support in the Parthood View, according to which the foetus is a part of the gestating organism. Here I propose a third answer: a pregnant individual is neither two individuals nor one individual but something in between one and two. This is because organisms are better understood as processes than as substances. With a special focus on the Parthood View, I explain why a Process View of pregnancy, according to which a pregnant individual is a bifurcating hypercomplex process, surpasses the substance ontological approaches.</dc:description>
  <dc:source>Philosophical Studies</dc:source>
  <dc:title>One or two? A Process View of pregnancy</dc:title>
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