January 20, 2015 Conference paper Open Access

Pol, Kevin; Noll, Thomas

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    "description": "<p>Information flow policies are widely used for specifying confidentiality and integrity requirements of security-critical\u00a0systems. In contrast to access control policies and security\u00a0protocols, they impose global\u00a0constraints on the information flow and thus provide end-to-end security guarantees.\u00a0The information flow policy that is usually adopted is non-interference. It postulates that con dential data must not\u00a0affect the publicly visible behavior of a system. However,\u00a0this requirement is usually broken in the presence of cryptographic operations.\u00a0</p>\n\n<p>In this paper, we provide an extended definition of non-interference for systems that are specified in a MILS variant\u00a0of the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL).\u00a0More concretely, we propose a type system for MILS-AADL\u00a0component definitions that distinguishes between breaking\u00a0non-interference because of legitimate use of sufficientlynbsp;strong encryption and breaking non-interference due to annbsp;unintended information leak. To this aim, it tracks bothnbsp;intra- and inter-component information flow and considersbr /&gt; both data- and event-flow security./p&gt;</p>", 
    "license": {
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    "title": "Security Type Checking for MILS-AADL Specifications", 
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    "keywords": [
      "Security", 
      "MILS components", 
      "information  flow", 
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    "publication_date": "2015-01-20", 
    "creators": [
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        "affiliation": "Software Modelling and Verification Group, Aachen University", 
        "name": "Pol, Kevin"
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        "affiliation": "Software Modelling and Verification Group, Aachen University", 
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    "meeting": {
      "dates": "20 January 2015", 
      "place": "Amsterdam", 
      "title": "International Workshop on MILS: Architecture and Assurance for Secure Systems"
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