Conference paper Open Access

Security Type Checking for MILS-AADL Specifications

Pol, Kevin; Noll, Thomas

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  <identifier identifierType="DOI">10.5281/zenodo.47989</identifier>
      <creatorName>Pol, Kevin</creatorName>
      <affiliation>Software Modelling and Verification Group, Aachen University</affiliation>
      <creatorName>Noll, Thomas</creatorName>
      <affiliation>Software Modelling and Verification Group, Aachen University</affiliation>
    <title>Security Type Checking For Mils-Aadl Specifications</title>
    <subject>MILS components</subject>
    <subject>information  flow</subject>
    <subject>type system</subject>
    <date dateType="Issued">2015-01-20</date>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="Text">Conference paper</resourceType>
    <alternateIdentifier alternateIdentifierType="url"></alternateIdentifier>
    <rights rightsURI="">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0</rights>
    <rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess">Open Access</rights>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">&lt;p&gt;Information flow policies are widely used for specifying confidentiality and integrity requirements of security-critical systems. In contrast to access control policies and security protocols, they impose global constraints on the information flow and thus provide end-to-end security guarantees. The information flow policy that is usually adopted is non-interference. It postulates that con dential data must not affect the publicly visible behavior of a system. However, this requirement is usually broken in the presence of cryptographic operations. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In this paper, we provide an extended definition of non-interference for systems that are specified in a MILS variant of the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL). More concretely, we propose a type system for MILS-AADL component definitions that distinguishes between breaking non-interference because of legitimate use of sufficientlynbsp;strong encryption and breaking non-interference due to annbsp;unintended information leak. To this aim, it tracks bothnbsp;intra- and inter-component information flow and considersbr /&amp;gt; both data- and event-flow security./p&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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