Conference paper Open Access
Pol, Kevin; Noll, Thomas
{ "DOI": "10.5281/zenodo.47989", "abstract": "<p>Information flow policies are widely used for specifying confidentiality and integrity requirements of security-critical\u00a0systems. In contrast to access control policies and security\u00a0protocols, they impose global\u00a0constraints on the information flow and thus provide end-to-end security guarantees.\u00a0The information flow policy that is usually adopted is non-interference. It postulates that con dential data must not\u00a0affect the publicly visible behavior of a system. However,\u00a0this requirement is usually broken in the presence of cryptographic operations.\u00a0</p>\n\n<p>In this paper, we provide an extended definition of non-interference for systems that are specified in a MILS variant\u00a0of the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL).\u00a0More concretely, we propose a type system for MILS-AADL\u00a0component definitions that distinguishes between breaking\u00a0non-interference because of legitimate use of sufficientlynbsp;strong encryption and breaking non-interference due to annbsp;unintended information leak. To this aim, it tracks bothnbsp;intra- and inter-component information flow and considersbr /> both data- and event-flow security./p></p>", "author": [ { "family": "Pol, Kevin" }, { "family": "Noll, Thomas" } ], "id": "47989", "issued": { "date-parts": [ [ 2015, 1, 20 ] ] }, "publisher": "Zenodo", "title": "Security Type Checking for MILS-AADL Specifications", "type": "paper-conference" }
All versions | This version | |
---|---|---|
Views | 12 | 12 |
Downloads | 8 | 8 |
Data volume | 3.2 MB | 3.2 MB |
Unique views | 12 | 12 |
Unique downloads | 7 | 7 |