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Formal Methods for MILS: Formalisations of the GWV Firewall

Koolen, Ruud; Schmaltz, Julien

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  <identifier identifierType="DOI">10.5281/zenodo.47983</identifier>
      <creatorName>Koolen, Ruud</creatorName>
      <affiliation>Eindhoven University of Technology</affiliation>
      <creatorName>Schmaltz, Julien</creatorName>
      <affiliation>Eindhoven University of Technology</affiliation>
    <title>Formal Methods for MILS: Formalisations of the GWV Firewall</title>
    <date dateType="Issued">2015-01-20</date>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="Text">Conference paper</resourceType>
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    <rights rightsURI="">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International</rights>
    <rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess">Open Access</rights>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">&lt;p&gt;To achieve security certification according to the highest levels of assurance, formal models and proofs of security properties are required. In the MILS context, this includes formalisation of key components - such as separation kernels - and the formalisation of applications built on top of these verified components. In this paper, we use the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant to formalise the Firewall application built on top of a verified separation kernel according to the model of Greve, Wilding, and Vanfleet (GWV). This Firewall application has been formalised twice after the original effort by GWV. These different efforts have been compared and&lt;br&gt;
discussed on paper. Our main contribution is to provide a formal comparison between these formalisations in the formal logic of a proof assistant.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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