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INIUNCTUM EST CASTELLANO: AUDITING, INSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE, AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL SAVOY

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Abstract: This study focuses on the instructions (*iniunctio*) inserted in the accounts of Savoyard territorial officials (castellans) at the regular audits. It argues that the insertion of increasingly numerous instructions in the castellany *computi* from the early fourteenth century transformed these records from mere balances of revenues and expenses into complex instruments for governing the territory from the center. This finding brings to the fore the hitherto neglected role of administrative accountability in the Savoyard fiscal-institutional project. In addition to addressing the preservation of the dynasty's patrimony and its more efficient exploitation, the instructions tackled the castellans' increased autonomy by emphasizing the norms and procedures that defined institutional accountability. The *auditores computorum* turned to rhetorical language the better to engage the castellans in an institutional dialogue. They achieved some success in inculcating the standards of accountability in office, but could not stem their decline in the late fourteenth century, as the House of Savoy failed to address the structural tensions in finances and administration.

Keywords: accountability, institutional dialogue, auditing, castellany accounts, rhetoric, Savoy.

The accountability of territorial officials within the developing institutions has emerged as a vital research direction in the study of the later Middle Ages.¹ In this context, the Savoyard case stands out through the survival of a vast archive of castellany accounts, which, moreover, reflect the creative adaptation of an imported institutional model and are remarkable in their level of detail. The present study is dedicated to a crucial yet little-explored aspect of Savoyard institutional accountability: the injunctions, or instructions, given to castellans at the periodic audits and written down in their accounts.² The study's first aim is to reassess the function of the castellany accounts, and more broadly the nature of

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¹ See notably Thomas Bisson, *Fiscal Accounts of Catalonia under the Early Count-Kings* (1151–1213), 2 vols. (Berkeley 1984); Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship, and the Origins of European Government* (Princeton 2008) 322–349; and John Sabapathy, *Officers and Accountability in Medieval England 1170–1300* (Oxford 2014).

² The instructions (and related memoranda) are only occasionally referenced in the scholarly literature, e.g., Monique Constant, *L'Etablissement de la maison de Savoie au sud du Léman: La châtelainie d'Allinges-Thonon (XIIe siècle–1536)*, Mémoires et documents de l'Académie chablaisienne 60 (Thonon-les-Bains 1972) 160n37, 177n17; and see n. 100 below.

Savoyard accountability, in light of the larger role that the instructions came to play from the early fourteenth century. The second and more specific aim is to examine how the proper form of accountability—from procedures to supporting documentation—and the standards of castellan service became central concerns in the instructions and were emphasized through rhetorical language. The working hypothesis underlying both research directions is that the functioning of late medieval institutions is best understood in the light of the processes through which officers were held accountable for the exercise of their duties.³

Through successful expansion, by the second half of the thirteenth century the House of Savoy, nominally subject to the Holy Roman Empire, ruled over a conglomerate of territories with distinct political traditions straddling the Alps, the Rhone, and Lake Geneva.⁴ In this fragmented polity, keeping tabs on local administrators was particularly important. The drafting and auditing of the accounts of revenues and expenses for the basic territorial-administrative unit, the castellany, was introduced in Savoy at the initiative of the reformist count Pierre II (1263–1268) upon his return from England, where he had become familiar with the records and procedures of the Exchequer. The English model, however, was from the beginning adapted creatively to Savoy's particular circumstances through the agency of a circle of professional administrators.⁵ A good deal of experimentation with the structure of the accounts characterizes the two decades following the reforms.⁶ There were obvious benefits to be reaped from a uniform administrative structure consisting of the same basic unit (the castellany), the same type of account, and audits by the same circle of administrators enforcing procedural standardization, after 1295 in principle held at Chambéry. A robust financial administration was essential, given the challenges to Savoyard expansion on multiple fronts from neighbors such as Geneva and Dauphiné.

A castellany account is a roll of several membranes of parchment stitched together.⁷ It lists revenues in produce and cash, with subtotals and left-margin rubrics for the different categories, from wheat to sale taxes to fines, followed

³ In this I follow Sabapathy, *Officers and Accountability* (n. 1 above) 20–22.

⁴ For an overview, see Eugene Cox, *The Eagles of Savoy: The House of Savoy in Thirteenth-Century Europe* (Princeton 1974).

⁵ Seven of them have been identified in Bernard Demotz, “Une clé de la réussite d’une principauté aux XIIIe et XIVe siècle: Naissance et développement de la chambre des comptes de Savoie,” in *La France des principautés: Les chambres des comptes, XIVe et XVe siècles*, ed. Philippe Contamine and Olivier Mattéoni (Paris 1995) 17–26, here 19n9.

⁶ Guido Castelnuovo and Christian Guilleré, “Les finances et l’administration de la Maison de Savoie au XIIIe siècle,” in *Pierre II de Savoie: “Le petit Charlemagne,”* ed. Bernard Andenmatten, Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, and Eva Pibiri, *Cahiers lausannois d’histoire médiévale* 27 (Lausanne 2000) 33–125.

⁷ Overview in Christian Guilleré and Jean-Louis Gaulin, “Des rouleaux et des hommes: Premières recherches sur les comptes de châtelainies savoyards,” *Etudes Savoisienues* 1 (1992) 51–108, esp. 60–67.

by the expenses, such as local repair and construction work but also deliveries (*librate*) of moneys and supplies to the count's household and agents throughout the year, and the salary of the castellan, who usually served a term of a few years before being appointed to another castellany. Although grouped in larger territorial units known as bailiwicks, the castellanies remained Savoy's fundamental administrative cells. They were quite small, typically consisting of a main town and a few other villages; the number of castellanies increased from some forty-five at Pierre II's death to around ninety by the middle of the fourteenth century.⁸ This is the backdrop for the distinctive characteristic of Savoyard accountability: the fact that it reached down to the level of the individual dues payer or emphyteutic lessee. What is more, the vital revenues from the taxation of trade were accounted for not only in the specialized records of the main trans-Alpine customs but also in specific sections (such as the *gabella*) of the accounts of certain castellanies.⁹ As such, the centralized audits were crucial events in the administration of the Savoyard principality.

The rulebooks of Savoyard accountability are late—dating from the second half of the fourteenth century, with a minor precedent in 1325—and not always a good guide to practice. By spotlighting the accounts' detailed yet understudied evidence on procedures and the dialogue between the central apparatus and local officials, the present study proposes a reconstruction of the workings of Savoyard administration from the ground up, based on the records of its yearly practice.¹⁰ The study deals with the first century of Savoyard accounts, up to about 1360; as it will be made clear, from the second half of the fourteenth century the situation changed dramatically with respect to the effectiveness of the instructions and the castellans' accountability as territorial officials. To explore in sufficient depth material to which no study has yet been dedicated, the analysis is limited in scope to a sample of castellanies from the Savoyard heartlands, the bailiwick of Savoy proper: Conflans, Faverges, La Rochette, Montmélian (the bailiwick's seat), and Tournon; additionally, a castellany from Savoy's western

⁸ Bernard Demotz, "La géographie administrative médiévale: L'exemple du Comté de Savoie," *Le Moyen Âge* 74 (1972) 261–300, here 284–292. Secular and ecclesiastical lordships were interspersed with the castellanies.

⁹ See Maria Clotilde Daviso di Charvensod, *I pedaggi delle Alpi occidentali nel Medio Evo* (Turin 1961); and Pierre Duparc, "Un péage Savoyard sur la route du Mont-Cenis au XIIIe et XIVe siècles: Montmélian," *Bulletin philologique et historique (jusqu'à 1610)* 1 (1960) 145–187.

¹⁰ A good deal of scholarship on the Savoyard castellanies is based largely on the handful of ordinances on auditing issued in the second half of the fourteenth century and does not delve into the *computi* much further than discussing their general structure, such as the list of rubrics. There is no equivalent for the castellanies of the close analysis of chancery accounts: Andrea Calzolari and Rosanna Cosentino, "La prima attività contabile della cancelleria sabauda e l'organizzazione dell'ufficio a metà del secolo XIV," *Bollettino Storico-Bibliografico Subalpino* 92 (1994) 505–553.

border, Pont-de-Vaux in the bailiwick of Bresse, is included as a test case.¹¹ Because of certain differences in institutional practice between the center and the periphery of the Savoyard principality, the findings of this study should not be generalized. Rather, it is hoped they will stimulate research on the castellanies from bailiwicks such as Val d'Aosta or (up to 1355) Viennois, where castellans were more rarely allowed to serve close to home and communications with the center were complicated by distance, the Alpine passes, or the proximity of enemy lands. Thus, under Amadeus V (1285–1323) two thirds of the castellany accounts from the bailiwick of Chablais were audited regionally rather than at Chambéry, and senior regional officials took on many of the responsibilities of the central financial administration.¹² The chronology of the changes in the functions and language of the instructions is also amendable by further research on Savoy's castellanies, which this study seeks to encourage.

This study makes two related arguments. The first and more general is that from the early fourteenth century instructions to castellans were inserted in the castellany accounts with such consistency and emphasis that they became an integral part of these records. Although the records were identified from their incipits as *computi* (numerical accounts), because of the instructions they evolved into direct instruments for administering the territory from the center. This is a significant finding, inasmuch as it highlights the role of administrative accountability in Savoy, thus complementing historians' traditional emphasis on the financial aspects of Savoyard accounts and audits.¹³ Obviously, administration and finances were very closely connected, and indeed the former was

¹¹ Of the *computi* cited, those preserved at the Archives départementales de la Savoie (hereafter ADS), Chambéry, have been scanned and are available online: <http://enligne.savoie-archives.fr/?id=search1401114404yuz5Js>. I have had the opportunity to examine tens of *computi* for their materiality when scanning them, per the ADS policy of restricting physical access to the manuscripts (specifically from Conflans, Faverges, and Tournon; for the rest I have used the scans).

¹² Bernard Andenmatten, "Amédée V et le nerf de la guerre: Organisation financière et dépenses militaires en Chablais durant la première moitié du XIVe siècle," *Études savoisiennes* 4 (1995) 19–31, here 23–29. On the other hand, the *computi* from Savoyard Piedmont, ruled as an appanage by a cadet branch of the dynasty, show clear signs of the influence of northern Italian documentary practices; Paolo Buffo, "Gérer la diversité: Les comptables des Savoie-Achaïe face aux comptabilités urbaines et ecclésiastiques," in *De l'autel à l'écritoire: Genèse des comptabilités princières en Occident*, ed. Thierry Pécout (Paris 2017) 393–413.

¹³ The focus on financial accounting goes back to Mario Chiaudano, ed., *La Finanza Sabauda nel secolo XIII*, 3 vols. (Turin 1933–1937), and is more recently illustrated, for example, by Christian Guilleré, "Étude comparée des finances des Maisons de Barcelone et de Savoie au début du XIVe siècle," in *Savoie et Région alpine* (Paris 1994) 245–259; and Guilleré, "Le financement de la cour savoyarde du milieu du XIIIe siècle au début du XVe: Essai de typologie des dépenses de cour," in *L'affermarsi della corte Sabauda: Dinastie, poteri, élites in Piemonte e Savoia fra tardo medioevo e prima età moderna*, ed. Paola Bianchi and Luisa Clotilde Gentile (Turin 2006) 145–161.

largely subordinated to securing the latter.¹⁴ But more than just rigorous financial accounting was needed to keep money and supplies flowing from the territories to the House of Savoy. The castellan's tasks were administrative and managerial, although most of what we know about them comes from the evidence of the *computi* (hence the financial bias): husbanding local resources, such as mills and vineyards, and overseeing the markets and tolls so as to collect sale and transit taxes. Policing the territory went beyond the maintenance of public order, inasmuch as it brought substantial sums in fines.

The second and more specific argument has to do with the subtler role played by the instructions, in addition to their two primary functions of preserving the integrity of the count's patrimony and, if possible, exploiting it more efficiently so as to generate higher revenues.¹⁵ Specifically, in the fourteenth century the instructions frequently addressed conduct in service and the proper form of accounting. Castellans were held to standards of diligence and prudence in office and instructed to keep their accounts in order, provide written proof and supporting documentation on a variety of matters, and use procedural means to ascertain fiscal information. Through emphasis and repetition, this normative discourse served to acculturate the castellans, predominantly drawn from the traditional landed aristocracy of the Western Alps,¹⁶ which did not extensively use written records until the thirteenth century, to the procedures and ethos of accountability in service imported from the most advanced fiscal administration of the time, the English Exchequer.¹⁷ The clerks and auditors, however, were

¹⁴ Conversely, the tension between the drive to raise higher fiscal revenues and the equitable governance of the territory is outlined in Sabapathy, *Officers and Accountability* (n. 1 above) 87–90.

¹⁵ These two functions have been contrasted in the study of medieval accountability; Bisson, *Fiscal Accounts* (n. 1 above) 1:151–152.

¹⁶ See the similar findings for the middle of the fourteenth century in Eugene Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy: Amadeus VI and Transalpine Savoy in the Fourteenth Century* (Princeton 1967) 356–358. As the seat of government and reservoir of trained clerks for the central administration, Chambéry was exceptional in that as early as the beginning of the fourteenth century it provided a number of castellans drawn from its urban elites; Pierre Lafargue, “Entre ancrage et déracinement: Les élites chambériennes et la fonction châtelaine (fin XIIIe–XVe siècle),” in “*De part et d’autre des Alpes*”: *Les châtelains des princes à la fin du Moyen Âge*, ed. Guido Castelnuovo and Olivier Mattéoni (Paris 2006) 189–219. On recruitment patterns from the middle of the fourteenth century, including from the ranks of the bourgeoisie, see Guido Castelnuovo, *Ufficiali e gentiluomini: La società politica sabauda nel tardo medioevo* (Milan 1994) 232–265; Castelnuovo, and “Les officiers en action dans les Etats de Savoie à la fin du Moyen Âge (milieu XIVe–milieu XVe siècle),” in *Entre monts et rivages: Les contacts entre la Provence orientale et les régions voisines au Moyen Âge*, ed. Philippe Jansen (Paris 2006) 173–197, esp. 180–191.

¹⁷ In Norman England, lords acquired the rudiments of literacy through routine exposure to the written word; Michael Clanchy, *From Memory to Written Record: England 1066–1307* (Oxford 1993). But, in Savoy, extensive use of written records dates only from first half of the thirteenth century, in large measure owing to the penetration of Italian-style public notaries after the

largely recruited from the ranks of urban professionals. They were not as familiar with the use of rhetoric in official records as their more learned counterparts from the Italian communes, where eloquent discourse was a staple of public life.¹⁸ But, from the 1320s, their instructions were injected with rhetorical language, as compliance was less readily forthcoming because the castellans' de facto autonomy increased at the same pace as the dynasty's financial dependence on them. Thus, the present findings about the central administration's emphasis on acculturation through persuasion, rather than strict enforcement of the norms of accountability, shed new light on the sociopolitical context of Savoyard institutional development. Assessing the effects of this development is difficult because of the nature of the evidence; however, some of the entries in the *computi* can be read as the castellans' calculated response to the rhetoric of accountability. This supports the case for the *computi*'s dialogical dimension and points to the auditors' qualified success in instilling an ethos of accountability in local officials.

AUDITING, MEMORANDA, AND INJUNCTIONS

The key notions of the normative discourse of the late medieval administration are still recognizable today: the Latin *iniunctio* is literally an injunction,¹⁹ but while this translation captures the strong normative charge of phrases such as *iniunctum est* or *qu'il soit enjoint* in the rare vernacular mentions, I also refer to them, more idiomatically, as instructions. The key point is that as exhortations they were different from two related types of entry:²⁰ less vital points expressed more matter-of-factly, "[the castellan] shall have to account [*debebit compu-*

twelfth-century Savoyard conquests in Piedmont; Patrizia Cancian, "Notai e cancellerie: Circolazione di sperienze sui due versanti alpini dal secolo XII ad Amedeo VIII," in *La frontiere: Nécessité ou artifice; actes du XIIIe colloque franco-italien d'études alpines* (Grenoble 1989) 43–51, here 44–45. In the Pays de Vaud, even matters as significant as homages and enfeoffments were not normally committed to writing before the middle of the thirteenth century; Bernard Andenmatten, *La maison de Savoie et la noblesse vaudoise (XIIIe–XIVe s.): Supériorité féodale et autorité princière*, Mémoires et documents publiés par la société d'histoire de la Suisse romande, 4th ser., vol. 8 (Lausanne 2005) 123–124.

¹⁸ See Paolo Cammarosano, "L'éloquence laïque dans l'Italie communale (fin du XIIe–XIVe siècle)," *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* 158 (2000) 431–442.

¹⁹ E.g., "iniunctio fit" and "iniunctio ut supra fit," in Chambéry, ADS, SA 9813, m. 4–5, under *banna de arragio* (La Rochette, 1349). The different spellings, e.g., *inijunctum*, are normalized here as *iniunctum*. The vernacular form is attested in the 1351 ordinances on the auditing of accounts, which are in French with Latin subtitles; Cesare Nani, "I primi statute sopra la Camera dei conti nella monarchia di Savoia," *Memorie della Reale Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche*, 2nd ser., 34 (1881) 161–215, here 202–203 (articles 14, 22, and 26).

²⁰ The equivalence between injunction and express command is explicit in the 1351 ordinances: "Item es ordonné qu'il soit por les dit meistres eniont et expressement commandé depart Monsieur es officiaires"; Nani, "I primi statute" (n. 19 above) 204 (article 26).

tare] for these in his next account”; and the *memorandum* or *memoriale*, generally added at the end of the *computi* with the more neutral function of aide-mémoire (brief notes introduced by *notum sit* or *sciendum est* can be assimilated to this category). Once written down, the instructions remained available to castellans who as a rule kept a copy of the previous year’s account. Official mandates or writs from the count were also dispatched to castellans throughout the year and some of them are mentioned in the *computi* inasmuch as they touched on the allocation of castellany revenues. Thus, it bears emphasis that the auditors’ instructions pertained mostly to the collection of revenues and occasionally to recurring annual expenses;²¹ the task where they showed the most initiative was a general accountability for annual revenues.

The insertion of injunctions in local officials’ accounts is a distinctly Savoyard feature. Catalonia, for instance, of roughly Savoy’s size, was more precocious in its use of accounts, but although late twelfth- and early thirteenth-century Catalanian accounts have a dialogical and occasionally narrative dimension, with signs of orality and brief summaries of past deliveries,²² their notes and memoranda are brief, of the *sciendum est* type, thus meant for the central fiscal administration rather than local officials. Given that in Catalonia local officials’ accounts were not audited with the same regularity as in Savoy,²³ the Savoyard use of instructions would not have made sense there. In Dauphiné—Savoy’s rival and possessed of a similar system of castellany accounts audited regularly—injunctions to castellans were not written in the accounts with a view to being taken up at the next audit, and even notes introduced by *est sciendum* or *requirendus est* are rare.²⁴ Lastly, because Savoyard accounting was modeled on the English Exchequer, there are obvious similarities. The formula “*iniunctum est castellano ut...*” was itself inspired by the Exchequer’s standard directive to sheriffs, “*preceptum est vicecomiti ut...*”; the two verbs, “to enjoin” and “to instruct,” are employed together in the English royal writs of the thirteenth century, *iniungendo ac precipiendo*.²⁵ But, in England, the *pre-*

²¹ Through the 1351 ordinances the auditors were explicitly given control over the allocation of revenues for the annual pensions; *Ibid.* 201 (article 13).

²² E.g., “*dicebat enim se plus expendisse*”; “*tu ... venisti mecum Ildefonso, Dei gratia rege ... ad computum*” (emphasis added); Bisson, *Fiscal Accounts* (n. 1 above) 2:78, 168. No. 90 in *ibid.*, 2:177, is a good example of narrativity in a Catalanian account.

²³ Christian Guilleré, “Regards croisés sur les officiers locaux catalans et savoyards: *Veguers, batlles, jutges* catalans et châtelains savoyards (XIIe–XIVe siècles),” in “*De part et d’autre des Alpes*” (n. 16 above) 223–250, here 246.

²⁴ Georges de Manteyer, “Les finances delphinales: Documents (1268–1370),” *Bulletin de la Société d’études des Hautes-Alpes* 63 (1944) 20–782, here 221, 264.

²⁵ William Stubbs, *Select Charters and Other Illustrations of English Constitutional History from the Earliest Times to the Reign of Edward I*, rev. ed. by H. W. C. Davis (Oxford 1913) 406,

cepta were recorded in a separate series of administrative documents, the memoranda rolls, together with internal Exchequer memoranda and the numerous writs sent to sheriffs on specific matters.²⁶ The contrast with the documentary separation between rolls of accounts and of memoranda at the Exchequer brings out the multi-functional, hybrid nature of the Savoyard castellany *computi*. Every year, it was the individual accounts of tens of territorial-administrative units that formed the backbone of Savoyard accountability, which even in the fourteenth century settled for a less than comprehensive general treasury account.²⁷

Most of what we know about the auditing of castellany accounts is pieced together from the *computi* themselves, particularly their incipit, which states the castellan's name and the term of office under audit; importantly, from the late thirteenth century, the names of the auditing staff and the place of the audit are also recorded. Modern standards of auditing are not helpful for understanding the Savoyard *computus*: the account was not produced and submitted by the castellan, but drafted on the occasion of the audit by a clerk of the central administration based on documentation brought by the castellan or preserved centrally (the previous year's account and the inventories known as *extente*).²⁸ From the late thirteenth century, accounts are occasionally said to have been "received" by a clerk *presente domino*, in the count's presence. As the need for a division of labor between drafting and auditing became more obvious, accounts were also received "in the presence" of senior administrators playing a supervisory and auditing role. But while this arrangement became more frequent in the first half of the fourteenth century, it was generalized only with the reorganization of auditing practices in 1351, after which the term "auditors" is consistently used, as in this example: "receptus apud Chamberiacum, presentibus dominis

495. *Iniungentes* was a common occurrence in the thirteenth-century royal writs; *Ibid.*, 399, 407, 448.

²⁶ Around 1300, the instructions given to sheriffs at the Exchequer audits were one of about a dozen sections of the memoranda rolls, "Precepta facta vicecomitibus super compotos et aliis ad scaccarium"; J. Conway Davies, "The Memoranda Rolls of the Exchequer to 1307," in *Studies Presented to Sir Hilary Jenkinson*, ed. J. Conway Davies (Oxford 1957) 97–154, here 109–111; some examples in *Calendar of Memoranda Rolls (Exchequer) Preserved in the Public Record, Michaelmas 1326–Michaelmas 1327* (London 1968) xl–xlii, 336–372.

²⁷ The general treasury account recorded only the final balance (*remanencia*) delivered by each castellan to the treasury, notwithstanding that castellanies supplied goods and moneys throughout the year. This crucial aspect must be borne in mind when examining the figures in Guilleré, "Financement de la cour savoyarde" (n. 13 above).

²⁸ See Chiaudano, ed., *Finanza Sabauda* (n. 13 above) vol. 3, *Le 'Extente' e altri documenti del Dominio (1205–1306)* (Turin 1937); and Nicolas Carrier and Fabrice Mouthon, "Extentes et reconnaissances de la principauté savoyarde: Une source sur les structures agraires des Alpes du Nord (fin XIIIe–fin XVe siècle)," in *Terriers et plan-terriers du XIIIe au XVIIIe siècle*, ed. Ghislain Brunel, Olivier Guyotjeannin, and Jean-Marc Moriceau (Paris 2002) 217–242.

Aymon de Chaland, Petro de Montegelato militibus et Guillelmo Boni auditoribus computorum domini, per Jacobum de Campo clericum domini” (Received at Chambéry, in the presence of Lord Aymon de Chaland, Pierre de Montgelaz, and Guillaume Bon, auditors of the count’s accounts, by Jacob de Campo, the count’s clerk).²⁹ Considering that the accounts were not just audited but even drafted by the central administration, the division of tasks between “receiving” clerk and auditors was obviously not absolute. Diplomatic evidence confirms that the clerk worked in the presence of the auditors, rather than first drafting the account and in a second stage submitting it to them: the *computi* do not show signs of substantial revision consistent with their being examined by the auditors after they had been drafted by the clerk.³⁰ Some additional text was inserted afterward (usually a few words squeezed next to the relevant entry and continuing on the dorse), but this was rare.

When the account is said to have been received in the presence of senior figures, sometimes the same individuals that post-1351 are explicitly called “the auditors of accounts,” there is every reason to believe that the instructions emanated from them, notwithstanding the clerk’s input as regards the form of words. A case involving the castellan of Pont-de-Vaux, analyzed below, makes it clear that when castellans entered into a debate at the audit it was primarily with the auditors. The 1351 ordinances merely codified earlier practice when they placed the clerks together with the whole of the auditing process under the authority of the *mestres des comptes*, Pierre de Montgelaz and Guillaume Bon, described as *auditores computorum* in subsequent accounts (sometimes joined by a third auditor, often Pierre Bonivard). Conversely, when before 1351 the clerk alone is mentioned in the incipits, his ad hoc competences would have been broader, including those that were otherwise part of the auditors’ brief. The usual statement in such cases that the clerk was mandated by the count (*de mandato domini*) to receive the account (that is, by himself, without senior administrators or the count present), confirms that in principle clerks’ work was meant to be supervised by a higher authority. In such cases it is obviously the clerk’s voice that we hear in the instructions; the more experienced among them, such as Viv-

²⁹ Chambéry, ADS, SA 10302, m. 1 (Tournon, 1358).

³⁰ In taking the opposite view, Bernard Demotz does not cite any specific evidence from the *computi*; his reconstruction is purely conjectural, the result of projecting the spatial organization of the late medieval French *chambre de comptes* onto the castle of Chambéry, although even after its acquisition in 1295 not all *computi* were audited at the castle; Demotz, “Une clé de la réussite” (n. 5 above) 20–22. The clerks did make some preliminary notes, for example on paper *cahiers*, in preparation for the drafting of the parchment account; these have very rarely come down to us, e.g., Chambéry, ADS, SA 8933 (Conflans, 1414).

and Veyllet and Romanet Barbier, penned powerful memoranda and instructions.³¹ When present, the count would have offered general directions and perhaps more: Pierre II, Philip I (1268–1285), and Aymon (1329–1343) became counts after ecclesiastical careers that familiarized them with written records and procedures. Most importantly, that the aims and language of the instructions and memoranda are consistent throughout the accounts, even when the senior administrators were not present at the audit, is the sign of an administrative culture shared by the auditors and their clerks.

Before it was written down in the account, an injunction would also have been delivered *viva voce* to the castellan. The spoken exchanges would have taken place in the vernacular, probably Franco-Provençal. Does this mean that our terse Latin record of the exchanges is second best evidence (common though this predicament is in historical research)? Yes and no; to verify the castellan's compliance it was essential that the injunction was written down in the account. As such, it bears emphasis that what we have today is not a copy of a putative original oral injunction, but the injunction itself, its written form inseparable from its content and prescriptive force. When the matter was taken up at the next audit, the auditors and the castellan referred to the written word of the *computus*, not unlike historians today. Lastly, it bears emphasis that although Latin remained in use in Savoy at a time when other administrations employed the vernacular, the Latin of the *computi* remained close to the vernacular, as evidenced by the correspondence between key terms from the *computi* and the ordinances preserved in French (such as *iniunctum/enioint* and *bona diligencia/bonne diligence*).

THE INSTRUCTIONS TO CASTELLANS: FROM MODEST BEGINNINGS TO PROLIFERATION (CA. 1270–1320)

Beyond the observation that instructions to castellans grew steadily from the end of the thirteenth century, a statistical approach is complicated by the need to distinguish between new instructions and the reiteration of previous ones. Specific events, not only the exceptional devastation of the 1348–1349 plague but also occurrences such as the appointment of a novice castellan or a string of expeditions (*cavalcate*) mounted in a particular year, can distort the statistics because they caused a temporary spike in the number of instructions. To chart the increasingly frequent recourse to instructions, the approach taken here is to compare like with like, specifically the initial *computi* from several castellanies, some created ca. 1265–1270 and others ca. 1290 and ca. 1320—bearing in mind

³¹ See nos. 1(a) and 2(a) in the appendix. Both Viviani and Romanet were among the *notarii jurati* officially attached to the Resident council through the 1329 ordinances; Laurent Chevailler, *Recherches sur la réception du droit romain en Savoie: Des origines à 1789* (Annecy 1953) 361.

that initial accounts included more instructions because of the issues raised by the organization of a territory into a castellany.

The first extant account from Montmélian (1264), the seat of the bailiwick of Savoy, includes three memoranda in the body of the text (“Et sciendum quod...”). Rather than specific instructions, two of them have a general prescriptive value, informing all future castellans of Montmélian about the rates charged at the great and small toll and the apportioning of the property-sale tax.³² The third, on some old dues in cash that had not been paid in a long while,³³ is more interesting because it ends with a directive, albeit formulated impersonally: “unde inquirendum est” (hence it must be investigated). Although such an investigation normally fell within the castellan’s brief, the fact that the phrase is not explicitly addressed to him suggests it might also have been intended as an internal note for the central administration—perhaps for next year’s auditor or the clerks drafting the *extente*. The first injunction from Montmélian comes six years later, in 1270: at the end of the roll, following a memorandum that the castellan had omitted to account for a *taille*, came the order to recover the amount (“iniunctum est ei quod recuperet et computabit de eis”).³⁴ At Tournon, the earliest extant castellany account (1271) includes two injunctions, one inserted in the body of the text and the other at the end with some memoranda. The former is directly relevant for the present analysis inasmuch as it instructed the castellan on a procedural matter, limiting his area of competence by calling on the judge’s involvement in the confirmation of wards.³⁵

Twenty years later, the first account from the castellany of La Rochette (1291), although only one parchment membrane long, includes two injunctions to the castellan, both inserted in the body of the text in relation to specific items of accounting rather than at the end. Notably, the second injunction, regarding the *placita* or succession payments (“iniunctum est ei quod ea recuperet”), displays two features that occur throughout fourteenth-century instructions: it is predicated on written documentation (here provided to the castellan, “tradita sibi sunt in scriptis”) and formulated in the conditional, thus acknowledging both that the locals might have a case against the central administration’s demand (“nisi debitores ostenderint quare ad predictum minime teneantur”) and, indirectly, that the castellan enjoyed a good deal of autonomy in running local affairs.³⁶ Put another way, the central administration recognized the agency of both the local community and the local official.

³² Chiaudano, *Finanza Sabauda* (n. 13 above) 1:85, 88.

³³ “Nec fuit solutus diu est”; Ibid. 87.

³⁴ Chambéry, ADS, SA 9313, m. 2.

³⁵ “Iniunctum est ei quod de cetero faciat confirmari seu dari tutelae per iudicem”; Chiaudano, *Finanza Sabauda* (n. 13 above) 1:163, 167.

³⁶ Chambéry, ADS, SA 9791, m. 2.

La Rochette in 1291 was a transitional case. Once a concern with keeping accounts within manageable proportions—a couple of membranes of parchment—was overcome, memoranda and instructions became more numerous. Thirty years later, the first account from Conflans (1320) includes no fewer than eleven injunctions on a variety of matters, in addition to memoranda and short notes.³⁷ This proliferation of instructions is a direct consequence of the problems raised by the sale of lands, revenues, and rights by Humbert of Conflans to Count Amadeus V; in many cases, it was unclear which tenants owed the quantities and amounts specified in the sale. This notwithstanding, the readiness of the auditors to sort out these issues through the instrument of numerous instructions inserted in the *computus* is noteworthy in itself.

The nature of the instructions is also revealing. It being the castellany's first account, the dues in produce and the census in *deniers* were itemized for each individual payer. Even when the specified amounts were recovered in full from *diversis personis*, because he had not recorded their names the castellan was urged henceforth to account for them *particulariter*, that is, through itemized accounting. This was the focus of four of the eleven instructions.³⁸ The premium placed by the central administration on detailed information is explicit in several injunctions urging the castellan to inform himself for the next audit about the names of dues payers (“est sibi iniunctum ut in suo primo computo veniat informatus de ipsis”) and local owners with whom the count shared the collection of certain revenues (“est sibi iniunctum ut se informet de nominibus illorum qui aliam medietatem percipiunt”), and the manner in which the corvées were apportioned (“est sibi iniunctum ut in suo primo computo sciat dicere qualiter levantur”).³⁹ Lastly, a few other examples illustrate the challenges that specific directives posed to the castellans by requiring them to take a hard stance against the local elites, when the circumstances of the castellans' appointment for a few years in a (relatively) new place with only a couple of aides recommended a different approach based on building ties in the community. The castellan was ordered to compel (*compellet*) Humbert de Conflans, until the previous year lord of half of Conflans, to supply some missing amounts and assign to specific tenants the payment of certain annual revenues sold to the count but not currently identified on the ground and collected.⁴⁰ The details are missing, but the *assetamentum* did not happen: the injunctions to this end were reiterated in subsequent

³⁷ Conflans was first organized as a *métralie*, a smaller administrative unit, in 1305.

³⁸ “Recepit apud Verchieres a diversis personis et non recordatur de nominibus ipsarum; Et est sibi iniunctum ut in suo primo computo de ipsis computet particulariter ____ iiii sestarios”; Chambéry, ADS, SA 8867, m. 2.

³⁹ Ibid. m. 2, 4, 5.

⁴⁰ Ibid. m. 2, 3, 4.

accounts. Occasionally one senses the exasperation of the central administration: in 1339 a second-term castellan was reminded that he had already been instructed to compel Humbert's heirs to designate the tenants who would supply the annual rent in wheat, and was now "expressly" ordered to "expressly" compel them.⁴¹ This was not done, and on the eve of the plague the injunction was reissued with the 1339 *computus* as reference point, "as in the twelfth previous account."⁴² The problem was probably not that successive castellans had failed to raise the matter with Humbert and then his heirs, but that the latter found it easier to supply the missing amounts themselves than to impose them on tenants. If so, this illustrates the peasants' agency and resistance in the face of the aristocracy.

The first accounts from Conflans not only illustrate the spectacular increase in the number of instructions but also represent a good entry point into the changing world of castellans' accountability. The itemized accounting by individual dues payers (not generalized but quite frequent, particularly for recently acquired revenues), the central administration's emphasis on gaining detailed information about local affairs, the rise in instances of castellans' noncompliance with increasingly demanding instructions, and the auditors' use of stronger normative language in response, characterize Savoyard institutional accountability from the early fourteenth century. These developments were facilitated by small but visible changes in the layout of the *computi*—an indication of the importance of the rolls of parchment for the functioning of Savoyard accountability. Beginning in 1315, in addition to the account's left margin, where the *tituli* or categories of revenue and expenses were noted, a right margin was created where the amounts were counted so as to stand out from the body of the text in the center. Henceforth, the typical membrane of a castellany account roll appears organized as if on three columns: categories, body of text, and amounts (gradually both margins became more ample). More important for the present analysis is that each item of accounting within a given category was now written on its separate line(s), whereas previously all the fines (for example) would succeed one another on the same line with minimal separation between them. Not only did this set each item out visually, it made it possible to attach an instruction to a specific item, rather than record it at the end of the list for a given category. Previously, when an instruction happened to begin in the middle of a paragraph, it was not easily visible and might be missed at the following year's

⁴¹ "Iniungitur sibi expresse, licet alias sibi iniunctum fuerit, ut dictum assetamentum faciat fieri per heredes predictos, et ipsos ad hoc expresse compellat"; Chambéry, ADS, SA 8875, m. 1.

⁴² "...ut in duodecimo computo precedente"; Chambéry, ADS, SA 8884, m. 1.

The effect of the changes in layout was to make the instructions easier to inscribe and subsequently identify in the account, but the crucial point is that by this time there were good reasons why more of them were needed.⁴³ While the changes in the *computi*'s layout emanated from the circles of professional clerks and auditors, they were an answer to larger financial and political pressures.

A global study of Savoy's finances is complicated by the limitations of the general treasury accounts,⁴⁴ but there are indications that in the early fourteenth century the costs of territorial expansion and consolidation were taking their toll on Savoyard finances. Amadeus V (1285–1323) in particular did not hesitate to spend the profits from Savoy's expanding territories and the taxation of trans-Alpine trade to buy lands from the aristocracy, notably the castle of Chambéry (1295). In the bailiwick of Savoy, the castellany of Conflans was created in 1319, following a purchase from a local lord (albeit on favorable terms for the count),⁴⁵ while in 1317 Faverges received its own castellan following substantial acquisitions from the local coseigneur (*condominus*).⁴⁶ Smaller purchases are frequent throughout the castellany *computi*. As long-term investments, these made a great deal of sense, but in the short run they added to the strain on Savoyard finances. Although not normally involving large numbers, military operations against the allied counts of Geneva and Viennois (Dauphiné) and the lord of Faucigny were a quasi-annual affair in the early fourteenth century, requiring Savoyard efforts on multiple fronts. Obviously, the chronology of political-military events does not map precisely onto the timeline of changes in the structure and language of the accounts, which were probably a long time in the making. Thus, it is not suggested here that the 1315 changes in layout were the direct consequence of the political events immediately preceding them, but it remains worth noting the close correspondence with the most intense years of fighting in the war with Dauphiné, around Ambronay in Bresse in 1308–1313,⁴⁷

⁴³ The importance of the *mise-en-page* is acknowledged in several contributions to a thematic volume on the rhetoric of medieval accounting records, but mostly with regard to the structure and organizing logic of the text, notably the order of the various rubrics; Patrice Beck and Sylvie Bepoix, eds., "Le vocabulaire et la rhétorique des comptabilités médiévales," special issue, *Comptabilité(S): Revue d'histoire de comptabilités* 4 (2012) <https://journals.openedition.org/comptabilites/838>.

⁴⁴ See n. 27 above.

⁴⁵ Humbert of Conflans chose to sell following a sentence against him, but he also received some compensation; François-Charles Uginet, *Conflans en Savoie et son mandement du XIIe au XVe siècle* (unpublished thesis, École nationale des chartes 1967) 60–66. In 1329, another substantial purchase followed, from the other leading seigniorial family of Conflans; Chambéry, ADS, SA 8871, m. 11.

⁴⁶ Chambéry, ADS, SA 10290, m. 12, 20. Previously the castellany of Faverges was run by the castellan of Tournon.

⁴⁷ Alain Kersuzan, *Défendre la Bresse et le Bugey: Les châteaux savoyards dans la guerre contre le Dauphiné (1282–1355)* (Lyon 2005) 50–54; and Nicolas Carrier, *La vie montagnarde en Faucigny à la fin du Moyen Âge* (Paris 2001) 38–40.

and the direct tax (*regalia*) imposed by Amadeus V in 1313 to finance his participation in Emperor Henry VII's Italian campaign. Indeed, several of the 1315 *computi* mention the *remanencia* or balance of the castellan's separate account for the *regalia*.⁴⁸ As usual in fourteenth-century Europe, the costs of the campaign were part motive and part pretext for the tax—an opportunity to balance Savoyard finances.

The challenges facing the central administration were manifold, hence not only the proliferation of instructions but a diversification of the issues they addressed, well beyond their traditional focus on recovering unpaid dues. For one, the acquisitions brought to the fore patrimonial concerns, as discussed above in the case of Conflans. Because reversing a precedent of years of uncollected dues was always a challenge, everything unclear about the collection of the revenues specified in a deed of sale to the count—such as which individual tenants were behind the total sum of an annual census—had to be sorted out by castellans under instructions from the center, lest the issues become permanent. A good deal of the instructions requesting local information from castellans were aimed in this direction. Other instructions sought to keep a check on an important part of castellans' activity, the acquisition of smaller revenues on the count's behalf. To guard against possible collusion between territorial officials and locals, the auditors sought full information and written proof, as in this example:

	Recepit a Perreto Tartarini de Turnone de novo redditu per annum in festum Beati Andree debitur pro domo ipsius Perreti sita in burgo Turnonis, ut in secundo computo continetur.
Vide	Et iniungitur dicto castellano quod in sequenti computo <i>aportet instrumenta facta</i> super dicto redditu <i>ad habendam informationem plenariam</i> supra predictis. ⁴⁹
	[The castellan] received from Perret Tartarin of Turnon on account of the new annual revenue due on St. Andrew's feast day, which is owed for the house of the said Perret, located in the town of Tournon, as stated in the second previous account.
See	And the said castellan is enjoined to bring with his next account <i>the written instruments</i> issued with respect to the said revenue, <i>so that more complete information can be had</i> on the above-mentioned matter.

But the first half of the fourteenth century was also characterized by a concern for raising higher revenues. This is only partly reflected in the instructions, because in the case of the annual *firme*—the farming out of the collection of dues

⁴⁸ E.g., "Item adduntur quas debet de remanencia sui computi regalie ____ xi lb. ix s. iiii d. fort. excucellorum"; Chambéry, ADS, SA 9334, m. 15 (Montmélian).

⁴⁹ Chambéry, ADS, SA 10297, m. 2 (Tournon, 1328; emphasis added).

from mills, ovens, and the weekly markets (*leyda*)—a general arrangement was in place, obviating the need for specific instructions. The castellan would make a public announcement inviting locals to bid for the annual farms, and if none was willing to pay the price fixed by the central administration, he would administer the resources directly, generally at a loss. On these matters the *computi* usually record only the castellans' explanations for why locals did not bid for the annual farms and the administration's reluctance to lower the asking price.⁵⁰ This aside, raising more money could be done along traditional lines, by going after all sources of revenue, however small—a noteworthy aspect in view of the auditors' insistence on castellans' diligence in service, as we shall see.

More remarkable and novel, however, was the effort toward a more efficient exploitation of local resources. This required the auditors to overcome castellans' administrative inertia, which they sought to do through more frequent instructions that, furthermore, reached into minute business matters. The result was an experiment in financial and economic micromanagement made possible precisely by the practice of writing down instructions in the *computi*. While this is not the focus of the present analysis, an example can be illustrative. It concerns the management of the count's vineyards at Tournon.

In 1308, their revenue is listed as a lump sum for several parishes, followed by itemized accounting for five individual tenants who between them provided 20 of the 46.5 *setiers* of wine in dues. There followed an injunction to future castellans that if the tenants failed to cultivate the count's vineyards as expected, a procedure should be initiated with the aid of ten men of standing in the community so as to bring back the vineyards under the direct management of the count's officials.⁵¹ The case illustrates the connection between itemized accounting and the recourse to instructions, notwithstanding that in this example predating the changes in layout the beginning of the injunction is squeezed at the end of the line and liable to be missed by an inattentive clerk. Furthermore, it offers precious insight into the administration's recognition of both the rights of customary tenants and the agency of the local community, represented by the "decem proborum virorum." The situation was monitored in subsequent accounts: individual accounting in 1309 for four of the tenants and a terse explanation for the lower yield, "computat minus solito propter tempestatem."⁵² Later, one of vineyards was taken back and given in annual farm to another

⁵⁰ See Ionuț Epurescu-Pascovici, "The Castellany Accounts of Late-Medieval Savoy: A Source-Oriented Approach," *New Europe College Odobleja Program Yearbook* (2014) 81–109, here 95.

⁵¹ "Iniunctum est castellanis quod si dicti tenementarii non excolunt vineas prout decet, talia fiat ad decem proborum virorum qui ipsas vineas ad manus domini reducant"; Chambéry, ADS, SA 10288, m. 1.

⁵² Chambéry, ADS, SA 10289, m. 2.

local, but since the move did not yield the expected increase in revenue, the castellan was instructed to investigate competently how much might be obtained if the vineyard were given in emphyteusis or perpetual lease and report back:

Recepit a Peroneto Grarieti de exitu cuiusdam vinee domini continentis circa sexdecim fosseratas, quam tenet a domino ad terciam partem musti ut in computo precedenti, quam solet tenere Johannes Boyssi in videmiis anni ccc xxi.

Vide Et est iniunctum castellano quod *sapienter perquirat* quantum haberi poterit de vinea si daretur in inphiteosim perpetuam, ita quod citius quam poterit illud reportet quod inde invenerit, *ita quod dominus non sit amplius in dampno* ___ i sest. vini.⁵³

Received from Peronet Grariet for the yield of a certain vineyard belonging to the count, of around 16 land measures, which he holds from the count for one third of the must as in the previous account, which Jean Boyssi used to hold at harvest time in the year 1321.

See And the castellan has been enjoined that he *knowledgeably inquire* how much could be had for the vineyard if it were given in perpetual lease, in such a way that he may be able to report as quickly as he can what he has found thenceforth, *so that the lord count may not suffer further damage* ___ 1 setier of wine.

The instruction was reiterated in the next *computus* for the benefit of the subsequent castellan, although the yield had tripled to three *setiers*—but this was merely what the farmer had been paying in 1308.⁵⁴

THE RHETORIC OF ACCOUNTABILITY

In addition to the castellan's role in gathering local economic information (though pointedly not in making a decision, which is reserved for the central administration), the example above is interesting for the use of value-laden, rhetorical language. *Sapienter* (knowledgeably) is used to qualify the standard of service expected of the castellan in his inquest, while a lower-than-expected annual revenue is presented as personal damage (*damnum*) to the count. Such vocabulary crops up in the instructions from the 1320s, alongside more traditional and accommodating language urging castellans to use best endeavors.⁵⁵ To understand why the auditors felt the need to drive their point home to castellans

⁵³ Chambéry, ADS, SA 10293, m. 1 (emphasis added; 1322).

⁵⁴ Chambéry, ADS, SA 10294, m. 1.

⁵⁵ For example, in the recovery of fines: "Iniunctum est castellano quod ... recuperet condemnationes *ut melius poterit*"; "Iniunctum est ei ut recuperet *prout melius poterit* et inde computet" (emphasis added); Archives départementales de la Côte-d'Or (ADCO), Dijon, B 9162, m. 4 (Pont-de-Vaux, 1325). For a late thirteenth-century example, see Chiaudano, *Finanza Sabauda* (n. 13 above) 1:217.

through rhetorical language, one must attend to the changes in the balance of power between the dynasty and the Savoyard elites.

In need of cash, counts such as Amadeus V and his sons Edward (1323–1329)—a prolific builder whose spending earned him the sobriquet “the Liberal”—and Aymon turned increasingly often to the practice of demanding loans (*mutua*) from castellans upon their appointment.⁵⁶ This made it difficult to reassign officials to backwater castellanies or remove them from the system,⁵⁷ for in the latter case the loan had to be repaid. In general, cooperation with the aristocracy was preferred—a strategy amply illustrated by the recruitment of castellans from its ranks. This notwithstanding, a credible threat of administrative censures would have helped things. Castellans’ compliance was becoming less readily forthcoming anyway, simply because the directives were increasingly numerous and complex. One of the instructions’ primary targets was the recovery of unpaid penal fines—it is in the *banna* section, and particularly the *banna de arragio* or arrears, that most injunctions are to be found. This is a reflection of the comparative fiscal weight of the proceeds from the administration of justice, the castellanies’ most elastic source of revenue, in contrast to the fixed revenues that dominate the *computi*’s rubrics. But in spite of repeated injunctions and substantial monetary incentives to castellans,⁵⁸ the recovery of unpaid fines did not go well, largely because poverty levels were on the rise. Conversely, despite receiving instructions aggressively to compel the more solvent offenders to pay their fines,⁵⁹ castellans would have been wary of damaging relations with men of higher standing.

The local communities and the castellanies as the basic administrative units were codependent for everything from policing the territory to public works.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, some communities, for example Chambéry with its urban elite, could make life difficult for the castellan by successfully complaining to the

⁵⁶ For the early fourteenth century, the topic is understudied, but see the examples from 1312 in Guido Castelnuovo and Christian Guilleré, “Le Credit du prince: L’exemple savoyard au bas Moyen Age,” in *Crédit et société: Les sources, les techniques et les hommes (XIVe–XVIe s.)*, ed. Jean-Marie Cauchies (Neuchâtel 1999) 151–164, here 157.

⁵⁷ In the 1330s, a castellan might remain in place for around a decade in the bailiwick of Vaud; Bernard Andenmatten, “Officier princier et patrimoine familial: Châtelains et vidomnes dans le pays de Vaud savoyard,” in “*De part et d’autre des Alpes*” (n. 16 above) 177–188, here 185.

⁵⁸ The doubling of the castellan’s prize from one to two *sous* for every *livre* recovered (i.e., ten percent of the fine) was formalized in Count Edward’s 1325 ordinances; Chevailler, *Recherches* (n. 31 above) 361.

⁵⁹ E.g., “Iniungitur sibi quod ipsum condemnatum *taliter compellat* quod de ipsis condemnationibus in suo sequenti *computi* computare valeat sine dilatazione quantacumque—vel de absolutione facere fidem”; Chambéry, ADS, SA 9354, m. 5 (Montmélian, 1349; emphasis added).

⁶⁰ Michael Gelting, “Between Prince and Peasant: The Ambiguous Role of the Parish Community in Fourteenth-Century Maurienne,” in *Bauern zwischen Herrschaft und Genossenschaft: Peasant Relations to Lords and Government, Scandinavia and the Alpine Region (1000–1750)*, ed. John Ragner Myking, Gertrud Thoma, and Tore Iversen (Trondheim 2007) 109–132.

count of his conduct.⁶¹ Against this complex background, getting the castellans to comply with the instructions became a challenge. The central administration's response to the castellans' increased autonomy was multifaceted. For one, we have seen that written documentation became a core tenet of institutional accountability as the most efficient means of keeping tabs on the castellans' doings. Often instructions to produce specific documents had to be repeated over several years. Indeed, repetition emerged as a habitual strategy for the auditors, eventually reinforced by the threat of pecuniary sanctions (see no. 1 in the appendix). But these efforts did not prove sufficient and, as we have seen, ca. 1320 the auditors began to use value-laden terms for emphasis, such as *sapienter* or, in a 1319 case that attracted the count's attention, *diligenter*: Antoine de Barges, castellan of Montmélian and *bailli* of Savoy, was instructed to make diligent inquiries so as to remedy his lapse in recovering less than half the amount of a fine imposed on a local notary. Present at the audit, Amadeus V might have suspected more than casual negligence—in view of the culprit's status, the castellan might have deliberately avoided a heavy-handed approach—for he threw the weight of his authority in support of the clerk's work: “Vidit dominus et non placet” reads a note on the dorse of the account, signaled by a *vide* in the body of the text.⁶²

The normative discourse evolved during the following two decades. To clarify, “rhetoric” is deployed here as an analytical construct, although the intersections with late medieval rhetoric are noted. The notion is used in a broad sense that captures the systematic effort to influence the conduct of local officials by means of persuasive language, from repetition to the threat of sanctions to emphasis through phrases such as “iniunctum est” and, in a significant development for the rhetoric of accountability, a series of key terms (see below). Persuasion is central to the sense of rhetoric espoused in this essay; here “rhetorical” does not carry a suggestion of insincerity, although I acknowledge that the auditors could be didactic and given to hyperbole, and both they and some of the castellans were quite calculated in their exchanges at the audits. Understandably, getting the castellans to comply with a specific directive would have been first and foremost in the auditors' minds, but they also used the instructions, quite opportunistically, to inculcate an ethos of accountability. The auditors probably reasoned that, once the ethos of accountability was instilled, castellans would require less prodding. The Savoyard auditors' preference for rhetoric and persuasion, rather than sanctions, as the means of inculcating standards of accountability was more necessity than virtue, but the posterity of this

⁶¹ Lafargue, “Entre ancrage et déracinement” (n. 16 above) 192.

⁶² Chambéry, ADS, SA 9335, m. 5; Epurescu-Pascovici, “Castellany Accounts” (n. 50 above) 87.

strategy is worth highlighting, if only in passing, for a version thereof informs modern approaches to accounting normativity.⁶³ In their instructions, the auditors did not insist solely on the financial side of things, such as having an outstanding sum counted in the next account's receipts. They also sought to uphold a model of accountability in service by emphasizing that, even if the amount could not be recovered, the castellan must still respond to the instruction and provide some justification—hence the standard phrase “in suo sequenti computo valeat sufficienter respondere vel computare” or “in suo sequenti computo valeat computare aut aliter sufficienter respondere.”⁶⁴ The auditors' discourse, although reactive inasmuch as it emerged in response to castellans' neglect of procedure and noncompliance, had an unmistakable didactic dimension, perfectly illustrated by the pedantic explanations to the castellan of Tournon in 1335 as to why he was denied a deduction in spite of the witnesses he produced, and what written documentation he should bring at the next audit in order to secure it.⁶⁵ With this attention to standards of proof and proper procedure, the instructions' object shifted to the very practices that defined accountability. In this sense, one can speak of a meta-discourse on accountability in the instructions.

From the 1330s, as accounting and documentary practices were becoming more professional and centralized,⁶⁶ on issues deemed particularly important the castellan was enjoined to demonstrate (*fidem facere*) that he exercised due diligence (*debita* or *bona diligencia*) and appropriate prudence (*ydonea cautio*) in discharging himself of the task, and threatened that he might be charged for the amount in question if he failed convincingly to make his case to the auditors (*supra ipsum allocetur*). These key phrases go to the heart of the idea of accountability. Not only a model of diligent and prudent administrative service but also the manner in which castellans were to prove they performed it were encapsulated in short and powerful phrases. Of them, *fidem facere* occurs more frequently because, as a standard of proof, it was used widely—see no. 3(a) in the appendix for its use five times within eleven lines of manuscript. Count Edward's 1325 brief ordinances on officials' conduct might have provided some of the inspiration, for it was then that pecuniary sanctions were instituted for

⁶³ Rouba Chantiri-Chaudemanche, “L'élaboration des normes comptables ou l'art de persuader: La rhétorique du normalisateur à travers la littérature,” *Comptabilité–Contrôle–Audit* 19.3 (2013) 35–58 (<https://www.cairn.info/revue-comptabilite-contrrole-audit-2013-3-page-35.htm>).

⁶⁴ Chambéry, ADS, SA 9347, m. 4 (Montmélian, 1342); and Chambéry, ADS, SA 9813, m. 5 (La Rochette, 1349).

⁶⁵ Transcription in the appendix, no. 2(a).

⁶⁶ Cf. Guido Castelnuovo on the second phase of Savoyard pragmatic literacy, after 1330: “Les officiers princiers et le pouvoir de l'écrit: Pour une histoire documentaire de la principauté savoyarde (XIIIe–XVe siècle),” in *Offices, écrits et papauté (XIIIe–XVIIe siècles)*, ed. Armand Jamme and Olivier Poncet (Rome 2007) 17–46.

castellans disobeying mandates—yet another indication both that compliance was becoming a problem and that efforts were made to address it. The 1325 rules also mention *idonea cautio* in relation to officials such as castellans (in the *computi* the phrase is used in the ablative, *ydonea cautione*, “through appropriate prudence”).⁶⁷ *Diligenter inquirat*, the phrase used in the example below, was quite common in the Exchequer mandates to sheriffs that had inspired the Savoyard injunctions.⁶⁸ But it is the articulation in a coherent whole of these discursive elements that bears emphasis: *diligencia* and *ydonea cautio* are the predicate of *fidem facere*, and it is furthermore significant that sanctions were now threatened for failure to meet the imperative of demonstrable diligence. Serving at Tournon during the first term following the castellany’s return to the count after it had been ceded to the abbey of Saint Michel de la Cluse for more than two decades, Jean de Beaufort was instructed to investigate diligently a decrease in the quantity of wheat collected in 1358 in comparison with 1334, when an account was last submitted to the count, and demonstrate his diligence in recovering it—or else be charged for the amount:

vide dorsum	...Et quia per dictas particulas non... [dorse] ...reperiuntur i. sesterius et dimidium quartum et sestum <unius quarte> frumenti, de quibus magis fuit computatum in computo precedente quam computet in presenti computo per dictas particulas, <i>iniungitur sibi quod diligenter inquirat</i> qui sunt debitores qui predicta debent et quod ipsam quantitatem frumenti quam non reperitur per dictas particulas recuperet ab eisdem, ita quod de ipsa in suo sequenti computo valeat com- putare pro dicto anno m° ccc lvii et pro tempore sequenti. Et <i>nisi fidem fecerit de bona diligencia</i> predictam quantitatem de- ficientem recuperandi, <i>supra ipsum allocetur</i> . ⁶⁹
See on the dorse	... And because according to the said individual records ... [dorse] ... 1 setier plus one eighth and one sixth of a quart of wheat cannot be found, which is by how much more it was accounted

⁶⁷ Chevailler, *Recherches* (n. 31 above) 360–361. Disobeying a mandate from the *bailli* and bailiwick judge was punishable by 10 *livres*, and from the count by 15 *livres*.

⁶⁸ E.g., “Preceptum est vicecomiti Glouc’ quod diligenter inquirat”; R. Allen Brown, ed., *Memoranda Rolls 16–17 Henry III* (London 1991) 107 (no. 1420); also see Ibid. 94 (no. 1307)—both examples from the 1230s. Diligence remained a key imperative at the Exchequer in the fourteenth century; Sabapathy, *Officers and Accountability* (n. 1 above) 104. It was a common standard of service in late medieval accounts; Patrice Beck, “Le vocabulaire et la rhétorique des comptabilités médiévales: Modèles, innovations, formalisation,” *Comptabilité(S): Revue d’histoire de comptabilité* 4 (2012) <https://journals.openedition.org/comptabilites/840>.

⁶⁹ Chambéry, ADS, SA 10302, m. 1 and dorse (emphasis added).

in the preceding account than is accounted in the present according to the said receipts, [the castellan] is enjoined to inquire diligently who the debtors are who owe the aforesaid and recover from them the quantity of wheat that is lacking according to the said records, in order that he may be able to account for it in his next account for the said year 1357 and so on for the following years. And *unless he shall make proof of his proper diligence* in recovering the aforesaid quantity that is lacking, *it shall be charged to him*.

At 1358 grain prices, this came to almost one *livre*,⁷⁰ a significant amount by the standards of the *computi*, particularly since this annual revenue risked being lost for good if action was not taken immediately upon the recovery of the castellany. Indeed, it bears emphasis that the novel expressions injected in the auditors' normative discourse were reserved for important cases, such as the collection of unpaid *banna*.⁷¹ They were not meant to replace repetition of the same instruction in account after account as the auditors' tactic of choice, but rather to complement it when it failed to achieve the intended effect.

The emphasis on convincing proof of diligence in service under threat of being charged for the amount in question also appears in the instructions about the *banna* to the castellan of Pont-de-Vaux on Savoy's western border, albeit somewhat later, ca. 1360.⁷² Another case concerning the collection of unpaid *banna*, this time from the bailiwick of Savoy proper, is interesting because it extends the standard of *ydonea cautione* to previously serving castellans. In 1335, Constantin de Vallion had his first account as castellan of Faverges audited *presente domino*, probably on purpose since he was summoned for the audit at Seyssel, where the count was staying. This was an appropriate occasion for the castellan to be enjoined "ex parte domini et de mandato ipsius" to collect half of all the criminal fines on which the count had granted a moratorium. If recovered fully this might amount to as much as 31 *livres Genevois*, a considerable sum that explains the count's personal mandate. The moratorium on payment was extended for the other half of the fines. But Constantin was also instructed to look

⁷⁰ Grain prices are given in the *venditiones* section; Chambéry, ADS, SA 10302, m. 10. Four similar entries were made on the account's dorse about other underreported quantities compared with twenty years earlier.

⁷¹ See Aude Wirth-Jaillard, "A Century of Insults, Adultery, and Fight: Justice and Its Administration in the Accounting Records of the Castellany of Pont-de-Vaux (Savoyard Bresse, 1274–1375)," in *Accounts and Accountability in Late Medieval Europe: Records, Procedures, and Socio-Political Impact*, ed. Ionuț Epurescu-Pascovici, Utrecht Studies in Medieval Literacy 50 (Turnhout 2020) 229–250, here 243–249.

⁷² "Nisi fecerit fidem de prosecutione vel de diligencia, super ipso allocetur"; ADCO, Dijon, B 9170, m. 9 (1360). The *banna* from Pont-de-Vaux have been recently edited in Aude Wirth-Jaillard, "Un siècle de justice à Pont-de-Vaux (Ain): Édition des *banna* des comptes de la châtellenie (1275–1375)," *Comptabilité(S): Revue d'histoire des comptabilités* 12 (2019) <https://journals.openedition.org/comptabilites/4194>.

into the matter of the fines not included in the moratorium but left uncollected by previous castellans, who now faced the prospect of being charged for the amounts if it turned out that they, rather than Constantin, had failed to take care of the matter:

Item iniungitur castellano de mandato domini quod alia banna de arreagio recuperet de tempore castellanorum precedentium ipsum, vel si ea recuperare non poterit propter pauperitatem vel aliam causam, exprimat in sequenti computo nomina condemnatorum, in cuius tempore castellani condemnati fuerunt, ita quod dominus tunc ordinabit quod supra ipsos castellanos allocentur condemnationes predictae si curam non habuerunt de recuperandi ydonea cautione a condemnatis predictis, aliter supra castellanum.⁷³

Likewise it is enjoined upon the castellan by the count's mandate that he recover the rest of the arrears in fines from the time of the castellans that preceded him, or, if he cannot recover it because of poverty or for other reason, indicate in the next account the names of those fined [and] during which castellan's term they had been condemned, so that the lord count shall then ordain that the aforesaid fines be charged to the castellans themselves, if they had not taken care to recover them through appropriate prudence, or otherwise to the [current] castellan.

The previous castellans were Amblard Bon, serving at Faverges for the better part of a decade, who had been repeatedly enjoined in the previous accounts to recover the fines,⁷⁴ succeeded by Rolet Candie, to whom the matter devolved before it reached Constantin.⁷⁵ But the previous injunctions to Bon and Candie contain no explicit reference to the exercise of care and appropriate prudence in recovering the fines. Was the standard applied retrospectively then? The point is that the notion had been around in one form or another—explicitly so in the 1325 ordinances—before being invoked in the instructions. The instructions did not create standards of administrative service and accountability but sought to inculcate them.

Since a flexible approach was needed to handle the castellans on whom the dynasty had grown dependent, the language of service was purposefully general. The auditors reinforced the key notions of diligence and prudence with strong adjectives such as *debita*, which would have reminded castellans of what they owed their lord, both in a financial-administrative and in a higher, moral sense; and *idonea*, a polysemic term denoting a high qualitative evaluation or standard

⁷³ Chambéry, ADS, SA 11584, dorse.

⁷⁴ E.g., “iniungitur sibi prout aliter similiter fuit sibi iniunctum ut ... ipsas condemnationes in toto vel in parte recuperet ita quod de ipsis valeat computare”; Chambéry, ADS, SA 11582, m. 4 (1333).

⁷⁵ “...nichil computat quia pauperes sunt et nichil ab eis recuperare potuit, ut dicit, sed iniungitur successore suo sicut et ei iniunctum fuerat, ut posse suum faciat ipsas condemnationes recuperandi”; Chambéry, ADS, SA 11583, m. 4 (1334).

(apt, appropriate, or worthy are some of the possible translations into English). Diligence was about the castellans exerting themselves for the resolution of potentially delicate cases. Its rather unambitious definition in the example below, merely as the opposite of negligence, is indicative of the difficult beginnings of Savoyard administrative professionalization:

vide   ...Iniungitur tamen sibi iterato ut et in computo precedenti ... ita quod de placitis predictis in suo sequenti computo valeat computare aut aliter sufficienter respondere; aliter, *si castellanus negligens fuerit et de diligencia fidem non fecerit*, alloquabuntur supra ipsum nisi a domino aliud habuerit in mandatis.⁷⁶

See   ...It is nonetheless enjoined a second time [upon the castellan] as in the previous account ... that in his next account he shall be able to account or otherwise sufficiently answer for the aforesaid inheritance dues; *otherwise, if the castellan will have been neglectful and not demonstrated his diligence*, they shall be charged to him, unless he will have had a different [disposition] in a mandate from the count.

As used by Savoyard officials, *fidem facere*—literally, “to make [plain] his [good] faith”—might be glossed as “to demonstrate through convincing evidence” or, when its predicate was the general imperative of diligent and prudent conduct, “to create the conviction.” Both usages are attested in fifteenth-century humanist rhetoric, where *fidem facere* is similarly associated with the idea of proof.⁷⁷ A full exploration of the rapprochement between the ad hoc rhetoric of the *computi* and the elaborate humanist dialectic falls outside the scope of the present study, but it clearly calls for an inclusive conceptual approach by historians of Savoyard institutions, going beyond strict financial accountancy. On concrete issues, the standard of *fidem facere* might be satisfied by producing anything from a modest receipt on paper to the records of procedures undertaken in the castellany in cases of missing documents,⁷⁸ as with the court *prothocollum* demanded of the castellan of Tournon in 1333 (no. 1 in appendix). A notion like

⁷⁶ Chambéry, ADS, SA 9813, m. 5 (La Rochette, 1349; emphasis added).

⁷⁷ Marta Spranzi, *The Art of Dialectic between Dialogue and Rhetoric: The Aristotelian Tradition* (Amsterdam 2011) 89–91.

⁷⁸ E.g., “facta fuit fides per papirum ipsius”; Chambéry, ADS, SA 8878, m. 6 (Conflans, 1342). Outside the context of accounting: “fidem faciens de suo procuratorio per quoddam publicum instrumentum”; Charles Auguste Dufour, “Vente du château, ville et mandement de Tournon par le comte Aymon de Savoie à l’abbé de Saint Michel de la Cluse,” *Travaux de la Société d’histoire et d’archéologie de Maurienne* 3.3 (1875) 139–178, here 159.

fidem facere fitted perfectly with these varying standards of proof.⁷⁹ In this respect, it also benefitted castellans, who had some room to maneuver when written documentation was hard to produce. But its flexibility made *fidem facere* even more suitable in connection with the key notions of diligence and prudence, both used in a general way. This ultimately empowered the auditors to decide whether they had been persuaded by the castellans' efforts to prove their diligence and best endeavors. The auditors' powers should not be exaggerated, as the decision was not arbitrary, but they did have a trump card: they could keep raising the matter one yearly audit after another, if need be to successive castellans, until some acceptable proof was produced.

One case both illustrates this scenario and offers precious insight into what diligence in service and convincing proof thereof amounted to in practice. An injunction regarding the recovery of fines, some going back a decade, was made in 1349 to Pierre de Compey and reiterated in 1350 to Jean de Cuines, who as first-time castellan of La Rochette pled ignorance of the matter (see no. 3 in the appendix). In 1351, the fines still not recovered, to comply with the auditors' injunction Jean needed the cooperation of both local notables and professional administrators,⁸⁰ who gave sworn testimonies to the vice-castellan (his relation, Antoine de Cuines), which were recorded in a notarial instrument copied in full on two membranes of the castellany account. The procedure entailed rigorous standards of proof, from the making of a written record to summarize the oral testimonies prompted by the vice-castellan's questioning and endorsed by oaths on the Bible, to the selection of witnesses from two different social groups as a precaution. What is more, the castellan substantively made the case for his diligence by emphasizing that he had looked into each individual case and assessed the culprit's means of payment. He made sure to give specific details in several instances so as to buttress his case, and referenced additional testimony, notably by the *curé* of Saint-Maurice. It was arguably this level of detail that convinced the auditors, who in 1349 had not accepted the similar but vague excuses professed by his predecessor.

THE INSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE

Notwithstanding the issues left unresolved in spite of repeated instructions, the much emphasized imperative that castellans make their case convincingly in

⁷⁹ That *fidem facere* did not simply mean "to swear by his faith" is demonstrated by the consistent use of *per iuramentum* to refer to oaths; cf. Olga Wijers, "Some Notes on 'fides' and Related Words in Medieval Latin," *Bulletin du Cange* 40 (1977) 77–102, here 80–82. The broad sense of *fidem facere* also emerges from no. 2(a) in the appendix, where it is contrasted with verbal assurances.

⁸⁰ Of the latter, Jean de Hurtières had a long career working for the count, who made use of his notarial services.

front of the auditors largely achieved its intended effect. The auditors engaged the castellans in an institutional dialogue in which they defined the terms. The dialogical dimension of the *computi* is clearly asymmetrical: for one, the voices of the central apparatus where the accounts were produced emerge clearly, the injunctions formulated emphatically and even with didactic overtones. The institutional dialogue involved not only the auditors but occasionally the count as well; other senior administrators could be drawn in depending on the situation.⁸¹ Conversely, the castellans' voices reach us through subtle traces in the accounts' forensic language, most often justifications for lower than expected revenues or higher expenses.⁸² Only occasionally are there hints that exchanges between auditors and castellans were becoming heated (see the 1351 case from Pont-de-Vaux, below) or portentous, as with Amadeus V's intervention in 1319. Second, the threats of substantial pecuniary sanctions against the castellans might suggest that the auditing of accounts was marked by an imbalance of power in favor of the auditors—a current view in the study of late medieval institutional accountability.⁸³ But as Amadeus V's intervention reprimanding the *bailli* of Savoy shows, matters were more complicated, particularly when the official staring the bourgeois *clerici* in the eye was a lord of significant status. For example, before Amadeus VI's half-brother, Ogier (*bastardus Savoiae*), was dispatched as castellan first to Faverges (1353) and then to Conflans (1354–1360), provisions were made at the auditing of the previous year's account to ensure that his *computi* would be drafted in the proper way⁸⁴—the expectation was both that Ogier might not be very concerned with accounting standards and that the auditors would subsequently find it difficult to correct someone of his status. What is more, occasionally the auditors found it expedient to let the castellans sort things out with other branches of the administration, such as appeals' judges.⁸⁵ Part of the motivation was probably that castellans' aristocratic status would have enabled them to deal successfully with senior administrators. Lastly, it is

⁸¹ The treasurer (or an aide) was routinely present “at the reckoning” (*in computo*) to bear witness about deliveries, including the final balance.

⁸² E.g., “computat minus quam in computo precedenti ... propter sterilitatem temporis” (Chambéry, ADS, SA 11584, m. 2; Faverges, 1335) or “sunt maiores expense quam alias sibi allocari consuetum propter maiorem societatem quam secum duxit transeundo per terram Dalphini”; ADS, Chambéry SA 9343, m. 3 (Montmélian, 1337).

⁸³ Olivier Mattéoni, “Vérifier, corriger, juger: Les chambres des comptes et le contrôle des officiers en France à la fin du Moyen Âge,” *Revue historique* 641 (2007) 31–69.

⁸⁴ Faverges: “cum computus sequens recipietur videatur computus precedens pro titulis et aliis in dicto computo continentis *ordinabiliter ordinandis*” (emphasis added); Chambéry, ADS, SA 11589, m. 1; Conflans: “Et quando computus sequens recipietur videatur precedens pro titulis et aliis ordinandis”; Chambéry, ADS, SA 8893, m. 1.

⁸⁵ E.g., “non computat quia dictus condempnatus dictam causam appellationis que nondum est terminata adhuc prosequitur eandem, propter quod nichil recuperare potuit; iniungitur tamen sibi expresse quod instet dictam cameram terminari ante proximum festum nativitatis domini et recuperet dictam condemnationem”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9170, m. 9 (Pont-de-Vaux, 1360).

probable that the reason why the same instruction was sometimes reiterated in tens of successive accounts, when it must have become apparent (particularly in the second half of the fourteenth century) that repeating it was not going to make much difference, is that the auditors anticipated having to answer to the count and his top aides from the Resident council.⁸⁶

To the historian searching for evidence of serious monetary sanctions against castellans, the auditors' threats inevitably ring hollow, but successive counts and their aides apparently believed in their deterrent function. The threat of sanctions was meant to influence castellans' conduct; doubtless the auditors would have been happy to see them enforced so as to set an example. The issue is approached here within the general frame of a dialogue between auditors and castellans marked by rhetorical uses of language. Two early cases, both from the bailiwick of Bresse and both audited in April 1298, concerned the mere suspicion that castellans might be inclined to give or receive a bribe (*drulia*), hence the threat of a 50 livres *Viennois* fine (25 livres *forts*).⁸⁷ The warning that there will be no absolution (*nulla remissio*) once the fines were incurred suggests that, despite the clerks' efforts to sound tough, past experience made castellans optimistic that even if the threatened sanctions were enforced the count might eventually grant a pardon. Indeed, it was often stated explicitly in the *computi* that a direct order (*mandatum*) from the count might overrule an instruction given by the auditors.⁸⁸ Consistent with their preference for written proof, however, the auditors were suspicious of castellans' assurances about oral (*oretenus*) mandates from the count and insisted that the writs be produced. One notable case is transcribed in the appendix, no. 2(a); another concerns Jean Bérard, the castellan of Saint-Rambert (bailiwick of Bugey), who, invoking the count's oral mandate to him, casually declared he could not remember which criminal cases were included in it.⁸⁹ Two decades later, the same official saw fit to protest the

⁸⁶ From the auditors' ranks, for the period studied here, only Pierre de Montgelaz was coopted into the Resident council (1355); Chevailler, *Recherches* (n. 31 above) 362. On the tensions between the auditors and the councils in the late fourteenth century, see Bernard Demotz, *Le comté de Savoie du XIe au XVe siècle: Pouvoir, château et état au Moyen Âge* (Geneva 2000) 357.

⁸⁷ Alain Kersuzan and Frédéric Chartrain, eds., *Documents comptables des Etats de Savoie, XIIIe–XVe s.*, Comptes des châtellenies savoyardes, castellanies of Saint-André and Saint-Martin-le-Châtel (<http://castellanie.net/txt.php?id=B9521&n=1&v=2> and <http://castellanie.net/txt.php?id=B9707&n=4&v=6>, respectively). In the latter case, the standard injunction phrase was used, "iniunctum est castellano sub pena quinquaginta librarum ne faciat nec recipiat druellias."

⁸⁸ E.g., "Iniungitur tamen sibi quod nisi aliud mandatum habuerit in contrarium de quo possit fidem facere, dictas quantitates recuperet ita quod de ipsis in suo computo sequenti computare valeat"; Chambéry, ADS, SA 9354, m. 5 (Montmélian, 1349); also see no. 3(a) in the appendix.

⁸⁹ "...non computat quia dicit quod dominus Aymo de Sabaudia sibi dedit in mandatis oretenus et per literam quam obmisit aportare quod adhuc aliquid non recuperaret ab ipsis pro quibusdam causis quas ad presens dicere nescit, sed iniungitur sibi quod ipsas condempnaciones recuperet ita quod de ipsis in sequenti computo respondere computet"; ADCO, Dijon, B 9743, m. 20 (1329).

oath demanded of castellans by the regulations of 1351 (see below). The auditors did have their successes: to illustrate, the repeated threat of sanctions led to an acceptable outcome in several cases, as with the castellan of Tournon eventually producing the tenant's oath about a missing lease contract requested by the auditors, although he never followed up by drafting the *prothocollum querendi* demanded of him (see no. 1 in the appendix).

The demographic and economic loss caused by the plague sparked pleas from castellans unable to raise the usual returns, and injunctions from the center aimed at collecting as much revenue as possible. The administration sought detailed information in this respect, clearly concerned that the plague's devastation might be exaggerated—the matter was even legislated in the 1351 ordinances.⁹⁰ The ordinances brought hyperbole to the rhetoric of accountability by threatening a penalty of 25 *livres forts*—a castellan's yearly salary—for every single accounting error detected in a *computus*.⁹¹ Subsequently, a statement was inserted at the beginning of all castellany accounts to the effect that the castellan had taken an oath to give a full and accurate account of revenues and expenses, under the said penalty. For example:

Computus viri nobilis et potentis domini Hugonis domini Grandis Montis ... redditus per Amedeum de Flaciato domicellum vice castellanum dicti domini Grandis Montis. Qui vicecastellanus iuravit bene et legaliter computare de receptis et libratiss factis per ipsum vel alterum eius nomine sub pena vigintiquinque librarum fortium tociens commitenda quotiens reperiretur in culpa; castrum et edificia domini sumptibus domini ad sostam tenere; pensiones ordinatas ad usum hospitii domini solvere sub pena duppli statutis terminis, necnon et alias ordinationes domini factas super computis firmiter observare.⁹²

The account of the noble and powerful man Lord Hugo of Grandmont ... submitted by Amadeus of *Flaciato* squire, vice-castellan of the said lord of Grandmont.

The vice-castellan swore rightly and lawfully to account for the receipts and the deliveries made by him or another in his name, incurring a penalty of 25 *livres forts* each time he shall be found lacking; to keep the count's castle and buildings in good state at the latter's expense; to pay at the set terms the pensions ordained for the benefit of the count's household under penalty of double the sum; as well as to observe firmly the other ordinances made by the lord count in the matter of the accounts.

⁹⁰ "Auditores computorum se informant de querelis et petitionibus Officiariorum circa detractiones per eos petitas ob pestem aut caristiam"; Nani, "Primi statute" (n. 19 above) 200 (article 8). The demographic loss due to the plague in the Maurienne valley has been estimated at forty-five percent (of which a small portion was due to emigration); Michael Gelting, "The Mountains and the Plague: Maurienne, 1348," *Collegium Medievale* 4 (1991) 7–45, here 38.

⁹¹ Nani, "Primi statute" (n. 19 above) 200 (article 4).

⁹² Chambéry, ADS, SA 9360, m. 1 (Montmélian, 1354).

The formula is a summation of the castellan's main duties (in this example delegated to a vice-castellan, a frequent practice in the second half of the fourteenth century), but it essentially repeats article 4 of the 1351 ordinances. That for more than a century to come castellans were asked to take an oath to observe the count's ordinances points to their status as the dynasty's partners in the Savoyard institutional project, possessed of a measure of autonomy. Put simply, castellans' acquiescence did not go without saying—it needed to be procured in writing. That the formula was inserted in account after account even if its clauses were already known also points to a larger program of inculcating through repetition a model of administrative service and accountability. It was a far more direct approach to acculturating the aristocracy to the norms of accountability than instructional literature, and thus it goes some way toward explaining the absence from Savoy of texts like *The Dialogue of the Exchequer*. In the 1330s, in the bailiwick of Chablais, where accounts were often audited regionally, castellany *computi* were used opportunistically to record on their dorse the castellan's duties.⁹³

Castellans did not react in the same way to the reforms of 1351 and, more broadly, to the auditors' discourse. Some took the threat of sanctions so seriously that they protested openly, while others sensed that they could meet the expectations of the central apparatus and hopefully advance their own careers by demonstrating that they had embraced the standards of conduct in office. The former scenario is illustrated by Jean Bérard, castellan of Pont-de-Vaux, who at the auditing of his account in March 1351 spoke out against the 25 *livres* fine. Although the auditor, Pierre de Montgelaz, affirmed his support for that part of the ordinances, and the phrase regarding the castellan's oath was duly inserted, Bérard succeeded in having his protestation signaled in the opening of the account and recorded in full on the dorse. In insisting that he be allowed subsequently to correct any error he might have committed, what he effectively objected to was the high standard of accounting meticulousness, or *diligence* (a recurring notion in the 1351 ordinances):

Et protestatur dictus castellanus in presentia domini Petri de Montegelato consentienti parte statutorum praedictae, et in presentia dicti Aymonis Luppi [the clerk], quod si contingeret ipsum aliquid commisisse in receptis et libratibus vel errasse in ipsis, quod illud possit corrigere infra annum, non comittentem penas praedictas.⁹⁴

And the said castellan protested in the presence of Lord Pierre of Montgelaz consenting to that part of the statutes, and in the presence of the said Aymon Loup, that if it should occur that he has incurred some [fault] in the receipts or deliveries or has

⁹³ Constant, *L'Etablissement* (n. 2 above) 246n238.

⁹⁴ Dijon, ADCO, B 9162, dorse.

committed an error in them, he may correct it within a year without incurring the aforesaid penalties.

Other castellans may have been more subdued in their objections, to the extent that they realized that it was easier for the auditors to threaten sanctions than to enforce them—the issue is signaled here to encourage further work on the vast archive of castellany *computi*. That castellans had found the auditing vexatious is suggested by the opening article of the 1351 ordinances, which references their complaints against the *magistri* (the substance of the regulations, however, went in the opposite direction, providing for closer control over castellans).⁹⁵ Paleographical clues suggest that, at least in the beginning, castellans took the matter of the oath seriously and only consented to it after careful verification of the account drafted on their behalf. In the first account from Montmélian to feature this statement—on 20 February 1351, two weeks after the ordinances—a space was left blank after the incipit, into which the castellan's oath was copied after the whole account had been drafted, for there is considerable vertical compression in order to squeeze in the four lines of text.⁹⁶ In a *computus* from Conflans two years later, the clerk omitted to copy the oath and the space remained blank, the note in the left margin to the effect that “the castellan's oath must be inserted here” (*poneatur hic iuramentum castellani*) going unheeded.⁹⁷ The approach was eminently sensible: the castellan could only swear as to the account's accuracy after it had been produced by the clerk at the audit.

Conversely, some castellans were quite quick to understand how to make the case for their diligence and, both before and after the plague, sought to advance their careers in this way. Because local officials' voices surface more seldom and distorted in the accounts, the case for their response to the ethos of accountability promoted by the auditors rests on succinct mentions in the *computi*. Increases in revenues in relation to previous terms were duly noted, sometimes matter-of-factly for the precedent thus created, but in other cases worded in a

⁹⁵ “Lidit maistre ... entendent a delivrer les officiaires si unesment qu'il ne se puissent plaindre comme autre foiz”; Nani, “Primi statute” (n. 19 above) 199 (article 1).

⁹⁶ Chambéry, ADS, SA 9356, m. 1.

⁹⁷ Chambéry, ADS, SA 8893, m. 1. The lenient approach taken by the central administration might be explained by the fact that the castellan was the experienced Pierre de Montgelaz, serving at Conflans the year before Ogier, Amadeus VI's half-brother, possibly to put things in order for him; see n. 84 above.

way that made the current castellan's performance stand out from his predecessors', and even signaled by a *vide* in the left margin.⁹⁸ Although such references were calculated, they could hardly prove decisive at a time when promotion to office was increasingly often a reflection of the candidate's capacity to loan the count upward of 100 *livres Viennois*, whereas the increase highlighted in the *computus* was on the order of a few *sous*, albeit in annual revenue.⁹⁹ My point is that through such mentions castellans sought to highlight not so much the financial gain as their diligence in identifying previously uncollected revenues or increasing productivity. For once, it was not the money itself but what it said about the official's conduct and character. Consequently, I interpret such phrases as the castellans' calculated response to the model of administrative diligence put forth in the auditors' instructions; small wonder that the clerks were happy to oblige and make sure the castellans' diligence was reflected in the record.

Understanding the auditors' discourse and meeting their expectations through a cooperating attitude was the sign of the upwardly mobile official, as illustrated by the example of Pierre de Montgelaz. As already intimated, in 1349 most castellans sought to justify their declining annual balance by pleading the devastations of the plague, described in the *computi* in a half dramatic, half matter-of-fact way.¹⁰⁰ Conversely, inspecting Pierre's account for the castellany of Montmélian (March 1349), the uninformed reader might wonder at the list of uncollected fines from twenty-four individuals, of whom some had died in the last few years and some who were too poor to pay,¹⁰¹ but would not guess that many of the deaths were caused by an epidemic, for there is no mention of it in the entire account. Nor is a phrase like "computat minus solito" even once used to justify a decrease in annual revenue, even though Pierre was not shy to claim a deduction of 30 *sous* promised him in last year's *computus* on account of a meadow flooded by the Isère.¹⁰² His final balance for March 1348–March 1349

⁹⁸ As in Chambéry, ADS, SA 11579, m. 2 (Faverge, 1319; emphasis added):

vide hic   Recepit ibidem de redditum per annum eodem termino quos invenit in dictam castellaniam deberi domino per annum *ultra summam predictam et de quibus hactenus non fuit computatum per castellanos predecessores eius.*

⁹⁹ See Epurescu-Pascovici, "Castellany Accounts" (n. 50 above) 88–89.

¹⁰⁰ E.g., in reference to the revenues from the *clame* (judicial pleas): "computat multum minus solito propter mortalitatem gentium que fuit dicto tempore universaliter in populo"; Chambéry, ADS, SA 9813, m. 5 (La Rochette, March 1349). And see the responses reviewed in Cox, *Green Count of Savoy* (n. 16 above) 68–69.

¹⁰¹ Chambéry, ADS, SA 9354, m. 5.

¹⁰² *Ibid.* m. 9.

shows the count substantially in his debt—a common occurrence, to be sure.¹⁰³ Pierre de Montgelaz started off as a small knight and became a senior administrator, *bailli* of Savoy proper (not unlike Guillaume, mere coseigneur of Châtillon, who four decades earlier rose to the rank of *bailli* of Genevois and then of Savoy proper); his account was audited in the presence of the count and his entire council. Whatever might have been said at the audit about the topic on everyone's lips, a plague so terrifying that it seemed a scourge of God, in the account itself—the version of record, archived and liable to be reexamined, if need be¹⁰⁴—Pierre chose not to plead its devastations as an excuse for posting lower revenues. Less than two years later he was appointed through Amadeus VI's ordinances as one of the two master auditors of all of Savoy's financial accounts. Since he was already an up-and-coming man, we cannot know what part was played in this promotion by his robust attitude in 1349, but it certainly could not have hurt his prospects. But that such remarkable deportment in the face of the plague's devastations should come from an official with ample knowledge of the workings of the administration is not coincidental. At a time when most castellans appeared overwhelmed by the calamity, he understood that a different response was expected by the count and his top aides.

The trajectory of castellans' accountability in the decades after 1351 cannot be analyzed here in any detail. The practice of appointing as castellans aristocrats and urban notables capable of lending substantial amounts to the count upon taking office picked up in the second half of the fourteenth century.¹⁰⁵ Aristocratic families ended up monopolizing the office of castellan in a given place for decades or generations.¹⁰⁶ By the late fourteenth century, these structural problems spelled trouble for the auditors' efforts to uphold standards of accountability in office. In 1391, in two requests for subsidies from the citizens of Chambéry and Aosta, Amadeus VII complained that he could not remove castellans until he repaid them the loans, for all that it would have been advantageous to him and his subjects to make new appointments inasmuch as the castellans' administration was geared toward aggressively recouping the large

¹⁰³ This trend has been observed from the earliest studies on the *computi*; Mario Chiaudano, "Il bilancio sabaudo nel secolo XIII," *Bollettino Storico-Bibliografico Subalpino* 29 (1927) 485–533, here 495–496. The debt was rolled over to Pierre's subsequent account, for the castellany of Ugine, his next appointment.

¹⁰⁴ As was the case with the accounts of Tournon in 1337: "ut in pluribus computis dicte castellanie Turnonis diligenter examinatis"; Dufour, "Vente du château" (n. 78 above) 151.

¹⁰⁵ This is studied in detail for Piedmont from 1360 onward: Alessandro Barbero, *Il ducato di Savoia: Amministrazione e corte di uno stato franco-italiano (1356–1416)* (Bari 2002) 48–67.

¹⁰⁶ The Beaufort family at Tournon from the 1350s to the 1390s; the Serraval at Faverges from the 1350s and Tournon from the 1390s; the Belletruche at Conflans from the 1380s; see Andrée Duperray, *Inventaire-index des comptes de châtelainie et de subsides* (Chambéry 1996) 258–263, 339–341, 557–561. For an overview, see Castenuovo, *Ufficiali e gentiluomini* (n. 16 above) 328–329.

amounts they had advanced him and his predecessors.¹⁰⁷ Even allowing for the rhetoric of demands for financial aid, the situation was serious. But even as the accountability of castellans as public officials was in sharp decline, the accountancy of castellanies' revenues and expenses was becoming more professional: the *computi*'s structure was standardized, the typical entry became more elaborate, and there were more cross-references to the accounts of other officials and to supporting documentation. Finally, in addition to injunctions, a variety of lengthy memoranda were duly inscribed in account after account. While instructions for the more efficient exploitation of local resources continued to be issued, this use of memoranda signals a renewed emphasis on the preservation of the count's patrimony—never far from the administration's concerns—inasmuch as they were meant to ensure that a revenue alienated for a few decades would not be lost for good through officials' neglect. In contrast to the European trend toward streamlining accounting records, the Savoyard castellany *computus* ballooned from the couple of parchment membranes of the thirteenth century to a dozen or more by the end of the fourteenth. On parchment, things looked more impressive than ever before in the history of Savoyard accounting, but the reality was different. The practice of instructing the castellans had ossified. The repetition of the same instructions in account after account over decades suggests that castellans' noncompliance only got worse, and we can only guess as to the effects on the auditors' morale. For all the administration's efforts to address it through more rigorous accountancy and auditing, the problem was structural and required structural changes in Savoyard finances. In the late fourteenth century, such changes took the form not of a reform of castellans' appointments but,¹⁰⁸ as throughout Western Europe, of a shift in the weight of the fiscal burden away from the castellanies' traditional revenues, largely rooted in twelfth-century seigniorial rights, and toward direct taxation, or *subsidia*. Castellany *computi* continued into the early sixteenth century, but were eclipsed by the accounts of the *subsidia*, although even these did not prove quite the hoped-for panacea for the system's ills.¹⁰⁹

CONCLUSION

Following the transfer of an advanced institutional model from England to Savoy, the process of acculturating territorial officials to the norms and practices of financial and administrative accountability unfolded over a century. Controlling the patchwork of lands and revenues straddling the Alps and the Rhone

¹⁰⁷ Etienne Dullin, *Les châtelains dans les domaines de la Maison de Savoie en deçà des Alpes* (Grenoble 1911) 43n5; and Castelnovo, *Ufficiali e gentiluomini* (n. 16 above) 258–259.

¹⁰⁸ On the abortive attempt of the 1390s, see Dullin, *Les châtelains* (n. 107 above) 43–44.

¹⁰⁹ Nicolas Carrier, "Local Communities and Fiscal Reform in Late Medieval Savoy: Lords, Peasants, and Subsidies," in *Accounts and Accountability* (n. 71 above) 205–228.

began with controlling territorial officials. The key findings of this study pertain precisely to the manner in which this was achieved. The exchanges with territorial officials could become tense but did not escalate into a *conflictus*, the epithet used by Richard of Ely to dramatize the auditing of sheriffs' accounts at the English Exchequer.¹¹⁰ Inculcating rather than strictly enforcing the norms of accountability was the logical choice for the senior administrators in view of their professional vocation and the dynasty's growing dependence on the aristocratic castellans. So was their turn to rhetoric to achieve this end, from systematic repetition to value-laden language to the hyperbolized threat of sanctions. The calculated approach taken by the central administration is an indication of the aristocracy's status as the dynasty's partners in a dialogue of power, which morphed into an institutional dialogue as local lords found in the castellan appointments an avenue for reinforcing their dominant social status.¹¹¹ It was overseen by the count and his top aides, but its protagonists were the auditors and clerks of the central administration. With hindsight, one may find vindication of the auditors' approach in the experience of powerful kingdoms such as England and France, where the alternative tactic of heavy-handed enforcement did not make local officials' conduct easier to control.¹¹² Inasmuch as the senior administrators meant to put things in order rather than sack local officials, their work had a remedial dimension, not unlike Louis IX's inquests,¹¹³ with the highly significant difference that it was regular and procedural; notably, when they turned to rhetoric it was to uphold procedures and standards of service rather than general moral-religious values.

The auditors were not free of professional hubris, for there is something incongruous in their ambition to micromanage remote affairs down to the level of individual farmers through the written word, even as it was becoming apparent that they did not have a say in the career trajectory of the local officials whose accounts they checked. But judged against the background of the structural problems that plagued the Savoyard administration, the auditors' success is not negligible. They advanced the cause of institutional accountability through little more than parchment and words, that is, record-keeping and rhetoric. For all the challenges they had been facing, in the immediate aftermath of the 1351 regulations the auditors could hope for further successes. Indeed, as far as we can judge from the brief notes highlighting castellans' performance, some of them responded favorably to the auditors' efforts, seeking to demonstrate that they

¹¹⁰ Emilie Amt and Stephen Church, eds., *Dialogus de Scaccario: The Dialogue of the Exchequer; Constitutio Domus Regis: Disposition of the King's Household* (Oxford 2007) 11.

¹¹¹ Cf. Castelnovo, *Ufficiali e gentiluomini* (n. 16 above) 257.

¹¹² Mattéoni, "Vérifier, corriger, juger" (n. 83 above) 62; and Sabapathy, *Officers and Accountability* (n. 1 above) 123–125.

¹¹³ Marie Dejou, *Les enquêtes de Saint Louis: Gouverner et sauver son âme* (Paris 2014).

had embraced the ethos of diligent service and accountability. But by the late fourteenth century, the weight of the structural problems, chiefly the de facto autonomy of the growing number of castellans who had lent money to the count, proved too much; the dynasty was unwilling to tackle the issue head on, and it could no longer be papered over through normative language. The auditors' instructions, which previously could be relied on to influence castellans' conduct, increasingly rang hollow. Even so, the procedures and standards that had been put in place were a reminder to castellans of their status as public officials. A model of institutional accountability was preserved, if largely in discourse rather than practice.

More broadly, this essay has suggested that the instructions inserted in the *computi* afford a privileged entry point into Savoyard institutional accountability. The substantive use made of instructions from the early fourteenth century reflects several defining characteristics of Savoyard governance and institutional architecture. To begin with, this study has shown that administrative accountability was fundamental for the Savoyard fiscal-institutional project. The auditing of accounts was about more than mere financial accountancy: even under complicated circumstances, it aimed toward a broader accountability of office. Owing to the instructions, the castellany *computi* served as instruments for governing the territory from the center, in addition to their function as balances of revenues and expenses. What is more, the records' hybrid nature is mirrored by their auditors' institutional role, which defies clear-cut description. While comparison with the compartmentalized modern institutions is a useful way of eliciting the functional overlap and lack of strict differentiation characterizing medieval administrations, the complexity of the Savoyard auditors' responsibilities cannot be properly understood if judged by modern standards. The auditors did not simply verify accounts but took steps to address a variety of financial and administrative issues. It is true that their normative discourse was reactive, responding to local developments and territorial officials' shortcomings, but that is in large measure what administration is always about. Lastly, the constant and occasionally quite vigorous exchanges to which the *computi* bear witness, while certainly aggravated by financial pressures, speak to larger tensions in Savoyard society: between the traditional oral culture of the Alpine communities and the newly arrived notarial culture, and between local aristocrats who looked to castellany appointments to reinforce their dominant status and the upwardly mobile bourgeois of the central administration.

Beyond its instrumental uses, the rhetorical language would have appealed to the auditors themselves, who would have found it appropriate for the value they attached to their work. For in the instructions and memoranda the auditors found a medium for expatiating on the core tenets of their profession: procedures, standards of administrative service, written proof, and the proper *mise-en-page*

of the account rolls. It takes someone truly convinced of the importance of his work to formulate pedantic instructions, as in the 1335 memorandum to the castellan of Tournon. Unlike in England, in Savoy there were no treatises in which to articulate a professional reflection on accountability, and so it fell to instructions and memoranda infused with rhetoric to fulfil this function. Through them, bureaucratic procedures were invested with value and significance. Practical objectives and professional values were mutually reinforcing.

Finally, the detailed findings on how local officials' accountability worked in practice suggest the value of this study for broader comparisons. It is significant that in Savoy the turn to rhetoric as an alternative to real censures came after half a century of institutional accountability. Some of the most powerful representations of state power in the context of accounts auditing are later still: for example, the miniature illustrations in a couple of manuscripts emanating from the *chambre de comptes* of nearby France.¹¹⁴ They are not, however, a transparent window onto auditing practice, and the image of strength they project should not be taken at face value. They tell us of the aspirations of the political-administrative elites, profoundly invested in the ideology of a strong central power. The reality, however, was more complex; even in France, sanctioning local officials was a complicated proposition. The symbolism, then, is best approached as visual rhetoric, part of the auditors' institutional dialogue with local officials—specifically, seeking to impress them with images of divinely-ordained rule at a time when real administrative censures were not readily available.¹¹⁵ While this aspect obviously needs more study, the way in which a rhetoric of accountability emerged in Savoy in the first half of the fourteenth century is an example of a more general trajectory in late medieval Europe.

¹¹⁴ Mattéoni, "Vérifier, corriger, juger" (n. 83 above) 42–45.

¹¹⁵ See Ionuț Epurescu-Pascovici, "From the Auditing of Accounts to Institutional Accountability in Late-Medieval Europe," in *Accounts and Accountability* (n. 71 above) 1–19, here 12–13.

APPENDIX

1. Repeated injunctions to the castellan of Tournon to produce the instrument of lease for a vineyard, 1328–1333.

a. Account of Pierre Fantin, castellan of Tournon, 6 July 1327–19 April 1328, received in Chambéry by Vivian Veyllet of Chambéry. Chambéry, ADS, SA 10297, m. 2.

Recepit a Peroneto Martonis de novo redditu per annum pro vinea domini continente circa sexdecim fosseratas quam tenebat dictus Peronetus ad terciam parte musti ut in tercio computo precedenti, sibi albergata pro tanto per dominum Martinum de Monte Gelato olim castellanum Turnonis per annum. Et fuit dicto castellano in secundo computo precedenti iniunctum quod in precedenti computo aportaret instrumentum albergamenti pro habenda pleniori informatione supra predictis; et quia dictum instrumentum non aportavit, iterum fuit sibi iniunctum in computo precedenti ut ipsum instrumentum in presenti computo aportaret; et quia ipse dictum instrumentum non aportavit, iterum iniungitur sibi sub pena viginti solidorum ut ipsum instrumentum in sequenti computo aportet.

b. Account of Pierre Fantin, castellan of Tournon, 8 February 1332–1 March 1333, submitted by his vice-castellan, Pierre Bartholomet, and received in Chambéry by Vivian Veyllet of Chambéry. Chambéry, ADS, SA 10299, m. 1.

... et fuit alia plures iniunctum dicto castellano sub certa pena quod aportaret in computo instrumentum vel litteram albergamenti, quod facere non potuit, ut dicit, quia ipsum instrumentum combustum fuit in incendio ville Turnonis, ut asserit dictus tenementarius per iuramentum; et iniungitur sibi ut posse suum faciat querendi prothocollum.

2. A deduction is initially denied because the castellan failed to convince the clerk through adequate proof; it is granted in the subsequent account (Tournon, 1335).

a. Account of Pierre Fantin, castellan of Tournon, 27 April 1334–20 March 1335, received in Seyssel by Romanet Barbier of Chambéry in the count's presence. ADS, Chambéry, SA 10301, m. 1.

Sciendum est quod dictus castellanus in suo precedenti computo dixit et adhuc dicit quod dominus nunc comes vendidit reverendo in Christo patri domino Aymoni de Miolano quondam Episcopo Maurienae, non tanquam episcopo sed tanquam domino Aymoni de Myolano, merum et mixtum imperium et omnimodam jurisdictionem et homines omnes, homagia, redditos, census, taillia, servicia et usagia que habet, habebat et sibi debebantur in mistralia Milleriarum que esse solebant de mandamento Turnonis; et facta fuit dicta venditio die xxvii^a mensis junii anno ccxxxiii^o. Et dicit quod inde receperunt instrumenta Johannes Reynandi et Humbertus Didieri clerici domini, propter quod petiit et iterum petit dictus castellanus sibi deduci blada, pecuniam et alia infrascripta in presenti particula, dicens quod ea includuntur in venditione predicta. Et petiit et iterum

petit ea sibi deduci, eo quod non recepit ipsa quamvis de ipsis ad plenum computatum fuerit pro anno ccc xxxiii. Sed quia fidem non facit de venditione predicta, nec de ipsis particulis que in ipsa venditione includuntur, necque portat litteram domini de mandato faciendi deductionem predictam, sed solummodo dicit oretenus ita esse, non fit ad presens deductio de predictis, quamvis Stephanus de Becone famulus dicti domini episcopi venerit in redditione precedentis computi et requisierit dictam deductionem fieri, que sibi facta fuisset si litteram domini de mandato exhibuisset vel reddere voluisset copiam instrumenti in formam publicam de venditione predicta, quam reddere recusavit. Sed cum de predictis fidem fecerit et copiam rediderit de venditione et mandato domini, ea tunc sibi debebunt deduci.

- b. Account of Pierre Fantin, castelan of Tournon, 20 March–14 May 1335, received in Chambéry by Vivian Veyllet of Chambéry. Chambéry, ADS, SA 10301, m. 10.

Quam remanenciam sibi retinet pro satisfactione viginta librorum sex solidorum sex denariorum fortium escucell. qui sibi debent deduci ut asserit pro redditibus datis in feudum per dominum domino Sancte Elene, ut supra in computo precedente in principio computi pro annis ccc xxxiii et xxxiiii.

3. Instructions for the recovery of criminal fines, castellany of La Rochette, 1349–1351

- a. Account of Pierre de Compey, castellan of La Rochette, 5 March 1348–12 March 1349, received in Chambéry by Etienne Barbier and audited by Guillaume Bon and Pierre Bonivard. Chambéry, ADS, SA 9813, m. 4–5.

*Banna de arragio*¹¹⁶

De quinque solidis Gebennensis in quibus Bastardus Batayllard pro verbis iniuriosis dictis Johanni Songeti condurario, et de x solidis in quibus Agneta uxor Bernardi de Beries pro iniuria dicta Thome Julliani de Monte Endrito fuerunt condemnati infra tempus de quo computavit in computo precedenti, in quo dixit quod nulla bona habuerunt et propter eorum pauperitatem minima nichil ab eis recuperare potuit et quod dictus Bastardus fuit condemnatus per errorem quia alias fuerat eadem occasione in decem solidis condemnatus, sed inquisitio non fuerat cancellata; De xxx solidis fort. in quibus fuit condemnatus Willelmus Chandreti de Campo Laurencii pro penis spretis, ut dicitur in computo precedenti, in quo dixit dictus castellanus quod dictus Willelmus appellavit et appellacionem suam prossequebatur, sed de hoc fidem non fecit, propter quod in dicto computo iniunctum fuit eidem quod ipsam condemnationem recuperaret nisi condemnatus fidem faceret quod dictam appellacionem prossequeretur, ita quod de ipsa posset in suo presenti computi computare aut de ipsa prosecutione appellacionis vel summa absolucionis facere fidem; quem fidem non facit et nichil recuperavit ab eo, ut dicit. Et iniungitur sibi quod dictas condemnationes et quantitates, et similiter alias condemnationes et quantitates infrascriptorum bannorum de arragio diu est condemnatus a quibus extiterat appellatum, ut dicitur in computo precedenti, et de quibus nullam facit fidem, nec fecit in eodem computo precedenti quod dicte appellaciones prossequantur, recuperet infra quindecim dies

¹¹⁶ In the manuscript, the headings, or *tituli*—here, *banna de arragio*—are indicated in the left margin.

post proximum festum Pasche, aliter allocabuntur supra ipsum in primo suo computo nisi a domino aliud habuerit in mandatis. Quantitates condempnationum et nomina debentium qui appellaverant sunt hec: primo, C s. in quibus Johannes Duchati de terra Aciis ...

Similiter iniunctio fit eidem de x solidis fort. in quibus Bastardus Baptaillardi condempnatus fuit aut stare in raterio cum pane et aqua per octo dies pro iniuria dicta Johanni Songeti; x solidis in quibus Aymo de Campis de Puttavilla aut stare in ratterio cum pane et aqua per certum tempus, occasione declarata in sexto computo precedenti ...

[m. 5] Et de quibus nichil recupperare potuit de predictis quia aliqui ipsorum diu est a terra domini fugitivi recesserunt, alii vero mortui sunt nullis bonis relictis, et alii sunt adeo pauperes quod nulla bona habent, ut dicit et dicitur in computo precedenti, et facta fuit fides pro maiori parte in novo computo precedenti, in quo dicitur quod dicte condempnationes, exceptis duabus primis, facte fuerunt in tempore domini Humberti de Chignino olim castellani ibidem, ut dicitur in computo precedenti.

b. Account of Jean de Cuines, seigneur of Ribaud, castellan of La Rochette, 16 May 1349–3 May 1350, received in Chambéry by Viviand Veyillet of Chambéry and audited by Pierre de Montgélaz, Guillaume Bon, and Pierre Bonivard. Chambéry, ADS, SA 9814, m. 4.

Banna de arragio

De bannis de arragio particulariter continentis in computo precedenti annexo presenti computo ▸ nichil computat quia ▸ Et de quibus non fuerunt facta tempore suo, et ignoratur utrum castellanus habet copiam ante ipsum ipsa recuperaverit, quia in dicto computo precedenti fuit sibi expresse iniunctum ipsa recuperari. Idcirco sciatur si ipsa in toto vel nec in parte recuperavit, et nisi iustam protulerit causam supra ipsum allocentur in suo computo, prout dicitur in computo precedenti – qua iusta causa ostensa, inserantur in computo sequenti.

c. Account of Jean de Cuines, seigneur of Ribaud, castellan of La Rochette, 3 March 1350–16 February 1351, received in Chambéry by Guiffredum Vethone of Chambéry and audited by Pierre Montgelaz and Guillaume Bon. Chambéry, ADS, SA 9815, m. 6. Copy of notarial deed dated 18 February 1351, inserted in *computus* after *banna de arragio*.

Per hoc presens publicum instrumentum cunctis appareat evidenter quod cum per computatores domini nostri Amedei comitis Sabaudie iniunctum fuisset castellano Ruppecule in suo computo per eum reddito in anno domini millesimo ccc^o quinquagesimo; banna de arragiis in dicta sua castellania condempnatis et debitis, quod idem castellanus ipsa banna recuperaret aut in suo sequenti computo alloquarentur, nisi de sua diligencia in ipsis recuperandis facta appareret; huic est quod Anthonius Cyna vicecastellanus Ruppecule diligenter inquisivit de personis infrascriptis si aliqua bona mobilia vel immobilia habent, tenent vel possident de quibus compelli possent ad solvendum et satisfaciendum quibus quantatibus in

qua extitit condemnatus in toto vel in parte, videlicet per dominum¹¹⁷ Johannem de Urteriis curatum imperiale, Johannem Vibondi, Johannem Marescalci clericum, Franciscum Vincencii, Perretum Ferrerie et dictum Disinuet de Ruppecula, qui per dictum vicecastellanum interrogati et supra sanctam Dei evangeliam iuraverunt si aliqua bona que teneat et possideat Bastardus Bataillardi sciunt de quibus compelli possit ad satisfaciendum decem solidos fort. escucell. in quibus condemnatus fuit iam diu est, qui eorum iuramento dixerunt quod idem Bastardus nulla bona possidet; Item de viginti solidis fort. in quibus Eynarda filia Rostagnii de Ruppecula condemnata fuit, dixerunt quod ipsa diu est decessit nullis sibi bonis relictis; Item de viginti solidis fort. de remanencia unius condemnationis sexaginta solidorum fort. in quibus Bertholetus de Rothonens condemnatus fuit, dixerunt quod diu est decessit et nulla sibi reperiuntur bona; Item de decem denariis fort. in quibus Clavellus condemnatus fuit, non fuit in patria a quindecim annis circa et nulla sibi reperiuntur bona per testimonium domini¹¹⁸ Hugonis curati Sancto Mauricii; etc.

¹¹⁷ In the text, *dognum*.

¹¹⁸ See previous note.

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