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Trustworthy MILS: CC Composite Evaluation Approach

Schwarz, Reinhard; Müller, Kevin; Blomberg, Alex Söding-Freiherr; Leconte, Bertrand; Gobbo, Gilles; Paulitsch, Michael; Tillequin, Axel

Researcher(s)
Leconte, Bertrand; Gilles, Gobbo; Schwarz, Reinhard; Müller, Kevin; Paulitsch, Michael; Blomberg, Axel Söding-Freiherr; Tillequin, Axel

As high assurance software systems are becoming more complex and sophisticated, assuring their security and safety is increasingly difficult and costly. Mono-lithic evaluation approaches do not scale well because evaluation effort grows exponentially with the complexity of the evaluation target. To keep pace with growing assurance demands, a compositional evaluation approach is a promising strategy.


In a compositional evaluation, the individual components of a system are evaluated independently, and these partial evaluation results are composed to derive the overall evaluation verdict with minimum additional effort. The Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (ISO/IEC 15408) and the sup-porting documentation offer two different compositional evaluation schemes: the “Composite Product Evaluation for Smart Cards and Similar Devices” (CPE) and the “Composed Assurance Package” (CAP).


In this report, we assess the suitability of CPE in the avionics domain, and we compare this evaluation scheme with its CAP alternative. We use the problem of evaluating an avionic security gateway as a case study to illustrate the implications, advantages, and drawbacks of the CPE approach.

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