January 1, 2012 Journal article Open Access

Steffen Wendzel; Jörg Keller

DataCite XML Export

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  <identifier identifierType="DOI">10.5281/zenodo.4618134</identifier>
  <creators>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Steffen Wendzel</creatorName>
      <nameIdentifier nameIdentifierScheme="ORCID" schemeURI="http://orcid.org/">0000-0002-1913-5912</nameIdentifier>
      <affiliation>FernUniversität in Hagen</affiliation>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Jörg Keller</creatorName>
      <affiliation>FernUniversität in Hagen</affiliation>
    </creator>
  </creators>
  <titles>
    <title>Preventing Protocol Switching Covert Channels</title>
  </titles>
  <publisher>Zenodo</publisher>
  <publicationYear>2012</publicationYear>
  <subjects>
    <subject>Covert Channels</subject>
    <subject>Data Leakage Protection</subject>
    <subject>Active Wardens</subject>
    <subject>Information Hiding</subject>
    <subject>Steganography</subject>
    <subject>Network Security</subject>
    <subject>Information Security</subject>
    <subject>Cybersecurity</subject>
  </subjects>
  <dates>
    <date dateType="Issued">2012-01-01</date>
  </dates>
  <language>en</language>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="JournalArticle"/>
  <alternateIdentifiers>
    <alternateIdentifier alternateIdentifierType="url">https://zenodo.org/record/4618134</alternateIdentifier>
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  <relatedIdentifiers>
    <relatedIdentifier relatedIdentifierType="URL" relationType="IsIdenticalTo" resourceTypeGeneral="JournalArticle">http://www.thinkmind.org/articles/sec_v5_n34_2012_2.pdf</relatedIdentifier>
    <relatedIdentifier relatedIdentifierType="DOI" relationType="IsVersionOf">10.5281/zenodo.4618133</relatedIdentifier>
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  <version>1.0.0</version>
  <rightsList>
    <rights rightsURI="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International</rights>
    <rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess">Open Access</rights>
  </rightsList>
  <descriptions>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">&lt;p&gt;Network covert channels enable a policy-breaking network communication (e.g., within botnets). Within the last years, new covert channel techniques arose which are based on the capability of protocol switching. Such protocol switching covert channels operate within overlay networks and can (asa special case) contain their own internal control protocols. We present the first approach to effectively limit the bitrate of such covert channels by introducing a new active warden.We present a calculation method for the maximum usable bitrate of these channels in case the active warden is used. We discuss implementation details of the active warden and discuss results from experiments that indicate the usability in practice. Additionally, we present means to enhance the practical application of our active warden by applying a formal grammar-based whitelisting and by proposing the combination of a previously developed detection technique in combination with our presented approach.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <description descriptionType="Other">Code is available: https://github.com/cdpxe/NetworkCovertChannels</description>
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