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We're only in it for the money: are incentives enough to compensate poor motivation?

Brunel Valentin; Palat Blazej


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  <identifier identifierType="DOI">10.5281/zenodo.4573241</identifier>
  <creators>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Brunel Valentin</creatorName>
      <affiliation>Sciences Po - CNRS</affiliation>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Palat Blazej</creatorName>
      <affiliation>Sciences Po - CNRS</affiliation>
    </creator>
  </creators>
  <titles>
    <title>We're only in it for the money: are incentives enough to compensate poor motivation?</title>
  </titles>
  <publisher>Zenodo</publisher>
  <publicationYear>2021</publicationYear>
  <dates>
    <date dateType="Issued">2021-03-02</date>
  </dates>
  <language>en</language>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="Text">Presentation</resourceType>
  <alternateIdentifiers>
    <alternateIdentifier alternateIdentifierType="url">https://zenodo.org/record/4573241</alternateIdentifier>
  </alternateIdentifiers>
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    <relatedIdentifier relatedIdentifierType="DOI" relationType="IsVersionOf">10.5281/zenodo.4573240</relatedIdentifier>
    <relatedIdentifier relatedIdentifierType="URL" relationType="IsPartOf">https://zenodo.org/communities/cdsp</relatedIdentifier>
  </relatedIdentifiers>
  <rightsList>
    <rights rightsURI="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International</rights>
    <rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess">Open Access</rights>
  </rightsList>
  <descriptions>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">&lt;p&gt;There are moments in online panel operation when technical, financial, or&lt;br&gt;
organisational constraints impose a change in panel functioning rules, resulting in increased&lt;br&gt;
risk of attrition. On the occasion of panel functioning change in ELIPSS, a French non-&lt;br&gt;
commercial online panel, we explored information predictive of panel survival when&lt;br&gt;
membership became less attractive to panellists. Available information was collected at&lt;br&gt;
different stages of individual participation: recruitment, profiling, and survey response&lt;br&gt;
behavior (paradata). We also devised an experiment aimed at testing differences in&lt;br&gt;
effectiveness between three types of incentives on panel survival: repetitive financial&lt;br&gt;
incentives (two incentives separated by a four-month period), single financial incentive, and&lt;br&gt;
single financial incentive coupled with a gift. A hierarchical logistic regression model made it&lt;br&gt;
possible to distinguish indices derived from survey response behavior and from questions&lt;br&gt;
pertaining to panellists&amp;rsquo; initial motivation to join the panel as significant predictors of panel&lt;br&gt;
survival. Our findings can be useful for panel monitoring in the context of important changes&lt;br&gt;
in its functioning. They outline that long-lasting attitudes towards panel participation have&lt;br&gt;
much more impact on panel survival than the amount of incentives received.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </descriptions>
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