Presentation Open Access

We're only in it for the money: are incentives enough to compensate poor motivation?

Brunel Valentin; Palat Blazej


DCAT Export

<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:adms="http://www.w3.org/ns/adms#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dct="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dctype="http://purl.org/dc/dcmitype/" xmlns:dcat="http://www.w3.org/ns/dcat#" xmlns:duv="http://www.w3.org/ns/duv#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:frapo="http://purl.org/cerif/frapo/" xmlns:geo="http://www.w3.org/2003/01/geo/wgs84_pos#" xmlns:gsp="http://www.opengis.net/ont/geosparql#" xmlns:locn="http://www.w3.org/ns/locn#" xmlns:org="http://www.w3.org/ns/org#" xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" xmlns:prov="http://www.w3.org/ns/prov#" xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" xmlns:schema="http://schema.org/" xmlns:skos="http://www.w3.org/2004/02/skos/core#" xmlns:vcard="http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#" xmlns:wdrs="http://www.w3.org/2007/05/powder-s#">
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4573241">
    <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/ns/dcat#Dataset"/>
    <dct:type rdf:resource="http://purl.org/dc/dcmitype/Text"/>
    <dct:identifier rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI">https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4573241</dct:identifier>
    <foaf:page rdf:resource="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4573241"/>
    <dct:creator>
      <rdf:Description>
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/Agent"/>
        <foaf:name>Brunel Valentin</foaf:name>
        <org:memberOf>
          <foaf:Organization>
            <foaf:name>Sciences Po - CNRS</foaf:name>
          </foaf:Organization>
        </org:memberOf>
      </rdf:Description>
    </dct:creator>
    <dct:creator>
      <rdf:Description>
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/Agent"/>
        <foaf:name>Palat Blazej</foaf:name>
        <org:memberOf>
          <foaf:Organization>
            <foaf:name>Sciences Po - CNRS</foaf:name>
          </foaf:Organization>
        </org:memberOf>
      </rdf:Description>
    </dct:creator>
    <dct:title>We're only in it for the money: are incentives enough to compensate poor motivation?</dct:title>
    <dct:publisher>
      <foaf:Agent>
        <foaf:name>Zenodo</foaf:name>
      </foaf:Agent>
    </dct:publisher>
    <dct:issued rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#gYear">2021</dct:issued>
    <dct:issued rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#date">2021-03-02</dct:issued>
    <dct:language rdf:resource="http://publications.europa.eu/resource/authority/language/ENG"/>
    <owl:sameAs rdf:resource="https://zenodo.org/record/4573241"/>
    <adms:identifier>
      <adms:Identifier>
        <skos:notation rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI">https://zenodo.org/record/4573241</skos:notation>
        <adms:schemeAgency>url</adms:schemeAgency>
      </adms:Identifier>
    </adms:identifier>
    <dct:isVersionOf rdf:resource="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4573240"/>
    <dct:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://zenodo.org/communities/cdsp"/>
    <dct:description>&lt;p&gt;There are moments in online panel operation when technical, financial, or&lt;br&gt; organisational constraints impose a change in panel functioning rules, resulting in increased&lt;br&gt; risk of attrition. On the occasion of panel functioning change in ELIPSS, a French non-&lt;br&gt; commercial online panel, we explored information predictive of panel survival when&lt;br&gt; membership became less attractive to panellists. Available information was collected at&lt;br&gt; different stages of individual participation: recruitment, profiling, and survey response&lt;br&gt; behavior (paradata). We also devised an experiment aimed at testing differences in&lt;br&gt; effectiveness between three types of incentives on panel survival: repetitive financial&lt;br&gt; incentives (two incentives separated by a four-month period), single financial incentive, and&lt;br&gt; single financial incentive coupled with a gift. A hierarchical logistic regression model made it&lt;br&gt; possible to distinguish indices derived from survey response behavior and from questions&lt;br&gt; pertaining to panellists&amp;rsquo; initial motivation to join the panel as significant predictors of panel&lt;br&gt; survival. Our findings can be useful for panel monitoring in the context of important changes&lt;br&gt; in its functioning. They outline that long-lasting attitudes towards panel participation have&lt;br&gt; much more impact on panel survival than the amount of incentives received.&lt;/p&gt;</dct:description>
    <dct:accessRights rdf:resource="http://publications.europa.eu/resource/authority/access-right/PUBLIC"/>
    <dct:accessRights>
      <dct:RightsStatement rdf:about="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess">
        <rdfs:label>Open Access</rdfs:label>
      </dct:RightsStatement>
    </dct:accessRights>
    <dcat:distribution>
      <dcat:Distribution>
        <dct:license rdf:resource="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode"/>
        <dcat:accessURL rdf:resource="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4573241"/>
      </dcat:Distribution>
    </dcat:distribution>
    <dcat:distribution>
      <dcat:Distribution>
        <dcat:accessURL rdf:resource="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4573241">https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4573241</dcat:accessURL>
        <dcat:byteSize>305560</dcat:byteSize>
        <dcat:downloadURL rdf:resource="https://zenodo.org/record/4573241/files/Brunel &amp; Palat 2020.pdf">https://zenodo.org/record/4573241/files/Brunel &amp; Palat 2020.pdf</dcat:downloadURL>
        <dcat:mediaType>application/pdf</dcat:mediaType>
      </dcat:Distribution>
    </dcat:distribution>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
18
16
views
downloads
All versions This version
Views 1818
Downloads 1616
Data volume 4.9 MB4.9 MB
Unique views 1616
Unique downloads 1414

Share

Cite as