Toward Defensive Restructuring in the Middle East

structures should allow states in the region to refrain from destabilizing offensiveweapon arms races and to pursue serious arms control efforts without fear of compromising their security. We do not contend that the problems of peace and stability in the region are principally military in character ; only that a defensive transformation of armed forces would contribute significantly to progress in the political sphere. We should also point out that we have excluded


Introduction
The Gulf Crisis signifies a staggering failure of policy on the part of all nations who have had a hand in shaping the security environment of the region. This is not a recent failure, nor one confined to the confrontation between Iraq and the US-led coalition. Four decades of realpolitik and USD 500 billion in arms transfers have brought neither security nor stability to the Middle East and North Africa. Looking to the future, some members of the anti-Iraq coalition envisage a new security order, at least for the Gulf area. But if this order is founded on a new confrontational alliance and massive new transfers of offensive arms to the region, it will not mark a turningpoint, just another phase in a 40-year march of folly.
In this study we suggest an alternative approach to defense and arms control policy for the Middle East and North Africa, comprising efforts to enhance the defensive potential of regional armed forces while limiting their capacity for cross-border offensive action. The goal of this approach is the evolution of defense structures that are non-provocative, resilient, relatively self-contained, and viable within existing demographic and resource constraints. Such structures should allow states in the region to refrain from destabilizing offensiveweapon arms races and to pursue serious arms control efforts without fear of com-promising their security. We do not contend that the problems of peace and stability in the region are principally military in character ; only that a defensive transformation of armed forces would contribute significantly to progress in the political sphere. We should also point out that we have excluded Turkey from the purview of this article because its geostrategic situation is greatly affected by its membership in NATO. Nevertheless, Turkey is an important actor in the region and has several outstanding disputes with its neighbors. In the light of the size and capability of its military, any comprehensive program of regional defensive restructuring should encompass Turkey.
Our analysis begins with a brief view of relevant non-offensive defense precepts.
Next we examine the special character of recent mid-intensity conflicts in the Mid-East and North Africa, paying particular attention to the structural limits on offensive and defensive action. On the basis of this analysis, we offer some defense modernization guidelines consistent with the precepts of non-offensive defense and suited to conditions in the region. With an eye to the recent Gulf Crisis, we apply our guidelines in some detail to the case of Saudi Arabia.
Finally, we show the implications of our approach for arms transfer and arms control policy, and for the intervention policies of extra-regional powers.
tive deterrence and, in the event of war, large-scale offensive action including escalation to the nuclear level. By contrast, a defense along non-offensive lines would deter aggression principally by lowering an aggressor's probability of success. Should deterrence fail, it would contain and exhaust aggression through a combination of areadefense and smaller-scale maneuver forces and tactics. By incorporating limits on the capacity for offensive action, a nonoffensive defense posture would improve crisis stability and mitigate interstate tensions. Moreover, by improving defense efficiency, it would make possible significant near-term reductions in the level of armed forces and military spending.' I Most alternative defense models draw in common on the area-defense tradition and emphasize the increased anti-armor capability of modern infantry weapons and indirect-fire artillery systems. Models differ from each other in several respects, including (1) how they balance and integrate light and heavy forces, and static and mobile components; and (2) the degree to which they rely on high-technology inputs.
Our application of non-offensive defense to the Gulf region derives from the most recent variant of the 'spider-in-its-web' model.'-Its distinguishing features are: 1. 'Lightness' of a large portion of its constituent combat units.
2. Division of the ground force into an areacovering component with low organic mobility and a mechanized/air-mechanized component -these components standing in a threeor four-to-one ratio. 3. Close integration of the mechanized and area-covering components, with the latter boosting the capability of the former by providing intelligence, logistics, and combat support. 4. The partial substitution of firepower mobility for troop mobility and, hence, an increased emphasis on non-line-ofsight artillery systems. 5. A range limit on most artillery systems of 50 kilometers, and on close-air-support aircraft of 300 kilometers (combat radius). 6. Reduced emphasis on intelligent weapons, and greater emphasis on improving the intelligence-gathering capacity of the defense system as a whole -for instance, by the use of sensor fields, reconnaissance drones, and network communications.
7. An emphasis on troop dispersion, battlefield preparations (including protected firing positions, shelters, minefields, and obstacles), and protection of the logistics and communication infrastructures.
These design features provide our starting-point for developing a model tailored to conditions in the Mid-East and North Africa. In the next sections we examine some of these conditions as revealed by the conduct of recent conflicts in the region.

Patterns and Parameters of Conflict
Most mid-intensity wars in North Africa and the Mid-East share distinctive attributes: War-initiating states are seldom able to consolidate initial gains quickly. Neither, however, are defenders able to contain and expel aggressors quickly. After an early period of intense combat and often considerable movement, wars typically settle into a long phase of intermittent and indecisive fighting. This despite the fact that the region's nations usually go to war with limited objectives in mind, frequently rely on strategic surprise, and have attempted to incorporate the tools and tactics of modern mechanized air-land warfare.3 Conforming closely to this pattern are Libya's long intervention in Chad, the Somalian assault on Ethiopia, Ethiopia's efforts to suppress Eritrean separatists, Iraq's invasion of Iran, and the war in the Western Sahara. Of course, these cases vary among themselves, especially as to the character of the stalemate phase. Common to them, however, has been the inability of the combatants to force a decision through sustained offensive action.4 By contrast, the Israeli successes in the Six-Day War and the 1982 Bekaa Valley campaign constitute strong counter-examples. We will return to these later; for now, suffice it to say that Israel and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) are unique in many respects besides their success in war.
3.1 I Regional Armies on the Defensive In contrast to their performance in offensive operations, regional armies have demonstrated both inventiveness and stamina when fighting on the defensive. In the Iran-Iraq war, for instance, Iraq was able to recover from its early, unsuccessful offensive to check numerous Iranian counter-attacks. Regarding Iraqi defensive operations, one analyst has observed that 'there has probably never been as much construction plant on a battlefield and such investment made in manipulating the terrain and making it suitable for military operations'.5 5 Iraq's defensive preparations included anti-tank obstacles, trenches, minefields, and underground headquarters; mutually-supporting, fortified strongpoints incorporating tanks in hull-down position; and alternate protected firing positions for artillery 6 Moroccan efforts to consolidate control of the Western Sahara against Polisario opposition provides another example of defensive ingenuity -although in this case associated with offensive objectives. To foil Polisario raids, Morocco built a tall sand barrier, the Hassan Wall, covered with sensors, reinforced with mobile units, and protected by minefields, small forts, and artillery. Eventually extending 1750 kilometers, the wall sealed off the rebels from 90% of the nation's population as well as from its key mineral resources, towns, and ports. Although Polisario troops proved able to breach the barrier repeatedly, it channeled their movements and helped the Moroccan army quickly locate and counter them.
The Arab-Israeli wars attest to both the strength and limits of defensive operations. On the Golan Heights in 1973, Israeli defensive positions proved more resilient than those along the Suez, holding out against vastly superior Syrian forces.',' On the Golan, the Israelis had deployed their forces in depth, not in a line; and the density of Israeli forces on the Golan was much higher than that along the Suez. These factors permitted better mutual support between firing positions, higher densities of artillery fire, and greater synergism between tanks, artillery, and minefields.
Exemplifying the strength of these defenses, one of the Israeli brigades withstood the attacks of a heavily reinforced Syrian division for four days. Chris Bellamy suggests that a major element of the brigade's success 'was its commanders' intimate knowledge of the ground'. They knew the advantages and disadvantages of every piece of high ground; moreover, the area had been prepared for a defensive holding battle, with hull-down tank positions and ramps, while range tables had been prepared to various landmarks to give an outnumbered force the maximum advantage against an oncoming enemy. 9 Just as the events of the 1973 war led some observers to predict the ascendancy of defensive operations, the 1982 Israeli defeat of Syrian forces in the Bekaa Valley led others to proclaim the renewed power of the offensive. But neither conflict provides sufficient grounds for such ambitious conclu-sions. The 1973 war demonstrated that defensive preparations, made and used with care, have the potential to arrest and erode armored thrusts. However, it also showed that an attacker can quickly learn to adapt and counter defenses that rest on too narrow a technical or tactical base. In other words, there is no more room for complacency on the defensive than on the offensive. The stunning Israeli success against the Syrians in the 1982 Bekaa Valley campaign amplifies this lesson.
In 1982 the IDF was able to dislodge 25,000 Syrians from prepared defensive positions in less than three days. Typically, Israeli air superiority played a critical role. Although the Syrian air defenses were formidable, including 79 missile launchers and 200 radar-directed guns, Syria had not deployed an adequate number of earlywarning radars. Moreover, Syrian electronic security was lax and its positions poorly protected. Compounding these errors, the Syrians made little use of the mobility of their SA-6 launchers, leaving them stationary for long periods. These failures allowed the Israelis to execute a devastating attack on Syrian air defenses. Given Israeli superiority in airborne reconnaissance and battle management systems, their air force quickly gained complete control of the air. This, plus a slight numerical superiority in soldiers and tanks, gave the IDF a decisive edge. The Syrians' many and egregious errors essentially derive from one: complacency in the preparation, deployment, and use of their defenses. That they could have, in any case, defeated the Israelis is questionable; but that they could have greatly increased the cost of Israeli success is certain.10

Factors Underlying the Historical
Pattern Several geostrategic and socio-economic variables have determined both the recent regional pattern of warfare and the major exceptions to it. These variables are: (1) the ratio of force to space in the theater, (2) the quality of the region's transportation networks, (3) the capacity of the military sustainment infrastructures of nearby nations, (4) the structure of their armed forces, and (5) the problems of national integration and. the politicization of regional military establishments. Examining these factors in greater detail will give us a better view of both the limits of and prerequisites for transforming regional defense postures.
3.2.1 The ratio of armed force to the space that regional armies must defend is, in many cases, quite low. When such conditions prevail, a European-style mobile or forward defense is susceptible to easy circumvention or penetration.&dquo; I As Table 1 shows, only one Arab nation among those with large armies -Syria -has a troop density approximating that prevailing in the central region of Europe. When we consider Arab nations other than Syria, the North-South contrast is stark. Of course, tactically, the largest Arab armies can achieve a degree of force concentration approaching that along Europe's former 'central front'. However, they seldom have the option of maintaining such a denselypacked front in peacetime, primarily because they perceive multiple threats on widely-separated borders, as well as facing serious internal threats. Moreover, most regional armies cannot, by means of rapid redeployment, quickly constitute a front wherever and whenever needed: they are not as mobile as their Northern counterparts, and the transportation networks along which they must move are comparatively underdeveloped (see Table 1). As a result, an attacker using surprise can often drive deep into a neighbor's territory before meeting substantial resistanceas was the case in Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia and Iraq's invasion of Iran. In conflicts where the force-to-space ratio is extremely lowfor instance, the wars in Chad and the Western Saharaa 'front', in the usual sense, might never materialize; neither attacker nor defender is able consistently to control any large portion of the contested area.
From the perspective of the dominant 6. Includes all alliance and national forces deployed in region. 7. Includes all alliance and national forces deployed in region. 8. Includes some number of tanks deployed in stationary mode. 9. Includes all alliance and national forces deployed in region. 10. Includes all alliance and national forces deployed in region. 11. Reflects addition of called-up reserves. 12. Reflects full mobilization potential.
European defense paradigm, there is only one good solution to these types of problems : increase the size and mobility of the armed forces. Later, we will suggest another: make better use of the resources at hand by specializing in area-covering defensive operations.
3.2.2 The transportation infrastructures of most nations in the region are underdeveloped. As noted above, there are relatively few roads and railbeds of sufficiently high quality to allow the rapid movement of heavy mechanized or even motorized troops. Although the presence of hardpacked desert areas and dried riverbeds partly compensates for this problem, diffi-cult terrainmarshes, mountains, escarpments, and shifting-sand deserts -often compartmentalizes the open areas. These features can make control of a few key transportation junctures critical to winning a war -as in the Sinai campaigns. 12 Underdevelopment of the transportation net also accelerates the tendency of combat power to degrade as the distance between an army and its base area increases. This dynamic particularly affects the capacity of combatants to sccstain cross-border offensives and, hence, partially counterbalances the problems defenders face in trying to meet an attack.

3.2.3
The sustainment infrastructures and equipment stocks of armed forces in the region are inadequate for prolonged combat. Compounding this weakness is the underdeveloped state of most of the region's military-industrial complexes. These factors help give the region's longer wars their oscillatory character: as wars proceed, periods of intense combat become briefer while recuperative periods grow longer, until defensive operations or simple raids predominate.
3.2.4 Most armed forces in the region have a 'Izybrid' character, mixing modern, mobile force components and components less suited to offense-oriented air-ground warfare. Developing nations have less leeway than do the nations of the industrialized North when attempting to balance perceived security needs and other competing claims on limited state revenues and scarce labor power. This results in distinctive force structures and unique operational problems. For example, as Table 2 shows, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq lack truly advanced tanks, and the proportion of advanced combat aircraft in their air forces is much less than that in the air forces of West Germany and the United Kingdom. There is less of a cost barrier, however, to acquiring large numbers of new, light and medium guided anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. This contributes to the greater strength of regional armed forces in defensive operations relative to offensive ones -at least when kind fights kind. Also significant is the lower ratio of tanks to ground force personnel in most Arab armies compared to Northern onesa contrast that grows in significance if one also considers the relative balance between advanced and older tank models. Syria and the Iraqi regular army attain tank-to-troop

Understanding Israel's Success in Offensive Operations
Israel's armed forces, although not the largest in the region, are the most modern.
As Table 2 illustrates, the Israeli ratio of tanks to ground force personnel far surpasses that of its neighbors. Israel also holds the only significant stock of advanced tanks in the region. The Royal Saudi Air Force has a larger proportion of advanced combat aircraft than does the Israeli Air Force (IAF), but the absolute size of the IAF's advanced segment puts it in a class by itself.
Nevertheless, like many nations in the region, Israel has a hybrid army: many of its tanks are of pre-1965 vintage, and it still makes use of half-tracks. Unlike the case in other nations, however, this 'second army' is well integrated with the first, and bifurcation is not evident in the quality of its officers or training.15 Augmenting the Israelis' advantage in equipment is their military sustainment infrastructure: the best in the region, perhaps the best in the world. Israel also possesses the region's most developed military-industrial complex. At the heart of these advantages is Israel's five-to-one advantage over its immediate neighbors in per capita income, as well as its highly skilled workforce and an extraordinary level of external military aid. Israel has not, however, simply substituted advanced technology for numbers of weapons and troops. In fact, Israel keeps a higher proportion of its citizenry under arms than does Iraq. Moreover, Israel maintains the highest density of military forces in the world -four times that of Iraq. This, together with its extensive road and rail network, allows Israel to concentrate armed forces quickly anywhere along its borders. Finally, the IDF embraces a style of military professionalism that gives play to innovation and initiative. This has occasionally led to costly problems of command and control, but it has also given Israel an important competitive edge in undertaking offenseoriented maneuver warfare. 16 Enduring demographic realities and the facts of underdevelopment preclude other nations in the region from successfully copying the Israeli style of warfare, at least in the near term. (The Israeli style is not, at any rate, of the stabilizing sort.) These realities do not, however, bar other nations from developing effective defensesprovided they are willing to eschew offense-oriented models.

Toward a Self-contained and Stabilizing Defense
The structural limits on offensive and defensive operations in the Mid-East and North Africa suggest several guidelines for developing stable and resilient defenses there. First, regional armed forces should build on their aptitude for defensive operations by placing special emphasis on such operations a competitive strategy that seeks to array strength against weakness.
Second, nations should structure and deploy their armed forces to minimize the problems associated with low theater forceto-space ratios. Several types of measures can help: with the aim of narrowing the scope of battle, nations should seek to defend critical areas selectively. More < important, they should emphasize measures I that facilitate area control by smaller forces for instance, the thorough preparation of likely battlefields and the substitution of firepower mobility for the mobility of heavy units.
Third, nations should plan, in the event of an invasion, to make better use of depth, seeking initially to trade space for time and enemy casualtiesa stratagem that would put strain on an aggressor's sustainment capabilities while relieving the defender's.
In the following sections we will examine each of these guidelines in greater detail.

Defense Specicrlization
By configuring their armed forces to take advantage of fighting in a defensive mode, nations can improve defense efficiency and, thus, increase their capacity to outlast an aggressor at a cost acceptable to themselves. Defense specialization entails less emphasis on early counter-offensive operations and greater emphasis on counter-mobility operations and preparation of the battlefield.&dquo; Such a shift in emphasis would also allow more efficient use of 'second-string' infantry and reserve troops in an appropriate role, fighting in familiar surroundings and from protected positions.
In the context of a well-prepared defense, lightly-armored anti-tank gun and missile systems could play a bigger role in countering mechanized units. Likewise, artillery systems would become more significant, and their use over familiar territory with the aid of forward or heliborne observers would reduce the requirement for expensive terminal guidance systems. i8 Nations can improve the defense efficiency of their air forces by means of greater mission specialization, strict limits on deep-strike operations, and closer co-operation with ground-based air defense and combat units. Their air force modernization plans should eschew expensive longer-range multi-purpose aircraft and emphasize instead shorter-range air superiority fighters, close-air-support aircraft, and some fighter-bombers configured for battlefield interdiction. Nations should shop at the high-cost end only when seeking to procure airborne reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and battle management systems. Even here, savings can be made by avoiding systems designed to support deep attacks into an adversary's home territory.
4.2 Selective Area-defense Nations can limit an aggressor's options by concentrating their defense efforts on critical terrain, key links in the transportation network, and the approaches to vital areas.
To limit the effect of enemy maneuver, nations should selectively deploy deep areacovering defenses. These should take the form of stronghold or fortified areas, each extending over 150-500 square kilometers and comprising (1) carefully-sited tank obstacles and minefields covered by antitank infantry fighting from prepared positions; (2) mobile tubeand rocketartillery systems (50-80 pieces), also operating from numerous alternate positions; and (3) mobile air-defense unites. 19 Small supply depots should be dispersed throughout the stronghold area.
Coverage by stronghold artillery and airdefense weapons could extend 40-60 kilometers beyond the stronghold's boundaries, thus permitting adjacent strongholds to support each other and deliver overlapping fire on the areas between them.20 Assuming some maneuver within the stronghold by air defense and artillery units, they could cover with fire a total area exceeding 10,000 square kilometers (see Figure 1). In this wider area, armored units, airmobile antitank infantry, and heliborne minedispensing systems could act to contain and defeat an invader.
The local counter-offensive power of this defense would derive from its armored and air-mobile units operating under the cover of the artillery and air defense systems, which themselves find protection within the stronghold area. In the interest of stability, however, the system would restrict counteroffensive capability in several ways. First, range limits on attack aircraft would entail some limit on the cross-border offensive capability of ground forces as well. Also, armored units operating outside the reach of stronghold artillery and air defense systems would have much reduced combat power.
Finally, the artillery, air defense, and armored units would all depend on the static stronghold sustainment network.

Better Use of Defensive Depth
Depth is first among the untapped defense resources of many nations in the region. By fighting a series of brief delaying battles before drawing a firm line, nations can trade space for time and enemy casualties. The value of such operations is undisputed, but many Western defense planners view them as acceptable above the tactical level only when defenders have no other choice, because, viewed in isolation, the practice means yielding initiative and national territory to one's opponent.21 However, under typical regional conditions, attempting a NATO-style forward defense can be very risky, putting as much strain on the defender's sustainment capacity as on the attacker's.
In its most developed form, the proposed system would comprise three types of defense areas or zones: a border zone, the stronghold areas, and the areas between these. 22 Covering the border area would be an array of sensors, obstacles, and minefields. Patrolling this area would be ultralight cavalry units, whose mission would be to detect and evaluate an incursion, and delay the invading force by attacking its forward reconnaissance elements. In the area between this forward zone and the strongholds, helicopters could deploy mines to impede an invader's mobility. The defender could bring up air-mobile antitank units supported by ground-attack aircraft to cover these minefields. This combined arms force would fight delaying battles all the way back to the stronghold areas. In this way the defenders could diminish the strength of an aggressor while conserving their own for use around the strongholds.

Stability Factors
Several features of the proposed defense would contribute to greater stability in the region. First, because it uses both depth and dispersal to its advantage, it limits the bonus an aggressor can obtain through surprise attack, thus reducing the incentive for such attacks. Second, by incorporating limits on cross-border offensive capabilities, the proposed posture is less likely, in a crisis, to provoke neighboring states to undertake pre-emptive attacks. Indeed, with less at stake in the opening salvos of a war, preemptive pressures diminish on both sides.

The Defense of Saudi Arabia: Problems and Prospects
The Saudis' capital-intensive approach tõ PfPncP ic -~ fm~tinT1 nf thPir ~~.rt~~~ .~~:t~., T)r~¡;;¡¡~...-t.~.a.IiiI'Ior.t.--&dquo;&dquo;...--ofol--l&dquo;income, iow populations density, ana vast national territory. Their great wealth gives them relative freedom to meet the material requirements of fielding a modern airground combat force. But they have been unable to surmount the difficulties associated with an extremely low population density. Today, Saudi Arabia is testing the limits of a quality-for-quantity trade-off, and has run up against the inherent inefficiencies of the mobile defense modela model that demands the investment of not only great wealth but also ample skilled active-duty personnel.
Saudi Arabia typically spends as much on defense as Iraq, even though its armed forces are only one-eighth as large as Iraq's. At present it maintains four large garrison cities for its field army, two more for the National Guard, and seven large air force bases -all of which have facilities among the most modern in the world. Although the 189 combat aircraft of the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) make it only 30% as large as the prewar Iraqi air force, when the size of the two nations' armed forces is taken into account the Saudis' distinctive emphasis on air power is clear. True to form, in the area of ground-based air defense, the Saudis have also sought to develop the most sophisticated system in the Gulf, incorporating 16  Unfortunately, coordination between the army and air force is poor -a condition reinforced by the air force's lack of dedicated close-air-support aircraft. The Saudi air defense effort exemplifies a problem endemic to Saudi defense planning : it is too ambitious given the Saudis' shortage of skilled labor and the limits of available technology. Despite defense expenditures equaling 18% of their gross domestic product, the Saudis have been unable to close the gap between perceived requirements and capabilities.
On paper, the Saudi air defense system is supposed to provide coverage for industrial and urban concentrations, protect the army as it maneuvers over wide areas, and augment the defense capabilities of the smaller Gulf states. The program hinges on the successful integration of the whole into automated C~I I and battle management systems. But the target date for system integration and start up -now set for 1992 or 1993keeps receding into the future.
Saudi efforts to build a capable heavymechanized ground force have faced similar difficulties. 25 Their regular army comprises two armored and four mechanized brigades, one infantry and one airborne brigade, a Royal Guard regiment, and five artillery battalions. But the number of personnel in their army, a mere 40,000 soldiers, reveals that Saudi units are understrength and lack sufficient support personnel. 26 Moreover, despite concerted development and training efforts, the army has little real capacity for high-paced mobile defense. Cordesman suggests that 'by the early 1990s, Saudi Arabia will have an army capable of fighting reasonably well in prepared defensive positions', but will still lack the 'offensive and maneuver warfare capability' its designers had in mind. 27 Emphasizing a NATO-style mobile defense, as the Saudis do, is not only costly, but also demanding in terms of skill requirements and sustainment needs. Although proponents insist that a mobile defense gives able practitioners the capacity to win when outnumbered, few would contest that trying to out-maneuver a moving enemy entails considerable risks.28 On the European central front, NATO and the WTO hedged these risks by maintaining very high force densitiesan option not open to the Saudis.
The maldeployment of the Saudi army would, in the event of conflict, compound its shortcomings in maneuver warfare. The closest army garrison to Saudi Arabia's northeast coastal cities and oil fields is 300 kilometers distant. Should the units there prove unable to re-position quickly in the event of an Iraqi advance, they might find the Iraqis positioned between them and the kingdom's major urban and industrial centers. Likewise, army deployments in the south and near the Jordanian border risk circumvention because they deploy far forward and in dense concentrations. Some analysts contend that keeping the Saudi army close to the border, while leaving the National Guard to defend in and around the cities and oil fields, improves deterrence. Such a disposition certainiy mirrors longstanding NATO practice. But Saudi groundforce deployments may have as much to do with royal concerns about internal stability as with defense requirements. As one analyst observes: Precautionary refusal to deploy the armed forces anywhere near the population centers, the royal leaders, and particularly the Al-Hasa oil fields limits their deterrent value against external attack on eastern targets. Failure to train the National Guard, who must defend these key locations, in front-line combat further contributes to this vulnerability Efforts to transform the 35,000-member Saudi National Guard into an effective light mechanized force have not been successful, as their low skills and readiness levels attest.
Better integration or cooperation with the regular army might help, but the Guard exists less as a complement to the army than a political counterweight. Adopting this posture would ameliorate Saudi defense problems in several ways.
First, greater emphasis on battlefield preparations would reduce Saudi dependence on high-technology fixes and highly skilled technicians. For instance, operations centered on strongholds and fortifications would ease the burden on centralized longer-range airdefense systems, because ground units would have better short-range defenses and better passive protection, and their deploy- Saudi air force modernization plans seek to add to the current fleet as many as 100 ground-based battlefield air defense, which might promise a higher marginal return. A more thoughtful approach would procure fewer Tornado deep-strike aircraft and rely instead on upgraded F-5Es and additional Hawk-200s in the ground-attack and closeair-support roles, respectively. Savings realized by implementing this alternative could profitably fund the needed improvements in ground-based short-and medium-range air defense. Again, transfer of some funds to the non-military sector should be possible.

Implications for Arms Control Policy
Although we have formulated our restructuring guidelines so that nations might safely adopt them unilaterally, measures of bilateral or multilateral arms control could provide an important catalyst for a broader process of regional restructuring. The guidelines we have proposed would also be relevant to such arms control efforts, providing them with the conceptual means for surmounting their present impasse.33 In the next sections we examine some of the implications of our perspective for regional arms control.
6.1 I Toward a Defensive Reorientation of the Arms Trnde Current efforts to control the trade in weapons and weapon technology focus narrowly on the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. More germane to regional security concerns, however, would be measures encompassing those conventional weapons that already serve as the mainstay of wars in North Africa and the Mid-East. But several obstacles stand in the way of negotiating more inclusive measures. First, great numbers of conventional weapons are already present in regional arsenals, and figure centrally in regional defense planning. Second, few if any nations in the region are satisfied with existing military balances, and they see continued procurement as a means for resolving the perceived imbalances. Th~=d, many nations supply conventional arms to the region, and most view the arms trade as a vital part of their economic activity. Fatty, given motivated and multiple buyers and sellers of conventional arms, it will be difficult to prevent the circumvention of negotiated limits on their transfer. To the extent that producing nations can enforce export limits, importing nations may turn increasingly to domestic production.
The major powers might surmount these various obstacles by not attempting to enact undifferentiated limits on the conventional arms trade, but seeking instead to defensively reorient the trade by selectively prohibiting those arms most suitable for offensive operations. This would speak to the security concerns of the arms importing nations and mitigate some of the objections of the producers, thus reducing the pressures for cir-cumvention. The participating powers might buttress these selective limits by similarly reorienting their military assistance programs and offering special credits to those nations willing to forgo the acquisition of offensive arms from other sources. 34 From the non-offensive defense guidelines presented earlier in this analysis, we can now derive a tentative list of controlled and uncontrolled weapon types: Co n trolled/ Proscribed Heavy and medium battle tanks Heavy and medium infantry fighting vehicles Tactical missiles with ranges exceeding 100 kilometers Armored, attack helicopters Ground-attack and bomber aircraft with combat radii above 800 kilometers All weapons of mass destruction U ncontrolled/ Subsidized Anti-armor and air defense weapons suited for use by infantry or mounted on lighterarmored vehicles Other infantry weapons including mortars Towedand self-propelled artillery systems (including rocket artillery) with ranges under 60 kilometers. (Provisions should be made to restrict the potential contribution of self-propelled systems to rapid offensive moves. Such provisions might include limiting the degree of armor protection on self-propelled systems.) Mines and mine-delivery systems Dedicated interceptor, close-air-support, and battlefield-interdiction aircraft with combat radii under 600 kilometers.35 Helicopters suitable for transporting troops or mounting mine-delivery systems A reorientation of the arms trade along these lines would facilitate comprehensive restructuring. However, it cannot guarantee such an outcome, because the character of a defense posture depends on much more than weapon mix. Also critical are doctrine, gross force structure, force size, unit structure, training, and deployment patterns. These features are likely to change only as the result of a positive commitment to defensive restructuring on the part of state and military leaders within the region. The major military powers might encourage such a commitment through other forms of military assistance, such as training programs and joint military planning.

Negotiating Reductions in Offensive Capa6ilities
The intensity and complexity of present disputes among the nations of North Africa and the Mid-East dim the prospects for bilateral or multilateral arms reduction agreements. However, the experience of the 1979 Camp David Accords suggests that cosponsorship of such agreements by major Northern powers could resolve the arms reduction impasse. Of course, the Camp David Accords did not entail arms reductionsquite to the contrary, the United States sealed the agreement by underwriting substantial defense modernization programs for both Israel and Egypt. Still, such inducements need not be incompatible with the goal of alleviating military confrontations in the region: outside powers might offer military assistance of a non-offensive sort as a quid pro qcco for reductions in the most offense-capable weapon categories. 36 The Camp David Accords and the 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement also illustrate the potential for negotiating confidence-and security-building measures (CSMBs) consonant with defensive restructuring. The Camp David Accords established a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel and institutionalized contacts between their military establishments. The Israeli-Syrian agreement established a zone of. restricted military activity extending 25 kilometers to either side of the Israeli-Syrian border.37 Building on these experiences, nations entering peace accords could establish 'offensive-weapon exclusion zones' along their borders.38 These might permit all manner of defensive preparations as well as the deployment of light troops, but no units capable of high-intensity assault. Nations might also negotiate measures that improve military transparency and thus reduce fears of surprise attack. These would include permitting cross-border reconnaissance flights and the posting of observers at each others' military bases. 39 Such an ensemble of arms reduction and confidencebuilding measures, together with defensive assistance packages, would provide a supportive context for comprehensive restructuring.

Implications for the Intervention Policies of the Major Powers
Steps toward defensive restructuring in the South would, by improving stability, remove one important rationale for the intervention policies of the North. It is unlikely, however, that Third World nations will attempt any comprehensive restructuring of their armed forces without some concurrent change in the intervention policies of their Northern neighbors; the process of change must be reciprocal. This much should be obvious from the skeptical reaction of Third World states to the 1977 US-Soviet talks on Conventional Arms Transfers and their continuing desire to link non-proliferation agreements to arms reduction in the North.
For their part, the major global powersthe United States, Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, France, and Germanyshould agree to abstain from military intervention in the South except to provide peace-keeping forces or defensive support for nations facing external aggression Moreover, military intervention should occur only under the auspices of global or regional agencies, and should be truly multinational in character. Finally, control of such operations should increasingly devolve to a United Nations military command.
A shift in emphasis by the major powers from traditional intervention to the missions of peace-keeping and defensive support would make superfluous much of their existing military capabilities for forced entry. These capabilities derive from large naval and long-range tactical air forces, airborne army corps, and marine or naval infantry forces. Hence, an agreement between the major powers limiting intervention, as suggested above, might coincide with negotiations on the reduction of tactical air forces and naval forces.
New emphasis on the peace-keeping mission would require forces specializing in surveillance, reconnaisance, and area control. Such forces should have a strong organic facility for self-defense, narrowly defined, as well as the capability for quick withdrawal under fire. Light airborne cavalry, motorized infantry, and air-mobile infantry better meet these requirements than do simple airborne infantry or marine units.
The defensive support mission requires a capability to rapidly reinforce the defenses of a nation threatened by aggression and, if need be, supplement that nation's ability to drive an invader from its soil. To address Third World concerns about Northern military domination, the major powers should design their defensive-support units to be structurally dependent on the defensive array of the host nation. This means emphasizing combat support elements and a limited number of light mechanized units, not self-contained heavy maneuver units.4' The air force component of a defensivesupport force should comprise close-airsupport, battlefield interdiction, and interceptor aircraft, and not longer-range fighter-bombers.
Clearly, such a force would lack the capability for far-reaching offensive operations, such as those characterizing Operation Desert Storm. In our view, this limitation is a political prerequisite for any widespread process of defensive restructuring in the South. To further guarantee, structurally, that defensive-support forces would not become the tool of narrow coalition or national interests, no single nation should possess more than 20% of the global total of such forces.

Conclusion
For many analysts, the recent Gulf Crisis and war portend an era of increased instabi-lity, hence establishing continuing relevance of defense postures based on punitive deterrence. Contrary to this view, we hold that the crisis can be most usefully understood not as the first act of the post-Cold-War era, but as the final act of an era shaped by the Cold War. To paraphrase Antonio Gramsci: the crisis consists in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born. Today, it is our urgent responsibility to imagine means of transition from the old era to the new. We have argued that defensive restructuring and related measures constitute such means. They can serve to break the crippling cycle of distrust and violence in the Third World, and help create a political setting in which nations will conduct their affairs without resort to arms.
Postscript: Initial Reflections on the Gulf War The disparity in the capabilities of the combatants was far more pronounced than that found even in Arab-Israeli conflicts. For instance, the ratio in theater combat aircraft was 3:1; in advanced aircraft, 30:1. Having marshaled an air force three times the size of Israel's and several times more capable, the allies fought the war principally by means of air power. (Nonetheless, revised intelligence estimates now show that the Coalition also enjoyed pre-war numerical superiority in the number of ground troops in the southern theater.) Compounding Iraq's disadvantages were its political isolation, six months of effective embargo, and the need to guard against powerful enemies on several fronts. These circumstances set this war apart from intraregional ones, historical and potential. However, it holds some general lessons about regional armed forces and their practice of defensive operations. These lessons will become more relevant should the war's outcome stimulate a new regional arms race, as seems likely. 1 3. The outcome of the war is an indictment of 'hybrid' armiesor, more precisely, of their hierarchical segmentation. The Iraqi army in and around Kuwait evinced two forms of hierarchical segmentation: first, in the quality of troops and equipment ; second, in their deployment: The Iraqi command placed the least welltrained and equipped troops -conscript infantry -far forward to take the brunt of an allied land assault. More capable mobile units were far back in large reserves, but these were not to support the forward line so much as engage allied units once they penetrated it. Lacking true cooperation, the various Iraqi forces could not multiply each others' effect or cover each others' weaknesses.
With inadequate air defense at lower levels, Iraqi units had no recourse under bombardment but to dig themselves into immobility. The allies reserved the most intense bombing for the weak frontline troops, and sought especially to strip these of their artillery assets -calling to mind the military maxim that an obstacle not covered by fire is no obstacle at all. 41. An expeditionary force could quickly bolster a host nation's defensive capability by providing reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition assets; equipment for rapid mine emplacement; air defense and artillery units; and air-mobile anti-tank infantry. For supplementing the host's tactical counterattack capability, the expeditionary force should include light mechanized units. Although lacking the combat power of heavier units, these would have the advantage of strategic mobility and would be quite effective as a supplementary force if adequately supported by artillery and air power.