NINTH-CENTURY ARABIC CHRISTIAN PERCEPTIONS OF ‘OTHERNESS’ UNDER MUSLIM RULE

There has been considerable research on late medieval and early modern perceptions of “others”, among them Muslims, and the Western perceptions of Islam, while the “otherness”/“othering” of Christianity under Muslim rule is far less investigated. In my paper, I seek to present the ways Christians perceived alterity in an Islamic society in the ninth century, with Christian doctrine articulated in the Arabic language for the first time and in a new frame of reference – set by Islam (Griffith 1994:42‒43). I consider the ways “others” ‒ Muslims, Jews and other, mostly Christian communities living under Muslim rule ‒ are represented, with reference to the names/forms and concepts related to “otherness” in the works of three authors: the Melkite theologian Theodore Abū Qurra (d. ca. 820‒825), the Jacobite theologian Ḥabīb ibn Ḫidma Abū Rāʾiṭa (d. probably soon after 830), and the Nestorian ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī (d. ca. 840), i.e. the first known Christian theologians who wrote in Arabic. In parallel to this, I seek to identify Christian definitions of “self” and reflect on the extent to which Christians perceived of themselves as “others” under Muslim rule. The first Arabic Christian theologians aimed to defend Christian teachings challenged by Muslims, i.e. the doctrine of the Trinity and divine filiation. In this apologetic literature, the theme of the true religion (ad-dīn al-ḥaqq, ad-dīn al-qawīm) and of the motivation underlying commitment to false religions frequently recur. I find that the true religion is a prevalent notion both in the way Christian communities defined themselves and in the way they perceived of others or otherness i.e. in the delimitation from the “other”. Therefore, in identifying the indicators of and reasons

for demarcation, I mostly interpret "otherness" in terms of difference or deviation in faith/religion.

"True religion" and its role in othering
For an examination of any "deviation"/"difference," the first step is the identification of the point of reference from which it is considered, i.e., in this case, the true religion. However, given that these texts were not written with the scope of transmitting theoretical knowledge with defined theological and philosophical concepts, but, as M. Swanson (2010:398) suggests, "to formulate pastorally useful arguments, in the period of and in regions under Abbasid rule in which rates of conversion to Islam were accelerating because of the pro-conversion policies", there are no definitions in most cases. The meaning of religion and the true religion can be deduced from the context. All authors present religion as a set of the following components: a messenger who claims to be sent by God with a revealed Scripture containing His doctrineon the divinity, His commands, or prohibitions, and reward and punishment. As for the true religion, instead of definitions, we find strategies for its recognition. The shared approach of these three authors is the assertion that there are negative elements that can discredit a religion or unworthy incentives to commit to a religion other than the true one, and the ones they present largely overlap. They emphasize that these causes cannot justify the spread of Christianity, which is therefore the true religion, verified by miracles and prophecies (Griffith 2002;and Stroumsa 1985). Sets of negative criteria as tools in their argumentation clearly delimit what the true religion is not; i.e. what Christianity is not, and who the Christians are NOT.
As a telling example, let us only cite Abū Rāʾiṭa, who explains the falseness of these causes with divergence and separation from God's religion, i.e. the true religion, lying outside of obedience to God.
" [But] these six types [of reasons] diverge from the religion of God (ḥāʾida ʿan dīn Allāh) and lie outside of obedience to Him (ḫāriǧa ʿan ṭāʿatihi), and so are separated from His religion (mufāriqa dīnahu) because of the depravity which possesses them, and the contradictions inherent in them. … We find that the believers of the Christian religion reject (munābiḏūn) the six types [of and in particular those smaller, more cohesive groups that have a common language or dialect and a sense of common loyalty as against outsiders, though they may not be living in a single homogeneous area. Religious communities between Nile and Oxus had long tended to be identified with such ethnic groups, and now the identification became more rigorous. Almost every ethnic group that did not adopt Islam came to be identified by its own special religious allegiance even more than by its language.
[…] The piety of each of the dhimmi religious bodies naturally retained its distinctive character." reasons to convert to another religion] foreign to the will of God (al-ḫāriǧa ʿan irādat Allāh), His remembrance is exalted! [and] contrary to the religion of truth (muḍādida [sic!] li-dīn al-haqq)." 3 For a better understanding of the relations between phrases and concepts, we may turn to the parallel structures that are evident in this passage. Given that parallelism had become the leading style in Arabic prose writing by the ninth century (Beeston 1974:134-146, Idem 1983:180-185, Sperl 1989:5), we may deduce synonymies taking into consideration the arrangement of the ideas. It is then clearly seen that deviation from the religion of God (ḥāʾida ʿan dīn Allāh) also means lying outside of it (ḫāriǧa ʿan ṭāʿatihi), being separated from it (mufāriqa dīnahu) or being contrary, i.e. opposing to it (muḍādida li-dīn al-haqq). Explicit references to divergence, separation, and being on the outer side testify the author's perceptions of difference and otherness; at the same time, these verbalizations of demarcation, delineation are examples for othering.

The semantics of otherness
Otherness and othering are already witnessed in the strategies for recognizing the true religion, but in the works of Arabic Christian authors, otherness and alterity are expressed in ways that are best demonstrated by a lexico-semantic approach. There is no explicit mention of the "other" by terms that we would expect on the basis of contemporary common usage (e.g. al-āḫar, [al-]ġayr). We can find instead references to "others" by way of words indicating difference, opposition, deviation. I am enlisting the most frequently used ones, and then bring a couple of representative examples to shed light on their connotations and denotations with regard to the semantics of otherness.
ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī is not the only author to use these roots to refer to doctrinalreligious difference. Abū Rāʾiṭa's following extracts refer to the same idea, even more explicitly, given that he places also milla, "religious community" by its side.
"…because the word of someone who is your opponent in religion (muḫālifukum fī l-milla) is unacceptable to you (kalāmuhu ladaykum ġayr maqbūl)." 7 and "Now it is necessary for us to notice in the teaching about analogy that "God" is not counted as a single one, in keeping with the witnesses of the [sacred] books, cautioning the one who differs from us (man ḫālafanā), and strengthening with support the one who follows us (šāyaʿanā), even if the ones who differ from us on it (muḫālifūnā lahā) declare it to be false (mukaḏḏibūn) when they claim we have altered [the sacred books] by adding to them and taking away from them." 8 The first example is of interest given that it reflects how Christians perceived of themselves as others under Muslim rule: "us" is defined as "opponent in religion" or in religious community in face of the other (muḫālifukum fī l-milla). In the second one, the "other" is called "opponent," both by a verbal and a participial reference (man ḫālafanā; muḫālifūnā lahā). Difference in religion then implies mutual othering and opposition, while those who belong to the same confessional group (as indicated by šāyaʿa) are strengthened. In both phrases, the Christian as other perceives himself as someone whose word and Scriptural evidence are not credited and are refused.
Dichotomies frequently recur, as e.g. in another example by Abū Rāʾiṭa: "so that no one may have grounds to reproach us concerning [our teachings about] God, whether he agrees or disagrees (muwāfiq -muḫālif) with us, is peaceful or obstinate (musālim -muʿānid)." 9 Group coherence is seen to be based on agreement in doctrine (i.e. in this case teachings on God), while the demarcation is difference in creed, i.e. disagreement. The parallel structures (muwāfiq -muḫālif and musālim -muʿānid) display agreement as a pair to peacefulness, while the contrasting terms place difference/disagreement as a pair term to obstinance/aggression. This implies the synonymy of the terms involved.
Difference, opposition, i.e. "otherness" in religion also entails exclusivity, as the idea that salvation may only be the share of the community that pertains to the true religion suggests. "If they say: "What about the salvation you have mentioned, are you saved, apart from your opponents (muḫālif)? We see that death is obviously upon you, just as [it affects] the rest of the peoples who are your opponents (muḫālif)?" 10 Even though in the end death is seen to affect both partsthe group proper as well as the opponents, the very emerging of the question attests to the presence of exclusivist tendencies. Abū Rāʾiṭa's following passage places the term ḫālafa in a wider semantic context. "May He put both of us among those who seek His truth (yaltamis ḥaqqahu) and His light, who are led by (yanqād) the light of His lamps of knowledge, and those who follow (yatbaʿ) His bright lights, which show the way to those who seek enlightenment by means of them, to a grasp of the true things. They are the ones persisting in [what is true] (muwāẓibūn), clinging fast to His precepts (mutamassikūn bi-farāʾiḍihi), and the obligation of His laws (lāzimūn bi-šarāʾiʿihi), fighting for His ways (mutaḥarribūn li-sunanihi), holding fast to His Word (āḫiḏūn bi-kalāmihi), rejoicing in His religion (fariḥūn bi-dīnihi), spurning those who differ from Him (rāfidūn li-man ḫālafahu), avoiding those who anger Him (muǧtanibūn li-man asḫaṭahu), rejecting the unbeliever and the Deceiver (ǧāḥidūn al-kufr wa-ṭ-ṭāġūt), giving credence to God and to what comes from Him (muṣaddiqūn bi-Allāh)." 11 Here the form, as we can see, refers to people pertaining to other religions, i.e. the ones who differ from God or oppose Him. However, a whole chain of words and parallel phrases are used to indicate a coherence of a community of those who belong to/follow God, while oppose those who oppose Him. A dichotomy is evident here. Belonging together or separation depends on whether one follows the "true religion." Those who follow (yatbaʿ), seek God's truth (yaltamis ḥaqqahu), are led by Him (yanqād), persisting in [what is true] (muwāẓibūn), cling fast to His precepts (mutamassikūn bi-farāʾiḍihi,) and the obligation of His laws (lāzimūn li-šarāʾiʿihi), fight for His ways (mutaḥarribūn li-sunanihi), hold fast to His word (āḫiḏūn bikalāmihi) rejoice in his dīn (fariḥūn bi-dīnihi)spurn those who differ from Him or oppose Him (rāfiḍūn li-man ḫālafahu), avoid those who anger Him (mutaǧannibūn li-man asḫaṭahu), reject unbelief and deception (ǧāḥidūn al-kufr waṭ-ṭāġūt).
Taking into consideration ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī's second example quoted above, 12 we may note a regularity in the use of inqiyād which expresses compliance or obedience (ʿAmmār's phrase qillat inqiyād baʿḍihim li-baʿḍ was translated as 'lack of their compliance with each other' -while Abū Rāʾiṭa's yanqād as 'being led by Him'). Being led by God and/or being inclined to follow each other then reflect a sense of belonging, while its lack indicates difference, demarcation.
Finally, let us turn to Theodore Abū Qurra, whose examples on doctrinalreligious difference include the following: "One day, a certain need compelled me to descend to civilization and to the community of my fellow human beings, and I observed that they adhered to a variety of religions (adyān muḫtalifa)." 13 And: "There is great difference between the religions (iḫtilāf kaṯīr fī l-adyān)." 14 And: "And yet, there are many messengers and many books, and they disagree (iḫtilāf) with one another!" 15 Finally: "After meeting all these people, I began to reflect on what each had said and realized that all of them both agreed (ǧumlatuhum muttafiqūn) and disagreed (muḫtalifūn) about three things. As for what they agreed on (ittifāquhum) …As for what they disagreed on (iḫtilāfuhum), they disagree with one another (yaḫtalifūn) as to the …" 16 In this bunch of short examples, the roots ḫ-l-f recur referring to difference, which is never ethnic, racial, etc., but is taken into consideration in religious terms, as the other meaning, disagreement implies it. The last example clarifies the nature of the differencei.e. the fields of disagreement, as well as it places difference as an antithetical pair of agreement (ittifāq -iḫtilāf).
Theodore Abū Qurra's last example makes a connection between deviation and difference in that it clarifies the meaning of deviation as the opposition/difference from right guidance: "If what I have said is true […], it is you who are astray (ʿindak ḍalāl). Indeed, there can be no doubt that guidance for you consists of the precise opposite of all this (al-hudā ʿindak ḫilāfuhu)." 17 So far, the wider contexts of the examples have suggested that difference from other religious communities are intended; doctrinal difference is seen to be the reason of demarcation.

Intra-Christian differences
However, differences may also be found among different Christian denominations. We can mostly find references to these in the works of Abū Rāʾiṭa, as we will see in what follows: "Examine what the wise Abū Qurra saysmay the Messiah guide him with [all the others] who oppose/differ from the truth (man ḫālafa l-ḥaqq)" 18 ; which expresses the acknowledgement of interdenominational difference, whence deviation means the opposing of the truth. The nature of difference is usually given and specified, as we can read it in the following example: "The Sanctus of Abū Qurra and those who adhere [to the same doctrine] (ašyāʿuhu), I mean Nestorius and all the dualists, the Jews, and the first and last opponents among them, has become the very same Sanctus, not a different (muḫtalif) one." 19 Here the difference regards the practice of "sanctification" (taqdīs), i.e. any difference from the Jacobite Trisagion. In this respect, Abū Rāʾiṭa considers his denomination different from any other denominations and religious communities, i.e. a practice, a way of saying the Trisagion defines a Jacobite conception of "us" in contrast to everything else; but the practice also reflects doctrinal differences. 20 In this respect, Nestorians, Melkites, Jews, and dualists are considered as "them" who adhere to something in common, as the word ašyāʿuhu indicates. As far as this practice is concerned, it is important for the author to demonstrate that it is not an innovation on the Jacobites' behalf, but a logical continuation of Patristic tradition: "The opponent (al-muḫālif) might claim that the Sanctus to which the Cross is added is an innovation and an invention (ḥadīṯ mubtadaʾ) that was not used by the forefathers (aslāf) in old times, and the Ancient Pure Fathers, who were close in time to the messengers or any other Christian leaders took no steps towards it." 21 Here the opponent is any other denomination that attacks the Trisagion containing the addition: "who wast crucified for us," the most famous characteristic of the Jacobite Rite. Opposition-difference are understood in this case rather as deviation, as the terms "innovation and invention/novelty" vs. the "forefathers" indicate. As far as the idea of innovation-heresy and the corresponding words are concerned, the influence of Islamic phraseology is clearly seen. Abū Rāʾiṭa then goes on in the following way: "Were this Trisagion to which the cross is added told only by those who are called Jacobites and by none of their opponents who are contrasting them (dūna ġayrihim min al-muḫālifīn al-muḍaddidīn [sic!] lahum) […], your claim would be accepted. But as it is found to be used and told by several groups and different religious communities (milal muḫtalifa) that do not accept one another (ġayr qābil baʿḍuhā min baʿḍ) […] no one who takes their religions (adyānahum) into consideration can doubt that this [practice] is adopted from an ancient source (aṣl qadīm), previous traditions (āṯār sābiqa) and a sunna in practice preserved by God's community (sunna ǧārīya maḫfūẓa fī bīʿat Allāh)." 22 This passage is of interest due to more reasons. On one hand, the Jacobites' introducing a doctrinal difference as an innovation is negated here. On the other hand, this negation is carried out through the presentation that the contested practice is not exclusively the Jacobites' own but is shared by other religious groups as well it is remarkable that this argument resembles the one generally used by Christian authors when contesting the accusation of taḥrīf. When referring to the different religious groups (milal muḫtalifa), their difference is emphasized in terms of opposition, contrast, lack of mutual acceptance (ġayr qābil baʿḍuhā min baʿḍ). Given that the shared practice is then traced back to a shared source and tradition (aṣl, sunna), difference between these groups may also be understood as deviance. The first sentence of the extract presents opposition and contrast as synonymous, as almuḫālifīn al-muḍaddidīn indicates it. Reference to the doctrinal innovation introduced is a tool for otheringwhile sticking to the sources and the sunna is part of the construction of belonging. Those who preserve tradition are called God's community, here indicated by the form bīʿat Allāh. Innovation as a theme will be visited on its own later on, in point IV, among the constructions of otherness.
So far, we have seen that the terms listed mainly refer to demarcation in terms of religious difference or deviation. We should add, however, that "difference" occasionally appears also regarding linguistic, ethnic, or geographical diversity. However, identity i.e. the construction of "us" is always based on religious affiliation in these texts, and other differences are solely mentioned when the universal nature of Christianity is contrasted to it.

Linguistic, ethnic, and geographical division
Most examples concerning difference in language and ethnicity/community are to be found at ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī, as we can see in the following: "As far as the Christian religion is concerned, I did not see it in a people of one house or one country, [among] a people speaking one language so that they might be in collusion over one thing which they desire, […]; nor in one kingdom in which they might [have a common] opinion, where the king could gather them together in one religion, […]; [nor] with what was accepted on account of [a common] opinion […]; nor in one kingdom with one language where they might be compelled by the sword to accept it, […]. Rather, in every kingdom, every language and tongue in the east and west, […], among the whites and blacks, in nations that dislike each other's language, they became enemies and could not be united to be in collusion or be established by the compulsion of the sword, or set up in the world by feverish fanaticism, or by bribery or payment. Separated by their languages (al-muḫtalifīn bi-luġātihim), living apart in their countries (al-mutabāʿidīn fī buldānihim), opposed in their kingdoms and the situation of their world (al-mutaḍāddīn fī mamālikihim waamr dunyāhum), situated apart from each other by the seas which God made as a barrier lest they join themselves together and destroy each other because of the diversity of their kinship (li-tabāʿud qarābatihim) and the differences of their races and skin colors (iḫtilāf aǧnāsihim wa-alwānihim)." 23 The passage aims to demonstrate that the unworthy incentives that make one embrace a religion are not found in Christianity. In order to prove that no collusion, coercion, ethnic solidarity or material gain can justify the spread of Christianity, it is necessary to show the diversity of circumstances among which it was accepted. Fields of diversity include community/country or geography, language, race. We can find the variants of the root ḫ-l-f twice in the paragraph, first in a participial form (almuḫtalifīn bi-luġātihim), then as an infinitive (iḫtilāf aǧnāsihim wa-alwānihim). Parallel structures render geographical distance (mutabāʿidīn fī buldānihim), enmity (al-mutaḍāddīn fī mamālikihim wa-amr dunyāhum) as synonyms for the first; and distance/diversity of kinship (li-tabāʿud qarābatihim) to the second: i.e. geographical distance and enmity between kingdoms appear together with linguistic differences, 23 Mikhail's translation (Mikhail 2013:360-361)  while difference of race and colour implies diversity of kinship. It then shows that the author perceived otherness, alterity, or diversity also in these terms, however, its display is intended to contrast it to the universality of Christianity In the first extract, the related notions of difference, opposition (iḫtilāfmuḍādda) and distance (tabāʿud) are contraposed with agreement (ittifāq), communication and meeting (taʿāruf -iǧtimāʿ -iltiqāʾ); while in the second, multiplicity (kaṯīra) and difference (muḫtalifa) are contrasted to agreement (muttafiqa). The arrangement of the ideas confirms the semantic vicinity of distancedifference-opposition (as also seen in the previous example) and complements the semantic field not only through the contrary notions, but also implying that agreement in a general sense can not be realized without communication and coming together. Taking this idea one step further, it is also evident that the lack of the latter 24 Mikhail's translation (Mikhail 2013:363) vs. Arabic text (ʿA. al-Baṣrī, Kitāb al-Burhān 34): yašhad bi-anna dīn an-naṣrāniyya lam yuṯbat bi-s-sayf wa-inna d-duʿāt ilayhi yastaʿmilūhuli-annahu lā yumkin ittifāq umam lā tuḥṣā fī l-mašriq wa-l-maġrib ʿalā ġayr taʿāruf wa-lā iǧtimāʿ wa-lā iltiqāʾ, li-iḫtilāf al-mamālik muḍādda baʿḍuhum baʿḍan fī amr addunyā wa-tabāʿud al-buldān wa-iḫtilāf al-luġāt wa-l-aǧnās -yašhad anna llaḏīn daʿawhum ilā hāḏā d-dīn ṣayyādūn ḍuʿafāʾ lā mulk lahum wa-lā sayf, wa-qad qaharūhum bi-aǧmaʿihim bi-s-sayf. 25 Mikhail's translation (Mikhail 2013:367-368) vs. Arabic text (ʿA. al-Baṣrī, Kitāb al-Burhān 41): fa-iḏ raʾaynā hāḏihi l-mamālik al-ʿaẓīma wa-l-umam al-kaṯīra wa-l-alsun almuḫtalifa muttafiqa bi-aǧmaʿihā ʿalā iḫtilāfihā fī l-buldān wa-l-mamālik wa-l-alsina ʿalā ttadayyun bi-kutub fī aydīhim ʿalā anna llaḏīn dafaʿūhā ilayhim qad faʿalū bi-him al-āyāt al-ʿiẓām, qaḍaynā annahum qad faʿalū ḏālika. is due to opposition or enmity between kingdoms and the linguistic and racial differences; i.e. there is causality between these features. The passages fit the larger context of denying unworthy incentives for the spreading of Christianity, which, as a religion, is homogeneous, is characterized by agreement, and its universality manifests itself above the level of geographical-linguistic-racial difference or plurality.
Finally, ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī's remarkable comment on the difference of languages as a sign of God presents division and variety as something that may eventually accord to God's will: "He sent messengers to all the people of the world in their different languages which He had created for them (bi-alsinatihim al-muḫtalifa allatī ḫalaqa lahum), so that people would know that the One who divided the languages and made them different (farraqa l-alsun wa-ǧaʿalahā muḫtalifa) is the One who calls them to know Him." 26 The passage introduces ḫilāf and farq as synonyms, both referring to an alterity that is originated in God; this proof is based on the fact that with this multiplicity, the Unity of its originator stands in obvious contrast. The passage renders difference (iḫtilāf) synonymous to diversity, separation, geographical distance, and divergence in intentions and languages (taštīt, inqiṭāʿ, tanāʾī, tabāʿud). Acceptance of Christianity as well as the morals or law observed by its followers is presented in a way that expresses how Christians consider or perceive of themselves as others, as well as it is an example for othering features that were mostly attributed to Muslims: worldly desires, fear, aspiration to a known afterlife, approval and embellishment, permissiveness, and collusion are among the unworthy incentives to accept a religion, as well as they are common accusations against Islam.

f-r-q
The second group of radicals that appears frequently in references to difference/otherness is f-r-q. It is mostly a synonym for the first one, as it is seen e.g. in the next example by ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī.
"And we have seen people in our day disagreeing about their religions (muḫtalifūn fī adyānihim), divided in their sects (mutafarriqūn fī milalihim), and each claiming that his religion is the religion of God, and that what contradicts it (ḫālafahu) is not from God." 28 The sentence displays difference in religion and division in sect/denomination in a synonymous parallel structure (muḫtalifūn fī adyānihimmutafarriqūn fī milalihim), indicating similarity in denotation. Division is then caused by difference; andas usualthe indicator as well as the cause is religious affiliation, not ethnicity.
Abū Rāʾiṭa uses the word to denote religious-sectarian difference, as well: "Were our Sanctus (taqdīs) 29 and prayers in the name of God […] without the True Believers' mentioning the Cross […] at the end, it would not be a division/difference (faraqa) between them and the Jews and "The People of the South". 30 Or: "It has always been a usage found at and told by the people of the blessed proclamation, and [has] also [been always] told and accepted by our opponents 28 Mikhail's translation (Mikhail 2013:353) vs. Arabic text (ʿA. al-Baṣrī, Kitāb al-Burhān 26): wa-qad raʾaynā n-nās fī dahrinā muḫtalifīn fī adyānihim mutafarriqīn fī milalihim wakull wāḥid minhum yaddaʿī anna d-dīn allaḏī huwa ʿalayhi dīn Allāh wa-inna mā ḫālafahu min ʿinda ġayr Allāh. 29 I.e. reference is made to the practice according to which Monophysites add to the Trisagionwhich comes after the lessons from the Old Testamentthe words "Who was crucified for our sake," the most characteristic feature of the Jacobite Rite. (muḫālif). This is the dividing line (farq) between all the believers and the non-believers." 31 Based on the context, Abū Rāʾiṭa uses this form more in the sense of a division, a demarcation caused and indicated by difference in religion, doctrine or practice. Though Jews, and "People of the South" are mentioned in the first extract, the names are used in a religious and not an ethnic sense. Division is twofold: in the first example, there is "us" on the one side, and Jews and Muslims on the other. The second example places "us" and some of our opponents (who also accept a shared practice) on the one side, while all non-believers (i.e. everyone who refuses the practice) on the other.

ḥ-y-d , ʿ-n-d, b-r-y, and ḫ-ṣ-r
The third word comes from the root ḥ-y-d and is found at the Jacobite author in participial form usually meaning 'deviating from' the (true) religion. For the sake of brevity, I am discussing it together with another root, ʿ-n-d, given that it is also a part of Abū Rāʾiṭa's vocabulary, and is mostly placed by the side of ḥāʾid, "deviant". We can then take it into consideration as a reference to deviance, too.
As for ḥāʾid, we may turn back to our first example concerning the unworthy incentives for accepting a religion 32 and recall that deviation from the religion of God also means lying outside of it, being separated from it or being contrary to it, so the term may refer to other religions. However, in the majority of cases, it refers to other Christian groups: " combatted (ǧāḥadū) those who deviate (al-ḥāʾidīn) from the religion of the Messiah." 34 "As Kyrill […] said of the Incarnation to Nestorius, the deviant, who rejects the truth (al-ḥāʾid al-muʿānid), and who is weak of reason." 35 "the Trisagion of the honest/devoted believers and their addition of the Cross to it is different from the Sanctus of every community that deviates from and resists the truth (ḥāʾida muʿānida li-l-ḥaqq) … 36 "those peoples who resisted the religion of God (umam muʿānida li-dīn Allāh)" 37 We may say, that ḥāʾid, when used alone, in the majority of cases, means Christian deviation; and, as the second example suggests, such deviation from Moses, or the Church Fathers, i.e. the tradition, is a cause of demarcation, contestation, dissent (as ǧāḥada suggests). When muʿānid is placed by the side of ḥāʾid, the two terms together still seem to refer to this deviation. When muʿānid is used independently, the meaning is more general, i.e. an opposition, or even aggression might be detected in the meaning, and difference is not necessarily interdenominational. (We may also recall Abū Rāʾiṭa's previously cited example, 38 where muʿānid was seen to be a synonymous pair to muḫālif, opponent, and an antonym to peaceful, musālim).
The form derived from b-r-y, i.e. barrāniyyūnto the best of my knowledgeis only present in Theodore Abū Qurra's usage among the three authors examined here. The use of this form is already noticed by Griffith, who says that "Abū Qurrah uses the term al-barrāniyyīn, i.e. "outsiders", […] to designate Muslims and Jews. It is a transliteration of the Syriac word barrāyānâ, often used for "heathens" or even desert 34  nomads." 39 Giffith's identification of al-barrāniyyīn with Jews is justified by the following example:

My translation vs. Arabic text (Abū Rāʾiṭa, Die Schriften 125): wa-qad yanbaġī an natbaʿ šahādāt Mūsā qawl al-ābāʾ al-qiddīsīn aṭ-ṭāhirīn allaḏīn kānū li-l-bīʿa aʿmida wa-daʿāʾim bi-mā ǧāḥadū al-ḥāʿidīn ʿan dīn al-Masīḥ. 35 My translation vs. Arabic text (Abū Rāʾiṭa, Die Schriften 70-71): ka-mā qāl […] ʿalā ttaǧassud wa-t-taʾannus Kīrillus aṭ-ṭāhir li-l-ḥāʾid al-muʿānid li-l-ḥaqq al-ʿāǧiz ar-raʾy
"We marvel at the outsiders (barrāniyyūn); they believe in the scriptures of the Old [Testament], while they find fault with the mysteries of the Christians, due to the disapproval of the bodily-minded," 40 given, that here the outsiders are those who accept the Old Testament, but, as implied, refute the New one, and the Christian mysteries. However, "outsiders" can be understood in a more general sense, too, as can be seen in the following examples: "I praise your solicitude, and I think it is appropriate to comply with your request, not in reliance on myself, that I should be able to set up the least goal for anyone of the Christians in his religion, or to protect them when anyone of the outsiders (al-barrāniyyūn), people of perdition, error and rudeness (ahl alḫasāra, wa-ḍ-ḍalāla wa-l-faẓāẓa), moves his tongue for Satan to cause them doubts." 41 This idea, i.e. whoever follows another religion, has lost [his soul], is gone astray and is a rude one (as ḫasāra, wa-ḍ-ḍalāla wa-l-faẓāẓa indicate it) is similar to the one seen previously e.g. in Abū Rāʾiṭa's use (c.f. the first citation of this paper concerning the six false motivations for adhering to a religion, where ḫāriǧ alluded to being an outsider, or to exclusion); but which is more, he is depicted as evil, seeking to please Satan by confusing Christians. Outsiders are also alluded to as a threat, against whom Christians are to be protected. Another example by Abū Rāʾiṭa shows further parallels: "The obvious demonstration that our teaching is the truth (qawlunā huwa lḥaqq) and our religion is the correct one (dīnunā huwa ṣ-ṣawāb) (and that the one who follows another [religion] is among those who are lost (wa-man ittabaʿa ġayrahu fa-huwa min al-ḫāṣirīn)), is in your confession and your assent to our teaching in which we describe God by His true description.
The allusion to the threat of the outsiders is carried on in the next example, where Abū Qurra writes: "Therefore, the Christian should not disapprove of the outsiders' calling the spiritual, divine, heavenly mysteries of Christianity (asrār an-naṣrāniyya arrūḥāniyya) foolish (taḥmīq). For, the most skilful of these people in their own wisdom is but someone animalish, satanic, utterly foolish (nafsānī, šayṭānī, aḥmaq)." 43 The outsider is extremely othered and denigrated here: he is presented as someone who calls Christian mysteries foolish; and, at the same time is animalistic, satanic, and foolish. The opposition between Christians and outsiders is emphasized by the contrastive use of the two adjectives rūḥānī, 'spiritual' vs. nafsānī, 'animalish'. There are other similarities between Abū Qurra's and Abū Rāʾiṭa's usages: e.g. when the former writes this way: "A person who refrains from making the prostration to the icons because of its repulsiveness (qubḥ) to the outsiders (al-barrāniyyūn) must disregard (yarfuḍ) other mysteries of Christianity too, because of their loathsomeness (samāǧa) to these same people;" 44 this outsider here may be compared to Abū Rāʾiṭa's previously seen "opponent" (muḫālif) who was presented as one who does not accept Christian teachings (as true). Abū Rāʾiṭa's references to the lack of acceptance and considering the other as a liar (ġayr maqbūlmukaḏḏib) are here paragoned by repulsiveness (qubḥ) and loathsomeness (samāǧa).
The last example of this section also offers parallels: "Because of the dullness of the ancients, God used to discharge his mysteries among them only by means of such miracles as their eyes could see in connection with them. Christians do not need anything like this. Nevertheless, for the sake of the outsiders (al-barrāniyyūn), and the lowest rank of the Christians (safalat an-naṣārā), God continues to manifest miracles in behalf of the mysteries of Christianity, and in behalf of the strong relationship of the icons with those of whom they are the icons." 45 It can be compared to Abū Rāʾiṭa's classification: we can remember that in case of the taqdīs, he placed Melkites, Nestorians, Jews and other opponents together in contrast to those true believers who accepted the Jacobite Trisagion. Similarly, Abū Qurra uses the veneration of icons as a dividing line between the Christians on the one hand and outsiders and the lowest rank of the Christians on the other. 46

Circulation of the adversos Judeos heritage and its manifestation in an Arabic Christian language
A specific case for othering is when the authors are referring to an adherent to another religion as an enemy. Apart from Theodore Abū Qurra's general remark on enmity and violence inherent in various religious groups, 47 the most specific case is 45 Griffith's translation (Abū Qurra, Veneration 72) vs. Arabic text (Abū Qurra,
47 C.f. Lamoreaux's translation (Abū Qurra, Theologus autodidactus 20): "With respect to this second subject, we see that not one of the other religions recognized or commanded such things. Indeed, the situation is quite the opposite. They permitted their followers to cling to the world and pandered to their desires for it and to their enjoyment of its sweetness. This was something that slew their nature and made it ill, barring it from love for the creator and from love for one another. Like wild animals, they commanded nothing of virtue, but only vengeance and revenge. Indeed, they were not satisfied with vengeance, but went even further. They abuse, but do not accept abuse, and if abused, they strike, and if struck they kill. Nor do they limit themselves to this, but they take their swords and go forth to those who have done them no harm, killing and taking them as booty. All the religions consider this acceptable." vs. Arabic text (Abū Qurra, Maymar fī wuǧūd al-ḫāliq 246): wa-fī hāḏā n-nawʿ aṯ-ṯānī wa-lam nara aḥad hāʾulāʾi l-adyān ʿarafahā wa-lā amara bi-hā wa-lākin ʿalā l-ḫilāf, innahum raḫḫaṣū li-aṣḥābihim ittiḫāḏ ad-dunyā wa-farašū la-hum šahawātihim wa-t-tamattuʿ fī laḏḏātihā, bi-amr qad qatalū fīhi ṭ-ṭabīʿa wa-amraḍūhā bi-hi, wa-ḥālū baynahā wa-bayna ḥubb al-Bārī, wa-baʿḍuhum baʿḍan. Wa-lam yaʾmurū ayḍan bi-šayʾ min al-faḍl, wa-lākin bi-aḫḏ al-qiṣāṣ, wa-l-intiqām ka-s-sibāʿ, li-annahum lam yarḍaw bi-l-qiṣāṣ, walākin bi-z-ziyāda ʿalayhi. Innahum yaštamūna wa-lā yaqbalūna š-šatm. wa-in šutimū ḍarabū wa-in ḍuribū qatalū. wa-lā yaqṭaṣirūna ʿalā hāḏā ayḍan, wa-lākinnahum yaʿḫuḏūna dubbing the Jew as enemy, as it can be seen in Abū Rāʾiṭa' following explicit reference: "Now, if they deny this teaching, and reject it, saying: "The prophets did not say this, rather, you have altered the words from their places, and you have made [the prophets] say what is false and a lie," it should be said to them: If these books were only in our possession, and not [also] in the hands of our enemies the Jews (aʿdāʾunā l-yahūd), then, By my life! one could accept your teaching that we have changed [them] and substituted [words for other words]." 48 Here, without further reasoning and clarification, merely the phenomenon that Jews are considered as enemies is visible. The presence of such a reference is not surprising, since, as S. Griffith states it: "The inclusion of anti-Jewish elements in these tracts was intended to generate sympathetic vibrations among members of the two communities who held a common prejudice against Jews. It also gave Christian polemicists the opportunity to score debate points against Muslims by associating Islamic doctrines with Jewish ideas" (Griffith 1998:66). Here, given that the passage seeks to reject the charge of taḥrīf, according to which Christians and Jews have distorted their scriptures, handling Jews as enemies with whom, however, some of the Scriptures are mutually accepted, is a mere rhetorical tool. 49 In the majority of cases, however, the reason for considering Jews as enemies is given: namely the charge of deicide, as the following examples indicate.
"As for His raising evidence against Satan and the Jews, [this] is so that they will not excuse themselves from [the crime] they have committed in killing Him," 51 Finally: "Peter says concerning the Acts (ibriksīs) to the Jews, the God-killers. He said "the beginning and the provider of lifeyou have killed him, who has resurrected from among the dead. And he has dissolved the chain of death that could not seize him." Inform us, who is the beginning of life whom the Jews killed if not God, the Word?" 52 Apart from the aboundant references by Abū Rāʾiṭa, 53 we also find allusions by the other two authors that include e.g. the following example by Theodore Abū Qurra: "The Jews crucified Him" 54 and by ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī a reference to Christ as the one killed by the Jews in the Book of the Questions and answers: "as for the [hypothesis] that different communities (umam muḫtalifa) and scattered peoples ( 53 Similar examples include also: Keating's translation (Keating 2006:289). "That which is related to the Jews in the killing of the Messiah is their act against Him and that which is related to Him in His killing is His deliverance of them, and His suffering what they [committed] against Him, without interfering with what they wanted."; and Keating's translation (Keating 2006:295): "The Jews are punishable for His crucifixion and His killing, because they intended His annihilation, even if He is exalted above this, glory be to Him! because His ousia rises above killing and death" 54 Lamoreaux's translation (Abū Qurra, Theologus autodidactus 46) vs. Arabic text (Abū Qurra, Maymar fī wuǧūd al-ḫāliq 269): innahu ḥīna atā l-hind karazahum dīn an-naṣrāniyya fa-qāla: inna Allāh baʿaṯa ibnahu min as-samāʾ ilā d-dunyā fa-taǧassada min imraʾa ʿaḏrā wa-wulida minhā insānan wa-inna al-yahūd ṣalabathu. Fa-māta wa-dufina wa-baʿad ṯalāṯat ayyām qāma min al-mawtā wa-ṣaʿida ilā s-samāʾ wa-ǧalasa ʿan yamīn al-Ab. 55 The text reads as s-b-b. Beacause of the context, I read it as sibāb, plural of sabb/subba, i.e. insult, cursing, abuse. šaḥnāʾ) that is between them and the Jews, this is inconceivable for anyone who's intelligent, but also for any ignorant [person]." 56 The presence of references to Jewish deicide is relevant. As S. Griffith states it, in Christian apologetics, from the second century, the claim was made that Jesus was crucified by the Jews, and in anti-Jewish polemics, the charge that the Jews killed the Messiah, came to be a standard topic. Epithets like "Christ-killer (christoktónos)", "Christ-murderer (christophónos)", and sometimes "God-killer (theoktónos)" began to be used from the fourth century, and then became commonplace in Christian writings in the Byzantine Empire and elsewhere (Griffith 1988: 74). This usage can be a continuation of the earlier polemical heritage and illustrates its circulation and translation into the Arabic Christian theological language.
The theme recurs with minor additional details, e.g. when the Jews are depicted as collaborators of Satan: as it can be seen in Abū Rāʾiṭa's following example: " Here, according to the author's claim, arguments are presented jointly by Satan and the Jews, and the link is in the evil heart and defective inclinations. The depiction recalls Abū Qurra's previously seen demarcation fom outsiders, barrāniyyūn, who were seen as animalish and evil. We can then see, that should there be an "other", an outsider in general, or a specific group, such as the Jews, defectiveness, evil, and threat for Christians are among the features that play an important part in his othering.
The Jew is often depicted as dull, as e.g. the following example by Abū Qurra illustrates: "This is a sufficient justification from the Old [Testament] and the New [Testament], for the act of prostration in the way of honor that the icons of the saints deserve. It would be better for anyone of the Christians not satisfied with it to become a Jew, due to the dullness of mind 58 This approach has also been seen above, at Abū Qurra himself, when the barrāniyyūn were depicted as bodily-minded and foolish. The demarcation due to a practice can be paralleled to Abū Rāʾiṭa's approach, as he was seen to define "us" according to the acceptance of the Jacobite Trisagion, while grouped everyone else (e.g. Abū Qurra, i.e. the Melkites and the Jews, etc.) as "them", who differ from it.

Further constructions
In course of the lexical examination, we have already seen examples for constructions of the self and constructions of the other; and we could see sharp contrasts when series of phrases sought to describe "us" in face of the "opponents," i.e. those "who differ from us." In the following, I will briefly take into consideration further ideas, notions and corresponding forms that are used to create division, demarcation, and thus contribute to the construction of otherness.
The first notion is ignorance, ǧahl; by which true believers can be distinguished from others, i.e. the ignorants. Such division can be seen in the following remark of Abū Rāʾiṭa: "By our sanctification (taqdīs) of God, we especially refer to the Son, priding ourselves (iftiḥāran [!] minnā) [in it] and rejecting the ignorant (raddan ʿalā l-ǧuhhāl): Jews and others (al-yahūd wa-ġayruhum), who negate and take it as a lie (al-munkira al-mukaḏḏiba) that the Crucified is God -Sanctusomnipotent and immortal." 59 The division made by the Jacobite author due to the question of the Trisagion has been noted before; the forms mentioned here for "us" and "them" echo the previous ones. "Priding ourselves," iftiḫāran minnā resembles "strengthening with support the one who follows us" tašdīdan al-yaqīn mimman šāyaʿanā, while "rejecting the 58 Griffith's translation (Abū Qurra, Veneration 75) vs. Arabic text (Abū Qurra, Maymar fī ikrām al-īqūnāt 175): wa-kafā bi-hāḏā taḥqīqan min al-ʿatīqa wa-l-ḥadīṯa, li-mā tastaḥiqq ṣuwar al-qiddīsīn min as-suǧūd ʿalā waǧh al-karāma. Wa-man lā yaqnaʿ bihi min an-naṣārā, fa-aḥrā bihi an yakūna yahūdiyyan, li-ġalaẓ ʿaqlihi. See also another example (from Ibid., 41): "We are constrained by the rule of reason to consent to everything pertaining to Christianity, which we mentioned above that the Jews and others, in the blindness of their minds, find repulsive." 59 My translation. vs. Arabic text (Abū Rāʾiṭa, Die Schriften 77): qaṣadnā fī taqdīsinā Allāh al-Ibn ḫāṣṣatan iftiḥāran bi-ḏālika minnā wa-raddan ʿalā l-ǧuhhāl min al-yahūd waġayrihim al-munkira al-mukaḏḏiba bi-anna al-maṣlūb Allāh quddūs qawī ġayr māʾit. Given that the context supports this meaning and version, I translated iftiḫāran instead of iftiḥāran, present in the text. ignorant," raddan ʿalā l-ǧuhhāl recalls "cautioning the one who differs from us" (tayaqquẓan li-man ḫālafanā). 60 Jews and others are presented as the ignorant, who, "negate and take it as a lie" al-munkira al-mukaḏḏibaas previously seen in case of the opponents. 61 Another basis for defining the self, i.e. by the adherence to the true religion while delimiting the other is the idea of being in line with previous tradition. Thus, innovation (bidʿa) takes part in the construction of otherness. Abū Rāʾiṭa writes: "It is a duty of every faithful ( The extract maintains the twofold division between true believers and others. True believers remain faithful to their religion (at-tamassuk bi-dīnihi), are careful of their faith (al-iḥtirāz bi-īmānihi); and make efforts (ǧuhd) to avoid doubtful matters (šubuhāt). This approach recalls an-Nawawī's sixth ḥadīṯ 63 that was transmitted both by al-Buḫārī and Muslim, i.e. widely circulating by the ninth century, which diplays a similar idea and phrasing. But while the ḥadīṯ text uses either umūr muštabihāt or šubuhāt, here, doubtful matters are merely referred to by the latter phrase. The ḥadīṯ text speaks of being wary of these unclear matters (ittaqā š-šubuhāt), which means absolving one's religion and honor (istabraʾa li-dīnihi wa-ʿirḍihi), which can be paralleled to the faithfulness to religion/carefulness of faith and making efforts to avoid doubtful matters mentioned by Abū Rāʾiṭa.
The doubtful matters, šubuhāt are the first step in building up a division, as from here Abū Rāʾiṭa goes on to describe the others: refusers and the erroneous (ahl annakl wa-l-aġālīṭ), as well as the heretics and defamators (aṣḥāb al-bidaʿ wa-ttaḫarruṣ), who are possessed or commended by the doubtful matters (as muḥtawiya and munawwiha indicates it). Once again, a contrast follows: Abū Rāʾiṭa turns back to the description of the faithful believer muʾmin, who is characterized by trust in God (ittikāl minhu), but more importantly for the present examination: by restricting himself to what is from God: His scriptures and messengers (iqtiṣār ʿalā man sabaqa ilayhi fī kutub Allāh), i.e. by an implicit refusal of innovation. God's scriptures clarify the right faith (al-mūḍiḥa al-īmān aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ) and the just and correct religion (ad-dīn al-ʿadl al-mustaqīm), and thus can be understood with approval (fahm attaṣdīq). This in contrasted to the understanding of the comprehension of the "how" (fahm al-iḥāṭa bi-kunh al-kayf), which is impossible due to the failure and straying of the mind/intellect (fašal al-ʿaql wa-ḍalālihi) and its distance from encompassing the knowledge of what exceeds every [other kind of] knowledge (buʿduhu min aliḥtiwā ʿalā maʿrifat at-tafāwut li-kull maʿrifa). Believers are juxtaposed with the refusers and the erroneous (ahl an-nakl wa-l-aġālīṭ) as well as the heretics and liars (aṣḥāb al-bidaʿ wa-t-taḫarruṣ). Also here, a ḥadīṯ text is recalled, namely that of an-Nawawī's No. 28 one: "Beware of newly-introduced matters, for every innovation (bidʿa) is an error (ḍalāla)." 64 This one was transmitted by Abū Dāwūd and at-Tirmidhī, i.e. was in circulation in the ninth century, and, as we can see, the formulation of Abū Rāʾita's argument is in line with Islamic thought. The question of "orthodoxy" v.s. innovation can be interpreted in multiple contexts. On one hand, it might be an interdenominational question (given that Abū Rāʾita is seen elsewhere to refer to Church Faters accepted by all (see in the next extract), and the synod of Chalcedon, associated with the innovation of the heretic group, i.e. the Melkites (see below), but refused by Jacobites), as well as an interreligious one. Its being directed against Islam would be supported by the fact that Islamic terminology and concepts are used, e.g. Abū Rāʾiṭa's formula iḥāṭa bi-kunh al-kayf also alludes to the Islamic bi-lā kayf approach.
This extract also used the idea of the true (i.e. just and correct) religion, ad-dīn al-ʿadl al-mustaqīm as a point of reference for the definition of the self and the other. Deviation, as an important tool for othering, is present here in the more specific form of bidaʿ, which was structured parallel to lie, refusal and error.
Abū Rāʾiṭa's examples on doctrinal differences between Christians also include the following: "As the Pure Gregory the Theologian […] 65 and other Fathers said who are accepted by all (al-muǧtamaʿ ʿalayhā) and concerning whose authority there is no difference (lā al-muḫtalaf fīhā)…" 66 In this case, reference is made to the authority of Church Fathers accepted by all Christian denominations, in order to show that Abū Rāʾiṭa considers his confessional group the direct follower of the Orthodox tradition; and accordingly, the other groups are to be considered as innovators and deviants. In an interdenominational context, we may see that consensus, iǧtimāʿ is the antonym of difference/disagreement, iḫtilāf; the use of the former term reflecting the influence of Islamic terminology. This is even more evident in the following passage: "And we have to explain our intention and doctrine concerning our Trisagion and our addition of the Cross that saved us. [We should do that] as an exhortation for the believers (tanbīhan li-l-muʾminīn) and a rebuke/reproach for the innovators and liars (faḫran wa-tabkītan li-aṣḥāb al-bidaʿ wa-ttaḫarruṣ). Our sanctification of God by a unique Sanctus that befits those who profess this blessed second proclamation (taqdīs ḫāṣṣ yalīq bi-ahl hāḏihi d-daʿwa)it is by it that those who profess it are distinguished (mumayyaz) from all the opposing religious communities (al-milal almuḫālifa lahā)." 67 It shows the importance of being rooted into tradition, as well as the demarcation from any innovation, heresy, as implied by the term bidaʿ, which reflects Islamic usage, as well. Here the dichotomy is between believers on the one hand, and innovators, liars on the other; and then between those who profess the blessed proclamation and the opposing/differing communities. We may presume that the pairs are intended to refer to the same idea, i.e. believers and the adherents of the proclamation are contraposed with opponents and innovators-liars. Innovation and lies are verbalizations and tools for othering.
The last example: "The well-known Christian groups are three: the Jacobites, the Melkites and the Nestorians. … We find the Melkites who are founded upon the innovation (bidaʿ) of the hypocrite (munāfiq) assembly, the synod of Chalcedon" 68 shows bidaʿ and hypocrisy (i.e. nifāq) as the ground upon which interdenominational difference and separation are based.

Concluding remarks
After examining individual extracts and their comparison, let us sum up forms, notions and techniques of othering in a more general way.
A key notion in othering is difference (iḫtilāf, or other forms derived from the same roots) which was detected in many fields and was rendered coherent and linked to even more. We could notice the difference of religions in general (adyān muḫtalifa, iḫtilāf kaṯīr fī l-adyān), that of religious communities (milal muḫtalifasynonymous to mutafarriq fī l-milal), which came together with opposition (as indicated either the presence of the form taḍādd or its variant, or by the form referring to the opponent in religion, i.e. the muḫālif). Construct structures then let the reader understand in what semantic area this difference, or opposition originates. E.g. we can see the difference of opinions, i.e. iḫtilāf al-ārāʾ as well as their plurality, kaṯrat al-ārāʾ in general, or more specifically e.g. the difference of exegesis iḫtilāf at-taʾwīl. The difference of language and race (iḫtilāf al-luġa/alfāẓ/alsun; iḫtilāf alaǧnās/al-alwān)linked to the distance of countries and kingdoms, their difference, (tabāʿud/tanāʾī al-buldān, taḍādd al-mamālik wa-dunyāhum, iḫtilāf al-mamālīk ) as well as the looseness or lack of tribal or family ties (tabāʿud al-qarāba/inqiṭāʿ annaṣab) are seen parallel on the one hand to the plurality of communities in general (umam kaṯīra) but contrary to the universality of Christianity that is present everywhere in the same form, with the same Scriptures.
The form derived from the same roots, muḫālif refers to the one who adheres to cases, conversion may come through ethnic solidarity (taʿaṣṣub) and the common opinion of the community.
Mention should be made of Jews as enemies, who were also presented as ignorant and dull (i.e. as any "other"); but were also introduced more specifically as collaborators of Šayṭān, having evil hearts, defective inclinations (sūʾ aḍ-ḍamīr, naqṣ al-ahwāʾ). The deliberate and explicit denigration and othering of the Jew is based on his presentation as Christ-killer or God-killer.
After summarizing the aspects of the description of the other, we may complete the conclusion by drawing attention to how complementary the features of the self were in these discourses. The construction of the self is based on the belonging to the group that is defined through the idea of adhering to the so-called true and just religion (dīn ʿadl, mustaqīm). This adherence was seen in forms like yaltamis ḥaqqahu, yanqād ilayhi, yatbaʿ, muwāẓib, mutamassik, lāzim, āḫiḏ, fariḥ bi-dīnihi, iḥtirāz bi-īmānihi. Apart from these positive traits, there are some negative ones that define the self by delineating, counter-acting in face of the other, as seen in the case of mutaḥarrib, rāfiḍ, mutaǧannib, ǧāhid and tabkīt. Such an adherent community is referred to as God's community, bīʿat Allāh, and induces pride (as faḫr indicates).
Complementary features include the following: if the other was presented as deviant, the follower of the so-called true religion, i.e. Christianity, is characterized by right guidance, i.e. hudā. If the other differs and separates from the group (ḫālafa, fāraqa), the adherent follows it (šāyaʿa); and is characterized by iǧtimāʿ. If the other is a heretic or an apostate, the Christian is a believer, muʾmin. If the other is forced/or forces others to convert, the believer does it voluntarily, through an understanding of approval, fahm at-taṣdīq. If the other is a threat or needs caution, the believer is strengthened and informed (tašdīd, tanbīh).
Finally, if the other is deviant, relies on false sources, or introduces innovations, the true believer is seen to restrict himself to God's revelation (iqtiṣār ʿalā kutub Allāh), which is illuminating the true religion and belief, and which belongs exclusively to the community (ḫāṣṣ, yalīq bi-ahl hāḏihi d-daʿwa, mumayyaz). The sources are indicated as ancient (aṣl qadīm, or even as āthār sābiqa), that of the forefathers (aslāf) and the Church Fathers.
To conclude: we could see both in argumentation and terminology how the cohesion and self-identification of the communities as well as the delineation from others are determined by the understanding of religious belonging. Following the true religion was a part of the construction of "us", at the same time, it was a marker of distinction and differentiation from others (who in turn define "us" by embodying what we are not). Religion was also a major factor in the perception of alterity: resulting in separation and opposition, manifesting on the level of the communities pertaining to them.
Based on the terminological approach, we could see that the concept of otherness as well as a term indicating it, was not present, however, a set of lexical items, terms, and notions were used to refer to perceptions of difference on multiple levels (religious, linguistic, racial, etc.), as well as they were tools for othering. A whole web of ideas could be identified either in case of the constructions of otherness, or in case of those of belonging.
As an outcome of the research, it may be mentioned that this essay addresses the contemporay and increasing debate on the perception of Islam/the Muslim as other. On the one hand, this paper offers data related to an early phase of this perception; on the other, the challenge of the research lies in the geographic area: the Christian authors examined here lived together with Muslims, so the so-called Saidian "oriental other" based on the Western othering is not applicable.