The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy: a critical appraisal

This article presents a critique of the existing consensus in the academic literature of a successful, completed and visible Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy. It is argued that such a view should be qualified. First, at least three different dimensions to the Europeanisation of foreign policy are put forward. Second, Greece’s membership is split into three successive periods (1981–1985, 1985–1995, and since 1996) and it is shown that only the first dimension of Europeanisation is visible — and this only in the most recent past (namely, since 1996). Therefore the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy has still a long way to go before it is completed.


Introduction
For the past thirty years much attention has been given to the degree of Europeanisation of the Greek political system. As shown by various analyses (Ioakimidis 2003;Kazakos & Ioakimidis 1994;Lavdas 1997), there is little doubt that the current Greek political system has been transformed as a result of EU membership. Further evidence of Europeanisation can be found in the fact that EU membership is no longer a controversial issue among the main political parties in Greece. Similarly, the current overwhelming consensus in Greece in favour of EU enlargement in general, and of the accession of Cyprus in particular (except for the Greek Communist Party, KKE) 1 further confirms this thesis. This transformation can be summed up by what

The Existing Literature on the Concept of Europeanisation
In terms of how to define and understand Europeanisation, there remains some confusion over its precise meaning (see Closa 2001, Featherstone & Radaelli 2003b. A single and concise definition of Europeanisation is not easy (see Featherstone 2003;Olsen 2002;Closa 2001). Indeed, each study on the subject (and there has been a proliferation of this approach in the past ten years or so) tends to present a preferred definition and then apply it to a specific case study, without necessarily considering the wider theoretical implications of such an exercise. However, there is overall agreement on the fact that Europeanisation has the following characteristics: -it deals mainly with the impact of EU membership. -it means more than "mere integration" (Featherstone & Radaelli 2003a).
-it represents an adaptation of the national state systems, politics and policies of EU member states to EU theory and practice (Vaquer 2001). That is to say, it is simultaneously a process, a cause, and an effect. Much emphasis has been given to date on the institutional and other administrative adaptations of national public policy organs and bodies (e.g. ministries, parliaments, political parties, and civil society actors).
The most common and simple way of defining the concept at this stage is therefore that it represents 'the impact of EU membership widely defined', in other words, 'EUisation'. This approach is the most common in the existing literature. It builds on the traditional field of Comparative Politics in the Politics/Political Theory discipline, and in particular in the area of comparative public policy studies. Another approach builds instead on the discipline of International Relations (IR), and in particular its (still often dominant) Realist paradigm. It argues that Europeanisation is only a reflection of traditional power politics and the constant intergovernmental bargaining among EU member states over their different national interests, including in the realm of FP. With reference to FP per se (Foreign Policy Analysis as a sub-field of IR), it is particularly useful if it is applied to its focus on the domestic sources of FP. This point concerns both studies that explicitly refer to Europeanisation Tonra 2001), and to those that only implicitly cover it .
Continuing within the IR realm, structuralist approaches (in particular neo-institutional liberalism) stress the importance of cooperation and interdependence in developing common habits and institutions which, in turn, 220 Charalambos Tsardanidis & Stelios Stavridis further strengthen the existing webs of cooperation. Europeanisation therefore reflects parts of a wider global process. The EU is the best example of this phenomenon at the European regional level (see Chryssochoou 2001, 15 & 28). Finally, in terms of constructivist approaches (in particular that of social constructivism: see e.g. Wendt 1999; see also Battistella 2003, 267-302), Europeanisation is the result of a construction based on means, ideas, codes of conduct and behaviour that are agreed and produce common practices that, in turn, affect the appearance of a common European identity and common European interests (White 2004, 21-22;Larsen 2004, 63-64).
From the above approaches, in the particular field of the Europeanisation of foreign policy (the focus of this article), there appears to be agreement in the existing literature over the following: -a need to use 'difficult cases', i.e. conflictual situations, to assess whether there has been a Europeanisation of any given national FP (Manners & Whitman 2000, 11). 7 -a claim that Europeanisation in FP requires the abandonment (or overcoming or surpassing) of past national FP priorities (Tonra 2001), best summed up as follows: "'Europeanizing' … specific national interests … is selling national interests as European interests" (Mahncke 2001, 229). This latter aspect will form part of this article's argument that Greek FP has not become fully Europeanised as the existing literature claims (see below).

The Three Dimensions of Europeanisation in Foreign Policy
When the above (Europeanisation) is applied to foreign policy, the conclusion can be drawn that there are three different dimensions. The first two dimensions concern processes, whereas the third one deals with a state of affairs or a situation, that is to say the outcome of the first two processes. The first dimension of Europeanisation refers to the extent and manner that the EU process, organisational procedures, principles and values have affected the national levels of the decision-making process. The logic and formulation of national FP in EU member states is being transformed by the way politics and economics develop in the EU (Ladrech 1994, 69). Europeanisation therefore represents a harmonisation and transformation of a member state to the needs and requirements that result from EU membership and to the overall process of European unification in general.
The emergence of a common European FP is extremely complex because common positions evolve over time and CFSP decisions come out of an intergovernmental decision-making process. That is to say that any national foreign policy stance can be defined as 'European' in the sense that it becomes so if it is accepted by the remaining member states. But equally because there are plenty of cases where there is no common EU stance on any given issue. For instance, it is not possible to argue that Greek FP was Europeanised during the 2003 war in Iraq as there was no common EU reaction to the US and UK attack. In other words, Europeanisation would mean The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy 221 the adaptation of the national system to the EU system. Care should also be taken not to identify this process of Europeanisation with that of modernisation, something that happened regularly in a recent study on that particular aspect of the question (see Stavridis 2003b, 18). But care must also be taken not to consider that 'Europe' (i.e. the EU) is something 'out there' and that it can only be affecting national policy making after membership (Radaelli 2001). In some instances it is in the pre-accession process that Europeanisation can be most effective (Irondelle 2003, 223). Similarly, and conversely, it is not possible to argue that Europeanisation has occurred simply because there is a compromise agreement among the larger and stronger political forces in a given member state over its European policy. Europeanisation is taking place if the political system of a member country is constantly obliged to take into account and apply EU methods, practices, norms and values that fit within the wider logic of European unification (Olsen 1996). Such a process could be defined as one of a 'gradual embedding of Europeanisation'.
Another related question has to do with whether Europeanisation is the result of a wider, more global, phenomenon, or instead, whether it is its cause. If the former, then Europeanisation merely represents a result of what has been conveniently dubbed 'globalisation'. If the latter, that is to say a 'force for change', its effect on national decision-making processes should then be pondered. Does the EU system impact on the national level, top down, not only at the elite level, but also among civil society actors, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), pressure groups and other lobbies, and even public opinion? Or, rather, is it the further top-down effect of Europeanised elites (Vaquer 2001, 5)?
The first dimension of Europeanisation can be visualised as in Figure 1. The second dimension of Europeanisation refers to the degree to which the national foreign policy of a member state affects and contributes to the development of a common European FP. In this approach, Europeanisation is not only the impact of the EU unification process or how it affects national policy and politics, that is to say, the 'internalisation' of EU political unification. It is also the 'externalisation' or, better, the 'Europeising' or 'EUising' of national FP positions into the EU level. This process not only entails the acceptance of national FP positions into those of the EU but also enhances the international action of the EU as a whole. The particular nature of a given policy that a member state adopts is not really what matters, but rather its impact on the wider role of the EU as a whole once this national FP approach has become 'Europeanised'. The main objective of the CFSP is not simply to offer a forum where national interests enter a bargaining process, but rather a system that allows for the emergence of common European interests leading eventually to a common international identity for all EU member states and institutions (see Tonra 2001, 11-15). Therefore, according to this second dimension of Europeanisation, the national FP system of any EU member state is not passively responding to EU membership demands. It is, instead, actively engaged in transforming and influencing the emergence of a more efficient and effective CFSP, independently of whether this is in line with its traditional narrow national interests or not. There is an additional element to this second dimension that has been described by one of the authors of this article as the 'pendulum effect'. This approach can be visualised by contrasting two initially extreme FP positions, usually that of one (or more) EU member state(s) and those of the remaining EU states (often including a number of, if not all, EU institutions, such as the Commission or the Parliament). A pendulum effect between these two extremes can then be witnessed, tending towards, but not necessarily arriving at, a meeting point in the middle of these two extremes. This harmonisation process, which can be described as an 'eventual meeting of minds' is neither guaranteed nor unavoidable (see Stavridis 2003b, 37). For instance, Greek FP slowly moved towards that of the EU over Middle East policy when it finally recognised Israel de jure in 1989. Conversely, the EU position also moved away from a pro-Israel to a more pro-Palestinian stance. Admittedly, such a process had already began with the 1980 Venice Declaration, prior to Greek membership, but it gained momentum after Greece had joined. In the case of Spain, its stance towards Israel became Europeanised on the day it joined the EU in 1986. These are but two examples of how the pendulum effect takes place, sometimes faster, and in other instances more slowly. Finally, it should be noted that, whilst parts of national FP may have moved closer to those of a majority of other EU member states, other member states' FP areas may continue to diverge greatly or, even, new areas of disagreement may appear. Christopher Hill points out that, paradoxically, the CFSP has given Germany, Italy, and Spain "the platform from which to assert national interests more confidently … The new freedom to be treated as 'ordinary countries' which was thereby created does not mean that they wish to leave the safety of the CFSP behind; it is only that they are now less willing to see European foreign policy made by others in their name" (Hill 1998, 47).
For a visualisation of the model see Figure 3. This model could also be used in the future in a systematic and comparative approach across EU member states in order to test levels of Europeanisation. As for the third dimension of Europeanisation, as stressed in this article's introductory comments, it is no longer a question of process, but one of outcome, in the sense that it is the result of the first two dimensions just described. According to this dimension, each member state's foreign policy, to a greater or lesser extent, is made through the European prism, that is to say, including both the internalisation of EU membership and its unification process, but also the externalisation of its national FP to the EU level. Most importantly, the national level cannot ignore the EU one. It is embedded into it and, reciprocally, the EU system adapts to various national FP decisions. In that perspective, the Europeanisation of national FP contributes to the emergence of a strong EU voice in the world. It is thanks to the contribution of Europeanised actors at the national level of the member state systems that common EU interests are promoted in a better and more efficient manner. The domestic sources of FP have therefore become fully Europeanised. All its actors have been involved in that process and now consistently affect the formulation of a CFSP at the EU level: governments, political parties, parliaments, pressure groups, the media and public opinions. As Ioakimidis has argued, it reflects the willingness and the possibility of all political actors, but also of all institutions involved, to include within their domestic political structure the logic and requirements of the EU policy-making process (Ioakimidis 2003, 552).  From this third perspective, Europeanisation is a gradual process that leads eventually, but necessarily, to an outcome where it becomes part of the national decision-making system (Ladrech 1994, 58). Simultaneously, there is a process of externalisation of national practices and preferences (as we have already seen). Thus, it can be argued that this mutual process of Europeanisation produces a final result of 'perfect harmony', a "whole" to use White's own words (2004,23). This approach overcomes the perpetual debate between those who see the CFSP as the result of the lowest common denominator among narrow national interests and those who argue that it is the result of common institutional mechanisms that produce common European positions (Smith, M. E. 2004, 58).

Greek Foreign Policy and Europeanisation
With regard to the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy, there has been a recent proliferation of such studies (Ioakimidis 1999(Ioakimidis , 2000(Ioakimidis , 2001Kavakas 2000;Kouveliotis 2001;. Previous studies on the impact of EU membership on Greek foreign and defence policies should also be mentioned (e.g. Verney 1993;Kazakos & Ioakimidis 1994;Couloumbis 1994;Valinakis 1994;Ioakimidis 1995Ioakimidis , 1996Featherstone & Ifantis 1996). These particular studies did not explicitly use the term 'Europeanisation', but, for all practical purposes, they dealt with the same question. They all agree that there has been a successful Europeanisation of Greek FP. In particular, it is noted that there is now a clear change of 'style'. Thus, such a development is presented as the best evidence of the Europeanisation of Greek FP. That is to say that from 'obstructionism' (the 'European Political Cooperation (EPC) footnote state' par excellence during the 1980s) and The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy 225 unilateral making of foreign policy (with the 1994 embargo against the Former Yugoslav Republic of Madeconia (FYROM) unilaterally decided by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou as the best example), Greek FP is now characterised by consensualism and the use of multilateral frameworks (especially in the Balkans after the 1999 Kosovo War but also with Turkey in recent years). We will return to this question later. Let us now turn to an alternative interpretation that includes the three dimensions of Europeanisation discussed above. The accepted consensus about the Europeanisation of Greek FP will, therefore, be qualified. As noted in the introduction, since the country joined the then EEC in 1981, Greek FP can be divided in the following three periods (see also Ioakimidis 2003Ioakimidis , 541): 1981Ioakimidis -19851985-1995 to date. Using the three-dimensional approach to Europeanisation discussed in Part One, this article argues that only the first dimension is visible in Greece's foreign policy, and this only in the third period (since 1996), and not earlier.
Greece's membership of the EU was meant to guarantee a number of important advantages for its foreign policy: -as the only way to maintain and consolidate its existing links with the West, be it at the political, economic, cultural or defence levels; -as a means to go beyond historical dilemmas of the past among West and East, by allowing a de jure equality between Greece and all the other (West) European states, including the big ones. Subsequently, the European card could allow a lessening of Greece's dependence, real or perceived, on the USA; -as a way of strengthening Greece's international bargaining power initially through EPC and later the CFSP; -as a deterrent to foreign interference in internal and domestic affairs in Greece; -as a means to secure solidarity from other EU states in its difficult relations with Turkey's hegemonic demands (over the Aegean and in Cyprus); -finally as a EEC/EPC and later EU/CFSP member state, Greece would add an important atout to its foreign policy especially in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, areas which have often acted as demandeurs of more European foreign policy action.
Let us now turn to the three periods identified above and apply the three dimensions of Europeanisation as discussed in Part One. The findings are first summarised before more detailed analysis in Section 2.1.
In brief: during the first period (1981)(1982)(1983)(1984)(1985), PASOK's rise to power did not fundamentally alter Greece's attitude towards European integration in general. However, it did indeed produce a dramatic rift with other member states and institutions over foreign policy matters. Greece's main political objective remained one of improving the terms of accession, as the 1982 Memorandum made it quite clear. The Greeks also favoured a strengthening of the intergovernmental nature of the arrangements and procedures that characterised EPC. Thus, EPC's intergovernmental nature was seen as 226 Charalambos Tsardanidis & Stelios Stavridis adequate for the formulation of a so-called "independent, Greek-centered, and proud" Greek FP (Christodoulidis 1988).
During the second period (1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995), there are signs of Greece influencing the process of European integration in terms of its political unification. On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence that, in terms of foreign policy cooperation, Greece accumulated obstacles to the emergence of a common European voice in the world. Indeed this period is characterised by a number of serious problems on international affairs. In terms of European defence prospects, however, Greece slowly emerged as an actor that favoured the extension of EPC prerogatives to security issues although it did continue supporting the Western European Union (WEU) as an alternative option to NATO, seeking for years to join that organisation.
In the final period (since 1996), the EU is transforming the main area of Greek foreign policy initiatives and policies. All its key FP issue-areas (Turkey, Cyprus, the Balkans and the Mediterranean) belong to the multilateral framework of the EU's international activities. They include the first pillar (external economic and commercial policies), the CFSP, and also its most recent addition of a security and defence dimension, nowadays commonly labelled the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). These EU means are seen not only as a tool for promoting better Greek national interests but also as a mechanism for better influencing the way European foreign policy, widely defined, is formulated and produced.

The First Dimension: the Degree of Harmonisation
According to this first dimension, Europeanisation means the constant adaptation to the needs and requirements that are produced by the integration process, namely EU membership. It is clear in the case of Greece that such a process has occurred in a gradual manner over a number of years. During the first period (1981)(1982)(1983)(1984)(1985), there was no sign of Europeanisation in Greek FP but, rather, ample evidence to the contrary. It would be more accurate to see Greece's membership of the EU as a means to counter unwelcome changes to its foreign policy behaviour. Greece kept on showing a clear preference for not aligning itself with the remainder of its EPC partners. Examples abound in that respect: over Poland, the deployment of Cruise and Pershing-II missiles in Western Europe, a nuclear-free zone proposal for the Balkans, Middle East issues ranging from Libya, Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the the Six-Nation Initiative for a banning of nuclear testing 8 to the Korean Jumbo tragedy.
It is interesting to note that, with only one or two exceptions, the Greek position of being in a 'minority of one' did not concern direct Greek national interests, nor did they really have an effect on the rest of the EPC states or the West more generally. Greek policy, however, prevented the emergence of a common European stance on quite a number of international policy matters and thus undermined European cohesion -a situation which EPC was meant to avoid. The fact that this fundamental objective was not achieved had repercussions for Europe, for instance at the United Nations, The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy 227 although it must be noted that Greece joining the EEC/EPC at that time was not the sole reason for such a lack of cohesion. It did, however, add to a lack of European solidarity over international issues (for details of EPC and UN voting behaviour, see Stavridis & Pruett 1996).
There were four main reasons for such behaviour: first, to respond to the internal pressure that the Socialist government was receiving from its own supporters and especially the leadership of the PASOK (who wanted a more independent Greek FP); second, as a means to avoid pressure from bigger member states within the EPC framework; third, to prevent any EPC decision that might include a political, economic or other cost for Athens, regarding the Cyprus problem and its dispute with Turkey; fourth, as a means to distance Athens from Washington (Valinakis 1987, 319). Of all four reasons, only the first one was achieved to a certain extent. The Socialist governments managed to combine anti-West and anti-American rhetoric within the framework of the EU. Quite paradoxically, it led to a better understanding of the advantages of EU membership among a population that harboured deep down anti-Western feelings.
During the second period (1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995) a different trend can be noted: There appears to be some degree of harmonisation and adaptation. The dynamics of European integration finally seem to influence Greek foreign policy (Verney 1993, 145-147). EU membership does not only begin to act as a reason for dropping the continuation of atavistic nationalistic positions in Greece (Couloumbis 1994, 191-192). It also starts to be considered as a means for enhancing the impact of national FP through EPC and, later, the CFSP. The reasons for such a development are as follows: -Greece's attempts to extend the scope of EPC to security matters, thanks to the first treaty revisions (under the Single European Act). Although Greece did not support the establishment of a political secretariat, it did back the inclusion of political aspects of security in EPC. As Greece was not yet a WEU member, it tried to facilitate such a development by showing more flexibility on the workings of the EPC (Valinakis 1988, 53;Valinakis 1991, 132-135). -The poor state of the Greek economy and the realisation that only the European dimension had the will and capability of altering it, mainly through the clear impact of European funds (cohesion and development, plus regional funds). -The conclusion that the European card could be used for the creation of a third 'pole' at a time of a new détente between East and West following Gorbachev's accession to power in the USSR. -The realisation that EPC had strengthened the capabilities of Greece's diplomacy. This became quite clear after 1986 when Turkey decided to try and improve its relations with the EU. Athens realised that Greek membership enhanced its negotiating capacity with Turkey (Ioakimidis 2003, 545).
As new tensions in Greek-Turkish relations appeared in March 1987, such an advantage became all the more apparent. Thus, this new Greek-Turkish dispute became not only central to NATO and the WEU but also to EPC.

Charalambos Tsardanidis & Stelios Stavridis
-Thanks to the transformation of EPC into a CFSP with a security and defence dimension, the Greeks realised that the EU could strengthen their own security.
During the third period (since 1996), the degree of Europeanisation of Greek FP has increased as never before. Most Greek FP issues are now dealt through the EU prism. The new characteristics are as follows: -Greek FP now 'absorbs' the logic of European unification with great success. Any international issue is immediately seen through the lens of the EU, bearing in mind the views of all the other member states. In that respect it has been argued, for instance, that the 1999 Kosovo crisis would not have been dealt with in the same manner if Greece had not accepted this logic of Europeanisation and its membership of the CFSP. A nationalistic and opportunistic policy was thus avoided (Kavakas 2000, 148). This is particularly true if it is contrasted to the Greek policy towards FYROM in 1994. -Once an obstructionist state (in the 1980s), Greece has become an ardent supporter of the communitarization of the CFSP. Thus, during the European Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003, Greece proposed a substantial reform of the CFSP with the possibility of some Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) decisions (for instance if there was an initial proposal by the Commission.) The proposal was not adopted in the end (Ioakimidis 2004, 199). -On issues of national interest such as the Cyprus Problem, EU relations with Turkey, South Eastern states, or Mediterranean countries, Greek FP increasingly reflects the wider EU positions which it has itself contributed to formulate. -There is greater participation of Greek FP actors, be they ministries or NGOs, to the formulation of Greek policy towards EU positions, including active involvement in EU institutions.
There is an interesting question worth posing at this stage, even if it can not be considered in more detail: is the shift in Greek FP towards Turkey first visible in 1995, officially materialising in February 1999, and culminating in the 1999 Helsinki European Council decisions, the direct result of Europeanisation, or is it due to other factors, or a combination of both (Stavridis 2003a, 20). 'Other factors' would include a decision that a rapprochement with Turkey will be more beneficial to Greek interests in the longer term or, simply, more systemic reasons such as the new international (dis-)order following the end of the Soviet empire in the early 1990s and the new international terrorist threat more recently.

The Second Dimension: the Degree of Influence of the Member State
During the first period (1981)(1982)(1983)(1984)(1985), Greece did not manage to influence the formulation of EPC positions effectively. Her policy of footnotes and asterisks only led to their being cited in Foreign Ministers' meetings and

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European Council sessions and increased her isolation. Clearly, Greek FP did not contribute at all to the formulation of a common European foreign policy stance.
On the contrary, during the second period (1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995) there appears to be some evidence of Greek influence in the CFSP, as in the case of FYROM, the Cyprus Problem or relations with Turkey. Greek FP seems to be 'Europeanised' in that respect. Even if, in the case of FYROM, the impact is negative (in the sense that Greece prevented the EU from recognising this Balkans state) and even if the period includes the embargo saga with the Commission bringing the Greek government to Court (during the 1994 Greek Presidency), the Greek position becomes that of the EU until the 1995 agreement between the two sides (see Tziampiris 2000). Similarly, by vetoing Turkey's Customs Union until 1994, Greece manages to link this issue with that of Cyprus' membership of the EU in an attempt to find a solution to the long-standing Cyprus Problem. However, if the influence and the results are clear, the term 'Europeanisation' still cannot be used to explain such behaviour. Indeed, by 'imposing' its own national views, Greece did not help enhance the overall influence of the EU in those specific matters. The 'name' issue over FYROM is far from being solved. 9 In that respect, it can be safely argued that Greece's hostility to the use of 'Macedonia' is not shared by the rest of the EU member states or institutions. (The European Commission had brought a case against the Greek government's decision to impose an embargo in early 1994). Thus, the Greek stance on the FYROM question resulted in major difficulties for overall EU policy towards that region of the world (Tziampiris 2000, 177-184), whereas her stance on Turkey had weakened EU relations with that country and, until 1993, had created problems for the so-called Renovated Mediterranean Policy (Tsardanidis 1992).
Since 1996, Greece has succeeded in forcefully promoting its own policies as European, in particular with regard to the question of Cyprus' accession to the EU. To realise that the EU can be used as the best and most privileged means to promote national interests cannot necessarily be equated with Europeanisation, all the same. Furthermore, Greece has not achieved clear advantages from the fact that its national interests are now presented as European ones. Thus, the question of the continued violations of Greek airspace by the Turkish airforce has not reached the 'Europeanisation' stage to the extent that it has not become a problem for the CFSP (Stavridis 2003b, 17). Nor was the EU (through its CFSP) implicated in the peaceful resolution of the 1996 Imia Crisis. 10 In conclusion therefore, in spite of all the opportunities that Greek accession to the EU has offered, Athens has only been able to use the EPC, and later the CFSP, either to promote its own national interests, or to prevent difficulties from arising to these interests. The CFSP has not been used as a means to the logic of Europeanisation for Greek FP but, rather, as a place where European foreign policy could cater for Greek foreign policy demands (Kouveliotis 2001, 44).

The Third Dimension: Adaptation of Domestic Foreign Policy Making to EU-level FP Factors
The key element to the third dimension of Europeanisation has to do with the degree to which the domestic foreign policy-making process (domestic sources) has been adapting to the EU's own norms, values, processes, institutions and policies. If this is fully the case, then Europeanisation has actually been completed. It is not possible to argue that, at any stage during the three periods under study here, Greek foreign policy has experienced such a situation. Despite the influence on Greek FP of the common positions and policies of the EU and its other member states; despite the EU's status as an independent international actor; despite trying to satisfy national foreign policy interests by means of the EU, it is not possible to see, within the Greek political system, evidence of a Europeanisation process that has created a full permeation of all domestic sources. This lack of inter-subjectivity does not result so much from the fact that EU FP continues to be constructed mainly through intergovernmental mechanisms, as to the lack of Europeanisation of the Greek FP decision-making system. This absence of Europeanisation is due to the factors outlined below.
First, the general observation that currently the EU is not able to offer an efficient security and defence system for Greece. After the initial hopes that EEC/EU membership would provide Greece's security, it became clear very quickly that this was not the case, no matter whether because the EU did not want or was not able to do so. As the case of the 1996 Imia Crisis showed very clearly, there was no European defence of Greek interests. The EU's lack of ability to provide security to Greece may be real or perceived 11 in the sense that some threats might be exaggerated, but perceptions and misperceptions can be significant in international security. Moreover, although EU membership has strengthened the international influence of Greece, in particular in the Balkans and in the Eastern Mediterranean; although it has facilitated the promotion of national interests such as Cyprus' accession to the EU; although it has facilitated Greece's ability and capacity to avoid unwelcome situations to its national interests, it is still not possible to argue that the EU can effectively defend Greece's national sovereignty and territorial independence. No other member state had put so much trust (and hope) that this would be the case. Nor would EU membership facilitate a solution to the many international problems that Greece has with its neighbours (Tsakaloyannis 1996, 200).
Second, even if it is the case that Greece enters into the core of EU membership and that such a development strengthens its own capacity to avoid difficult international situations, this would not necessarily mean that Greece has achieved a high level of Europeanisation. This is simply because it does not follow automatically that European norms and values have become totally embedded in the Greek political system, including its foreign policy decisionmaking process. It would mean merely that the EU is part of what the Realist School calls another internal/domestic element in the instruments that Greece tries to possess in its foreign policy (see Couloumbis 2003, 40).

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Third, Greek FP continues to address the same old 'narrow' national interests (known in Greece as the ethnika themata or national issues (that is to say, mainly the Cyprus problem and Greek Turkish relations). Even if, since 1996, Greece has tried to promote them through the EU framework, it does not necessarily and automatically mean that it has Europeanised them, mainly because such a tactical shift is meant to better promote those traditional interests (not a change of strategy, only of tactics). The continued disfunction of domestic factors and actors further strengthens the view that Greek FP has not yet become Europeanised. As Ioakimidis has argued, "[c]oupled with the institutional malfunctionalities, this narrowly orientated approach in defining the country's foreign interests and in conditioning negotiating behaviour in the context of CFSP generates the impression that Greek foreign policy cannot adjust to the EU requirements" (Ioakimidis 1999, 163). Therefore, it came as no surprise that, at the end of August 2003, the following traditional issues again topped the agenda of a meeting between Prime Minister Simitis and Foreign Minister Papandreou: Greek-Turkish relations (including Turkey's EU membership prospects), the European Convention, and the Cyprus issue (Greek newspaper Kathimerini, 28 August 2003). Perhaps a change of style but not one of substance is to be witnessed here. Again, there might be some Europeanisation but that does not necessarily imply, as the existing literature and interviews claim, that the process has been successfully completed.
Fourth, the absence of a European 'culture', due to the clientelistic nature of the Greek state system, must be mentioned. In addition, there are signs that Europe and Europeanisation are perceived among the Greek population as evidence of the abandonment of traditional Greek and Christian Orthodox values. Such an approach tends to identify the process of Europeanisation with traditional Greek fears about 'foreign protection', meaning in fact foreign intervention in internal affairs (Ioakimidis 2001, 79-80). EU funds do not seem to have altered the fundamentally clientelistic and corrupt nature of the Greek system either. Rather than seeing a shift in Greek practice thanks to the availability of more EU funding, the opposite has occurred. The more EU funds were received, the more these phenomena appeared to occur. A Report by the Council of Europe's Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) finds that the allocation and distribution of EU funds is the area most plagued by corruption in Greece (Athens News, 10 January 2003, A05).
Fifth, the Europeanisation process in Greece is the result (to a large extent) of the ongoing struggle between conservatives/traditionalists and modernisers/transformers (Tsoukalis 1997, 182). That is to say that the real issue is the economic and political convergence of Greece with the rest of the West European system. Foreign policy changes fall within that category rather than a policy area where Europeanisation occurs for its own sake. Because the modernisation effort in Greece is linked to developments in the EU, there appears to be a 'nationalistic backlash' that further complicates the Europeanisation of Greek FP (Lavdas 1997, 252-254). If it is the case that Europeanisation is identified with modernisation, then the Europeanisation process only represents one side of the wider debate between modernisers and traditionalists. As one element in a debate it may not represent a new state of affairs, where the output of Greek FP has become Europeanised. The difference that exists between these two concepts therefore needs to be kept in mind.
Sixth, the above points are further illustrated with two specific empirical examples: public opinion in Greece and the Greek Presidency of 2003. During the Kosovo campaign in 1999, surveys showed that 95 per cent of the Greek public opinion were opposed to NATO intervention. Thus, Greek public opinion was said to be "atypique" (Reynié 2004, 67). Others have gone as far as to compare it to views held in Arab countries, i.e. not European ones. 12 In 2003, well over 90-95 per cent of Greek public opinion expressed their opposition to the war in Iraq, as did most public opinion in the EU28. The well-known debate over the question of the volatility of public opinion(s) over foreign affairs is not entered into here; it is only questioned if this represents true Europeanisation. After all, in 1999, the Greek opinion was in a minority of one within the EU15. A number of surveys show that it is difficult to play the Europeanisation card when, "[t]he high level of Greek public trust in EU institutions reflects to a significant degree the low trust in the national civil service…, and the low degree of overall satisfaction with the functioning of national democracy" (Pagoulatos 2002, 25). Similarly, a recent poll suggests that: "[m]ost Greeks are skeptical of the government (53 percent) while eight out of 10 don't trust political parties and half do not trust the news media … Greeks are more distrustful of their democratic system (80 percent) than of multinational corporations" (Kathimerini/ English edition, 23 July 2003). How can a so-called Europeanised system in Greece be mistrusted so much and so much trust be put in the EU, 13 especially after the disappointment of the European reaction to the Imia Crisis in 1996? Similarly, Greek public opinion remains rather disappointed by the EU's overall stance over Cyprus' continued division and occupation. In late May 2004, 30.3 per cent were totally unhappy, and 40.4 per cent rather unhappy: a total of 70.7 per cent (Kyriakatiki Elefterotipia, 30.05.04). It appears to be the case (although further, more systematic, research is needed) that Greeks are constructing an ideal Europe (read EU) which simply does not exist, then claim that they obviously belong to it and are proud of doing so, before showing signs of disillusionment that at the end of the day the EU is not the panacea they though it was.
The second empirical example deals with the way the Greek government handled the reactions to the war in Iraq, and especially within the context of the Greek Presidency (Greece's fourth EU Council Presidency). 14 There appears to be consensus that the Presidency was a 'success', and that therefore, by implication, it represented a good example of how Europeanised Greek FP had become. This link needs more research before it can be proven. Indeed, international circumstances may be a better guide than Europeanisation. Moreover, the consensus in Greece was that the Greek government managed the crisis that the war in Iraq created among EU member states rather well. However, there is plenty of evidence that the Government made The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy 233 a Houdini-like act in an effort to appear anti-US at home, pro-US abroad on the one hand, and on the other, of being pro-EU (common position), whilst actually only supporting the Franco-German axis (a minority view in terms of the governments of the member states). But it must be stressed that the overall claim was that the 2003 Greek Presidency was considered to be a success and a showcase of Europeanisation, especially when contrasted to less successful ones in the past (1983,1988,1994). 15 The fact that the following Italian Presidency was a disaster added later ammunition to such a claim. 16 The rather poor 2000 French Presidency was also mentioned as another good reason for stressing the success of the Greek one in 2003 (Interviews).
Therefore, there is plenty of evidence in the media 17 of the success of the Greek Presidency, including opinions of foreign governments. It remains difficult to understand, however, why all Greek academics agree (Interviews). It is very difficult to argue that the objectives of the Greek Presidency as spelt out repeatedly by Simitis himself (EP 2003) were achieved (these were: to avoid war in Iraq; to keep the EU together). 18 If these objectives were not achieved, how could the Presidency have been a success? It is acceptable for politicians or even journalists, as long as they write under the 'opinion section', to express their opinions and the readership knows the political views of the national media, yet only a single example of a critical analysis in the journalistic world could be found (beyond the traditional ideological bashing from extreme right or extreme left quarters). 19 There were plenty more critical comments from the academic community but, surprisingly, not in Greece. For instance, the comments made at a conference in Paris just before the beginning of the war in Iraq to describe the role of the Presidency in the crisis: "the Greek Presidency had been sidelined" (Institute for Security Studies 2003). Esther Barbé expressed a similar viewpoint in her introductory comments to a 'Special Iraq' dossier. 20 Similarly, very little attention was given to the fact that the Greek Prime Minister was informed about the 'Letter of the Eight' 21 not by Tony Blair or Silvio Berlusconi, with both of whom he had separate phone conversations on the eve of the letter's publication, but by Hungarian Premier Peter Medgyessy who happened to be in Athens on an official visit. This is just one -but a very significant -example. It must also be said that in Greece it seems that the flattering comments in the media were enough when contrasted to the rather more critical assessments of past Greek Presidencies. 22 Greek FP did indeed suffer from a pretty negative image in the past. The real question remains, however, is this a result of Europeanisation? In other words, is any shift in the FP of an EU member state to be necessarily attributed to the impact of EU membership? Is it not more credible to argue that perhaps the 'wrong' attitudes or policies had just been corrected?
It should also be noted that the 2003 debâcle over Iraq had more to do with a lack of a Europeanised CFSP. This would be a fairer assessment than claiming that there was evidence of a Europeanised Greece.

Conclusions
This article therefore disagrees with the dominant view (existing literature; Interviews) that Greek FP represents the most 'successful' or even the only area of Greek Europeanisation. It concludes that, far from being a completed process, the Europeanisation of Greek FP is a rather superficial development which has only so far, and only partly, affected the elites in Greece. The latter is mainly visible through a change of style (from confrontational to more consensual politics) and approach (from unilateral to multilateral initiatives), especially within the EU framework (Balkans, Cyprus, Turkey). But when the three dimensions of what Europeanisation in foreign policy actually means are considered, only the first dimension can be said to be partly fulfilled in Greece and, even in this case, only in the most recent past.
There is also an element of 'wishful thinking' in a positive assessment of a Europeanised Greek FP, as if by repeating it, often and long enough, it would become a reality. 23 Thus, this article argues that, although a number of developments have taken place, they are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a Europeanised Greek FP. It is a step in the right direction but as Europeanisation is a dynamic process more research is still needed on the actual impact of the EU on Greek FP and vice versa. There is also confusion in the debate in Greece between Europeanisation and other phenomena such as modernisation, democratisation, westernisation and globalisation.
In the authors' view, further work is needed in all these areas and, in particular, attention should be given with regard to Greek FP in respect of sectorial and geographic areas (the Middle East and the Mediterranean would be areas of particular interest), as well as on institutional adjustments (the Greek Parliament/Vouli appears to be one of the institutions dealing with foreign policy that has not been affected fully by Europeanisation, see Ioakimidis 2001, 90).
In particular, the need has been identified for more comparative studies on international conflict situations as a way of assessing if Europeanisation has occurred (or, to be more precise, of how much Europeanisation has occurred). That is to say that the 'national issues' should be studied in a more comprehensive and critical way in order to show if, and how much, Europeanisation has actually taken place. More work should also be carried out on the impact of Greek FP on the CFSP and, more particularly, of how Greek FP policy priorities have become externalised into EU foreign policy (a similar task on defence would also be useful). So far, it appears that Europeanising Greek national interests amounts to 'selling' them as European interests, to paraphrase Manhcke's words as already mentioned above (2001, 229); a rather difficult process if all EU states were to behave (or are behaving) the same way.
Finally, to use a Kissinger-like argument about the foreign policy of a country where he is rightly not considered as a good guide for foreign policy, it is difficult to believe in Europeanisation if the dominant view is that of anti-Americanism instead. There is an implicit and explicit identification of anti-Americanism with Europeanisation. This is a question that deserves further investigation. It might be a zero-sum approach only in some Greek The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy 235 minds. It may form part of a wider debate about what kind of Europe we want, that is to say, a transatlantic dimension with the EU as an ally of the USA or, rather, the EU as a counterbalance to the supremacy of the USA in a unipolar world after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.