3949291
doi
10.5281/zenodo.3949291
oai:zenodo.org:3949291
user-disputatio
The Debate between Explanation and Understanding in von Wright and Apel. A Double Interpretation of the Leibnizian Proposals
Ortiz de Landázuri, Carlos
Universidad de Navarra, Spain
issn:2254-0601
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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Wittgenstein
Foundation
Logical Positivism
Universal Language
<p>G. H. von Wright and Karl–Otto Apel have conducted a review of Leibniz's presence throughout the development of analytic philosophy after Russell and the first Wittgenstein. In both cases it was intended to solve the crisis of foundation generated by the initial positivist–logical proposals. Both Russell and the first Wittgenstein would have initially proposed some constitutive presuppositions of a dogmatic nature, which they would borrow from the Monadology of 1714 of the last Leibniz. However, these principles were in clear contradiction with respect to the unlimitedly revisionist regulatory ideal on which the elaboration of a truly universal mathematical language proposed by the young Leibniz was based. For von Wright the last Wittgenstein and the young Leibniz would have tried to legitimize the reciprocal semiotic understanding in the name of a previous experimental explanation, while for Apel both the last Wittgenstein and the young Leibniz would have tried to show the impossibility of explaining a fact of the experience if we do not have a previous language that allows us to understand it.</p>
Zenodo
2020-03-31
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
3949290
user-disputatio
1616277303.68699
549984
md5:0b076ce2d74554621971255346f95d71
https://zenodo.org/records/3949291/files/2020Ortiz.pdf
public
2254-0601
Is cited by
issn
10.5281/zenodo.3949290
isVersionOf
doi
Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin
9
12
2020-03-31