



Migration, Integration and Citizenship in Germany between 1990 and 2018

Country Report: Germany

By

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Preface

This paper, written by Dr. Ayşe Tecmen, reviews the major political, social and cultural developments in Germany that are related to migration and integration. It covers significant developments such as elections, new discourses, including the rise of populism and radicalisation. In doing so, it discusses immigration laws as well as migration and integration policies in Germany while stressing the case of Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants. However, this particular study does not focus on the influence and reception of migration and integration policies on the migrant population. Thus, it avoids making a sociological evaluation in order to refrain from reproducing stereotypes based on culture, religion, and ethnicity. In fact, this review focuses on the changing migration and integration policies which have also contributed to the structural discrimination of migrants. In addition, Muslim-origin migrants have also been scapegoated by the rising populist discourse in Germany and Europe, which has revived the political and public debates on who remains “foreign”.

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Table of Contents

Introduction	5
Integration and Citizenship: critical theoretical discussions.....	6
Background: early years of migration to Germany	9
1. 1990s: Who remains “foreign”?	11
1.1. The Act on Foreigners of 1990	11
1.2. Maastricht Treaty (1992) and EU citizenship	16
1.3. Asylum Compromise of 1992	18
2. 2000s: Islam, Migration and Terrorist Threats	20
2.1. Citizenship Act of 2000	20
2.2. September 11, 2001: Migration, securitization, and stereotypes	25
2.3. Migration Act of 2005	27
2.4. National Integration Plan of 2006	29
2.5. Global Economic Crisis of 2008	32
2.6. Thilo Sarrazin Debate of 2010	32
3. 2012 onwards: Increase in Migration	34
3.1. Europe’s Migration Crisis of 2015	36
3.2. Integration Act of 2016	39
3.3. The skilled labour immigration law of 2018.....	42
Conclusion.....	43
References	46

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Introduction

This paper aims to critically elaborate on the relevant literature revolving around migration, integration and citizenship debates in Germany since 1990. The paper is written within the framework of the ERC Advanced Grant Project titled “Nativism, Islamophobia and Islamism in the Age of Populism: Culturalisation and Religionisation of what is Social, Economic and Political in Europe”¹ (ISLAM-OPHOB-ISM).² The paper follows the scholarly research in a chronological manner covering significant developments such as elections, new discourses, the rise of populism and the rising terrorist threats in the country. In doing so, it overviews the major political, social and cultural developments in Germany and the scientific analysis and the responses. As will be illustrated, there have been various works studying Germany’s immigrant discourse, which has become recognized as a country of immigration since 2000.³

This paper overviews immigration laws as well as migration and integration policies in Germany while stressing the debates surrounding Europeanisation versus nationalisation of relevant policies. This review looks at the socio-economic, political, and psychological factors impacting the everyday lives of native and immigrant-origin individuals as they are stated in the extant literature. However, this particular study does not focus on the life-

¹ This project with the acronym of “ISLAM-OPHOB-ISM” has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme grant agreement no. 785934. This research analyses the current political, social, and economic context of the European Union, which is confronted by two substantial crises, namely the global financial crisis and the refugee crisis. These crises have led to the escalation of fear and prejudice among the youth who are specifically vulnerable to discourses that culturalise and stigmatize the “other”. Young people between the ages of 18 to 30, whether native or immigrant-origin, have similar responses to globalization-rooted threats such as deindustrialization, isolation, denial, humiliation, precariousness, insecurity, and anomia. These responses tend to be essentialised in the face of current socio-economic, political and psychological disadvantages. While a number of indigenous young groups are shifting to right-wing populism, a number of Muslim youths are shifting towards Islamic radicalism. The common denominator of these groups is that they are both downwardly mobile and inclined towards radicalization. Hence, this project aims to scrutinize social, economic, political and psychological sources of the processes of radicalization among native European youth and Muslim-origin youth with migration background, who are both inclined to express their discontent through ethnicity, culture, religion, heritage, homogeneity, authenticity, past, gender and patriarchy.

² I would like to thank Ayhan Kaya, Melanie Weißenberg, and Ayşenur Benevento for their support, suggestions and remarks during the writing of this report.

³ Please note that this study does not cover “illegal immigration”, for a discussion of this topic, see inter alia İçduygu and Toktas, 2002; Kyle and Koslowski, 2001, for a case study on Germany see Heckmann 2004.

worlds of Muslim-origin migrants in Germany and the influence of migration and integration policies on the migrant population. It rather provides the context for the field and desk research is conducted in the scope of the ISLAM-OPHOB-ISM project, which deconstructs the motivations and the outcomes of the escalation of fear and prejudice among the youth who are specifically vulnerable to discourses that culturalise and stigmatize the “other”. In doing so, this review avoids making a sociological evaluation in order to refrain from reproducing stereotypes based on culture, religion, and ethnicity which are the core of this project. The aim is to contribute to the re-assembling of the “social”, which we think is dissolved and dispersed through cultural, religious, and ethnic distinctions.

Integration and Citizenship: critical theoretical discussions

As will be illustrated, the literature on integration policies and practices in Germany also acknowledge that European integration and the emergence of transnational identities and EU-wide understandings/practices on integration also play an important role in the German case. Gilane Tawadros (2001: 8) for instance notes that national identities are continually fluctuating, as they are unsettled from below by the dynamic, transnational identities of Europe's changing citizenship while being overshadowed from above by globalisation that cross national boundaries. Therefore, as in various EU countries, national identity thus remains problematic and challenging thereby remaining in a state of redefinition and negotiation. The growing multiculturalism and multiethnicity of Germany is a significant contributing factor.

To that end, Germany's migrant integration policies and practices have evolved differently from other European countries because Germany is a federal state with a decentralized system, which led to the fragmentation of integration policies between the national government and the states (*Länder*). Additionally, Germany was one of the last West European immigration countries to officially recognize itself as a country of immigration (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou, 2009). This meant that immigrant integration policies were more recently instituted starting with the ‘National Integration Plan’ in 2006 and a National Action Plan on Integration.⁴ These plans aimed at improving the inclusion of immigrants and people of immigrant background in different policy areas, and at all federal, state and local levels of government. These mainstreaming efforts stimulated the production of coherent migrant integration policies at different levels of government in Germany.

Due to the complex nature of Germany's migration and integration policies, before it is helpful to remind that migration, integration and citizenship practices are related to national identity. Stuart Hall (1992) describes national identity as a kind of cultural identity in which the nation-state is both a political entity and a signifying system of cultural representation. He argues that:

National cultures are composed not only of cultural institutions, but of symbols and representations. A national culture is a discourse a way of constructing meanings which influences and organizes both our actions and our conception of ourselves

⁴ See <https://polen.diplo.de/blob/485830/b3bada7b7614c18bb869326b0bef63aa/integration-nap-eng-data.pdf>

(...). National cultures construct identities by producing meanings about 'the nation' with which we can identify; these are contained in the stories which are told about it, memories which connect its present with its past, and images which are constructed of it (Hall 1993: 292-293).

As such, national identity is not only about membership or citizenship but also about a sense of identification and belonging to an "imagined community" (Anderson, 1986). In line with the imagined nature of our communities, John Russon (1995: 510-511) describes that human beings feel at home in their own worlds, always reflecting our own "selfhood" (Russon, 1995: 510) as a response to a sudden and unforeseeable crisis in the functioning world. As such, in reference to Hegel, Russon shows that self-consciousness is part of a dialogue and mutual recognition. Making it a collective achievement, Hegel argues that communal life and customs define who one is (Russon, 1995: 513-517). This is related to the construction of inner and outer boundaries through political and public discourses on inclusion and exclusion of particular communities. In this sense, nationalism is a political construct tapping into innate human tendencies to affiliate and identify one's sense of self as belonging to certain groups (to the detriment of others) (Tyrrell, 1996). Specifically, citizenship functions as a form of governmentality, which is an institution, that defines the rights and duties of individuals vis-a-vis the state. Modern states deploy it as an ideological institution to turn the centrifugal social forces into centripetal forces. Citizenship then enhances social, civil, political, economic, environmental, ethno-cultural and other kinds of resources employed by the modern central state in negotiating with societal groups who raise various sets of claims (Marshall 1950).

In turn, there are various conceptualisations of citizenship and its practices. Notable studies include Brubaker's (1992) juxtaposition of the universalist and assimilationist French concept contrasting the particularist, organic, and ethnicized German citizenship. Brubaker's analysis of the constructed nature of citizenship in relation to nationalism, and ethnicity is especially important in relation to politics of recognition of Turks in Germany. As it will be relevant in our discussion of the Turkish community in Germany, in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, Barth (1969) emphasises the boundaries between ethnic groups and criticizes the idea of a world that is consisting of many individual cultures, which are easily distinguishable and composed of homogeneous groups of people. According to Barth, ethnic groups are a form of social organization, which are formed through social contact rather than isolation. They are created in contrast to other groups and are the result of such delimitation processes (Barth, 1969: 22-23). In addition, one can argue that both ethnic and cultural representations of citizenship lead to greater outgroup prejudice, albeit stemming from different ideological conceptions (Reijerse, 2013).

Ethnic, cultural, religious, and political identities are constructed in the dialogical and dialectical encounters with the others. Concerning those who leave their homes, Stuart Hall (1999) argues that migrants are not uniform and unified, because they are the product of several interlinked histories and cultures. As such, while individuals might embrace their ethnic identity, they can be part of several "homes" and do not necessarily always belong to one homeland. In Hall's words, these multiple affiliations require plurality, thus using the term "hybridity" (Hall, 1999: 435).

As Nora Räthzel (1997: 41) writes, “[t]he uniform nation exists to the degree to which a majority of individuals contributes to the image of the uniform nation and defines itself and others that way, i.e. including itself, excluding others” (1997: 41). Despite European integration and the discourse of unity in diversity, “the national Other is predominantly an Other that resides within the borders of the nation-state: ethnic or religious minorities, migrants, illegal aliens and so on” (Räthzel cited in Minnard 2008: 16). In this sense, homogeneity of the nation is nothing but a myth in the age of globalization shaped by diversity, mobility and interactions of all kinds across the borders.

Within this myth of homogeneity, what actually exists is a complex dynamic that is formulated on recognition/unrecognition as well as inclusion/exclusion. In turn, while citizenship is a seemingly simple form of exclusionary practices, citizenship may have different meanings for the native and immigrant-origin members of the nation at stake. Czarina Wilpert (2013: 125) notes that while citizenship could indeed be a key concept in republican societies in terms of belonging, immigrants often interpret citizenship more pragmatically and less dynamically and perceive it as “an issue of having the right to a passport or to an incontestable right to reside - a better legal status”.

However, transnational citizenship, such as European citizenship introduces a new layer of belonging. Regarding the establishment of European citizenship, Diez and Squire (2008: 566) support that citizenship is a means of rendering the global population governable. As such, they argue that citizenship might be defined both as a nodal point that draws together notions of belonging, access, rights and obligations, and as an institution around which concepts such as the nation and political community are articulated (see Howarth 2000; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Torfing 1999; Wæver 1998). Seen from this perspective, citizenship is not simply a legal status that is conferred upon individuals and embedded in institutions, but it can also be conceived of as forming part of a broader discourse of national identity (Isin and Wood, 1999).

In the case of Germany, Jürgen Habermas (1999) argues that historically German citizenship does not emphasise national identity but rather procedures for political decision-making. Brian Turner (1993: 2) asserts that this tradition defines individuals as a component of society that functions through a set of practices shaping the flow of resources between individuals and social groups. Finally, in our review of the citizenship and integration practices and discourses in Germany since the 1990s, we see that recognition, acceptance, or equality has not been reached, instead generalized negative images on Muslims’ inability to integrate have become more visible.

As will be illustrated, in the last two decades, the descendants of immigrants with Turkish-origin have found new expressions of their belongingness and workable identifiers to express their place within German society as a response to institutional and ideological factors. As Wilpert (2013: 109) notes

Until recently, it has been assumed that incorporation through citizenship would be a sufficient basis for acceptable hyphenated identities such as Italian-, German-, Irish-, or Polish-Americans commonly used in U.S. history and considered a normal approach in classical countries of immigration. It cannot be denied that in an age

that offers the ease of global communication and the internationalization of networks alternative identifications of belongingness are available (see also Kaya, 2001).

This is also a form of “postnational imaginary” (Mandel: 2008) which acknowledges that regardless of globalisation, individuals still live within their states capable of providing recognition, as well as resources and infrastructures. In turn, the state remains the leading authority for recognition and belonging (Wilpert 2013: 109). As Ayhan Kaya (2001) argues in his analysis of the lyrics used in hip-hop music “no youngster feels attached to either Germany or Berlin, but they are attached to their local neighbourhoods such as Kreuzberg.” Kaya notes that youth prefer transnational identities that transcend the nation and are simultaneously situated in the local as a response to the exclusionary policies of the nation-state.⁵

Background: early years of migration to Germany

Despite various migratory movements towards Germany since the 1950s, the political and social discourse insisted that Germany is not a country of immigration maintaining that the country is not a “classical immigration country” but rather a “labour recruiting country” (Chin, 2007). This was a result of the labour-intensive approach to migration policies and the emphasis on “guest workers” (“*Gastarbeiter*”) mainly migrating from Turkey. Labor migrant recruitment pattern is still visible in the residential distribution of Turks in Germany within predominantly or formerly, industrialised urban areas like Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, Duisburg, Augsburg, München, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Nürnberg, Darmstadt, and Göppingen in Stuttgart are still centres of Turkish life in Germany (Schiffauer, 2005:1130).

In 1955, West Germany signed the first labour recruitment treaty with Italy, which was followed by similar other bilateral labour recruitment treaties with Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and the former Yugoslavia between 1955 and 1968 (Crul and Doornik, 2003; Castles et al., 1984; Kaya, 2009). In turn, West Germany officially initiated a Guest Worker program with eight different Mediterranean countries, which stated that signatories were able to select suitable workers that migrated to Germany to fill in the gaps in the continuously growing German industrial sectors.

In the beginning, migrant workers from Turkey came “mainly from the middle and upper-middle ranks of the peasantry and the urban labor force” (Paine, 1974: 19). They were more educated and skilled than the average working population in Turkey and came from urban

⁵ It is important to note that the concept of “youth” has been difficult to define and position. For instance the UN defines ‘youth’, as those persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years (<http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/youth/youth-definition/>) as a period of transition from the dependence of childhood to adulthood’s independence. Therefore, it is more fluid than other fixed age-groups. “Yet, age is the easiest way to define this group, particularly in relation to education and employment, because ‘youth’ is often referred to a person between the ages of leaving compulsory education, and finding their first job.” (<https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/fact-sheets/youth-definition.pdf>). For an overview of the development of “youth” as an age group and a stage in life, see Buckingham, 2008; Heywood, 2001; Kehily, 2007; Roche et al., 2004; Kessem et al, 2010; Jones, 2009; Purhonen 2015).

areas (Pennix and Renselaar 1976, 21-24; van Velzen and Pennix, 1976: 173–175). Phillip Martin underlines that approximately 30 percent of the Turkish migrants were skilled workers, most migrants who migrated in early 1960s were skilled workers. Most labor migrants who left Turkey to Europe during the peak of labor migration between 1968 and 1973 were unskilled workers (Martin, 1991: 25, 30). The people who migrated from Turkey to Germany after 1973 were less skilled and educated (Abadan-Unat, 2011: 53) and came mostly from rural areas (Gökdere, 1978; Unat, 2002; Kaya and Kentel, 2004).

These treaties underline that migrant guest workers would eventually return to their countries of origin (Chin, 2007: 3). For instance, the Recruitment Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Turkey signed in 1961 anticipated a stay of only two years, but Turkish guest workers had the possibility of exceeding their stay. This led to the proliferation of social, cultural and political discontents in Germany. Following the economic crisis caused by the oil crisis in 1973, these labour recruitment programs were discontinued (Hailbronner, 1987: 329). Despite the encouragements to guest workers to return to their countries of origin, most decided to stay in Germany and applied for visas for themselves and their families (Wolbert, 1984). This also applied to Turkish migrants since 1973, as family reunification and political asylum exceeded labour migration (Kaya and Kentel, 2004: 10). At the end of the Guest Worker program, more than 600.000 Turks have migrated to Germany, and due to the subsequent immigration of family members, the number of people with Turkish origin in Germany has increased to roughly 3 million in 2013 (BAMF, 2013). By the end of the 1970s, the continuing presence of a large number of migrants in the country led West Germany to institute a formal policy of “integration” (Chin 2007: 10).

Furthermore, in the early years of migration, chain migration in some cases led to the reestablishment of ethnic and religious communities in Germany.⁶ As will be discussed in this paper, migrants originating from Turkey were already ethno-culturally and religiously very diverse and they were ethno-culturally Turkish, Kurdish, Circassian, religiously Sunni Muslims, Alevi Muslims, as well as non-Muslims. Especially in the late 1960s, many employers encouraged migrants to invite fellow villagers and relatives to join the labour force in Germany. In particular, migrants from minorities (like the Alevi) or from communities that had a history of persecution in Turkey (like the Yezidi or Assyrian Christians) tended to engage in chain migration. Apart from the major centres of immigration mentioned earlier, the Yezidi had communities of considerable size in Celle, Lower Saxony, and in Emmerich, North-Rhine Westphalia. The Assyrians had communities in Berlin, in Giessen, and in Wiesbaden/Mainz (Kleff, 1984; Kaya, 2001; Mandel, 1990; Schiffauer, 2005:1130).

Migration imposed a particular challenge in terms of the socialization of children. In Turkey, children would pick up social norms and values on their own through socialization without any special efforts. Migration, however, changed the stereotypical socialization processes, which mainly focused on gender roles that privileged males over females (Mihçiyazgan,

⁶ Chain migration is “the practice where those who have settled on a family reunification basis can themselves sponsor further family members, consistent with European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) obligations.” (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/chain-migration_en).

1986). The influence of German society on children became a source of concern for Turkish migrants because it was markedly different from the Turkish culture in terms of individualism/community, as well as gender roles (Schiffauer, 2005: 1134; Pfluger-Schindlbeck, 1989). Over time, the dynamics of integration and assimilation also changed as the first generation of guest workers could hardly speak German, which separated them from the society; the second and third generations play an active part in society, in which they shape the political, cultural and economic lives. These generations were brought up in-between two countries and cultures and had to negotiate two identities (Bartsch, Brandt and Steinvorth, 2010).

Despite the growing number of immigrants, the German governments of the 1980s and 1990s insisted that 'Germany is not a country of immigration', which prepared the grounds for Turkish governments to use their power in the Turkish media to discourage integration (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes, 2007). As it became clear that the immigrants would not return, the German governments commenced their domestication policies (Özyürek, 2014).

As will be discussed below, 9/11 has further marginalized and criminalized Islam and shifted the public image of Turkish immigrants from 'ethnic problem' in the 1990s to religious 'other' in the 2000s (Holtz, Dahinden, and Wagner, 2013). In Western media and political discourse, stereotypes about Islam and Muslims, such as "the chauvinist males", "gender inequality", and "oppression and violence against women" have been portrayed as the antithesis of Western cultural values (Kunst and Sam, 2013; Kunst, 2016). This then associated the ethnic Turkish migrants with Islam and initiated discussions on intentional disintegration and underachievement in the late 1990s and early-2000s, which had negative implications on the self-identification of Turkish-origin youth (Kristen and Granato, 2007; Fischer-Neumann, 2014).

1. 1990s: Who remains "foreign"?

As it noted above, Germany has been an appealing destination for Turkish migrants and other. While its appeal was maintained in the 1990s, there were various national and EU-wide developments which influenced Germany's approach to migration and integration. As such, The Act on Foreigners of 1990, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the introduction of EU citizenship, as well as the Asylum Compromise of 1992 will be discussed in this section. As will be illustrated below, the 1990s were marked with discussions on how migration has changed from labour to family reunification and marriage migration, as well as discussions on the nationalisation versus Europeanization of migration and integration policies.

1.1. The Act on Foreigners of 1990

The Act on Foreigners of 1990 was a major development in Germany's approach to migration and integration policies. At that time, the political reasoning was that since Germany was not acknowledged as a country of migration, an integration policy was not necessary (Minnard 2008: 42). As will be discussed shortly, this line of reasoning changed in the beginning of the new millennium with the new law and the transition from *jus sanguinis* to *jus soli* after more than 40 years of immigration (Abadan-Unat, 2011: 7). Consequently, the Foreigners Act aimed primarily to provide legal certainty for migrants living legally in Germany and to restrict immigration from non-EU countries. Acknowledging the limits of Germany to take in immigrants, the explanatory memorandum to The Act gave

priority to immigrants of German descent, those escaping political repression and EU citizens enjoying freedom of movement.

The explanatory memorandum to the Act asserted that Germany had limited ability to take in immigrants and that immigrants of German descent, foreigners fleeing political persecution and EU citizens exercising their right to freedom of movement had to be given priority. It stated, “Germany would not be able to continue an open and liberal foreigner policy if every time-limited stay resulted in a permanent residence right”.⁷

The Act on Foreigners of 1990 introduced new rules on spousal and family reunification, and on legal rights and naturalization for second-generation immigrants. It granted that the children of foreigners who were born in Germany would automatically receive a temporary residence permit, subject to extension, if the mother had a residence permit. When the child legally becomes an adult, the residence permit was converted into permanent residence. Kaya and Kentel (2010: 11) note that:

According to the new *Ausländergesetz* (1991) and the *Gesetz zur Änderung Asylverfahrens, Ausländer- und staatsangehörigkeitsrechtlicher Vorschriften* (1993), two groups of *Ausländer* have been legally entitled to naturalization (paragraphs 85 and 86 of the *Ausländergesetz*). Paragraph 85 declares that ‘foreigners’ between the ages of 16 and 23, who have been residents of Germany for more than eight years, attended a school in Germany for at least six years and who have not been convicted of serious offences, have the right to be naturalized. On the other hand, paragraph 86 introduces that those ‘migrants’, who have been residents of Germany for at least 15 years and possess a residence permit, have the right to naturalization. The absence of a conviction on a serious criminal offence and financial independence of the applicant are also crucial for the acquisition of citizenship according to this paragraph.

In addition, the protection of spouses and children of those persecuted for political purposes was extended, and a “grandfather clause” was introduced for former asylum seekers whose deportation was suspended. The Act further strengthened the guidelines for deportation and relocation of immigrants, increasing the immigrants' control in rescinding residency permits. On the other hand, this law also restricted the residence rights of people in long-time unemployment. According to article 46, people who personally or in the name of a family member made use of welfare payments for more than three years could be deported by local authorities. The right of residence (*Aufenthaltsgenehmigung*) prevented deportation (Abadan-Unat, 2011: 23).

The *Ausländergesetz* also included a section for adolescents (age: 15-21) leaving Germany against their will in the course of a family return. After the return act was passed in 1983, several adolescents who had to return to their parents' homelands tried to return to Germany without papers. According to the right of return (*Recht auf Wiederkehr*) adolescents can return to Germany after eight years of regular residence, including at least

⁷ Full text of the Act on Foreigners is available at: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/11/063/1106321.pdf>

six years of school attendance in Germany, on the condition that their living costs are covered by a salary or another person (Sieveking, 1991: 151-153). Despite non-EU migration to Germany, the rules on freedom of movement for EU citizens took precedence over general foreigner's law. As such, the Act of 1990 did not contain any provisions on that topic but retained the regulation in a separate law.

Non-EU immigrants, or resident aliens, were granted what T. H. Marshall (1992) described social, civil, but not political, rights. The immigrants built a genuine political presence in Germany, where they could not legally participate in politics through conventional means. These legal barriers provided the ground for the Turkish immigrants in Germany to organize themselves politically along collective ethnic lines. In response to German insistence on the exclusionary 'Ausländerstatus,' Turkish migrant communities established strong ethnic structures and preserved ethnic boundaries. The lack of legal opportunities to allow immigrants to engage in politics and representative democracy in the receiving country made them be active civically through unconventional ways of political participation (Ataman, Sener, Noack, & Born, 2016) or direct their political activity towards their country of origin. In addition, this home-based involvement has been promoted by Turkey, which has developed networks of consular services and other official organizations (religious, educational and commercial). Homeland opposition parties and movements have also forged an organizational presence in Germany (Kaya 2009: 47, see also Berger et al. 2004).

Furthermore, this ethnic identity formulation also led to several studies on ethnic retention and integration starting in the mid-2000s when the effects of the 1990s policies became more visible (Diehl and Schnell, 2006; Skrobaneck, 2009; and Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011). These studies have also developed discussions about the notion of "reactive ethnicity" in Germany. Rumbaut (2008: 10) notes that 'reactive ethnicity,' denotes "one mode of ethnic identity formation [among ethnic minorities] that highlights the role of a hostile context of reception in accounting for the rise rather than the erosion of ethnicity". As Çelik (2015: 1647) argues this has become more visible after 9/11 as when people increase their identification with their ethnic group when they experience discrimination.

On the other hand, the preservation of ethnic ties and identification with the homeland also hinders integration, educational success, and economic prospects (Ross, 2008: 710). To that end, in the 1990s, education of Turkish-origin youth also became a topic of debate and study. For instance, Kristen et al. (2008: 127) studied three large datasets from the German Higher Education Information System Institute (HIS) from 1990, 1994 and 1999. They found that Germans are considerably more likely than Turkish-origin youth to enter tertiary education. That was attributed partly to their lack of experience with the German dual-training system and their educational motivation. Interestingly, the study concluded that Turkish-origin youngsters preferred academically-oriented educational institutions, rather than the lower-tier applied science universities, as these provided education in more traditional fields.

Furthermore, Martin states that "almost one-fourth of foreign youth in the vocational training system in the late 1990s were learning to be barbers or hairdressers, and another 20 percent were learning to be mechanics or painters" (Martin, 2002: 14) whereas German youth had the chance to enter vocational training in banking and IT. Empirical data provided by Heitmeyer et al. (1997) also confirm discrimination experiences of adolescents with

relatives of Turkish origin in public offices, schools, at the workplace and the housing market in Germany during the mid-1990s. As such, the fact that Turkey-origin migrants in Germany were less likely to enter university and were disadvantaged concerning certain jobs in vocational training due to structural discrimination.

In 1990, East Germans had elected a pro-unification parliament, and the state merged into the Federal Republic. Subsequently, the dominant (political) discourse anticipated (indigenous) Germans to identify with the 'myth' of a shared, ethnoculturally defined Germanness. While this discourse emphasised ethnocultural democratic and economic discrepancies actually accentuated the differences between East and West Germans (Minnard, 2008: 40). Against this backdrop of debates surrounding "Germanness", this period was marked by intense debates about "foreigners" and "natives" (Rätzzel, 1991). Despite the ethnic diversification caused by migration starting in the 1960s,

ethnic minority groups such as the Turkish-German community remained largely outside of the evolving discourses on 'German' memory, 'German' unification and the 'German' future. It seemed as if these hyphenated Germans did not partake in this historical moment of national transformation. Additionally, after the alarming outcries of racist violence, German politics dodged the long-overdue realisation of appropriate migration and, especially, integration measures (Minnard, 2008: 42).

One of the ways that the Turkish ethnic community remained outside the "German" memory was through the construction of an official discourse which "othered" and "stereotyped" the Turkish community (see Kolinsky, 1996). Drawing on the gender stereotypes established between the 1960s and the 1990s, German public and scholars repeated the idealized traditional Turkish family structures. This is an essentialised category derived primarily from studies of Turkish village life and generally ascribed to Islam, which also includes arranged marriages, emphasis on girls' virginity and women's honour and the resulting restrictions on mobility, independent decision-making, and pursuit of self-fulfilment (Kolinsky, 1996; Kitayama and Uskul, 2011). In this sense, scholars also argue that Turks were considered among the inferior groups within the foreigner category, mainly due to religious differences (Çağlar, 1994:194; Mandel, 1994:120). Nevertheless, as long-term residents, Turks have until recently occupied a unique, if still negative, place in German discourse about foreigners (White, 1997: 762).

Jenny White (1997) notes that the negative image of Turks in Germany was in part due to the contradictory constructions of gender and family: the Turks focusing on collective obligation, Germans on individualistic goal-oriented behaviour. As John Borneman (1992) writes in the 1970s German women of the second generation after World War II, who coincided with the first generation of Turkish migrants, experienced a change in their sense of identity. This was mainly a shift towards more individualised and more sexuality- and gender-centred understanding rather than marriage and having children (Borneman, 1992:272). In turn, the stereotypes about oppressive behaviours towards women, and the lack of individualisation led to concerns among German society. Women from Turkey were stigmatized as victims of patriarchal violence and via this construction represented "the German woman" as enlightened and liberated (Yıldız, 2009; Scheibelhofer, 2014; Erel, 2002, 2016).

These “traditional” Turkish behaviours contradicted with the “modern” German society, in which sense, the latter symbolized the model cultural behaviour. This behavioural emphasis led Turks to be considered neither Turkish nor German, remaining “between cultures,” or as having a double identity. It has also led to German attempts to “integrate” individuals by enabling ideal (German) behaviour (Horrocks and Kolinsky, 1996). Different researchers have criticized that migrants with Turkish background and their descendants are represented along the problematic notions revolving around conflicted identities, identity-crises, in-betweenness, degeneration, delinquency and integration problems (Kaya, 2001; Sökefeld, 2004; Tosic and Streissler, 2009; Mandel, 2008). Thus, integration was perceived as an ideal formula “for dealing with immigrants without disturbing German identity, that is, without having to become an immigrant nation or a multicultural society” (White, 1997: 759). In the 1990s and 2000s, this “in-betweenness” also inspired a vast literature on “hyphenated identities” in Europe, including the German-Turks (Caglar, 1997; Faas, 2008, 2009; Keyman and İçduygu, 2013; Spyrou, 2006; Kaya 2001, 2007, 2009, 2013; Modood and Werbner, 1997).

These studies highlight that hyphenated civic identities and/or hyphenated citizenships are different from their counterparts in America, which emphasises Americanness rather than ethnic identity. By comparison, the German experience emphasizes the ‘German’ part of the hyphenated identity. As Kaya and Kentel argue

the precondition of granting a hyphenated identity such as ‘German-Turk’ in Germany is integration into the German way of life”. In the United States of America, on the other hand, the granting of the hyphenated identity is relatively less unconditional since the USA is by definition an immigrant nation. The usage of the German hyphenated identities in both official and public discourses is an indication of the discursive shift in the perception of Germany as an immigration country by the German authorities. This has actually been confirmed by the changes in the citizenship laws as well as by the report prepared by the Independent Commission on Migration to Germany. Citizenship laws do not only spring from legal concerns, they are also culturally formed (Kaya and Kentel, 2004: 13).⁸

Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel (2004:3) also argue that this has happened through calling Turkish workers ‘*Gastarbeiter*’ (guestworker), ‘*Ausländer*’ (foreigner), and/or ‘*Mitbürger*’ (co-citizen) in German official discourse –terms which underline their ‘otherness’ and/or ‘displacement’.⁹ In reference to essentialization through these “labels”, Jenny White (1997)

⁸ In *Turkish Origin Migrants and Their Descendants*, Ayhan Kaya (2018) further studies the problematic nature of those having “hyphenated” identities, in other words their labelling by both their home and host countries. Challenging the generalised “Muslim” and/or “Islam” label Kaya presents the multiple identities of Muslim-origin immigrants by interrogating the third space paradigm. He analyses the complexity of the hyphenated identities of the Turkish-origin community with their intricate religious, ethnic, cultural, ideological and personal elements.

⁹ Kaya and Kentel (2004) also note that Turkish immigrants in Germany are officially defined in Turkey as either ‘*gurbetçi*’, or ‘*Almanya’daki vatandaşlarımız*’ (‘our citizens in Germany’). German-Turks are stereotypically defined by their compatriots in Turkey as either ‘*Almanyalı*’ or ‘*Almancı*’. Both terms carry rather negative connotations in Turkey. The German-Turks are depicted as being rich, eating pork, having a very comfortable life in Germany, losing their Turkishness, and becoming increasingly Germanised. Implicitly derogatory in its

notes that the essentialised identity of Turks in Germany has been redefined various times to meet Germany's own economic and political needs. Subsequently, in the 1990s *Fremdarbeiter* (foreign workers) and *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) fell out of use and was replaced in part by *Ausländer* (foreigners) or *Ausländische Arbeitnehmer* (foreign employees). The more politically correct nomenclature *Migranten* (migrants) or *ausländische Mitbürger* (foreign co-citizens) were also introduced but “never *Immigranten*, as that would imply the right to remain” (White, 1997: 762).

Moreover, in the 1990s, there were three generations in Germany, with varying degrees of fluency in either language or with widely different lifestyles. A variety of migrant organizations represents the political, social, and religious orientations and interests of the Turks (White, 1997). There were few centralized, representative umbrella organizations. Yasemin Soysal (1994) attributes this to the lack of a German institutional system, which prescribes and supports centralized organizations by migrants, such as those found in Sweden and the Netherlands. However, in Germany, state funding for migrant organizations is allocated through local, regional authorities, mainly for specific projects, such as cultural organizations, youth job training centres, and women's centres.

Furthermore, a review of the recent literature shows that sociological and psychological studies refer to the Turkish “youth” as “second-generation migrants/immigrants” (Worbs, 2003; Crul, and Vermeulen, 2003; Kalter, 2006; Thomson and Crul, 2007; Heath et al. 2008; Timmerman, 2003; Crul, 2012; Euwals et al. 2010; Kristen and Granato 2007; Pott, 2001; Çelik, 2015). For instance, Frankenberg et al. (2013: 158) note that they “use the term migrants to refer to persons with immigrant backgrounds, that is, immigrants and their second- and third-generation descendants”. This is an important trope in the migration literature which does not acknowledge that those born in Germany cannot be considered immigrants due to the definition of migration. However, in the current literature, the boundaries of the descendants of immigrants have been defined ethno-culturally. Therefore, even if they have gone through generations of civic citizenship and do not have any migration experience, they still are not accommodates within the nation.

1.2. Maastricht Treaty (1992) and EU citizenship

On 1 November 1992, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty initiated the “Europeanisation” of immigration policies by introducing European citizenship as well as an EU-wide common approach to migration.¹⁰ Although the idea of bringing Europe ‘closer to its citizens’ and hence European citizenship and identity was not new, it was the first time institutionalized

markedness, in its explicit differentiation from a non-emigrant Turk, the labels correspond to a combination of difference, lack of acceptance, and rejection. Their Turkish and the way they dress also contribute to the construction of an ‘*Almanca*’ image in Turkey.

¹⁰ Any person who holds the nationality of an EU Member State is automatically a citizen of the EU. The free movement of people has existed since the founding of the European Community in 1951, but it was confined to workers. Treaty (1992) Article 8 extended the right of residence in another Member State to persons who are not engaged in a professional occupation, provided they have sufficient resources and social insurance cover. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) extended citizens' rights by introducing a new anti-discrimination clause on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. The Treaty of Nice (2001) and the Lisbon Treaty (2009) have since confirmed citizen rights.

in the Maastricht Treaty. This was guaranteed in the preamble to the Treaty which marked “[...] a new stage in the process of creating an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen.”¹¹

To that end, one of the developments was in the family reunification regulations. Most of the changes was in the family reunification legislation. Reunification Directive (Directive 2003/86/EC), enacted in 2003 and came into effect in 2005, provides basic requirements for the circumstances under which third-country citizens resident in a Member State will be able to bring over their family members. The Directive is binding on all EU member states and while they may choose to implement less stringent standards, they cannot implement more restrictive policies (Block et al., 2013: 205).

This Directive and the subsequent implementing acts also touch upon stereotypes on Muslims. For instance, Article 4(5) of the Directive allows the Member States to mandate that spouses need to reach a minimum age before marriage to ‘ensure better integration and to prevent forced marriages’. Since 2004, the Netherlands requires spouses to be 21 years. France and Germany introduced the minimum age of 18 years in 2006 and 2007 respectively (Block et al., 2013: 205).

Despite the rapid Europeanisation of migration policies, restrictive family migration policies are not a result of Europeanisation but rather a result of member states’ strategic objectives. This stems from the fact that while national governments can face opposition forces or experience stalemates at the legislative level, EU’s policymaking was relatively quicker in the 1990s (Guiraudon, 2000; Lavenex, 2001; Luedtke, 2009; Menz, 2001; Schain, 2009). The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Lisbon Treaty (2009) have since restructured this policy field, which have shifted power from member states to EU institutions. In turn, many studies have highlighted and criticised the construction of the EU and Europeanisation as a solution to national predicaments surrounding migration and integration (Thielemann, 2001; Bigo, 2001; Spohn and Triandafyllidou 2003; Tholen, 2005; Rosenow, 2009). These studies also argue that national migration and integration policies have remained diverse and mostly exclusionary despite the attempts at normative European standards.

In turn, scholars began to question the possibility of a new type of post-national or trans-national citizenship (Habermas, 2001; Soysal, 1994). Scholars suggested that the institutionalisation of EU-wide citizenship via the Treaty, the rights conferred upon EU citizens across member states, and the provision of limited rights for third state residents all contributed to a new citizenship regime (Bhabha, 1999; Koslowski, 1999; Shaw, 2000). Nonetheless, as Thomas Diez and Vicki Squire (2008: 565) argue national traditions of citizenship tend to impede the effective development of a post-national form of citizenship in which exclusionary distinctions between ‘nationals’ and ‘foreigners’ or citizens and migrants no longer hold.

¹¹ For the evolution of the phrase “ever closer union” in legal texts, see <https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7230>

1.3. Asylum Compromise of 1992

As noted above the Foreigners Act of 1990 reinforced the hierarchy within Germany, which maintained the ethnic demarcations in political and public discourse (Minnard 2008: 40). Also, due to the war in Former Yugoslavia, between 1991 and 2001, the numbers of asylum seekers and immigrants in Germany increased and reached an all-time high of 440,000 (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Asylum applications in FRG between 1973 and 2014.¹²

The approval rate for asylum applications was at 4.3%. Despite the compromise, the public discourse remained that the government's migration policies remained too liberal which led to xenophobic violence in Germany through revitalizing right-wing ideologies exploiting the Other as the source of socio-economic problems. On the other hand, Bade (1996: 247), argued that:

The political disorientation of the population resulted from the political refusal to acknowledge the unmistakable social fact that for over more than a decennium the Federal Republic had become a new type of immigration country – not in a legal sense, but in a social and cultural one (Bade, 1996: 247 cited in Minnard, 2008: 41).

In this view, the animosity and the subsequent violence was a result of the persistent ethnocultural definition of German citizenship and the ambiguity of migration and integration policies. Combined with the growing mobility amongst European countries, this led to an all-party compromise in Germany. Maren Borkert and Wolfgang Bosswick (2007:

¹² Source: <http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/kurzdosiers/207671/asylum-law-refugee-policy-humanitarian-migration?p=all>

16) note that this fundamental shift of the opposition was a response to the pressures from local communities, which “had to cope with the problems of inadequate resources for taking care of the large numbers of asylum seekers.” The compromise led to a sharp decrease in the number of asylum applications but the amendment played a minor role constituting a case of symbolic politics on an old conflict line within the German political discourse: ethnic nation-state versus republican constitutional patriotism (Mommsen, 1990: 272; see also Bosswick 1995, 1997).

It should be noted that beginning in the middle of the 1980s, CDU and the CSU representatives had been advocating for restrictions to the broad right of asylum laid down in the German Constitution. Nevertheless, the SPD and FDP had withheld approval, so the two-thirds majority required to amend the Constitution could not be reached. In the light of the increase in debates and developments regarding asylum seekers in Germany, on 6 December 1992 the Social Democrats (SPD), the Free Democrats (FDP) and the Christian Democratic parties (CDU/CSU) agreed to reform German asylum law, which has become known as the “asylum compromise” (*Asylkompromiss*). On 6 December 1992, an all-party compromise led to the required constitution-amending majority. Subsequently, the right of asylum was significantly restricted. Until then, under Article 16 of the Basic Law without any

Safe third country: According to German law, safe third countries are states which guarantee humanitarian protection in accordance with the Geneva Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights. Asylum seekers can be sent back to these countries without their application for asylum being reviewed by German authorities (Article 26a of the Asylum Procedure Act/AsylVfG). Besides the EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland are also currently considered safe third countries. Since Germany is surrounded by safe third countries, people seeking protection have to travel to Germany by air or sea, or cross the land border illegally.

Safe countries of origin are states where there is assumed to be no risk of political persecution, or of inhuman or humiliating punishment or treatment (Article 29a AsylVfG). Safe countries of origin are currently (as of March 2015) all EU Member States as well as Ghana, Senegal, Serbia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Asylum applicants from these countries undergo a simplified and accelerated asylum procedure with limited opportunities to appeal. The German *Bundestag* and *Bundesrat* (Federal Council, upper house of parliament) may decide which countries are added to, or removed from the list of safe countries of origin.

The airport procedure (*Flughafenverfahren*), an expedited mechanism allowing for asylum claims to be processed in the transit area of airports (Article 18a of the Asylum Procedure Act/AsylVfG). Furthermore, the adoption of the Asylum-Seekers’ Benefits Act (*Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz*) created a separate social security system for asylum seekers, with a significantly lower level of benefits. (<http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/kurz dossiers/207671/asylum-law-refugee-policy-humanitarian-migration?p=all>)

exceptions, any individual persecuted for political reasons had a right to asylum. The “asylum compromise” introduced the concepts of “safe third country” and “safe country of origin,” and the “airport procedure,” which made it more difficult to claim asylum in Germany. Nonetheless, as Friedrich Heckmann (2004: 1108) argues:

Due to the safe-third-country regulation of 1993, any person asking for asylum at a land border would be

turned back, since Germany is surrounded only by “safe” countries in which a person might find asylum and would not have to go to Germany to be safe from political persecution. Once a person is in the country, asks for asylum, and does not tell authorities about the true route and mode of traveling or of being smuggled into the country, an asylum procedure is started. Authorities know the person applying for

asylum has illegally entered the country across a land or sea border, but they accept it within the asylum-seeking process. A “regular” way to get access to the asylum procedure without crossing the border illegally is to arrive by arriving by air or sea.

In this sense, the concept of “safe third country” has been one of the ways in which countries such as Germany have been able to redirect asylum-seekers to other countries. This has also been considered a kind of a buffer zone in which refugees are “prevented” from entering into certain countries (Collinson, 1996), and it has since been criticised as the legal standard that states use to transfer their obligations towards refugees to other countries.

2. 2000s: Islam, Migration and Terrorist Threats

As it is the case across the globe, the 2000s have been marked by growing terrorist concerns which have since led to the discursive association of terrorism and radicalisation with Islam and Muslims. The attacks on 11 September 2001 has certainly reshaped the political and public discourse on terrorism across the worlds, including Europe.

Nonetheless, there have been various legislations in Germany which also shaped the lives of migrants, migrant integration, and the descendants of migrants. In this section the Citizenship Act of 2000, the Migration Act of 2005 and the National Integration Plan of 2006 will be discussed to illustrate the changing approach to migration and integration. The impact of 9/11, which led to the re-articulation of Muslim migrants in Europe and the global economic crisis of 2008 will also be considered to show that there were also external occurrences which influenced migration trends in Europe as well as the socio-cultural dynamics among Muslim-origin migrants and the majority society. This section will then be concluded by a discussion of the Thilo Sarrazin Debate of 2010 to demonstrate the polarisation within the German society regarding migrants from Islamic countries.

2.1. Citizenship Act of 2000

The Citizenship Act of 2000 had vast implications in terms of the self-perception of German society. For the first time, the *ius sanguinis* principle was partially replaced by *ius soli*, meaning that under certain circumstances, people who were born in Germany but did not have *ethnic* German origin could be naturalised as German citizens. In order to do so, individuals who apply for German citizenship need to have visited a school in Germany for at least 6 years, submit a language certificate or prove their German skills in an interview with the naturalization authority. In 2000, shortly after the new citizenship law was passed the number of naturalizations in Germany rose by thirty percent. However, in comparison to other foreign residents in Germany, the number of German-Turks that naturalized was lower with 20 percent (Kaya, 2009: 47–49). Furthermore, the post of national commissioner for foreigners’ affairs, a largely symbolic post, was renamed as “migration, refugees and integration” and made a cabinet-level deputy minister by the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) coalition government (International Crisis Group, 2007: 2). This was a political discursive turn in the recognition of migrant and refugee communities’ need for integration.

Even though many regulations remained as barriers to naturalisation for many immigrants, one of which was the non-acceptance of dual citizenship, the changes in perception, “went along with the Federal Government calling Germany an immigration country after a long

time of negating this fact, [marking] an important turning point for society and politics” (Mühe, 2010: 23).¹³ In regard to dual citizenship, it should be noted that the SPD’s original proposal called for the right to dual citizenship. In response, the CDU maintained that citizenship was a sign of belonging therefore individuals should know where they belong. Christian Democratic Union (CDU) MP, Roland Koch initiated a campaign against dual citizenship, which gained over 500,000 signatures. This discourse challenged the loyalty of Turks as Muslims in the public arena (Wilpert, 2013: 118; see also Kraler, 2006).

Kaya and Kentel’s (2004: 11) study illustrated that the number of ‘foreigners’ applying for naturalization has remarkably increased after the introduction of the new citizenship laws. Naturalizations rose by around 30 percent in 2000 compared to 1999. According to the information provided by the *Länder*, 186,700 foreigners were granted German citizenship in 2000, compared with 143,267 in 1999. Subsequently, 178,100 foreigners were naturalised in 2001. That was a decline of 8,600 or 4,6 percent from 2000. On the contrary, to the increase of naturalisation of foreigners in general, the rate of naturalisation of Turks in 2000 decreased by around 20 percent compared with 1999. This trend remained the same in 2001, decreasing by about 9 percent compared with 2000. While the highest absolute number of naturalisations were among Turks due to their size,

the highest rates of naturalisation in the year 2000 were found to be among the Iranians (13.35%), the Lebanese (11,4%), citizens of Sri Lanka (9%), Afghans (6.6%), Moroccans (6.2%). Immigrants from Turkey (4.1%), Bosnia (2.5%) and Yugoslavia (1.5%) tend to have lower rates of naturalisations, although Turkey is higher than the average rate for the foreign population. All of the nationalities with above average rates of naturalisation with the exception of Sri Lanka could be considered countries of mainly Muslim origins. It would seem that the major distinction between those nationalities that have relatively high rates of naturalisation and those with relatively low rates of naturalisation is the type of migration. The Iranians, Lebanese and the Afghans have primarily entered Germany as refugees or fleeing from civil war (Sri Lanka) (Wilpert 2004: 8).

It was in the midst of such debates surrounding citizenship, ethnicity and belonging that the notion of German *Leitkultur* was publicly discussed. *Leitkultur* is a concept, which resurfaces in the literature on migration and integration in Germany on a regular basis. Nonetheless, its definition and significance has changed over time. The concept of ‘European *Leitkultur*’ (leading culture, or guiding culture) was first constructed by political scientist Bassam Tibi in 1998. Tibi argued that Germany should reposition itself at the democratic heart of this modern and enlightened Europe by acknowledging and accepting ‘European *Leitkultur*’, which refers to the generation of a set of European core norms and values to be accepted and followed by every person living in Germany – indigenous or non-indigenous. Bassam Tibi “denounced multiculturalism as merely an expression of bad conscience over what

¹³ According to Nationality Law, which was amended in 2014, a child born in Germany acquires German citizenship as well as the parent’s citizenship with one restriction: on their 21st birthday, they will have to decide whether or not they want to retain German citizenship or their other nationality. Kaya (2009) argues that young Turkish immigrants in Turkey may be hesitant to sacrifice their homeland identity in Exchange for citizenship rights in Germany and EU in general.

happened in the colonial era. Germans are additionally plagued by the guilt of the Holocaust, which is why they have been disproportionately tolerant towards immigrants” (Pautz, 2005: 43).¹⁴ While Tibi’s conception of *Leitkultur* is highly challenging for migrant communities, it still remains a significant part of the discussions on German identity.

By the end of 2000, increases in the number of naturalisation applications and naturalisation of “foreigners” led to a public debate about a common German *Leitkultur*. In the German context, conservative politician Friedrich Merz who was the then chair of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) in the German Federal Parliament initiated this debate by demanding that immigrants adapt to the German culture if they wanted to stay in the country. This initiated an intense debate on German multiculturalism, which followed the Netherlands’ controversial debate about the pros and cons of Dutch multiculturalism, which was labelled as the ‘multicultural drama’ (cf. Prins 2002; Duyvendak and Scholten, 2012).¹⁵ Deploying Tibi’s conception of *Leitkultur*, Merz redefined it as ‘the putative essence of national culture to which immigrants must assimilate’ (Cheesman, 2004: 84; see also Cheesman, 2002). In his propagation of a ‘liberal German *Leitkultur*’, Merz nationalised and culturalised the concept, suggesting that these core norms and values are (to be) rooted in (a superior) German culture. His provocative statements aimed to regain their lost hegemony in the political field of migration and to recharge the discursively contested theme of the nation (Manz, 2004).

Leitkultur has gained increasing significance and has come to indicate the controversy around the future of the German multicultural society. This controversial debate “which discredited any debate about multiculturalism and tried to replace it - can be perceived as an expression of a certain fear of losing cultural hegemony within the newly declared country of immigration and an attempt to sustain a vanishing homogeneity” (Wilpert, 2013: 118). In fact, it was in the wake of a discussion about foreigners in German society that, for example, the radio station *Deutschlandradio* broadcast a series under the title ‘*Was ist deutsch?*’ [What is German?], and the daily newspaper *Die Welt* published a series of articles under the same title (*Die Welt*, 23 December 2000 cited in Manz, 483). In this sense, the German “self” articulated in the *Leitkultur* discourse heavily relied on the construction of the non-German “other”. Inadvertently, this led the Turkish minority in Germany to remain marginalized and separated by cultural and religious lifestyles within the *Leitkultur* discourse. Mueller (2006: 432) articulates this situation as a “parallel society” reinforced by discrimination, xenophobia, limited schooling and low socio-economic status. For the same reason, scholars also argue that this assimilationist discourse is a dialectical process of identity construction in which native-born Germans and immigrants from Turkey construct

¹⁴ For a thorough discussion on multiculturalism, in brief, multiculturalism refers to a society that contains several cultural or ethnic groups in which cultural groups do not necessarily engage with each other. Multiculturalism assumes that cultures are primordial, distinct, separate, fixed, static, pure wholes, which have the risk of being polluted, degenerated and distorted when they interact. This assumption is actually a continuation of the 19th-century notion of culture. This understanding is an ethnocentric one, which inevitably leads to a kind of hierarchy between cultures. For further information, see Kymlicka (2012); Beck, and Grande (2007); Kaya (2012); and Brahm Levey (2012).

¹⁵ For studies on other European countries with a similar approach to integration, see Alba and Nee, 2009; Brubaker, 2001, Ehrkamp, 2006; Ramm, 2010; Scholten et al 2017.

their respective 'other'. In turn, the rejection of the *Leitkultur* by Turkish minorities is also a response to the larger political and social discourse, which contests their belonging (Ehrkamp, 2006).

According to Claus Mueller (2006), within the *Leitkultur* discourse, the Turkish minority in Germany remains marginalized and separated from the majority society by cultural and religious lifestyles, which Mueller called a "parallel society" compounded by segregation, reduced educational success, and low socioeconomic status. For the same cause, academics contend that this assimilationist argument is a dialectical identity-building mechanism through which native-born Germans and Turkish immigrants construct their respective 'other'. Turkish minorities often oppose *Leitkultur* as a reaction to the wider political and social debate contesting their identity (Ehrkamp, 2006).

German *Leitkultur* was an indicator of efforts to establish a paradigm for migrants to conform to the society in a socio-economic as well as a socio-cultural context that was widespread throughout European countries in the 2000s (Alba and Nee, 2009; Brubaker, 2001; Ehrkamp, 2006; Ramm, 2010; Scholten et al., 2017). To this end, Rogers Brubaker (2001: 531) claims that while there was in fact a return to assimilationism, it was not a revival of the analytically debunked and politically disreputable "assimilationist" approach, but rather a more analytically nuanced, and normatively defensible interpretation of it.

Moreover, citizenship tests were also reflective of the *Leitkultur* discourse. As Ataman et.al. (2017) argued that in 2016, foreigners applying for citizenship were subjected to a 'conscience test' comprised of inquiries about German politics, the constitution and history in addition to a German language proficiency test:

As the first test of its kind in Europe, the test was first used in Baden-Württemberg – the third largest state in Germany... Beside the questions related with the legal system in Germany, some are about parental authority, religion, homosexuality, terrorism, etc....One question, for example, was: 'Some people hold Jewish people responsible for the malignancies in the world and claim that it is the Jewish people behind the terrorist attacks occurred in September 11th 2001. What do you think about these assumptions?' When responses were considered contradictory with German values, the application was denied. Even though some civic organizations (e.g. Migration Policy Center, Turkish communities), politicians and scholars raised concerns about such questions regarding 'desired' German values, the test is still in use. Similar tests are used in the Netherlands and Denmark in Europe. Practices such as these suggest that what is required of the newcomer is assimilation rather than a pathway into integration (Ataman et al., 2017: 4-5).

Furthermore, Scholten et al. (2017) note that there were similarities between the German policies in the 2000s and the rise of interculturalism as opposed to multiculturalism:¹⁶

¹⁶ Multicultural refers to a society that contains several cultural or ethnic groups in which cultural groups does not necessarily engage with each other. Intercultural refers to communities in which there is an understanding and respect for all cultures and through intercultural communication, communities exchange ideas and norms

Like multiculturalism, this clearly involved a state-led effort to promote assimilation, but unlike multiculturalism, it was no longer group-specific, but rather generic in terms of demanding from migrants that they adapt to and participate fully in generic institutions (Scholten et al. 2017: 289).

Lastly, interculturalism reflects on interethnic and intercultural interactions as a strategy to redefine a common sense of belonging (Bouchard, 2010; Cantle, 2012; Wood and Landry, 2008; Zapata-Barrero, 2013). This paradigm is often normative, but it is less state-centric than assimilationism with its focus on the need to collaborate across various policy fields and through multiple levels of government (Scholten et al., 2017: 290).

A significant thing to remember is that the state avoided contact networks with its Muslim community before the reforms in German citizenship; the state sought to establish discourse by religious institutions serving only a minority's interests. This delegated the management of Islam, addressing theological requirements within Germany to the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Türk-Islam Birliği*, DİTİB), an extension of the Turkish government (Koopmans and Statham, 1999). This was because since Turkish migrants were perceived as a temporary presence, Islam was perceived similarly (ibid). DİTİB's role in Germany was to operate mosques, support religious education and provide Turkish state paid clerics. The Turkish state viewed this as a rational extension of the "secular" regime. The Turkish state's administration of Islam in the Turkish diaspora is the exception among Muslim immigrant communities in the West who established organisations organically out of religious needs (Humphrey, 2009: 140).

According to Michael Humphry, the German state's acceptance of the DİTİB's role in the Turkish Muslim diaspora inhibited the development of a German-Islam by reinforcing immigrants' alien status as well as their social separateness. First, it obviated the need for Islam to gain official recognition as a minority religion. Second, the DİTİB's role divided Muslims on religious and ethnic grounds and hindered the development of more representative German Islamic organisations (2009: 140; Pfaff and Gill, 2006). Despite the widespread perception that religious organizations are significant actors in the lives of young Turkish Muslims, studies show that in the early 2000s less than 10% claimed membership in a Mosque (Glatzer, et al. 2004). Frese's (2002) study on the youth and young adults participating in the activities of Mosques or those who have a leadership position found that the majority also do not reflect an extremist position. Instead, Frese found that they are conscious of the values of democracy and a pluralist society and want to deploy these values to achieve recognition, equality of rights and the acceptance of difference (see also Wilpert, 2004: 26-27).

to sustain relationships. For further information on these concepts, see Russon, John (1995). "Heidegger, Hegel, and Ethnicity: The Ritual Basis of Self-Identity," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.XXXIII; Beck, Ulrich and Edgar Grande. "Cosmopolitanism: Europe's Way Out of Crisis." *European Journal of Social Theory* 10 (1) (2007): 67-85; Geoffrey Brahm Levey (2012) Interculturalism vs. Multiculturalism: A Distinction without a Difference?, *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 33:2, 217-224; Emerson, M. (2013). Interculturalism: Europe and its Muslims in search of sound societal models. *A Micro-Level Perspective on the Dynamics of Conflict, Violence, and Development*, 126.

2.2. September 11, 2001: Migration, securitization, and stereotypes

September, 11, 2001 changed perceptions of Muslims and Islam across the world. Germany also entered into a challenging period where suspicion toward Muslims were increasing. SPD-Green government's approach favouring a positive immigration policy was diminished as well. 9/11 redefined and extended "otherness" in Europe and in the Western world in general, which juxtaposed the Islamic world and the "Christian" West (see also Kaya, 2009; 2016, 2017, 2018; Brubaker, 2017; Mandaville, 2009; Rabasa, 2004; Powell, 2011; Abbas, 2004; Cesari, 2009; 2009a).

As Ayhan Kaya (2009) notes the designation 'Muslim' can be misleading due to the diversity of the population in Germany or elsewhere. In 2009, in Germany, approximately more than three quarters– 3 million – were of Turkish-origin who constituted 3.5 percent of the general population. They also belonged to different categories in ethnic lines (Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians), class, urban or rural origin, religion (Sunni, Alevi, Shiite), degree of modernity and religiosity (secularists and Muslims), and political status (German citizens and non-citizens) (Kaya 2009: 45, see also Karasik and Benard, 2004: 441).¹⁷ Kaya (2009) explains the diversity of Turkish-origin migrants and their descendants with the following words:

The majority of the Euro-Turks are influenced by the modernist Kemalist tradition, which subordinates Islam to the modernist-nationalist interests of the state. Moreover, Turks in Germany are not former colonial subjects, but mostly economic migrants. Attitudes are marked by Atatürk's reforms and the Turkish state's impact on religious practice through the directorate for religious affairs, its NATO membership and its candidacy for EU membership, which have no direct equivalent in the Arab world (Kaya, 2009: 35).

Furthermore, with the exception of the Islamic Group *Milli Görüş* (IGMG), Islamic activism associated with the Salafiyya, Tabligh and Muslim Brothers – have little presence in this population (Crisis Group Middle East and North Africa Report, 2007:3). While there is Islamic advocacy associated with non-Turkish Muslim communities in Germany, Islamist philosophies are not widespread; the federal government reports that only 1% of Germany's Muslim community is Islamist (Crisis Group Middle East and North Africa Report, 2007:3).

Nevertheless, after 9/11 Western communities and governments became preoccupied with an "integration crisis", which attributed terrorist attacks to immigrants' lack of integration (Joppke, 2007: 43). This resulted in various national integration policies which had foresaw

¹⁷ According to a survey by Wilamowitz-MoeUendorf (2001: 3), 12% of immigrants are Alevi, 2% are Shiite, 7% are Yezidi, Assyrian, or Armenian Christians, and 63% are Sunni (8% of the immigrants questioned did not reply). There are 4,500 associations and organizations, and 1,200 Islamic communities. Furthermore, Alevis, are the largest religious minority in Turkey, representing between 10 and 30 per cent of the population. See Zeidan (1999); Kocan and Oncu (2004).

civic integration of immigrants and anti-discrimination measures on the part of the majority society (see Goodman, 2010). Furthermore, across the EU free movement was constructed as a security 'threat' (Huysmans 1995, 2006; Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008), against which member states' citizenship practices were deployed as exclusionary political and public practices (Diez and Squire, 2008: 571).

Securitisation also emerged within policies and public discourse, which occurs through the distinction of specific groups as 'threatening' national identity or 'societal' security (Wæver et al., 1993, Kaya, 2009). Securitisation, therefore, invokes a form of politics that labels the excluded communities and persons as a 'threat', and those included as 'normal' (Huysmans, 1995). As such, representation of certain groups and individuals as 'existential threats' effectively justifies and legitimizes extraordinary or 'emergency' measures (Buzan et al., 1998). This is observed in the articulation of 'Muslim immigrants' as 'threatening' to the physical safety of citizens after 9/11 (see Hampshire and Saggar 2006, see also Jager, 2004 and Minnard, 2008).

As Czarina Wilpert (2013: 125) argues, the new citizenship legislation implemented in 2000 was not one that anticipated recognition, acceptance, or equality, but rather generalized negative images of the ability to integrate Muslims. This further supplemented the perception of Turkish-origin migrants in particular as threats to German society. As a result of the attacks of 9/11, the public perception of the former labour migrants – previously defined as ethnic 'Turks' – was heavily transformed into 'Muslims' -a practice which had already started during the 1990s when the Huntingtonian civilization discourse was escalating. While ethnic definitions of "foreigners" have remained problematic, this was worsened by the second differential marking as Muslims. With the concentration on the religious background of immigrants, the problems became more culturalised and essentialised. The factor of class – which plays a vital role in the analysis, as the former labour migrants were recruited almost exclusively from working classes – was almost entirely blended out in the public discourse after 9/11. Subsequently, new "cultural" issues were attributed to the Muslim community such as arranged/forced marriages, homophobia, anti-Semitism, and others and the stigmatisation and exclusion of this group became less and less socially vexed. The concept of multiculturalism and tolerance discourse then became a source of political and public debate. As Mühe (2010: 23) emphasises this caused a significant shift in the tolerance discourse, as Muslims became the perpetrators of violence rather than victims, which was the case in the xenophobic attacks in the 1990s.¹⁸

¹⁸ Please note that "tolerance" is a key concept in multicultural discourse, which also has its pitfalls. It assumes a hierarchical structure in which the majority society "tolerates" the minorities. For a discussion of this topic, see Žižek, S. (2008). Tolerance as an ideological category. *Critical Inquiry*, 34(4), 660-682.; Hui, B. P. H., Chen, S. X., Leung, C. M., and Berry, J. W. (2015). Facilitating adaptation and intercultural contact: The role of integration and multicultural ideology in dominant and non-dominant groups. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 45, 70-84; Berry, J. W., and Kalin, R. (1995). Multicultural and ethnic attitudes in Canada: An overview of the 1991 national survey. *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science/Revue canadienne des sciences du comportement*, 27(3), 301.

Academic studies in the aftermath of 9/11, focusing on the Muslim-origin youth note that they cannot consider themselves in the light of perceptions of terrorism and transnational Islamic networks. A common thread among these studies is that the Muslim youth are experiencing a “re-ethnisation” or “Islamisation”. Islamic Community and Mosque Associations are of particular importance (Gesemann and Kapphan 2001) as some experts find that they are responsible for an “Islamic Ghetto”, a breeding place for fundamentalism (Tibi 2000). Others underline that Islam and the community around the local Mosque can serve a bridge to integration into the wider society (Jonker 2000, Kuppinger 2014). In his study, Schiffauer (2003) found that there are three ideal-typical orientations found amongst young Muslims of Turkish origin: those who demand recognition with a right to difference in the majority society; those that retreat to an ultraorthodox position preparing a revolutionary upheaval in Turkey, and those taking advantage of Islam in a democracy, and begin to initiate a strategy similar to that of the movements of the disabled and LGBTI communities to redefine our understanding of the standards of “normality” in the majority society (Wilpert 2004: 3).

It is also significant that Turkey’s Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power in 2002, which has since led to various clashes between the secular and religious segments of the Turkish society. Notably, studies note that Turkish immigrants in Germany have an ambiguous relationship with Islam due to the secular and modern nature of the state, which has been challenged under the JDP government. This conflict between the secular state tradition and the increasingly Islamist tone of the JDP has also shaped public statements by Germans about Turkish Muslim practice have been shaped by fears and polarizations stemming mainly from political and social conflicts within Turkey (Ewing, 2003: 405; Kaya, 2018). This research has been complemented by studies, which explore the role of the Fethullah Gülen’s Movement, which creates a synthesis of Turkish-Islam in Europe in general, and Germany in particular (Ögelman, 2003; Bilir, 2004; Park, 2008; Seufert 2014).

2.3. Migration Act of 2005

In 2000, the shortage of qualified IT staff reignited a debate on reforming German migration policy, regulating migration, and Germany as a “immigration country”. Since 2000, the discourse on migration issues has changed considerably in the national policy discourse, leading to a series of political actions and legal amendments. As one of the most relevant events then chancellor Schroeder announced the introduction of a so-called ‘Green Card’ for the recruitment of foreign information technology experts during Hannover’s computer fair CEBIT in March 2000 (Currell, 2004: 21). The emphasis on the need for “skilled migrants” changed the political discourse, which perceived immigrants as a societal burden, to a much-needed resource in global economic competition.

The conservative mainstream faced to its surprise harsh criticism from the industry which demanded liberal immigration regulations, and adjusted its hitherto very restrictive position, departing from the prominent mantra ‘*Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland*’ (Germany is not an immigration country) (CSU position paper, 23.4.2001). This position paper, however, marked the beginning of an almost four-year struggle upon German migration policy between the conservative parties CDU and CSU and the governing coalition. While the coalition held a majority in the parliament, the lacking majority in the

chamber of the Laender resulted in a deadlock upon the new immigration law (Borkert and Bosswick, 2007: 15.)

Subsequently, the government set up the “Independent Commission Migration,” which published its report in July 2001.¹⁹ Among other items, the Commission noted that Germany had become an “immigration country” and required highly skilled immigrants to address labour-market shortages. The Migration Act came into effect on January 1, 2005.²⁰ It revised the Nationality Act and introduced a new Residence Act, which marked a first in Germany’s legislation in which the focus was placed on long-term permanent residency for migrants focusing on skilled workers, and on integration measures. In this sense, “integration” has four distinct dimensions.²¹ These dimensions are: a) culturization/socialisation as a process of transmitting knowledge which includes the acquisition of the language and cultural standards; b) placement *vis-à-vis* acquiring a position in a society which provides for partaking in the educational or economic systems, or as a citizen; c) interaction as the formation of interethnic networks and relations such as friendships, marriage relations, membership in associations or involvement in social groups; d) identification as the individual’s identification with a given society on both a cognitive and emotional level.

Additionally, the rules on migration that were spread out over several acts and regulations were consolidated in the new Residence Act²² which streamlined and limited the amount of residency permits to two, a temporary resident permit and a permanent settlement permit. The “support and challenge” policy (*Fördern und Fordern*) also anticipated integration courses for immigrants in which migrants studied German language and culture became an important part of the policy. This policy was later detailed in the Integration Act of 2016.²³

In addition to new Residence Act, the Migration Act also codified improvements to German residency legislation. German citizenship may only be acquired if one is born to a German parent. The revised Nationality Act established that if a child of foreign parents was raised in Germany, if one parent had been lawfully residing in Germany for eight years and had been given a permanent right of residency, he or she would gain German citizenship. The current legal migration structure adopted in the Migration Act has been updated many times over the years.²⁴

¹⁹ See Unabhängige Kommission „Zuwanderung,“ Zuwanderung gestalten, Integration fördern [Framing Immigration Policy, Support Integration] (July 4, 2001), archived at <http://perma.cc/7JPU-36GJ>.

²⁰ See also http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Publikationen/Broschueren/02-integration-in-deutschland-e.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

²¹ See Esser (2000) cited in http://www.hwwi.org/uploads/tx_wilpubdb/PB10-integration.pdf.

²² See http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/aufenthg_2004/index.html

²³ See

https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl116s1939.pdf#_bgbl_%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl116s1939.pdf%27%5D_1589527164398

²⁴ Amendments include the Act to Implement Migration and Asylum Directives of the EU of 2007, the Work Migration Control Act of 2008, the Second Act to Implement Migration and Asylum Directives of the EU in 2011, and the Act to Implement the Highly Qualified Professionals Directive of the EU in 2012.

While the German debate on multiculturalism and integration has been shaped by a heavy emphasis on the legal issues, this has been criticised for moving away from the real debate surrounding the negotiation of cultural pluralism and social integration (Sollors, 2005: 6 cited in Minnard 2008: 42-43).

2.4. National Integration Plan of 2006

In 2006, the annual Summit on Integration in the Federal Chancellery, as well as the German Islam Conference, were initiated. Both efforts intended to demonstrate that German politics aimed to engage in active *dialogue* with immigrants (Busch and Golts, 2011). The Summit on Integration resulted in the “National Integration Plan”²⁵ and a ‘National Action Plan for Integration’, which focused on the integration of immigrants by focusing on social and cultural participation. As such, the Expert Council of German Foundations for Integration and Migration (*Die Beauftragte für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration*, 2007) identified the drivers of integration as follows:

- *Dialogue and recognition*: mutual respect, recognition of the achievements of the migrants living in Germany, openness to others and a desire to work together for a common future.
- *Civil society vital for successful integration*: welfare organizations, the churches, migrant community organizations, sports, educational, cultural and youth bodies, women’s groups, neighbourhood projects, small-scale initiatives and large associations are important for integration at the local level.
- *Strong migrant community organizations*: dialogue with migrants should be through migrant organizations, especially to promote education and training.
- *Welfare organizations and foundations are key integration actors*.
- *From pilot project to standard practice*: pilot projects on integration will be turned into sustainable projects.
- *A better life through education and work*: education, training and employment will be the priority.²⁶

Additionally, in 2006, Chancellor Angela Merkel founded the Islam Conference and the National Council for Integration, which was widely viewed as a positive development, particularly in terms of the negative discourse on Turkish integration and Islam after 9/11 (Wilpert, 2013: 119). In turn, the German government has established two kinds of consultation procedures: one for issues of immigrant integration in general, and a separate state–Islam dialogue. In turn, this aimed to enable dialogue through allowing the state access to immigrants, while created channels through which immigrants could organise (Much, 2012). Islam Conference has since been a source of debate in academic circles (Kaya, 2009; Humphrey, 2009; Amir-Moazami, 2011) constructing a new form of German Islam

²⁵ Full text of the National Integration Plan is available at: [www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Archiv16/Artikel/2007/07/Anlage/2007-07-12-nationaler-integrationsplan.pdf? blob=publicationFile&andv=3](http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Archiv16/Artikel/2007/07/Anlage/2007-07-12-nationaler-integrationsplan.pdf?blob=publicationFile&andv=3)

²⁶ This Plan was utilized as a model of integration by various European countries. See *Die Beauftragte für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration*, 2007, “The National Integration Plan: Driver of Integration Policy”, <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/?action=media.download&uuid=2A91BC23-E195-CCE2-3F70DDECBCA02D10>

made in Germany and not Turkey. Kaya (2009: 194) notes that due to national, ethnic, and doctrinal cleavages dividing Muslim populations, attempts at organizing European Islam have not been successful,

[a]ttempts to institutionalize Islam in Europe, on the one hand, create new legal frameworks, political opportunity structures, and cultural repertoires for claims of religious recognition. On the other hand, they also strengthen established actors in the field of religious governance and give new legitimacy to historical institutional arrangements by reframing them as the representatives of communities of migrant origin.

Moreover, this debate is also considered in regards to the accommodation of Islam in Germany in which Islam and Muslim identity are defined and perceived in a monolithic manner reproducing the civilizations discourse (Kaya, 2009).

In the light of this growing interest in dialogue, in 2007, the National Integration Plan was developed into a National Action Plan on Integration and several intercultural dialogues (such as on Islam, children, labour market access and the media) were instituted and these were not group-specific but rather oriented towards the whole society. In addition, owing to the emphasis on education and integration, the state of Berlin “reformed its secondary education system to create a more inclusive education framework for all pupils, regardless of socio-economic or ethnic background. Similarly, all states have introduced obligatory language testing for all pupils enrolling into primary school, regardless of background” (Scholten et al., 2017: 293). Several research findings played a role in motivating efforts to create a more inclusive and participatory school climate. For instance, previous research shows that Turkish children perform worse than their German peers at school (Krohne, Meier, and Tillmann, 2004), which places them at risk for school dropout and delinquency (Baier & Pfeiffer, 2008), and severely limits their employment opportunities.

It is important to note that Berlin is also a significant location in the study of German-Turks. As Soysal (2001) writes, since the 1990s, Turkish youth have been very active in the revitalisation of Turkishness and Islam and “particularly significant for the cultural projects of Turkish youths are transnational cultural flows and contemporary discourses of plurality, human rights, and equality, which (en)gender their presence in the public spaces of Berlin and complicate ‘national’ configurations of belonging and conventional conceptions of otherhood” (for other studies on Berlin; see Soysal, 2001; Kaya, 2001; Abadan-Unat, 1985; Koydemir, 2013).

In 2007, a major academic survey of Muslims in Germany called “Muslims in Germany: integration, barriers to integration, religion and attitudes towards democracy, the rule of law, and politically/religiously motivated violence” was conducted by Katrin Brettfeld and Peter Wetzels, criminologists at the law faculty of the University of Hamburg focused on Muslims. The survey exploring the attitudes of the youth sought to measure and describe their attitudes to integration, religion, democracy and violence to identify the ‘problem group’ of those who are at risk of radicalisation into Islamist extremism. This survey found that Muslims in Germany identified themselves more with their country of origin, but also that tendency was highest amongst school children and it decreased with age,

complemented with the finding that identification with the country of origin did not mean rejection of integration (Brettfeld and Wetzels, 2007: 363). The survey was also presented at the 'security and Islamism' study group of the German Islam Conference, which was established to facilitate a 'dialogue' with Muslim representatives on integration. However, Dornhof (2009: 75-76) argues that the design of the survey and its categories of interpretation were more indicative of the assumptions of the researchers than about the cultural, religious or political life of Muslims in Germany, mainly that

Muslims are not the only group in society with a potential to hold anti-democratic values; comparisons are made with xenophobic and anti-democratic attitudes among Germans who are not Muslims; and the emergence of what the authors identify as 'problematic attitudes' is seen not just as a product of Muslim 'voluntary segregation' or an ideology of fundamentalism but as also being linked to discrimination and educational opportunities (Dornhof, 2009: 80).²⁷

Furthermore, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) provided an empirically based estimate of the size of Germany's Muslim population in its representative 2008 survey of 6,000 Muslims over the age of 16 years (Haug et al., 2009). This survey included 49 possible countries of origin for Muslims. The respective proportions of Muslims in the sample groups were then projected for the overall study. The results indicate a population of 3.8 to 4.3 million Muslims in Germany, representing about 5 % of the population of the country. According to the BAMF study, 2.5 to 2.7 million Muslims residing in Germany are of Turkish ancestry; 496,000 to 606,000 are from Southeast European countries; 292,000 to 370,000 from the Middle East, and 259,000 to 302,000 from North Africa (Haug et al. 2009: 80–83). Sunnis comprise the majority of the Muslim population of Germany (74 %), followed by Alevi (13 %), and Shia Muslims (7 %). The study identified the four most essential organizations in Germany. The *Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V.* (DITIB) [Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs]. DITIB aims to establish a branch of Islam for Turkish immigrants in Germany that would be characterized by the concept of laïcité. The *Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş* (IGMG) [Islamic Association Millî Görüş]. IGMG is the largest non-state-affiliated Sunni organization and in the 1980s, it was tied to the Islamist Welfare Party in Turkey and with the JDP. The *Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren* (VIKZ) [Association of Islamic Cultural Centres]. VIKZ represents an orthodox Sunni branch of Islam and in the 1960s was the first organization to call for the establishment of a unified movement at the federal level. The *Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland* (AABF) [Federation of Alevi Communities in Germany]. AABF is the most important Alevi organization in the country with the primary objective is the establishment of Alevism as an independent branch alongside Sunni Islam (Halm, 2013: 459). In Germany 29% of young people (between the age of 5 and 25) have an ethnic minority background (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015), with Turkish-origin youth constituting the biggest group. Research shows that Turkish immigrants in Germany are a marginalised group that often feels less integrated into the host society (Soltani, 2001). Research indicates that, to compensate for this lack of integration on the larger societal level, meeting other like-

²⁷ See also Mitts (2019) for a similar argument which argues that isolation and anti-Muslim hostility in the West also increases pro-ISIS radicalisation in Western Europe.

minded peers, integration in social networks and perceived social norms are of particular significance for Turkish origin youth than with majority (Jugert et al., 2013).

2.5. Global Economic Crisis of 2008

Following the global economic crisis, in November 2008, Germany declared to be officially in recession. Bertoli et al. (2013) find that the Euro crisis and other economic and institutional shocks affected migration to Germany between January 2006 and June 2012. The study found that deteriorating conditions in alternative destinations caused 78 percent of the migration surge in Germany, including an increase in the migration of natives from Southern Europe which were impacted by the economic crisis (Bertoli et al., 2013:2).

In addition to the global economic crisis, in 2010, Angela Merkel stated that multiculturalism has 'utterly failed' (Schrader, 2010).²⁸ This reignited the debate surrounding the proper definition of German *Leitkultur* and in 2010 Chancellor Merkel's conservative *Christliche Demokratische Union's* (CDU) Party congress resolution discussed the term as follows:

In this way, Germany is more than a country of birth or a residence. Germany is our spiritual home ('Heimat') and part of our identity. Our cultural values - influenced by our origin in the ancient world, the Jewish-Christian tradition, enlightenment, and historical experiences - are the foundations for societal cohesion and, additionally, shape the leading culture in Germany, to which the CDU especially feels obligated. We expect that those who join us will both respect and acknowledge this (CDU, 2010: 2 cited in Scherr, 2013: 7).

Chancellor Merkel's comments and the CDU's discussion suggested that providing migrants with educational progress and exposure to the job market through various legislations was not perceived to be sufficient for integration, and as such the assimilationist discourse was revived.

2.6. Thilo Sarrazin Debate of 2010

Following Merkel's controversial statements in 2010, Thilo Sarrazin a member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) published "*Deutschland schafft sich ab*" (Germany does away with itself). Even though the book received extensive criticism from the public and political figures, it still maintained a discourse of cultural homogeneity among the German public. Sarrazin states:

From an economic standpoint, we don't need the Muslim immigration in Europe. Because of their low labour force participation and high utilization of social welfare benefits, Muslim immigrants cost each country more than they contribute in economic value. The idea of society and the moral concepts they represent signify a cultural and civilizational regression. Demographically, the incredible fertility of Muslim immigrants poses a long-term threat to culture and civilization in an ageing Europe. Through Muslim immigration and the growing influence of the Islamic faith,

²⁸ See <https://www.dw.com/en/chancellor-merkel-says-german-multiculturalism-has-utterly-failed/a-6118859>

the Western world is being confronted by authoritarian, pre-modern, and even anti-democratic tendencies, which not only challenge our self-image but also could pose a direct threat to our lifestyle (Sarrazin, 2010: 267).

In an explicitly racist manner, Sarrazin argues that Muslim immigrants are unwilling and even unable to integrate into German society, having a lower level of intelligence while having more children than the non-Muslim majority. Research conducted in the scope of the Horizon 2020 project titled ACCEPT: PLURALISM found that it was not Sarrazin's book as such that concerned many Muslims in Germany, but rather the fact that while mainstream political forces rejected this argument, the mainstream society endorsed this view while blaming the victims by debating the ability of Muslims to integrate into German society (New Knowledge about Germany, Policy Brief 2013/10).

In every country of Europe, the Muslim migrants, because of their low labour participation and high claiming of social benefits, cause more costs for the treasury than they bring in economic surplus. Culturally and regarding civilisation, the societal models and moral concepts, they represent, mean a step backwards. Demographically the enormous fertility of Muslim migrants constitutes a threat for the cultural and civilisational balance within ageing Europe (Sarrazin quoted in Mühe 2012).

These quotes from Sarrazin's book provide examples for the articulation of public fears, which discursively construct the tolerable and the intolerable within German society (Schiffauer, 2013). Werner Schiffauer (2013) notes that Sarrazin's statements are indicative of the broader focus on the future scenarios which "predict" potential conflict between the host society and migrants by evoking fear, and anxiety regarding the "other". These statements lack rationale and are not based on facts or contemporary circumstances; as such, their "emotional" characteristics are difficult to counter.

Furthermore, in 2010, a well-known criminology institute published a report on its findings violence among Muslim youth (Baier and Pfeiffer, 2010). This report studied the database of information collected among fourteen to sixteen-year-old ninth graders. The study found a correlation between the self-reported strong adherence to Islam and the expressed willingness become violent. Nonetheless, as Czarina Wilpert (2013: 120) argues the methodology of this study was questionable since

Lengthy paper and pencil questionnaires employed to study the values and behaviour patterns of adolescents and especially those perceived as ethnic minorities have reliability problems. They are suggestive when they ask youth from a minority religious position to validate the well-known stereotypes that exist in the dominant society about their religion or ethnicity. It can be expected that these young people already know what "the world" thinks of them and what the researcher wants to hear. The media once again impact further stigmatized and estranged young persons with a Muslim heritage and prevented them from perceiving a favorable sense of belongingness in German society. In fact, the media reports were cited by the political elite as a warning to "Muslim" youngsters to behave (Wilpert, 2013: 120).

This analysis showed that similar to the research conducted by Katrin Brettfeld and Peter Wetzels in 2007, surveys and systematic studies on Muslims, or migrants, bear the risk of minority ethnicization, which is particularly detrimental to adolescents subjected to systemic structural discrimination. This, in effect, contributes to stigmatisation, which often affects their understanding of their opportunities in society, including socioeconomic mobility, labour mobility, and cultural integration prospects. Many characteristics assigned to Muslims in these studies are the opposite of German citizens, describing them as “potentially” homophobic, anti-Semitic, misogynist, anti-democratic, backward, anti-modernist and drawn to violence and criminality (see Schiffauer, 2013; Mühe 2010; Wilpert, 2013).

The divisive events of 2010 also provided the Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (JDP) with the ability to interact with Turkish people in Germany by developing strategic discursive assets. On 6 April 2010, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) was created to coordinate the activities for Turks living abroad, related (sister) communities and Türkiye Scholarship Program, and develop the services and activities carried out in these fields. The Presidency aims to advance relations with Turkish people living abroad and with sister communities through stronger commercial, social and cultural connections.²⁹

This coincided with the rise of JDP’s increasingly authoritarian and Islamic tone in Turkey. By appealing to their Turkish patriotism and nationalism and by reminding the Turkish-Germans about their cultural heritage, then PM Erdoğan sought to involve the Turks in Germany for his political campaigns. The abovementioned Presidency was specifically created to meet the needs of the Turkish-German population. It aimed at reconnecting this population with their Turkish heritage, and to do so, it exploited the commonly shared experiences of discrimination and exclusion. In turn, it promoted the Turkish government as a representative of the Turkish-German community’s interests, which inevitably increased Turks’ separation from society (Sauer, 2016). Separation (see Constant et al., 2009) along with assimilation, integration, and marginalization is one of the levels of social integration and it applies to the Turkish community in Germany because they maintain a strong connection with Turkish culture, and face “resistance” from the society, thus they remain disconnected from the German “native” society in terms of “language, cultural elements, ethnic interaction, ethnic self-identification and migration history” (Karcher and Darity, 2010: 6).

3. 2012 onwards: Increase in Migration

Germany introduced The Blue Card initiative in 2012. The EU Blue Card Directive was a pan-European initiative adopted in 2009, and it was designed to attract highly skilled workers from abroad, address labour and skills shortages and strengthen the EU’s competitiveness and economic growth because the EU has to compete with other destinations to attract skilled migrants (European Commission Memo, 7 June 2016). The goal was to ease the procedure of securing a work and residency permit within the EU for highly skilled

²⁹ See <https://www.ytb.gov.tr/en/corporate/institution>

professionals coming from non-EU countries. The Transposition Act for the European Union’s Directive on Highly-Qualified Employment (Directive 2009/50/EC) was implemented on 1 August 2012. However, it was criticised for various reasons, which included the vague designation of “highly-skilled” and “qualified” workers. German Interior Minister, Hans-Peter Friedrich remarked that

If someone receives a salary offer of 45,000 euros (about \$60,000), then it's a clear signal that, for one, an institution here wants to employ him or her, and two, that he or she is qualified enough, otherwise, the offer wouldn't be made.³⁰

Among other reasons, the Blue Card was criticised for monetarising the benchmark for being “qualified” (Cerna, 2013). Academic studies are divided in their analysis of this initiative: some scholars note that it would in fact attract skilled migrants from various regions (Gumus, 2010; Wogart and Schuller, 2011; Wiesbrok and Hercog 2012), while others criticize the nature of the qualification benchmarks and argued that it served to deter migration (Cerna, 2010, 2013; Peers, 2009).

Beginning in 2012, the number of people with a migration background in Germany rose significantly because of the liberalised migration policies, the economic crisis impacting Europe and the globe, as well as the conflicts in neighbouring regions (Figure 2).³¹ In 2013, there were approximately 16.5 million people, so 20.5% of the population had a migration background. In 2011, this was 19.5%, In 2013, 1.2 million people came to Germany. Simultaneously, 797,000 emigrated from Germany.³²




Figure 2. Population with Migration Background in the Federal States in 2017.³³

³⁰ See <https://www.dw.com/en/german-blue-card-to-simplify-immigration/a-15915424>

³¹ The Statistical Federal Office defines people with a migration background as people “who moved to the present territory of the Federal Republic of Germany after 1949, all foreigners born in Germany and all people born in Germany with German nationality who have at least one parent who immigrated to Germany or is a foreigner who was born in Germany”.

³² See <https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/laenderprofile/262758/historical-and-current-development-of-migration-to-and-from-germany>

This marked another trend in migration to Germany, which was an increase in EU migrants emigrating due to circumstances created by the economic crisis. Due to high unemployment, especially among younger people, more and more qualified professionals began to migrate to Germany. For instance, in 2011, Greek immigrants increased by 78%, and Spanish and Portuguese immigrants by over 50%. Among those 50-70% have degrees. Germany, in this sense, also became an attractive educational destination. In total, 86,000 students in Germany have earned their higher education entrance qualification outside of Germany (Figure 3).



Figure 3. Covers of the Magazine “Der Spiegel”, 41/1964 and 09/2013³⁴

3.1. Europe’s Migration Crisis of 2015

Asylum applications have also risen considerably in the early-2010s, with a total of 70% increase between 2012 and 2013, with another 60% increase between 2013 and 2014. This marked the beginning of an unprecedented inflow of refugee inflows to Germany.

In 2014, 23% of the applicants came from Syria, 10% from Serbia and 8% from Eritrea. In January 2015 24.6%, applicants came from Syria, 14% from Kosovo and 9.4% from Serbia. In comparison to other countries such as Lebanon or Turkey, Germany offers very few people asylum. Moreover, the cities and communities are often not prepared for the arrival of refugees. The temporary accommodations are overcrowded and turn into semi-permanent solutions.³⁵

In September 2015, Chancellor Merkel offered temporary asylum to refugees, prompting mass movement of people through Balkans towards Germany. Merkel shaped Germany’s

³⁴ See <https://www.domid.org/en/migration-history-germany>

³⁵ See <https://www.domid.org/en/migration-history-germany>

by her pragmatic motto: “We can manage” (*Wir schaffen das*).³⁶ Acknowledging the international praises for her positive and humanitarian handling of the refugee crisis, TIME magazine named Angela Merkel the “Person of the Year” for 2015, calling her the “Chancellor of the free world”.³⁷

In the first half of 2016, the highest number of asylum seekers were Syrians, Iraqis and Iranians, which was in contrast to 2015 as the Balkan countries such as Albania and Kosovo ranked the highest. Asylum applications from these countries declined significantly after Germany designated them as safe countries along with Montenegro.³⁸ In recent years, as the numbers of asylum-seekers have grown, Germany has granted humanitarian protection to a growing number of people under the “protection quota”, which allows at least temporary stay in Germany. In 2013, only one-quarter of asylum seekers in Germany were allowed to stay; in 2015, this number was doubled and half of the applicants were permitted to stay (Figure 4).³⁹




Figure 4. Immigrants in 2015 by the Ten Most Frequent Countries of Origin in Germany⁴⁰

According to PEW (2017), the number of Muslims residing in Germany increased from 3,3 million (4,1 percent) to approximately 5 million (6,1 percent) from 2010 to 2016. The rest of the population declined moderately from 77,1 million to 76,5 million. The survey also states that even if migration of Muslims to Germany decreases, their numbers will remain

³⁶ See <https://www.politico.eu/article/merkel-on-migration-we-will-manage/>;
<https://www.politico.eu/article/the-phrase-that-haunts-angela-merkel/>

³⁷ See <http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2015-angela-merkel-choice/>

³⁸ See <https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-list-of-safe-countries-of-origin-and-what-it-means/a-46262904>

³⁹ See <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/new-reality-germany-adapts-its-role-major-migrant-magnet>

⁴⁰ Source: <https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/laenderprofile/262758/historical-and-current-development-of-migration-to-and-from-germany>

considerable as German Muslims are on average are considerably younger and have more children than Germans.⁴¹

Parallel to this, according to a 2016 PEW survey, many Europeans, median of 59% across 10 EU countries, expressed concern that the arrival of refugees would increase terrorism and burden their countries. Around 61% in Germany and the Netherlands and 60% in Italy also expressed that refugees would increase terrorism in their country (the poll in France and Germany was conducted before the 2016 terrorist attacks). In addition, many Europeans, median of 59% across 10 EU countries, also claim that they compete with refugees as the latter is presumed to take away jobs and social benefits. However, the majority in Germany and Sweden claim that refugees strengthen their country by their hard work and skills. The survey also found that generally negative opinions of refugees could possibly indicate that Europeans do not believe that growing diversity through an increasing number of people from different races, ethnic groups and nationalities, would make their countries better.⁴²




Figure 5. PEW Survey Question on diversity.⁴³

⁴¹ See https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/11/muslimMigration_dataEssay_ai2html_1ageFertility-320px.png

⁴² Source: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-5-charts/?amp=1andusqp=mq331AQCKAE%3D>

⁴³ Source: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-5-charts/refugees_2/

The mass migration of refugees also led to violent acts against refugees and their accommodation facilities motivated by Islamophobic and xenophobic attitudes. This was in part due to the rise of the right-wing populist anti-immigration movement Pegida in late 2014 (Dostal, 2015), as well as the rise of “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) founded in April 2013 (see Kaya, 2017, 2018, 2019). Based on an analysis of the data collected and published by the Amadeu Antonio Foundation, and PRO ASYL, Bencek and Strasheim (2016) found that in 2014 and 2015, there were 1645 attacks committed

Major Incidences leading to the rise of right-wing populism in Germany

2015 September - Chancellor Merkel offers temporary asylum to refugees, prompting mass movement of people through Balkans towards Germany in autumn and winter, and stretching European Union Schengen Agreement on abolition of border controls to breaking point in many countries.

2016 January - Sexual assaults on hundreds of women in Cologne and other German cities during New Year celebrations by men largely of North African or Arab appearance prompts public backlash against Chancellor Merkel’s welcome to migrants.

2016 March - Anti-migrant Alternative for Germany party makes strong showing in three state-level elections, beating Christian Democrats into third place in Chancellor Merkel’s home state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.

2016 July - Attacks by migrant Islamic State sympathisers in Würzburg/Wuerzburg and Ansbach leave 17 people injured.

2016 March - Alternative for Germany party makes strong showing in Berlin state elections.

2016 December - Tunisian migrant Anis Amri kills 12 people by driving a hijacked lorry into a crowded Berlin Christmas market.

2017 September - The Alternative for Germany exploits social tensions over migrants to surge into third place at parliamentary elections, behind the much-weakened Christian Democrats and Social Democrats.

2018 March - Chancellor Merkel reforms the “Grand Coalition” with the Social Democrats, after her failure to assemble a government with the pro-business liberal Free Democrats and left-leaning Greens.

2018 August - Violent anti-immigrant protests in the eastern city of Chemnitz after two migrants were detained over a fatal stabbing.

Source: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17301646>

against refugees and four different forms of right-wing violence and social unrest were identified: xenophobic demonstrations, assaults, arson attacks, and miscellaneous attacks against refugee housing (such as swastika graffiti) illustrating the range of anti-refugee violence. Violence committed on European soil by Muslim-origin individuals also increased in the recent years, which has been used to legitimise an anti-immigrant discourse by deploying domestic security (see box below). In turn, Christopher Caldwell (2018: 9) argues that this dynamic led Germans to shift “their votes from establishment parties (not just Merkel’s Christian Democrats but also the Social Democrats) to radical ones (not just the AfD but also the post-Communist Left party)” (see also Hockenos 2015). Moreover, against this backdrop of anti-refugee and anti-immigrant sentiments, the populist right-wing AfD entered into several state parliaments partly by instrumentalizing its anti-immigration and anti-Islam attitudes. In March 2016, AfD made a strong presence in three state-level

elections.⁴⁴ Since the elections on 24 September 2017, the AfD is also represented in the German Bundestag (see Kaya, 2019).

3.2. Integration Act of 2016

Immigrant integration has been discursively constructed as a challenge in liberal democracies, which was misguidedly attributed to a ‘failure of integration’ among new and long-established immigrant populations. In the light of the growing resentments between minority and majority communities, The Integration Act and the Regulation on the Integration Act, which aimed to facilitate the integration of refugees into German society, entered into force on 6 August 2016. This legislation was a continuation of the policy of “support and challenge” (*Fördern und Fordern*), which was introduced in the Migration Act of 2005. According to the Integration Act of 2016,⁴⁵ refugees with strong chances of permanent stay would take mandatory integration classes and take advantage of job and training programs as long as they are required to work on their integration. The Integration Act of 2016 defines the details of integration courses, access to vocational training and the labour market, as well as a residence:

- *taking integration courses at an early stage*: being able to speak German and knowing how German society works are of key importance to integration. More refugees should be able to take integration courses as early as possible. That is why the number of courses and class sizes are to be increased;
- *legal certainty while undergoing vocational training*: trainees will be given exceptional leave to remain in Germany while they are undergoing vocational training. Those who are taken on by their training enterprise will be given a two-year right of residency;
- *making it easier to do vocational training*: young refugees who have good prospects of being allowed to stay are to be able to start and complete a qualified vocational training course wherever possible. To make this easier, they will now be eligible for a training grant;
- *job opportunities for refugees*: while their asylum claim is being processed, refugees are to be able to take up meaningful employment, such as serving meals or tending to green spaces in their refugee shelter. The Federal Government launched a Refugee integration measures programme for 100 000 asylum seekers in August;
- *labour market priority check suspended*: it will be easier for refugees who have good prospects of being allowed to stay in Germany to take up a job. The Federal Employment Agency will suspend its labour market priority check for a period of three years, depending on the regional job situation;
- *settlement permit dependent on integration will*: the German government is creating

⁴⁴ On 16 September, the European Council, meeting in Bratislava, issued the Bratislava Road Map for a stronger European defence capacity (European Council 2016). This initiated a series of initiatives and action plans for the implementation of a common defense policy (see European Parliament, 2016; European Commission, 2016, 2017, European Council 2017). This declaration further cemented the links between migration and security across Europe. Importantly, they agreed to broaden EU consensus on long term migration policy and apply the principles of responsibility and solidarity and efforts to this end are ongoing (<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21597/bratislava-implementation-report.pdf>).

⁴⁵ See https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl116s1939.pdf

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- a powerful incentive to integrate: only those recognised refugees who have shown their willingness to integrate will be given a settlement permit;
 - *residence rule provides better means of control*: one key aspect of successful integration is the question of where someone lives. Asylum seekers will be assigned a place of residence because if, for example, too many refugees move to urban centres, integration becomes very difficult;
 - *uniform rule on permission to reside*: asylum seekers will be granted permission to reside when they are issued with their arrival certificate. This will ensure that asylum seekers have legal certainty and are given early access to the labour market and integration courses.⁴⁶

2016 also initiated a new trend in migration to Germany, which saw a significant rise in the number of European migrants, coming in from EU member states. In 2017, the number of German citizens and ethnic Germans returning to their country rose to 167,000, as opposed to 146,000 in 2016.⁴⁷

2017 was also significant for Germany-Turkey relations. Relations between Turkey and Germany were strained since the “Armenia Resolution” of the German Bundestag in June 2016, and the attempted coup in Turkey followed by state of emergency in July 2016. In May 2017, Germany followed the Netherlands’s blocks on Turkish referendum rallies in Germany. This led President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to accuse German government of “Nazi practices”. At a women’s rally in Istanbul before the referendum, Erdoğan stated: “Your practices are not different from the Nazi practices of the past, I thought it’s been a long time since Germany left [Nazi practices]. We are mistaken.”⁴⁸

Furthermore, in May 2017, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party launched a referendum to change Turkey’s constitution to transform Turkey into a Presidential system. 1.43 million Turks residing in Germany became eligible to vote in the referendum, rendering German-Turks more influential in Turkey’s domestic politics. Despite the media coverage⁴⁹ in Germany and Europe, Goerres (2018) found that only a minority of all Turkish citizens in Germany (23.5 %) voted for Erdogan in June 2018, and that Alevis and Kurds, two sizeable communities in Germany, are distinctly anti-Erdogan, which was complemented by the fact that second-generation Germans of Turkish descent show higher support for Erdogan than first-generation (Goerres, 2018: 2).

⁴⁶ See <http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/news-and-press/news/germany-new-act-aid-refugee-integration>, https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/act-on-residence--economic-activity-and-integration-of-foreigners-in-the-federal-territory.html/Act_on_the_Residence_2008.pdf; see also <http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/germany-act-to-integrate-refugees-enters-into-force/>

⁴⁷ See <https://www.dw.com/cda/en/germany-net-migration-drops-to-less-than-half-a-million-in-2017/a-45889791>

⁴⁸ See <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/05/erdogan-accuses-germany-of-nazi-practices-over-blocked-election-rallies>

⁴⁹ See <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44546035>; <https://www.dw.com/en/turks-in-germany-praise-our-leader-after-two-thirds-vote-for-erdogan/a-44378286>




Figure 6. Number of asylum seekers and people entitled to protection in Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Austria and Greece.⁵⁰

In the light of the mass migration of Muslim-origin refugees in Germany, and the widely publicised “clashes” which dominated the public discourse, on 16 March 2018 German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer stated that ‘Islam doesn’t belong to Germany’.⁵¹ Following this remark, he promised his self-declared plan anticipated to limit immigration numbers, consequent and effective returns, and no ‘social romanticism’ for criminals.

3.3. The skilled labour immigration law of 2018

In 2018, the German parliament introduced a new labour bill to recruit skilled workers from outside the EU, to address a persistent shortage. Business lobbies also urged the government to relax immigration laws, claiming that a lack of workers would have long-term consequences for the economy. The skilled labour immigration law (*Fachkräftezuwanderungsgesetz*)⁵² makes it easier for employers to recruit from outside the EU, given that German and EU workers are not able to fulfil the demand. This law has been rigorously debated, and parts of Angela Merkel’s conservative alliance and the AfD have repeatedly stated that this law might also encourage low-skilled migration to Germany.⁵³

Simultaneously, the society regardless of their political affiliation, still remains sceptical about migration and continue the *Leitkultur* discourse. Both CDU (76%) and CSU (81%) adherents believe it is necessary for immigrants to adopt German customs and traditions, according to the survey, conducted among 1,983 German adults in late 2017. However, differences emerge when those who identify with the two conservative parties are asked about the impact of immigrants on German society. Nearly seven-in-ten CSU supporters

⁵⁰ Source: <https://www.statista.com/chart/14494/germany-is-home-to-the-most-refugees/>

⁵¹ See <https://www.dw.com/en/german-interior-minister-horst-seehofer-islam-doesnt-belong-to-germany/a-42999726>

⁵² See <https://www.bmas.de/DE/Presse/Meldungen/2018/fachkraefteeinwanderungsgesetz.html>; <https://www.bmas.de/DE/Presse/Meldungen/2020/neue-gesetze-fachkraefteeinwanderungsgesetz.html>

⁵³ See <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/19/germany-passes-immigration-law-to-lure-non-eu-skilled-workers>, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/was-steht-im-neuen-einwanderungsgesetz/>

(68%) say immigrants increase the risk of terrorist attacks in Germany, compared with 47% of CDU backers. Similarly, 27% of those who identify with the CSU voice the view that immigrants are a burden on the German economy, but just 13% of CDU supporters feel the same way.

Simultaneously, regardless of the skilled-labour shortages expressed by the government and the business sectors, surveys show that the German society remains sceptical about migration and continue the *Leitkultur* discourse. For instance, a Pew survey conducted at the end of 2017, which comprised of 1,983 German adults showed that all CDU (76%) and CSU (81%) adherents feel it is important for immigrants to follow German customs and rituals. This also shows that political affiliation does not necessarily lead to differing perceptions of immigrant integration. Differences, however, are observed in regard to the attitudes on the impact of immigrants on society. 68% of CSU supporters believe that immigrants raise the likelihood of terrorist attacks in Germany relative to 47% of CDU backers. Similarly, 27% of people who affiliate with CSU say that immigrants burden the German economy, but this drops to 13% among CDU members.⁵⁴

Conclusion

Despite the growing diversity discourse across Europe, and in Germany, the country remains among the lowest in terms of multicultural policy, that is, “the degree to which governments and other administrative bodies promote cultural diversity as a national goal” (Berry, Westin, et al., 2006: 18). This mainly stems from the fact that despite the various attempts to legislate migration and asylum issues, German policies, as well as the political and public sentiment, still resembles assimilationist tendencies (Yağmur and Van de Vijver, 2012; Zick et al., 2001). This is likely a remnant of Germany’s traditional stance toward so-called “guest workers” in the 1960s who were expected to eventually to return to their countries of origin. As such, long term accommodation of migrants, and recently refugees, remains very problematic, especially in the light of the growing civilizational discourse, which antagonizes the relations between Muslims and native Europeans.

This also should be understood in the light of the German *Leitkultur* debate, which still expects migrant to remain segregated or adapt to German culture as efficiently as possible (Zick et al., 2001). Scholars agree that successful adaptation is only possible within a multicultural society that endorses the integration of migrants and acknowledges the right of migrants to maintain their heritage culture while adapting to certain aspects of the national culture (e.g., Huddleston, Niessen, Ni Chaoimh, and White, 2011; Van Oudenhoven et al., 2006). As such, structural and ideological segmentations create social distance, particularly between the “second and third generation” of Turkish-origin migrants in Germany, and the dominant society. This can be due to ideologies, public discourses underlying recruitment, migration policy and the debate around citizenship legislation, as well as the perceptions of Germans and Turks about each other. This process is also reflected in the everyday experiences in school, media and public life of young immigrant persons. In turn, these so-called “cultural” differences are grounded not only in ideological

⁵⁴ See <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/06/21/differing-views-of-immigrants-pose-a-test-for-germanys-coalition-government/>

discourse, or in mutual perceptions, but also used to systematically create institutional discrimination (Gomulla and Radtke, 2002).

Similarly, the migrant societies' perception/reception of government policies also determine their attitude toward integration. As noted above, the German government has conducted a series of studies examining the tendencies amongst Muslim-origin migrant. A series of collaborative studies commissioned by the Federal Ministry of the Interior yielded qualitative and quantitative data indicating that the German public's official support of integration is viewed by young Muslims between 14 to 32 years of age demand for assimilation (Frindte et al., 2011). The German population is described as distanced, dismissive, and lacking in acceptance of Islam (ibid). Adolescent migrants perceived Germans' endorsement of cultural maintenance and intergroup contact to be lower than their own. Young migrants also view the majority group attitude as rejecting rather than endorsing multiculturalism (Pfafferott and Brown, 2006). This also argument is also maintained by various scholars (Frankenberg et. al, 2013: 160; Frindte et al., 2011; Berry, 2006; Kunst and Sam, 2013, 2014) who found that personal experiences with discrimination are often surpassed by feelings of collective discrimination which frames Muslims *vis-à-vis* terrorism.

Germany has undergone various legislative periods since the 1960s to accommodate and integrate its settled immigrants and to adapt to changes in immigration trends. This literature review discussed migration politics, migration policies and regulations while aiming to provide the circumstantial framework for these changes. However, due to limitations of this review, the societal impact of these policies and regulations, and their influence on the heterogeneous Turkish-origin migrant community have not been discussed at length.

As this literature has demonstrated Muslim-origin migrants, particularly the those of Turkish origin, has been debated in relation to migration and integration over the years. As the literature shows, academic studies have highlighted the separation and alienation of Turkish-origin migrants while placing the responsibility on the state, the public or those who are alienated.

However, despite the structural discrimination and the othering discourse, there are many German-Turks who take an active role in society to attain recognition while criticising the focus on cultural differences which also further perpetuates ethnic and cultural stereotypes. Some examples include the hashtag me two debate on Twitter following Mesut Özil 's resignation from the national football team. This was a struggle for recognition especially the right to plural cultural affiliations and a struggle to shed light on daily interactions of immigrants with racism and discrimination.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ See <https://www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de/en/new-germans>, <https://www.bpb.de/apuz/32367/neue-deutsche-postmigranten-und-bindungs-identitaeten-wer-gehoert-zum-neuen-deutschland?p=all>; The "New German Organizations", the "New German Journalists": <https://neuedeutsche.org/>; <https://www.neuemedienmacher.de/>

In line with the criticisms of the supposition that Muslim-origin migrants are a heterogeneous community, the PRIME Youth project aims to understand the *various* forms and sources of alienation experienced by Muslim-origin migrants in Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In doing so, the case of Germany as the host to the largest Turkish-origin community is especially important to understanding the diverse and individualised dynamics behind alienation, isolation, humiliation and radicalisation.

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