August 29, 2019 Conference paper Open Access

Panagiotis Radoglou-Grammatikis; Panagiotis Sarigiannidis; Ioannis Giannoulakis; Emmanouil Kafetzakis; Emmanouil Panaousis

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  <identifier identifierType="URL">https://zenodo.org/record/3834759</identifier>
  <creators>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Panagiotis Radoglou-Grammatikis</creatorName>
      <affiliation>University of Western Macedonia</affiliation>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Panagiotis Sarigiannidis</creatorName>
      <affiliation>University of Western Macedonia</affiliation>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Ioannis Giannoulakis</creatorName>
      <affiliation>Eight Bells Ltd.</affiliation>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Emmanouil Kafetzakis</creatorName>
      <affiliation>Eight Bells Ltd.</affiliation>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Emmanouil Panaousis</creatorName>
      <affiliation>University of Surrey</affiliation>
    </creator>
  </creators>
  <titles>
    <title>Attacking IEC-60870-5-104 SCADA Systems</title>
  </titles>
  <publisher>Zenodo</publisher>
  <publicationYear>2019</publicationYear>
  <dates>
    <date dateType="Issued">2019-08-29</date>
  </dates>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="ConferencePaper"/>
  <alternateIdentifiers>
    <alternateIdentifier alternateIdentifierType="url">https://zenodo.org/record/3834759</alternateIdentifier>
  </alternateIdentifiers>
  <relatedIdentifiers>
    <relatedIdentifier relatedIdentifierType="DOI" relationType="IsIdenticalTo">10.1109/SERVICES.2019.00022</relatedIdentifier>
    <relatedIdentifier relatedIdentifierType="URL" relationType="IsPartOf">https://zenodo.org/communities/h2020_spear_project</relatedIdentifier>
  </relatedIdentifiers>
  <rightsList>
    <rights rightsURI="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International</rights>
    <rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess">Open Access</rights>
  </rightsList>
  <descriptions>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">&lt;p&gt;The rapid evolution of the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) services transforms the conventional electrical grid into a new paradigm called Smart Grid (SG). Even though SG brings significant improvements, such as increased reliability and better energy management, it also introduces multiple security challenges. One of the main reasons for this is that SG combines a wide range of heterogeneous technologies, including Internet of Things (IoT) devices as well as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. The latter are responsible for monitoring and controlling the automatic procedures of energy transmission and distribution. Nevertheless, the presence of these systems introduces multiple vulnerabilities because their protocols do not implement essential security mechanisms such as authentication and access control. In this paper, we focus our attention on the security issues of the IEC 60870-5-104 (IEC-104) protocol, which is widely utilized in the European energy sector. In particular, we provide a SCADA threat model based on a Coloured Petri Net (CPN) and emulate four different types of cyber attacks against IEC-104. Last, we used AlienVault&amp;#39;s risk assessment model to evaluate the risk level that each of these cyber attacks introduces to our system to confirm our intuition about their severity.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </descriptions>
  <fundingReferences>
    <fundingReference>
      <funderName>European Commission</funderName>
      <funderIdentifier funderIdentifierType="Crossref Funder ID">10.13039/100010661</funderIdentifier>
      <awardNumber awardURI="info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/787011/">787011</awardNumber>
      <awardTitle>SPEAR: Secure and PrivatE smArt gRid</awardTitle>
    </fundingReference>
  </fundingReferences>
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