Journal article Open Access
The author touches upon the issue of the international legal personality of individuals, and also considers scientific research on this issue. A large number of fundamental scientific works were taken into account, which later made it possible to reveal the ambiguity of the scientists' positions. Thus, the article repeatedly proves and confirms the discussion of this issue. Initially, it was important to determine the etymology of the concept of international legal personality, and only then to find out which of the scientific representatives ascribed it to individuals and who denied it. Based on this, scientists in this article were conditionally divided into two groups. The first group concerns the complete non-recognition of the legal personality of individuals, while the second group demonstrates unconditional recognition. The author analyzes the positions of both sides, quotes and cites as an example the convincing arguments of the researchers. Moreover, in addition to statements based on their own opinions, scientists refer to the practice of international judicial institutions, in particular the European Court of Human Rights. The number of opinions regarding the fact that individuals do not act as subjects of international law dominates in the modern domestic doctrine. Proponents of this legal approach argue that individuals are under the jurisdiction of the state and are subjects of domestic legal relations, and therefore they do not have independent international status, do not have legal capacity to independently implement international rights and obligations. The author considers the evidence and arguments of the representatives of the second group to be more convincing and reasonable. A weighty basis for their arguments is the practice of the European Court, which directly indicates in its decisions that the legal personality of individuals is recognized in international documents. Attention is focused on a number of international documents, such as: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (article 6), the International Covenant on Political Rights of 1966 (article 2), etc. As a conclusion, the author makes it clear that he adheres to the position of the second group of researchers, he is deeply convinced that individuals are subjects of international law, as this is confirmed by the practice of the European Court of Justice and the fact that international treaties give individuals the right to apply to international judicial institutions for protection of their rights. Indeed, as Tarasov said, O. V.: “without a person, the world of law is dead, because it is the man who is the source and carrier of all legal reality”, which once again confirms the right position of the author.