Conference paper Open Access

On Deception-Based Protection Against Cryptographic Ransomware

Alper Genç, Ziya; Lenzini, Gabriele; Sgandurra, Daniele


DataCite XML Export

<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<resource xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-4" xsi:schemaLocation="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-4 http://schema.datacite.org/meta/kernel-4.1/metadata.xsd">
  <identifier identifierType="URL">https://zenodo.org/record/3472437</identifier>
  <creators>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Alper Genç, Ziya</creatorName>
      <givenName>Ziya</givenName>
      <familyName>Alper Genç</familyName>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Lenzini, Gabriele</creatorName>
      <givenName>Gabriele</givenName>
      <familyName>Lenzini</familyName>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Sgandurra, Daniele</creatorName>
      <givenName>Daniele</givenName>
      <familyName>Sgandurra</familyName>
    </creator>
  </creators>
  <titles>
    <title>On Deception-Based Protection Against Cryptographic Ransomware</title>
  </titles>
  <publisher>Zenodo</publisher>
  <publicationYear>2019</publicationYear>
  <subjects>
    <subject>Ransomware</subject>
    <subject>Cryptographic</subject>
    <subject>Malware</subject>
    <subject>Deception</subject>
    <subject>Decoy</subject>
  </subjects>
  <dates>
    <date dateType="Issued">2019-06-06</date>
  </dates>
  <language>en</language>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="Text">Conference paper</resourceType>
  <alternateIdentifiers>
    <alternateIdentifier alternateIdentifierType="url">https://zenodo.org/record/3472437</alternateIdentifier>
  </alternateIdentifiers>
  <relatedIdentifiers>
    <relatedIdentifier relatedIdentifierType="DOI" relationType="IsIdenticalTo">10.1007/978-3-030-22038-9_11</relatedIdentifier>
    <relatedIdentifier relatedIdentifierType="URL" relationType="IsPartOf">https://zenodo.org/communities/futuretpm-h2020</relatedIdentifier>
  </relatedIdentifiers>
  <rightsList>
    <rights rightsURI="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International</rights>
    <rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess">Open Access</rights>
  </rightsList>
  <descriptions>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">&lt;p&gt;In order to detect malicious file system activity, some commercial and academic anti-ransomware solutions implement deception-based techniques, specifically by placing decoy files among user files. While this approach raises the bar against current ransomware, as any access to a decoy file is a sign of malicious activity, the robustness of decoy strategies has not been formally analyzed and fully tested. In this paper, we analyze existing decoy strategies and discuss how they are effective in countering current ransomware by defining a set of metrics to measure their robustness. To demonstrate how ransomware can identify existing deception-based detection strategies, we have implemented a proof-ofconcept anti-decoy ransomware that successfully bypasses decoys by using a decision engine with few rules. Finally, we discuss existing issues in decoy-based strategies and propose practical solutions to mitigate them.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </descriptions>
  <fundingReferences>
    <fundingReference>
      <funderName>European Commission</funderName>
      <funderIdentifier funderIdentifierType="Crossref Funder ID">10.13039/501100000780</funderIdentifier>
      <awardNumber awardURI="info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/779391/">779391</awardNumber>
      <awardTitle>Future Proofing the Connected World: A Quantum-Resistant Trusted Platform Module</awardTitle>
    </fundingReference>
  </fundingReferences>
</resource>
132
29
views
downloads
Views 132
Downloads 29
Data volume 15.0 MB
Unique views 121
Unique downloads 26

Share

Cite as