Conference paper Open Access

A Symbolic Analysis of ECC-Based Direct Anonymous Attestation

Whitefield, Jorden; Chen, Liqun; Sasse,Ralf; Schneider, Steve; Treharne, Helen; Wesemeyer, Stephan


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    <subfield code="a">&lt;p&gt;Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a cryptographic scheme that provides Trusted Platform Module (TPM)- backed anonymous credentials. We develop TAMARIN modelling of the ECC-based version of the protocol as it is standardised and provide the first mechanised analysis of this standard. Our analysis confirms that the scheme is secure when all TPMs are assumed honest, but reveals a break in the protocol&amp;rsquo;s expected authentication and secrecy properties for all TPMs even if only one is compromised. We propose and formally verify a minimal fix to the standard. In addition to developing the first formal analysis of ECC-DAA, the paper contributes to the growing body of work demonstrating the use of formal tools in supporting standardisation processes for cryptographic protocols.&lt;/p&gt;</subfield>
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