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Asphalion: Trustworthy Shielding Against Byzantine Faults

Vincent Rahli; Ivana Vukotic


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{
  "publisher": "Zenodo", 
  "DOI": "10.5281/zenodo.3368206", 
  "author": [
    {
      "family": "Vincent Rahli"
    }, 
    {
      "family": "Ivana Vukotic"
    }
  ], 
  "issued": {
    "date-parts": [
      [
        2019, 
        8, 
        14
      ]
    ]
  }, 
  "abstract": "<p>Asphalion is a Coq-based framework for verifying the correctness of<br>\nimplementations of fault-tolerant systems. It especially provides<br>\nfeatures to verify the correctness of hybrid fault-tolerant systems<br>\n(such as the MinBFT protocol<br>\n<a href=\"http://www.di.fc.ul.pt/~bessani/publications/tc11-minimal.pdf\">http://www.di.fc.ul.pt/~bessani/publications/tc11-minimal.pdf</a>), where<br>\nnormal components (that can for example fail arbitrarily) trust some<br>\nspecial components (that can for example only crash on failure) to<br>\nprovide properties in a trustworthy manner.&nbsp; Asphalion allows running<br>\nsuch trusted-trustworthy components inside Intel SGX enclaves.<br>\nMore details are provided here:<br>\n<a href=\"https://vrahli.github.io/articles/asphalion-long.pdf\">https://vrahli.github.io/articles/asphalion-long.pdf</a></p>\n\n<p>&nbsp;</p>", 
  "title": "Asphalion: Trustworthy Shielding Against Byzantine Faults", 
  "type": "article", 
  "id": "3368206"
}
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