Atheism, Religion and Society in Mandeville’s Thought

Starting by analysing the atheist’s character, Mandeville gets gradually 5 closer to Bayle’s thesis on virtuous atheism, but he takes a different turn, and 6 maintains that a society without religion cannot exist because atheism goes against 7 a natural passion, fear of invisible causes. In order to understand Mandeville’s 8 position on this last point, in the second part of this essay I will consider his 9 reﬂection on the origin and on the social and political functions of religion.

In the tenth book of The Laws, Plato severely condemns atheism considering it 27 dangerous for society and stemming from ignorance. The Greek philosopher's 28 proposal consists in the establishment of a special detention institution called 29 Sophronisterion, that is "wisdom creator", even though for the most serious cases he 30 advocates the death penalty. This conception reflected Hellenic culture's common 31 attitude towards atheism and impiety in general, but Plato gave a new philosophical 32 depth to the condemnation of atheists and their persecution by making a link 33 between the denial of the existence of the gods and of the immortality of the soul 34 with immorality, political and social subversion and diseases. Atheism is considered 35 a vice because the idea that God doesn't exist and the soul is mortal loosens the link 36 with virtue. It is therefore dangerous for the polis' safety, as politics without virtue 37 lack their foundation. In fact justice, like health, consists in the harmony of the parts, 38 and this harmony falters if we exclude religion and morals. 39 When Pierre Bayle, at the end of the seventeenth-century, reflects upon the 40 possibility of a society of atheists, he still has to deal with the rooted conviction that 41 atheism is a vice, an illness, and, more than anything else, a social liability. Bayle 42 asks his contemporaries two tightly related questions: can an atheist be virtuous? 43 And if atheists can be virtuous, can society without religion exist? In other words, 44 Bayle was wondering whether it was possible to break the exclusive bond between 45 morals and religion and to theorise the existence of lay morals, 2 morals that would 46 then constitute the basis of a society where religion would be politically irrelevant. 3 47 These questions generate at least three problems. The first was about God's 48 reaction towards those societies who would decide to tolerate atheism. In this 49 perspective, the persecution of the atheist was necessary as a form of society's 50 self-defence, not to prevent the damage done by the atheists themselves, but as a 51 safeguard against God's wrath that would inexorably hit such a society. Therefore 52 the problem was that of a vindictive God, not the social danger caused by atheists. 53 The second problem, instead, was of an epistemological nature: it regarded the 54 foundation of morals without religion. Would reason suffice to found the distinction 55 between vice and virtue? And would the absence of God necessarily generate 56 conventional and relativistic morals? 57 The third problem regarded the relationship between virtue and behavioural 58 motivations. If God didn't exist, then everything would be possible: virtue would not 59 gain any reward nor vice any punishment. In this state of affairs, evil and vice would 60 rule and good and virtue would be nothing else than a con to keep the ignorant and 61 17 Atheism, Religion and Society in Mandeville's Thought the fools subjugated. The absence of eternal reward or punishment would also have 62 consequences on a strictly political plan: without God no oath could be consider 63 valid, and an oath was the seal of all important commitments. Without fear of 64 perjury any promise would be a lot less binding, and so any agreement stipulated 65 with atheists could not be considered valid because atheists were not bound by their 66 word. 4 67 Bayle concluded that atheism did not constitute an obstacle to the birth of society; 68 that lay morals could exist; that an atheist could be virtuous and that a society 69 without religion was therefore possible. 5 In his analysis of society, Bayle boldly 70 asserted that the Christian religion, if adhered to in all its moral precepts, could 71 cause damage to a society's wealth and power. 6

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In 1723 the second edition of the Fable. Part I 7 by Bernard Mandeville appeared 73 in London, and within a few years a series of works aimed at confuting its most 74 radical theses followed. 8 On January 20th 1724, William Law published an essay of 75 about a hundred pages called Remarks upon a late Book entituled The Fable of the 76 Bees, 9 in which he put great effort into criticising some of the main mandevillean 77 theses, in particular the ideas that passions are at the origin of human actions, that 78 reason cannot act as guide to human behaviour, that morals are a human invention 79 and that the belief in the immortality of the soul results from pride. It is rather 80 significant that in the final pages of this essay dedicated to the Fable of the Bees, 81 William Law adds a postscript of seven pages, in which two of Bayle's theses are 82 also criticized: the first is the conviction that virtue and religion can be explained as 83 "blind effects" of human passions (Law: 100); the second is the belief in the possible 84 existence of a society of virtuous atheists (Law: 101-102). 85 We cannot relay here the whole of William Law's confutation, which follows 86 from a conception that reflects the orthodoxy of the time, but I would like to 87 underline that in 1724 Mandeville had already been accused of being close to 88 Bayle's positions. 10  Mandeville, in truth, shares only some of Bayle's positions, while he distances 97 himself from them on a few very significant points. Among Bayle's conclusions was 98 the view that religion is not necessary for social life, and it is therefore possible to 99 imagine a society of virtuous atheists; and that religion could have negative effects 100 on a social level too. Bayle used the hypothetical existence of a society of virtuous 101 atheists to support his opinion that religion is not necessary for man and society. 102 Mandeville also states that religion is not necessary for life in society, but on the 103 other hand he cannot imagine a society without religion; he asserts not only that 104 religion can be damaging to society, but that virtue itself, intended in its radical 105 sense, is incompatible with the very existence of society. It becomes therefore 106 apparent that Mandeville disagrees with Bayle right on the most crucial point: the 107 hypothesis of the possible existence of a society of virtuous atheists. 108 In the pages that follow we will see how Mandeville's argument on atheism and 109 religion develops. Starting by analysing the atheist's character, Mandeville gets 110 gradually closer to Bayle's thesis on virtuous atheism, but having admitted the 111 possibility of the existence of the apparently virtuous atheist, the Dutch physician 112 takes a different turn, and maintains that a society without religion cannot exist.   Mandeville's analysis of atheism fits into his more general interpretation of 129 human behaviour within the framework of the passion system. Atheism, like faith, 130 is not a matter of choice; it depends on one's upbringing and one's own emotional 131 structure. According to Mandeville, in fact, man is not granted free will. 14 The most 132 technical definition of free will was given by Mandeville in Free Thoughts, in the 133 chapter in which he reflects upon the existence of free will and predestination: «what 134 we call the Will is properly the last Result of deliberation» (Mandeville 2001, 61). 135 It is a definition that Mandeville borrows from Hobbes, and that he comments as 136 follows: «The reason, why every Body imagines that he has a Free-Will, is, because 137 we are Conscious that in the choice of Things we feel a Power [ : : : ] to determine 138 our Judgment either way. [ : : : ] If we reflect on this, I say, our Will shall not seem 139 to be as free, as is commonly imagin'd» (Mandeville 2001, 61). In another passage, 140 Mandeville is even more explicit: «Every Man may be convinc'd within himself, that 141 Believing is not a Thing of Choice» (Mandeville 2001, 49-50 as to neglect his present Life, nay, court and covet Death, if he but imagines that it will add 157 to the Glory he had acquired before. (Mandeville 1924a, 213-214) 158 15 Mandeville makes a distinction between Pride and Self-Liking starting from Fable Part II and then in An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour. 16 In Mandeville's anthropological conception there are two main passions: self-love and selfliking. Self-love is an expression of self-preservation, while self-liking is the passion from which the desire to be esteemed comes from. Self-liking therefore is a relational passion as it has its foundation in other people's judgement and it is stronger than self-love as demonstrated by the case of suicide. See. Mandeville 1990, 6-7: «I now understand perfectly well what mean by Selfliking. You are of Opinion, that we are all born with a Passion manifestly distinct from Self-love; that, when it is moderate and well regulated, excites in us the Love of Praise, and a Desire to be applauded and thought well of by others, and stirs us up to good Actions: but that the same Passion, when it is excessive, or ill turn'd, whatever it excites in our Selves, gives Offence to others, renders us odious, and is call'd Pride. As there is no Word or Expression that comprehends all the different Effects of this same Cause, this Passion, you have made one, viz. Self-liking, by which you mean the Passion in general, the whole Extent of it, whether it produces laudable Actions, and gains us Applause, or such as we are blamed for and draw upon us the ill Will of others». See  17 In the first edition of the Fable Part I, published in 1714, Mandeville made clear that his intent was first of all descriptive, and that his analyses started from the premises that the will of man was not free, but determined by passions: «As for my Part [ : : : ], I believe Man (besides Skin, Flesh, Bones, &c. that are obvious to the Eye) to be a compound of various Passions, that all of them, as they are provoked and come uppermost, govern him by turns, whether he will or not» (Mandeville 1924a, 41). Though Mandeville often changes his opinions in time, when it comes to free will, instead, he remains faithful to this first definition; in fact in 1732, in his An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour, we find a formulation that is very similar to that of 1714, even in the words he chose: «So most of the Passions are counted to be Weaknesses, and commonly call'd Frailties; whereas they are the very Powers that govern the whole Machine; and, whether they are perceived or not, determine or rather create the Will that immediately precedes every deliberate Action» (Mandeville 1990, 6).
17 Atheism, Religion and Society in Mandeville's Thought Differently from Bayle, 18 Mandeville states that there is no such a thing as a 159 virtuous atheist, but there are indeed vain atheists: «yet it is certain, that there have 160 been Men who only assisted with Pride and Constitution to maintain the worst of 161 Causes, have undergone Death and Torments with as much Chearfulness as the 162 best of Men, animated with Piety and Devotion, ever did for the true Religion» 163 (Mandeville 1924a, 214 Arguments, to skreen themselves from their own Fears, and only deny a God, because they 178 wich there was none. Practical Atheists, as they commonly spend their Lives in Riots, 179 and ridiculing every thing that is holy, generally dye (unless they happen to repent) in This distinction seems to introduce Bayle's thesis about a difference between 182 virtuous and vicious atheists, a difference that a few years before he had not taken 183 into consideration. In fact, the speculative atheists are men that behave virtuously 184 even though they don't believe in «an Immortal Power, that, superior to all Earthly 185 Dominion, invisibly governs the World» (Mandeville 2001, 15). Atheists can be 186 virtuous and Christians can be vicious because the reasons for their actions do not 187 descend from the principles that are professed but from the passions and individual 188 inclinations. Mandeville writes: «And therefore it ought not to appear more strange 189 to us, that an Atheist should be a quiet moral Man, than that a Christian should lead 190 a very wicked Life» (Mandeville 2001, 15). Practical Atheists, instead, are sinful 191 and vicious men, who deny the existence of God because they hope not to have to 192 account for their behaviour.

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In order to avoid ambiguity, we need to specify the way in which Mandeville 194 makes use of the term virtue. This word is used by Mandeville with two different 195 18 Bayle's judgment on the reason for Vanini's martyrdom moves from the attribution of a "certain idea of honesty", that would make of him a virtuous atheist, to considering Vanini as a man "animated by a ridiculous point of honour", which would make of him only an extremely proud man. See P. Bayle, Pensées diverses, § 182. 19 Mandeville takes from Bayle the distinction between speculative atheists (athées de théorie) and practical atheists (athées de praticque). As noted by M.E. Scribano, the difference between Bayle and Mandeville is that the first describes the atheist as a heroical and militant man, while the second presents him a library mouse, completely defenceless and pacific. See Scribano 1981, 213.
meanings that can be identified as "real virtue" and "apparent virtue". Real virtue is 196 defined as «every Performance, by which Man, contrary to the impulse of Nature, 197 should endeavour the Benefit of others, or the Conquest of his own Passions out of 198 a Rational Ambition of being good» (Mandeville 1924a, 48-49). Apparent virtue, 199 instead, is the exterior behaviour that respects common values within a social 200 context, but whose real reasons is the passion of self-liking, and not the "rational 201 ambition of being good".

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In the end, real virtue cannot be practiced because it is contrary to human nature, 203 which is passional. Apparent virtue, instead, is a behaviour that on the exterior level 204 produces the same effects as real virtue, but is motivated by selfish reasons.

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This distinction between virtuous and vicious atheists seems to have disappeared 206 in Mandeville's later works. He may have used it simply to distinguish virtuous 207 atheists, who are not dangerous for society, from vicious atheists, who reject not 208 just the existence of God, but also society's shared values.

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Consequently, nobody can be really virtuous, because virtue requires free will, 210 which is denied to human nature. It is on this level that Mandeville distances himself 211 from Bayle: an atheist who is truly virtuous does not exist. Having clarified this 212 point, Mandeville proceeds by explaining that men can be divided in two categories: 213 those who satisfy their passions behaving as if they were virtuous, that is respecting 214 shared social codes, and those, instead, who satisfy their passions as if they were 215 vicious, that is breaking shared social codes.

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Going back to the problem posed by Bayle regarding the existence of the virtuous 217 atheists, Mandeville's position is now more understandable. On the one hand, 218 Mandeville states that a truly virtuous atheist does not exist. On the other, though, 219 he thinks that we can distinguish two categories of atheists, the apparently virtuous 220 ones, and the vicious ones.

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In the Sixth Dialogue of the Fable. Part II Mandeville reiterates what he had 222 affirmed in Free Thoughts regarding speculative atheists. The only difference is 223 that the attitude of his description is more generous, but the subject is dealt with 224 only after reassuring his readers that «Multitudes are never tainted with Irreligion» 225 (Mandeville 1924b, 313). The atheist is described as a talented, spirited, reflexive 226 and well-adjusted person, and a defender of freedom. He is fascinated by maths 227 or natural philosophy, is keen on research, he is disinterested, and he lives a good 228 healthy life. Mandeville especially notes that most of those who become atheists are 229 proud and full of themselves, especially if they did not receive an adequate religious 230 education when young. 20

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The atheist's image that emerges from the pages of the Fable Part II is one that 232 resembles more and more a defence from an accusation of debauchery. In truth, 233 17 Atheism, Religion and Society in Mandeville's Thought the definition of the atheist as a vain man does not change, but the attitude of the 234 author appears more sympathetic, as is made evident by his choice of adjectives, and 235 in his description of the atheist as a moderate and freedom-loving man. Besides, 236 Mandeville specifies that virtue does not depend on having faith or being atheist: 237 «and if Men were sway'd in their Actions by the Principles they side with, and 238 the Opinion they profess themselves to be of, All Atheists would be Devils, and 239 superstitious Men Saints: But this is not true; there are Atheists of good Morals, and 240 great Villains superstitious» (Mandeville 1924b, 314).

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This description of the atheist opens the way to the explicit defence of atheism 242 that we find in the Enquiry into the Origin of Honour, which is the work in which 243 Mandeville dedicates the most space to this subject.

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In this work, after having confirmed what sustained in previous ones, that is the 245 impossibility to make atheism universal 21 (because it is contrary to a natural passion, 246 the fear of invisible causes) and the importance of religion for what concerns oaths 247 (believers have an extra deterrent in comparison to atheists), Mandeville explicitly 248 states that faith is not a better guarantee of virtue than atheism. If vice means 249 indulging in one's passions, then a miscreant is no more vicious than a believer, 250 on the contrary:  263 We will now set aside the reflection on atheism to analyse the origin and function of 264 religion. The idea of religion in Mandeville is not straightforward. The first problem 265 has to do with Mandeville's general philosophy. In the 1740s his works were inter-266 preted in two different ways. In the first, born in the mid-twenties as a result of the 267 controversy that originated with the publication of An Essay on Charity and Charity 268 Schools, Mandeville appeared to be an atheist and a free-thinker. In the second 269 perspective, which originated from the French translation of the Fable of the Bees in 270 1740, Mandeville was regarded as an important philosopher 23 and, in some cases, a 271 good Christian. 24 These two different interpretations will re-emerge in the twentieth 272 century, and have been characterising the historiographical debate until now.

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The second difficulty concerns the language and the argumentative structures 274 used by Mandeville in tackling the specific theme of religion. Kaye was the first, 275 in 1924, to address the dilemma of whether the passages on religion should be 276 considered literally or whether they should be interpreted ironically. 25  Ouvrage qu'il a publié quelques années après celui dont nous donnons la traduction, il enseigne expressement que la Vertu est plus propre que le Vice pour procurer le bonheur général de la Société: maxime qui paroît directement opposée à la doctrine de la Fable, dans laquelle il semble que l'Auteur veut prouver qu'une Société ne fauroit fleurir s'il n'y règne de grands vices. Pour sauver cette contradiction apparente, nous disons que Mr. Mandeville badine dans la Fable, où l'ironie faute aux yeux en tant d'endroits, & qu'il parle sérieusement dans ses Recherches». The publisher-translator was probably Jean Bertrand (1707-1777). On Mandeville's reception in Francia see Gai 2004. 25 Kaye was the first to make the hypothesis that Mandeville swaps the characters' roles when addressing religion. See Mandeville 1924b, 21-22 n. 2. Kaye thinks that Cleomenes' references to the biblical story of creation, in contrast with the scientific story told by Horace are to be interpreted ironically, especially the frequent references to miraculous and providential interventions that would explain history. John Robertson instead suggested that Mandeville intended to stay close to Bayle positions, who had sustained that the most debated christian doctrines could be accepted only believing in the literal truth of Scripture (doctrines of revelation, divine providence, and the perfection of God  Mandeville's interpreters are therefore divided between those who recognise 283 in his thought the idea of Anglican orthodoxy (Chiasson 1970;Pinkus 1975) or, 284 on the contrary, the defence of radical Calvinism (James 1975(James , 1996; those who 285 place him within the libertine tradition, 27 or those, last but not least, who recognise 286 an ambiguity in his works, remarking on the elements that make one think that 287 Mandeville was both «a pious Christian, an ascetic, and an unusually austere 288 moralist» and, at the same time, «at best an easy-going man of the world, at worst a 289 profligate, a cynic, a scoffer at all virtue and religion» (Monro 1975, 1). The mortalist theory (or soul-sleeping doctrine) was rather popular among 300 English physicians at the beginning of the eighteenth-century, as demonstrated 301 by the case of a friend of Sir Hans Sloan, the medical doctor William Coward 302 (like Mandeville, a specialist in digestive disorders 29 ), who became associated with 303 members of the Royal College of Physicians in London, and whose books were 304 sentenced to be burned in 1704 30 for having upheld the mortality of the soul and for 305 having supported vitalistic materialism. The sentence was passed by a Jury instituted 306 by the House of Commons of which Bolingbroke was also a member.

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However, this is just an interpretative hypothesis and, on the other hand Mandev-308 ille's main interest in religion was not of a theological nature. In fact, Mandeville 309 analyses religion as a human phenomenon, that is as a product of passions. From 310 this point of view, we can distinguish three levels on which his research develops. 311 At the first level we have the relationship between religion and anthropology 312 (and all religions are considered); at a second level the relationship between 313 religion and society (and this analysis is restricted to Christianity); at the third 314 level the relationship between religion and politics (and this analysis moves from a 315 27 This interpretation is popular especially in Italy, see Olivetti 1980; Sabetti 1985; Costa 2008. 28 Irwin Primer, in his Introduction to Free Thoughts, recalled that «his enemies called him atheist, infidel and deist, but nowhere in his writings do we find him explicitly revealing the details of his personal religious belief» and that «whatever Mandeville may have believed, it is known that he was married in the Church of England and that at least the first of his two children was baptized in that church» (Mandeville 2001, xxxiiii

First of all let's see what is religion in Mandeville's perspective: «Religion in 319
General consists in an Acknowledgment of an Immortal Power, that, superior to 320 all Earthly Dominion, invisibly governs the World, and a respectful Endeavour to 321 discharge such Duties, as every one shall apprehend to be requir'd of him by that 322 Immortal Power». 31

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In the fifth dialogue of The Fable of the Bees. Part II and in the first dialogue 324 of An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour, Mandeville addresses the problem of 325 the origin of religion. Religions are all considered on the same level and any 326 religious phenomenon is analysed in a historical perspective and in a comparative 327 way. This way, the Dutch physician could exalt his anthropological method and 328 give an explanation that was strictly psychological, without resorting to any kind 329 of revelation. Mandeville not only makes no distinction between Christianity, 330 Judaism, or Islam, but he doesn't even make distinctions between monotheistic and 331 polytheistic faiths or any other form of superstition or idolatry. What is therefore the 332 origin of religion? Fear. He who believes, in the common Acceptation, that there is a God, and that the World is rul'd by Providence, but has no Faith in any thing reveal'd to us, is a Deist; and he, who believes neither the one or the other, is an Atheist». 33  had not been planted in Human Nature and visible in both Sexes. (Mandeville 1990, 24-25) 350 This investigation on the origin of religion allows Mandeville to conclude that 351 religion is not a crucial factor in the birth of society (as, instead, are morals, which 352 are detached from religion; we can behave morally independently of our religious 353 beliefs) and yet it is a necessary and non eliminable component of human nature. 354 Therefore society doesn't need religion (as Bayle remarks), virtue is enough, and 355 yet it is impossible to think of a society without a religion.   361 Mandeville develops his first theory on the origin of society in 1714, when he 362 resorts to the theory of political imposture, then abandoned in 1728, presenting an 363 evolutionary theory of men and society. 34 In both these formulations, Mandeville 364 makes a distinction between the origin of religion and its social function. Regarding 365 its social function, in 1714 Mandeville held that religion is not necessary for life 366 in society, 35 and in 1728 he stated that it is part of the structure of an impersonal 367 power that creates a more or less stable balance without need for the purposeful 368 project by a single will. This means that religion has no determinant function in 369 society, sharing the same religion is not the necessary social glue for community 370 life, but it is nonetheless useful to reinforce social bonds through a grid of shared 371 values and to reinforce political obligation when Church and State come to coincide. 372 But in practice, so to speak, what is the social function of religion?

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The subject is addressed by Mandeville at different times and with slightly 374 different acceptions throughout his works. However, if we take into consideration 375 the last of Mandeville's work, An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the 376 Usefulness of Christianity in War, we see that he leaves his comparative-historical 377 method in the background to concentrate all his attention on Christianity (as already 378 suggested in the title). The analysis on this point becomes more precise, and Mandeville makes a 380 distinction between the religion of the Gospels and the religion of the priests. The 381 religion of the Gospels is Christianity as it was shaped in the first two centuries, 382 while the religion of the priests is the result of the transformation that it underwent 383 as an official state religion. The religion of the Gospels is the first Christians' set of 384 original values, values that are incompatible with the possibility of the institution of 385 a society, while the religion of the priests is the adaptation that those values went 386 through in time so that Christianity may survive.

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In the Beginning of Christianity, and whilst the Gospel was explain'd without any Regard to 388 Wordly Views, to be a Soldier was thought inconsistent with the Profession of a Christian; 389 but this Strictness of the Gospel-Principles began to be disapproved in the Second Century.

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The Divines of those Days were most of them become arrant Priests, and saw plainly, that 391 a Religion, which would not allow its Votaries to assist at Courts or Armies, and comply 392 with the vain World, could never made National; consequently, the Clergy of it could never 393 acquire any considerable Power upon Earth. In Spirituals they were the Successors of the 394 Apostles, but in Temporals they wanted to succeed the Pagan Priests, whose Possessions  The problem posed by Mandeville has therefore a dual nature: on one hand there 402 is the impossibility to conciliate the message of the Gospels with social usefulness 403 (a polemic against the deists); on the other hand, we have the churches' hypocrisy, 404 about which Mandeville makes no distinction between Catholics and Protestants, 405 who would like to make their religion, Christianity, worldly rather than unworldly. 36 406 The distinction between religion of the Gospels and religion of the priests 407 has therefore the function to highlight the contrast between Christian values in 408 themselves and their political exploitation.

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If we go back for a moment to the Baylean hypothesis of the possible existence of 410 a society of atheists, we see that Mandeville follows Bayle's thesis and states that a 411 society of virtuous Christians cannot exist, as Christian values are incompatible with 412 the development of a rich and powerful society («Religion is one Thing, and Trade is 413 another» 37 ). As for a society that is neither rich nor powerful, that would be doomed 414 in the game of international competition: «T'enjoy the World's Conveniencies,/ Be 415 fam'd in War, yet live in Ease,/ Without great Vices, is a vain/ Eutopia seated in 416 the Brain./ [ : : : ] Bare Virtue can't make Nations live/ in Splendor; they, that would 417 revive/ A Golden Age, must be as free,/ For Acorns, as for Honesty» (Mandeville 418 1924a, 36-37). Mandeville, therefore, states that Christianity does not constitute a social binding 420 agent, but must instead adapt to worldly needs. In Mandeville's perspective the real 421 social binding agent is honour, 38 that is the set of those values that satisfy the true 422 innate passion of human nature which is self-liking, defined as the desire to be 423 esteemed. 39 424

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The third level of analysis of the religious phenomenon deals with the negative 426 effects of churches from a political perspective. While Mandeville's reflection 427 on religion is rather cautious, often disguising his real positions, his analysis of 428 the secular power outright shows his anticlericalism. The clergy are accused of 429 favouring radical positions and of being responsible of the schisms and persecutions 430 in English history. In Free Thoughts, for example, we read that «the Doctrine of 431 CHRIST plainly forbids Malice, Hatred and Revenge, and every where exhorts us 432 to Meakness, Patience, Humility, Peace and Charity to all Men, so a Christian, who 433 is really such, can never hate others upon any religious Account, tho' they were 434 Mahometans or Pagans» (Mandeville 2001, 22). Consequently «Religion is not the 435 Cause of the unhappy Breaches, that divide Great Britain; and that therefore all 436 Divines of what Perswasion soever, who would insinuate the contrary to us, and 437 perverting the Word of GOD, make a handle of it to breed Quarrels and Animosities, 438 or any way disturb the publick Peace, are evil Teachers and Seducers of the People» 439 (Mandeville 2001, 22). 440 Mandeville states that there is no Christian principle that a skillful politician 441 cannot exploit for anti-Christian aims. In this perspective, all churches must be 442 considered impostures and this explains Mandeville's open anti-clericalism. A 443 common mistake that is made while judging the clergy is to believe that priests 444 are better than ordinary men, instead «we ought to consider, that Clergy men are 445 made of the same Mould, and have the same corrupt Nature with other Men; that 446 they were born with the same Infirmities, and that consequently they were subject 447 to the same Passions, and liable to the same Temptations» (Mandeville 2001, 153). 448 Mandeville insists:  39 Mandeville thinks that the secular advantages of religion more modestly consists «in Promises of Allegiance and Loyalty, and all solemn Engagements and Asseverations, in which the invisible Power, that, in every Country, is the Object of the Publick Worship, is invoked or appeal'd to. For these Purpose all Religions are equally serviceable; and the worst is better than none: For without the Belief of an invisible Cause, no Man's Word is to be relied upon, non Vows or Protestations can be depended upon» (Mandeville 1990, 23-24). Bayle had already sustained that only by controlling children's upbringing since 455 infancy the church had managed to make the strangest ideas acceptable, such as 456 trinity or transubstantiation, and that no adult brought up outside Christianity would 457 ever have accepted ideas so openly unreasonable. 40  to be thought on his Matrimony, which we can't enter into without them. In Sickness they 465 come to Comfort us, and claim a Right to examine our Consciences when we are in Health.

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They still visit us on our Death-Beds, even when the Physician has left us; and, after we 467 have taken our leaves of them and the whole World, they won't yet part with us before they 468 have seen us in the Grave. (Mandeville 2001, 156) 469 The political solution identified by Mandeville in Free Thoughts consists in 470 proposing a national church that allows a broad internal tolerance. 41 Such a proposal 471 substantially "de-socialises religion", making the church irrelevant on a social 472 and political level. M. Emanuela Scribano showed how, at the beginning of the 473 eighteenth-century the defence of religious tolerance took the shape of a war against 474 the power of the church and, in particular, against the threat of an alliance between 475 the High church and the Tories' reactionary fringes, part of which was very close 476 to the Jacobites (Scribano 1980, 47-74). In the past many proposals had been 477 advanced against this threat, but two main attitudes could be identified: that of 478 the Latitudinarians, who conceived a single comprehensive church encompassing 479 conceptions even quite different among them, and that of Independents, who AQ4 480 advocated a multiplicity of churches, all equally subordinated to the civil power. 481 Mandeville's position is neither, but can be seen as a sort of compromise. He 482 advances the idea of a national church with a few privileges, such as exemption from 483 taxes on its income or control of temples and public schools (Mandeville 2001, 141-484 142). At the same time though, these privileges must not interfere with the existence 485 40 See Mandeville 2001, 55-56: «There is hardly a Truth more convinc'd of, than that Two and Two make Four: Yet were Men to be taught from their Infancy that it was a Mystery, that on a certain occasion Two and Two made Seven, with an addition to be believ'd on pain of Damnation, I am perswaded, that at least Seven in Ten would swallow the shameful Paradox, and that if they had always seen others ill treated for disbelieving of it, by that they were come to Years of Maturity, they would not only assert it themselves, but likewise dislike, if not hate those, who should call it in question. We must suppose, that it had been inculcated to them with Application and Assiduity by Parents, Nurses, Masters, and all that had the Tuition of, or any direction over them». 41 On the historical context in which Free Thoughts appeared, see Scribano 1980, 11- The central point of Mandeville's thesis about religion and politics is the idea 518 that the clergy must be controlled by the state. The Dutch physician adopted many 519 of the points of freethinkers and deists, in particular the idea that there isn't a 520 single interpretation of the Scriptures and the consequent fallibilistic conception, 521 the criticism of fanaticism, the necessity of a national religion, and the conviction 522 42 In truth, Mandeville, in polemic, states that even persecution can safeguard peace and safety but only in those cases where the church is capable to nip in the bud any dissent, as is the case in a few catholic countries. See   that the clergy must be kept under control by lay people. The proposal he makes 523 in Free Thoughts is that of a nation with a national Church in which the clergy act 524 as if they were social civil servants. The model he proposes is that of Holland, 525 where all the clergy, not just that of the official church, are paid by the State, 526 respect the government's absolute authority and do not interfere in political matters. 527 Furthermore «they are allow'd to inveigh against Sin and the Vices of great Men, 528 as much as they please, without pointing at particular Persons» (Mandeville 2001, 529 158). 530 Mandeville, therefore, takes from Bayle the rehabilitation of the atheists and 531 seems to suggest, in a few passages, that a society without a religion would perhaps 532 be less vulnerable to internal conflicts; but his basic conviction is that religion, being 533 an anthropological need, cannot be erased from human society. Civil power must 534 acknowledge that and act consequently: «No Discourses nor even Prayers, which 535 have the least tendency to Sedition, should be suffer'd in any Assembly:'Tis the 536 business of a careful Ministry to look into these Matters, and the least Conventicle 537 ought no to be neglected» (Mandeville 2001, 141). In conclusion, religion can act in 538 two different ways: on one hand, it can constitute one of the main reasons of internal 539 unrest; on the other, Mandeville is aware of the opportunity that may arise from the 540 manipulation of religious feelings for political purposes.

541
This ambiguity, highlighted earlier more than once, is well expressed by Man-542 deville himself in An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour where he discusses the 543 political function of religion and clergy in case of war:

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In all Wars it is an everlasting Maxim in Politicks, that whenever Religion can be brought 545 into the Quarrel, it ought never to be neglected, and that how small soever the Difference 546 may be between the contending Parties, the Divines on each Side, ought to magnify and 547 make the most of it; for Nothing is more comfortable to Men, than the Thought, that their  559 Mandeville states that all the motives for human actions can be explained with two 560 human passions: self-liking and fear, and that reason and rational principles have no 561 impact on human behaviour. Atheism and religion are not explained by Mandeville 562 in moralistic terms, but in psychological ones. Faith is not a matter of rational choice 563 or predestination, but is a psychological response to fear of invisible things or fear of 564 death. An atheist is one who overcomes this fear and does not conform to the socially 565 accepted explanations for life mysteries. A society of virtuous atheists would be 566 hypothetically possible, because society is based on honour and law, not on religion, 567 but in reality it cannot exist because religion is the answer to an innate passion. 568 Religion therefore is not necessary to society, but it is necessary to man. It is on this 569 point that Mandeville more explicitly differs from Bayle, as it clearly emerges from 570 this passage that seems to refer directly to him: «But whatever Philosophers and 571 Men of Letters may have advanced, there never was an Age or a Country where the 572 Vulgar would ever come into an Opinion that contradicted that Fear, which all Men 573 are born with, of an invisible Cause, that meddles and interferes in Human Affairs» 574 (Mandeville 1990, 27).

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In Mandeville's perspective, religion is a natural need and therefore a society of 576 atheists cannot exist. He advocates an Erastian model of Church, subordinated to the 577 political power, in which religion is relegated to the private sphere and the clergy 578 are kept under strict control by the state.