

The Concept of Organization

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In recent years a good deal of the very best sociological work has been devoted to the study of organization. Although the term, organization, belongs to the category of expressions about which there is maintained an air of informed vagueness, certain special conventions exist that focus its use, with qualifications, on a delimited set of phenomena. In accordance with these conventions, the term applies correctly to stable associations of persons engaged in concerted activities directed to the attainment of specific objectives. It is thought to be a decisive characteristic of such organizations that they are deliberately instituted relative to these objectives. Because organizations, in this sense, are implementing and implemented programs of action that involve a substantial dose of comprehensive and rational planning, they are identified as instances of formal or rational organization in order to differentiate them from other forms.¹

It has been one of the most abiding points of interest of modern organizational research to study how well the programmatically intended formal structures of organizations describe what is going on within them, and what unintended, unprogrammed, and thus informal structures tend to accompany them.

How do sociologists go about distinguishing the facts of formal organization from the facts of informal organization? There seem to be two things that matter in the ways this distinction is drawn. There is, in the first place, a certain scholarly tradition in which the distinction is rooted. It dates back to Pareto's definition of rationality, Tönnies' typology, Cooley's concept of primary-group, and – tracing through the seminal achievement of the Hawthorn studies – the tradition is very much alive today. Being steeped in this line of scholarship allows a sociologist to claim his colleagues' consent to the decisions he makes. In this way the distinction is a fact of life in sociological inquiry, and perceiving it correctly is a trademark of

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professional competence. Although this is undoubtedly a potent factor in many decisions, it does not furnish a clear-cut rule for the distinction.²

The rule, which is the second consideration, can be stated as follows: In certain presumptively identified fields of action, the observed stable patterns of conduct and relations can be accounted for by invoking some *programmatic constructions* that define them prospectively. Insofar as the observed stable patterns match the dispositions contained in the program they are instances of formal organizational structure. Whereas, if it can be shown that the program did not provide for the occurrence of some other observed patterns which seem to have grown spontaneously, these latter belong to the domain of the informal structures.

Despite its apparent cogency, the rule is insufficient. The programmatic construction is itself a part of the presumptively identified field of action, and thus the sociologist finds himself in the position of having borrowed a concept from those he seeks to study in order to describe what he observes about them.

In general, there is nothing wrong with borrowing a common-sense concept for the purposes of sociological inquiry. Up to a certain point it is, indeed, unavoidable. The warrant for this procedure is the sociologist's interest in exploring the common-sense perspective. The point at which the use of common-sense concepts becomes a transgression is where such concepts are expected to do the analytical work of theoretical concepts. When the actor is treated as a permanent auxiliary to the enterprise of sociological inquiry at the same time that he is the object of its inquiry, there arise ambiguities that defy clarification. Now, if the idea of formal structure is basically a common-sense notion, what role can it have in sociological inquiry?

1. THE THEORETICAL SENSE OF FORMAL STRUCTURES OF ORGANIZATION

In an influential essay published fifteen years ago, Philip Selznick explicitly addressed the problem of the theoretical significance of formal constructions by relating them, as facts of life, to functional imperatives of organizations conceived as cooperative-adaptive systems.³ Arguing along the lines of structural-functional analysis, he showed convincingly why 'formal administrative design can never adequately or fully reflect the concrete organization to which it refers,' but is nevertheless a relevant element in the sociological study of organizations. In his view, the design represents that particular conception of organization which management technicians seek to explicate. Even though there may attach to these explications some descriptive or analytic intent, they are primarily active elements of the concrete phenomenon of organization rather than disinterested statements about it. As such, the presence of rational organizational design in social systems

of action is a source of tension and dilemma. These consequences arise out of the 'recalcitrance of the tools of action,' relative to the 'freedom of technical or ideal choice' reflected in plans and programs.

It is important to note that in this new and rich context the old conception of formal organization, which is traceable to Max Weber, remained intact. Together with Weber, Selznick assumes that the formal structures represent an ideally possible, but practically unattainable state of affairs. While Weber outlined the contents of the normative idealization in general terms, Selznick pointed out that the normative idealization, to be an effective source of restraint, must be constantly adapted to the impact of functional imperatives of social systems. Thus he furnished the necessary theoretical argument for an entire field of sociological investigations by directing attention to a sphere of adaptive and cooperative manipulations, and to the tensions typically found in it.

Despite the gain, the argument retains a certain theoretical short circuit. While Selznick quite clearly assigns the formal schemes to the domain of sociological data, he does not explore the full range of consequences arising out of this decision. By retaining Weber's conception of them as normative idealizations, Selznick avoids having to consider what the constructions of rational conduct mean to, and how they are used by, persons who have to live with them from day to day. It could be, however, that the rational schemes appear as unrealistic normative idealizations only when one considers them literally, i.e., without considering some tacit background assumptions that bureaucrats take for granted.

In the following we shall endeavor to show that the literal interpretation of formal schemes is not only inappropriate but, strictly speaking, impossible. We shall further show that the tacit assumptions are not simply unspecified, but instead come to the fore only on occasions of actual reference to the formal scheme. Finally, we shall argue that the meaning and import of the formal schemes must remain undetermined unless the circumstances and procedures of its actual use by actors is fully investigated.

2. CRITIQUE OF WEBER'S THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY

We shall introduce our argument by considering Weber's work critically because the short circuit in theorizing occurred first in his work and because most contemporary research in formal organization claims to stand in some sort of relationship to the definitions formulated by him. We shall be discussing the theory of bureaucracy as the most general case of many possible, more specific, rational schemes. But what we say about the general form is applicable to such specific

instances as manuals of operations, tables of organization or programs of procedure.

Weber used the concept of organization to refer to a network of authority distribution.⁴ As is well known, he asserted that such a network may be said to exist when and insofar as there prevails a high degree of correspondence between the substance of commands and conditions favoring compliance with them. Confining our interest to bureaucracy, we note that the condition favoring compliance with its authority lies in its acceptance as being efficient.⁵ From this premise, pure bureaucracy obtains when the principle of technical efficiency is given overriding priority above all other considerations. The ideal type of bureaucracy is, consequently, the product of ostensibly free conceptual play with this principle.

To say, however, that the resulting scheme is a meaningful conceptualization indicates that the ideal of efficiency is exercised over a domain of objects and events that are known to exist and that are known to possess independent qualities of their own. The efficiency principle merely selects, identifies, and orders those existing elements of a scene of action that are perceived as related to it. The relevance of the known qualities of things becomes very apparent when one considers that it must be at least possible for them to be related in ways that the idealization stipulates. What sorts of things are taken for granted may vary, but it is not possible to have any rational construction of reality that does not rest on some tacit assumptions.⁶

It could be said that this is not an unusual state of affairs. In scientific inquiry it is always the case that in order to assert anything one must leave some things unsaid. Such unsaid things stand under the protection of the *ceteris paribus* clause. The use of this clause is, however, restricted and its contents are always open to scrutiny.⁷

When one lifts the mantle of protection from the unstated presupposition surrounding the terms of Weber's theory of bureaucracy one is confronted with facts of a particular sort. These facts are not sociological data, or even theoretically defensible hypotheses. Instead, one is confronted with a rich and ambiguous body of background information that normally competent members of society take for granted as commonly known. In its normal functioning this information furnishes the tacit foundation for all that is explicitly known, and provides the matrix for all deliberate considerations without being itself deliberately considered. While its content can be raised to the level of analysis, this typically does not occur. Rather, the information enters into that commonplace and practical orientation to reality which members of society regard as 'natural' when attending to their daily affairs. Since the explicit terms of the theory are embedded in this common-sense orientation, they cannot be understood without tacit reference to

it. If, however, the theorist must be persuaded about the meaning of the terms in some prior and unexplicated way, there then exists collusion between him and those about whom he theorizes. We call this unexplicated understanding collusive because it is a hidden resource, the use of which cannot be controlled adequately.

Some examples will help to clarify this point. Consider the term 'employee'. There is little doubt that Weber presupposed, rather than neglected, a whole realm of background information in using it. Certainly employees must be human beings of either the male or female sex, normally competent adults rather than children, and in many ways familiar types of persons whose responsiveness, interests, inclinations, capacities and foibles are in a basic sense known as a matter of course. All this information is obvious, of course, but does not by any means coincide with the scientifically demonstrable or even scientifically tenable. Rather, the full meaning of the term 'employee,' as it is used in the theory of bureaucracy, refers to that understanding of it which fully franchised persons in society expect from one another when they converse on matters of practical import. That is, insofar as the term refers meaningfully to some determinate object, it does so only in the context of actors making common sense of it in consequential situations.

Let us consider the ideal of efficiency itself. While Weber is quite clear in stating that the sole justification of bureaucracy is its efficiency, he provides us with no clear-cut guide on how this standard of judgement is to be used. Indeed, the inventory of features of bureaucracy contains not one single item that is not arguable relative to its efficiency function. Long-range goals cannot be used definitively for calculating it because the impact of contingent factors multiplies with time and makes it increasingly difficult to assign a determinate value to the efficiency of a stably controlled segment of action. On the other hand, the use of short-term goals in judging efficiency may be in conflict with the ideal of economy itself. Not only do short-term goals change with time and compete with one another in indeterminate ways, but short-term results are of notoriously deceptive value because they can be easily manipulated to show whatever one wishes them to show.⁸ Clearly, what Weber had in mind when speaking about efficiency was not a formally independent criterion of judgement but an ideal that is fully attuned to practical interests as these emerge and are pursued in the context of every-day life. The standard itself and the correct way to use it are, therefore, a part of the selfsame order of action that they purport to control. The power and right to judge some procedure as more or less efficient require the same kind of sensitivity, responsiveness and competence that using the procedure presupposes in the first place. Only those who have serious business in doing what must be done are also franchised to judge it.

Weber, of course, intended to achieve an idealized reconstruction of organization from the perspective of the actor. He fell short of attaining this objective precisely to the extent that he failed to explore the underlying common-sense presuppositions of his theory. He failed to grasp that the meaning and warrant of the inventory of the properties of bureaucracy are inextricably embedded in what Alfred Schutz called the attitudes of every-day life and in socially sanctioned common-sense typifications.⁹

Thus, if the theory of bureaucracy is a theory at all, it is a refined and purified version of the actor's theorizing. To the extent that it is a refinement and purification of it, it is, by the same token, a corrupt and incomplete version of it; for it is certainly not warranted to reduce the terms of common-sense discourse to a lexicon of culturally coded significances to satisfy the requirements of theoretical postulation. This is the theoretical shortcut we mentioned at the beginning of our remarks.

3. THE STUDY OF THE CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATION AS A COMMON-SENSE CONSTRUCT

Plucked from its native ground, i.e., the world of common sense, the concept of rational organization, and the schematic determinations that are subsumed under it, are devoid of information on how its terms relate to facts. Without knowing the structure of this relationship of reference, the meaning of the concept and its terms cannot be determined.

In this situation an investigator may use one of three research procedures. He can, for one thing, proceed to investigate formal organization while assuming that the unexplicated common-sense meanings of the terms are adequate definitions for the purposes of his investigation. In this case, he must use that which he proposes to study as a resource for studying it.

He can, in the second instance, attach to the terms a more or less arbitrary meaning by defining them operationally. In this case, the relationship of reference between the term and the facts to which it refers will be defined by the operations of inquiry. Interest in the actor's perspective is either deliberately abandoned, or some fictitious version of it is adopted.

The investigator can, in the last instance, decide that the meaning of the concept, and of all the terms and determinations that are subsumed under it, must be discovered by studying their use in real scenes of action by persons whose competence to use them is socially sanctioned.

It is only the last case which yields entirely to the rule specifying the relevance of the perspective of the actor in sociological inquiry. This is so because in order to understand the meaning of the actor's thought and action, which Weber sought,

one must study how the terms of his discourse are assigned to real objects and events by normally competent persons in ordinary situations.

Insofar as the procedures and considerations actors invoke in relating terms of rational common-sense construction to things in the world exhibit some stable properties, they may be called a method. It is, of course, not proper to assume that this method is identical with, or even similar to, the method of scientific inquiry. Garfinkel proposed that in order to differentiate the study of this method from the study of the methods of scientific inquiry it be called ethnomethodology.¹⁰

In the following we shall propose in brief outline a program of inquiry which takes as its object of interest the study of the methodical use of the rational constructions subsumed under the concept of organization. We shall also present examples of this program. The concept itself and its methodical use are, of course, defined as belonging entirely to the domain of facts.

We must emphasize that our interest is in outlining a program of inquiry, not in producing a theory of organization. It has to be this way because the inquiry cannot get under way without first employing the very sensibilities that it seeks to study, i.e., the common-sense outlook. At the outset the phenomenon or organization comes to our attention in just the way it comes to the attention of any normal member of our linguistic community. Even as we turn to the investigation of the common-sense presuppositions in which it is embedded, and from which it derives its socially sanctioned sense, other common-sense presuppositions will continue to insinuate themselves into our thinking and observation. The important point in the proposed study is that we must be prepared to treat every substantive determination we shall formulate as a case for exploring the background information on which it in turn rests.

By way of defining our task we propose that *the study of the methodical use of the concept of organization seeks to describe the mechanisms of sustained and sanctioned relevance of the rational constructions to a variety of objects, events and occasions relative to which they are invoked.*

In order to free ourselves progressively from the encumbrance of presumptive understanding we shall take two preliminary measures. First, the author of the rational scheme, typically the managerial technician who deals with organization in the 'technical sense,' will not be treated as having some sort of privileged position for understanding its meaning. By denying him the status of the authoritative interpreter we do not propose to tamper with the results of his work in the least. From our point of view he is merely the toolsmith. It seems reasonable that if one were to investigate the meaning and typical use of some tool, one would not want to be confined to what the toolmaker has in mind.

Second, we will not look to the obvious or conspicuous meaning of the expressions used in the scheme to direct us to objects and events which they

identify. Rather, we will look for the way the scheme is brought to bear on whatever happens within the scope of its jurisdiction. The consequence of this step is that the question of what the scheme selects and neglects is approached by asking how certain objects and events meet, or are made to meet, the specifications contained in the scheme.

After denying the technician and his scheme the authority to organize the field of observation for the sociologist, the question of how they, nevertheless, organize it in some other sense is open for investigation.

If one suspends the presumptive notion that a rational organizational scheme is a normative idealization with a simple import, i.e., demanding literally what it says it demands; and if one views a rational organizational scheme without information about what it is ostensibly meant to be, then it emerges as a *generalized formula to which all sorts of problems can be brought for solution*. In this sense there is no telling what determinations a formal organizational scheme contains prior to the time that questions are actually and seriously addressed to it.

More important than the open capacity and applicability of the formula is, however, the fact that *problems referred to the scheme for solution acquire through this reference a distinctive meaning that they would not otherwise have*. Thus the formal organizational designs are schemes of interpretation that competent and entitled users can invoke in yet unknown ways whenever it suits their purposes. The varieties of ways in which the scheme can be invoked for information, direction, justification, and so on, without incurring the risk of sanction, constitute the scheme's methodical use. In the following we propose to discuss some examples of possible variations in the methodical use of organizational rationalities.

4. EXAMPLES OF VARIATION IN THE METHODICAL USE OF THE CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATION

A. THE GAMBIT OF COMPLIANCE¹¹

As we have noted earlier, the concept of rational organization is often regarded by sociologists and management technicians as a normative idealization. Even though one finds only 'is' and 'is not' in the substantive determination, there attaches the sense of 'ought' to the entire scheme.

Conceived as a rule of conduct, the concept of organization is defined as having some determining power over action that takes place under the scope of its jurisdiction. This power to produce an intended result is uncertain and depends for its effectiveness on complex structural conditions. Hence, research informed by the conception of organization as a rule of conduct will seek to procure

estimates of its effectiveness, and will relate the findings to factors that favor or mitigate against compliance. All such research is necessarily based on the assumption that the relationship of correspondence between the rule and the behaviors that are related to it is clear. A cursory consideration of the significance of rules as social facts reveals, however, that their meaning is not exhausted by their prospective sense. Aside from determining the *occurrence* of certain responses under suitable conditions, rules are also invoked to clarify the *meaning* of actions retrospectively. For example, one knows what a driver of an automobile signaling intent to make a left turn is doing in the middle of an intersection because one knows the rule governing such procedures. Indeed, it is a readily demonstrable fact that a good deal of the sense we make of the things happening in our presence depends on our ability to *assign them* to the phenomenal sphere of influence of some rule. Not only do we do this but we count on it happening. That this is so is richly documented in the work of Goffman who has shown how persons conduct themselves in such a way as to enable observers to related performances to normative expectation.

When we consider the set of highly schematic rules subsumed under the concept of rational organization, we can readily see an open realm of free play for relating an infinite variety of performances to rules as responses to these rules. In this field of games of representation and interpretation, the rule may have the significance of informing the competent person about the proper occasion and form for doing things that could probably never be divined from considering the rule in its verbal form. Extending to the rule the respect of compliance, while finding in the rule the means for doing whatever needs to be done, is the gambit that characterizes organizational acumen.

We propose that we must proceed from the theoretical clarification of the essential limitation of formal rules achieved by Selznick to the investigation of the limits of maneuverability within them, and to the study of the skill and craftsmanship involved in their use, and to a reconsideration of the meaning of the strict obedience in the context of varied and ambiguous representation of it. This recommendation is, however, not in the interest of accumulating more materials documenting the discrepancy between the lexical meaning of the rule and events occurring under its jurisdiction, but in order to attain a grasp of the meaning of the rules as common-sense constructs from the perspective of those persons who promulgate and live with them.

B. THE CONCEPT OF FORMAL ORGANIZATION AS A MODEL OF STYLISTIC UNITY

It is often noted that the formal organization meets exigencies arising out of the complexity and large scope of an enterprise. The rationally conceived form orders

affiliations between persons and performances that are too remote for contingent arrangement, by linking them into coherent maps or schedules. The integration transcends what might result from negotiated agreements between contiguous elements, and lends to elements that are not within the sphere of one another's manipulative influence the character of concerted action. As a consequence of this, however, each link derives its meaning not so much from the specific rule that determines it, but from the entire order of which the rule itself is a part. Each link is intrinsically a member of a chain or fabric of links which conducts a reproducible theme. In this context, many specific instances or elements can be compared with each other as variations of a single pattern. For example, a simple polarization of authority pervades the whole order of an organization and can be found as a redundant thematic focus in many segments of it. A rational principle of justice may prevail in the entire structure while governing differentially correct associations between particular performances and rewards. The varieties of demeanors that are appropriate to a particular status within the system may be perceived as variations of a more general pattern.

We are suggesting the possibility of a principle of discipline that derives from the formal style of the rational scheme and which works against centrifugal tendencies and heterogeneity. The resulting coherence will be in evidence as outwardly proper conduct and appearance. One would then ask how the sensibility of esthetic appreciation is summoned for direction, information and control in various concrete situations. The dominant consideration underlying this construction would not be found in the fields of means-ends relations but in an all-pervading sense of piety (i.e., in accordance with Burke's definition of the term, a sure-footed conviction of 'what properly goes with what').¹²

The question whether the syntactic composition of the formal scheme is the leading metaphor for the interpretation of the composition of actual performances and relations is obviously difficult to investigate. A tentative approach may be in the investigation of ties and performances that appeal to bureaucrats as incongruous or in bad taste, and the study of those observed proprieties and tolerated licenses that are restricted to 'on the job' circumstances. In further development the problem could lead to experimental studies. For example, the features of the stylistically normal could be studied by having subjects perform tasks that are not related or even contrary to their routine activities. The subjects would be induced to perform these tasks under the gaze of their work associates, and would be penalized for attracting attention and rewarded for remaining unnoticed.

C. THE CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATION AS CORROBORATIVE REFERENCE

There is another problem which is related to the problem of stylistic unity. A large-scale and complex organization is often composed of fragmented tasks and relations that are not capable of acquiring a phenomenal identity of their own or, at least, it is thought to be extremely difficult to value them for their intrinsic merits. Whether it is enough to relate these tasks to work obligations, and whether work requires any corroboration of worth beyond pointing to its market price is an open question. If it does, however, the formal scheme could be invoked to attest to it.

When from the perspective of a fragmentary involvement the actual contingent outcome of one's work cannot be appraised, or appears senseless, then it can be understood and judged in terms of its over-all functional significance by invoking the formal scheme. For example, mismanagement and waste could be defined as merely accidental or perhaps even justified, relative to the total economy of the enterprise. This consideration of the formal scheme not only persuades the participants of some correct or corrected value of their duties, but can also be used as a potent resource for enforcing prohibitions when interest dictates that such prohibitions should be justified.

In this construction, the formal scheme is used as a resource for bringing anything that happens within an organization under the criterion of success or failure when real results are not visible, or must be discredited. This is not a simple matter, of course, because the scheme does not promote a single ideal of economy but specifies a field of economy in which various aspects of an operation may compete for priority. For example, in an industrial enterprise certain ways of doing things may have one value relative to interest in production and an altogether different value relative to interest in maintenance. The problem that requires investigation is how various evaluations can be used as credits, and what sorts of credits have the consequence of assimilating some partial performance closer to the larger enterprise. The investigation of this problem would reveal the negotiable relationship between policy and politics.

CONCLUSION

We have cited the gambit of compliance, stylistic unity, and corroborative reference merely as examples of the possible methodical use of the concept of organization by *competent* users. The examples are based on reflections about ethnographic materials depicting life in large-scale and formally programmed organizations.¹³ We have indicated earlier that such formulations must be regarded as preliminary at best. Whether what we have tentatively called the reference

through the sensibility of esthetic appreciation exists effectively or not, is a matter to be decided by empirical research. Without doubt, these suggestions will have to be revised and amplified, but they must suffice to illustrate the ethnomethodological study of rational organization.

In conclusion, we should like to mention that there remains for this inquiry one more problem that we have mentioned in passing but have not discussed adequately. We have noted that the methodical use of the concept of organization must be studied by observing competent users. We mean, of course, socially recognized competence. Consequently it is not within the prerogative of the researcher to define competence. Instead, while he looks for the right way to use the rationalities subsumed under the concept of organization, he must also be looking for the rules governing the right to use the concept.

NOTES

1. These characteristics are generally noted when the task is to identify real instances of 'formal organization.' Cf. Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies* (New York: Free Press, 1960), pp. 16–96; Amitai Etzioni, *Complex Organizations* (New York: Free Press, 1961); P. M. Blau and W. R. Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Chandler Publications, Inc., 1962). Various authors have studied such organizations in ways that seem to disregard the identifying characteristics, or subordinate them to other interests. To study a phenomenon while suspending the relevance of that feature by which it is recognized is not an unusual procedure, though it produces peculiar problems. G. E. Moore and Edmund Husserl have explored these problems from substantially different perspectives.

2. It should not be thought that such grounds are wholly particular to the procedures of sociological inquiry. The distinguished physical chemist, G. N. Lewis pointed out that a traditional conception of causality has led to an arbitrary interpretation of Maxwell's equations with the consequent development of a special electromagnetic theory of light. On purely theoretical grounds an entirely different development was equally justified and did occur later, making possible the development of quantum electrodynamics. See G. J. Whitrow, *The Natural Philosophy of Time* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), pp. 25–35.

3. Philip Selznick, 'Foundations of the Theory of Organization,' *American Sociological Review*, 13 (1948), pp. 25–35.

4. Unfortunately there exists some confusion on this point. Weber himself uses the term organization as we have stated, cf. 'Herrschaft durch "Organisation,"' *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (4th edition by J. Winckelmann, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1954), Kapitel IX, Abschnitt I, #3. The German term 'Organisation' is translated by Shils and Rheinstein as 'organization' in M. Rheinstein, ed., *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society* (Cam-

bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), Ch. XII, sect. 3. On the other hand, Henderson and Parsons translate Weber's German term 'Betrieb' as 'organization.' The reason for this choice is that Weber's definition of 'Betrieb' coincides with Alfred Marshall's definition of 'organization' in economic theory. More important than the question of 'authenticity' is, however, the fact that Weber's statement on 'Betrieb' is almost never cited in modern organizational studies while his work on authority is widely used.

5. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, eds. and trans., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1948), pp. 214-216.

6. It has been proposed that this restriction extends to all types of rational constructions. For a critique of Russell's mathematical logic along these lines see M. J. Charlesworth, *Philosophy and Linguistic Analysis* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1959), Ch. 2.

7. Concerning the role of the *ceteris paribus* clause in economic analysis see Felix Kaufman, *Methodology of the Social Sciences* (New York: Humanities Press, 1958), Ch. XVI.

8. Cf. Mason Haire, 'What is Organized in an Organization?' Mason Haire, ed., *Organization Theory in Industrial Practice* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), especially pp. 8-10.

9. Alfred Schutz, 'Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Action,' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 14 (1953), pp. 1-38.

10. The term 'ethnomethodology' does not appear in Garfinkel's writings; he invented it, however, and uses it sometimes to refer to a program of inquiry that he has formulated; cf. his 'Common Sense Knowledge of Social Structures,' J. M. Scher, ed., *Theories of the Mind* (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 689-712; and 'Studies in the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities,' *Social Problems*, 11 (1964), pp. 225-250.

11. We should like to point out that this example corresponds to what Selznick suggests when he urges the study of the 'manipulation of the formal processes and structures in terms of informal goals.' *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

12. Kenneth Burke, *Permanence and Change* (2nd revised edit., Los Altos, Calif.: Hermes Publications, 1954), pp. 74 ff.

13. Some prominent examples of works containing excellent ethnographic descriptions of conduct in formal organizations are, Chester R. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938); F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939); Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949); Melville Dalton, *Men Who Manage* (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1959)