Journal article Open Access

Moore i semantyczna autonomia etyki [Moore and The Semantic Autonomy of Ethics], Principia 59-60 (2014)

Piotr Makowski

Among different types of autonomy of ethics (logical, semantic, epistemological, and metaphysical), semantic autonomy seems to be the most interesting. It is a thesis about irreducibility of meaning of ethical terms to some other types of discourse. The paper proposes an argument for the semantic autonomy of ethics, based on a detailed interpretation of the Open Question Argument by G.E. Moore (in his Principia Ethica), and followed up by the reading of Philippa Foot's argument about weak objectivity (intersubjectivity) of evaluative meaning of ethical terms. The result of investigation gives the two-fold picture of modern understanding of morality: (1) irrevisability of moral demands as attempted by any theoretical armchair endeavors, which are external to the moral practice, and (2) democratic intersubjectivity of moral discourse.

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