THE RELIGIOUS INTEREST.

IN accordance with the method of the extended discussions of a work¹ of which the matter of this paper forms a part, we may take up the psychological aspects of religion under the heading of "religious interest." By the term interest we mean to designate the larger mental dispositions in which the motives of experience and life organize themselves, in certain special directions, and terminate upon certain special classes of objects: the æsthetic interest terminating in art, the theoretical interest in truth, the practical interest in conduct and practical affairs. The inner organization or interest, on the one hand, stands over against the objective content, on the other hand, to which the interest gives form and intelligibility.

Considering religion as being in this sense one of the great interests of mankind, found at all stages of racial culture, and everywhere in individual practice, the aspects under which it may be discussed—and is currently discussed—may be distinguished for convenience as follows: (1) The religious experience; (2) the religious object and its meaning; (3) the development of religious meaning: its logic; (4) the social character of religion; (5) the sort of reality that religion discloses. These topics, except the last, are treated in the paragraphs that follow.² The unifying thread throughout will be seen to be the genetic point of view by which the topic is made part of the whole of the work mentioned.

I. THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

The religious interest is universally admitted to be one that is, so to speak, "pointed outward"; it always terminates upon an object found by it to be holy, sacred, divine. Apart from this object, the presence of which it assumes, the interest as such has distinct emotional and conative qualities not found in the

1. *Thought and Things or Genetic Logic*, vols. I-III. It is in the final volume (IV) that the religious interest is to be treated. Certain paragraphs of this paper reproduce in somewhat different form matter published from time to time in recent years in more special publications. The treatment given here serves to set the subordinate topics together in a larger view of the nature and development of the religious interest.

2. The publications to which reference is made in the preceding note are, following the numbers given to the different headings in the text: on (1), *Social and Ethical Interpretations* (1st ed. 1897); on (2) and (3), *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, art. "Religion (Psychology of)"; on (4), *Proc. Fourth Internat. Congress of the History of Religion*, Oxford, 1904, and *Darwin and the Humanities*, chap. vi.

individual's attitude toward any other sort of conscious object. These qualities persist as substantially the same throughout all the changes that the religious object undergoes—from totem to Zeus, let us say—representing an attitude which is, for consciousness itself, *sui generis*. There is a true religious disposition, on the part of the devotee, believer, or worshipper.

This response in the life of interest is present wherever there is the suggestion of "sacredness"; it is absent when the sacred is absent. The secular does not excite it; and the profane excites an opposing attitude of repulsion and avoidance toward that which produces a violation, injury or profanation of the sacred. Just what the "sacredness" means will concern us later on, in the discussion of the character of the sacred object itself.¹

The components of this interest or disposition—the emotional and active factors which enter into it—are described by different terms which, however, on the whole, serve to bring out a fair agreement among the writers who use them. The early analysis of Schleiermacher, reducing the emotional part of the religious experience to feelings of "dependence" and feelings of "awe" or reverence, has stood as substantially correct despite various verbal substitutions in the description. Paulsen, seeking a more psychological term, substitutes "trust" for dependence; while theological writers, emphasizing the intellectual, use "faith." Later sociological writers, seeing the matter more objectively, go back to the word "dependence." Likewise for "awe," different writers use different terms—reverence, fear, sense of mystery, respect, etc. But apart from these differences of verbal rendering, we may say that whatever the object may be toward which the religious attitude is taken up, there is the recognition in this object of a presence or force *worthy of respect and capable of giving aid*: it is *auguste et bienfaisante*.²

In the individual, the religious interest always shows these two great aspects; and they both develop noticeably with the development of the consciousness of personality, that is with the apprehen-

1. M. E. Durkheim (*La Vie religieuse*, 1912) makes the distinction between sacred (*sacré*) and secular (*profane*) the fundamental one, but does not distinguish, so far as I can find, the secular from the properly profane; he seems, however, by the word *profane*, to mean secular or *laïque* (as in the application of the term to "matter," *loc. cit.*, p. 613). The profane, properly speaking, is by no means the same thing as the secular or non-religious.

2. Durkheim, *loc. cit.*, p. 303. I cite in preference this new work of M. Durkheim, not only because it is recent and of high authority, but also because it is a work of detailed inductive research and of interpretation based upon facts (drawn from the totemic beliefs and practices of the Central Australian tribes). The full title is *Les Formes élémentaires de la Vie religieuse: le System Totémique en Australie* (Paris, Alcan, 1912).

sion of "self" and the correlative apprehension of other persons. I have elsewhere traced out this development in detail.¹ It preserves throughout—from the child's early physical dependence and appeal for help, to the high reflective sentiments of faith and praise for moral favours—its character as directed towards an object that is separate from the personal self, but in intimate physical and moral relation to it, and claiming a very special respect.²

As thus described, the religious interest, considered as a mass of organized human motives, reveals characters which mark it as being at once personal and social. Both the dependence and the respect which its object inspires are of the sort found peculiarly in social relationships: they are the same in kind as those directed toward persons. Religious dependence is not merely subjection to law, although its sanctions are external to the individual. Only in its crudest form, where it is a question whether, either in the child or in the savage, it should still be called religious,³ does the sense of dependence become mere fear, or religious worship mere recognition of authority or force. Similarly, the feeling of respect or reverence differs from the sentiment of the sublime in nature, on the one hand, and from respect for moral law, on the other hand. Moreover, the cult, in which these feelings take on active form, centres about a presence that sees, hears, sympathizes, blames, punishes—that enters, in short, into personal relations with the worshipper. Its elements are prayer, praise, thanksgiving, and sacrificial, intercessory, and other rites.

In the system of activities, and in the institutions in which these activities are performed and developed by many persons in common, religion shows again its unique character. It is true that emotion and interest have generally their appropriate active channels of expression, either native or acquired; but in religious rites and observance, we find not a mere direct and, so to put it, "causal" way of reacting upon the world—a means of accomplishing an end directly, such as throwing a stone to hit a bird—but an indirect, personal way, acting by means of suggestion, information, persuasion, confession—all the means by which one person is commonly approached by another. It makes use of all the refinements of the personal *rapprochement*, from simple spontaneous suggestion, on the part of the savage, to the most refined and sophisticated logical subtleties of the learned theologian.

It is extraordinary, moreover, that in religion, both the privacy of our inner experiences of value, and the publicity of social sanction

1. *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 4th ed., chap. viii, §5.

2. Spoken of more fully below.

3. British writers generally, notably Tylor (*Primitive Culture*) and Frazer (*The Golden Bough*, and *Totemism and Exogamy*) refuse to admit that these sentiments are religious.

and authority, seem to be at their highest, although perhaps, at different periods and with different adjustments of the motives involved. In the early pre-logical religious interest of primitive man, the externality of the sanction is brutally evident; the religious authority does not differ much from those other modes of social constraint with which it is bound up, and to which in many instances in itself appears to give rise. Here the element of privacy in the experience—the sense that the relation to God is special and personal to oneself—is at its lowest. Religion of this grade has been called “objective.” Its rites, prohibitions, benefits, values, are socially regulated, publicly measured, and enjoyed by many persons in common.

On the other hand, religious experience goes on to become “subjective.” The “religious consciousness” becomes the arbiter and judge in matters of belief and practice. The inter-subjective meaning of religion becomes that of a direct relation between the man and his god; and it loses something of the generalized or syntelic character so conspicuous in primitive religious practices. In the subjective religion of the logical consciousness, the religious allies itself with the ethical and absorbs its universal and synnomic force: one feels the duty of religion as one feels the duty of morality. But with it all the religious relation becomes more individual and less social. The flat “do not” of the savages’ “taboo,” and the equally arbitrary “do this” of the Ten Commandments, yields to the sympathetic “do this in remembrance of me,” of personal union and communion.¹

II. THE RELIGIOUS OBJECT: ITS PERSONAL MEANING.

There are two senses in which the term object may be employed in connection with an interest or disposition²: it may mean either,

1. It would seem to be at the two extremes of “objectivism” and “subjectivism” that those explosive and convulsive manifestations occur that give interesting variety to religious experience. The frenzy of the primitive religious dance is due to the public and collective suggestion and stimulation; as is also the fervour of the religious revival meeting. At the other extreme, the states of trance, ecstasy, prophetic mania, etc., in individuals, are instances of inner exaltation in which the communion with the deity and union with him lead to loss of personal identity with pathological nervous manifestations. These “variations,” treated interestingly by James (*The Varieties of Religious Experience*) are the accidents, so to speak, of religion.

2. There are, in fact, no less than four different senses in which the terms “object” and “objective” have been used in this connection, and their distinction from one another is essential: (1) the mere objective thing set up before the worshipper; this may be properly designated the religious “symbol” or “emblem”; (2) the entire objective meaning or presence, the spirit, force, or god, which the emblem stands for or symbolizes; this is,

on the one hand, the mere external thing, together with the symbols, ideas, etc., which describe or represent this thing; or, on the other hand, a further significance, meaning, or intent attaching to the thing, something symbolized or suggested. The distinction is a familiar one. Our interests always pour themselves, so to speak, over and around their objects and shape them into values, goods, or ends. The mere object becomes a symbol or emblem of the larger object of interest; the "thing of fact" suggests and symbolizes the "thing of desire" or will.

So far as the mere thing set up in the religious consciousness is concerned—the mere external symbol or emblem—it may be anything whatever. Actually it shows extraordinary variety in the different religions. A fetish, a totem, a churinga, a charm, a relic, a locality, a sound, an eclipse, an idol, a picture, things animate and things inanimate, may and do serve as objects of religious or quasi-religious veneration. It is clear, then, that it is not a particular thing as such, but some further value the thing possesses, that stirs the religious interest. The thing becomes a signal, sign, symbol, emblem, of the further signification in which this value resides.

The thing suggests the religious meaning; and the question arises, what is the religious meaning suggested? It is a meaning, we may say at the outset, appropriate to the sentiments which the object excites—dependence and respect, both coloured in consciousness with a personal quality. The object appropriate to these sentiments must be either a person or something that suggests personality so directly that a relation is established to which that of person to person appears to be the only available analogy. Let us look a little more closely at these two cases.

(1) The first is the case in which the religious object is a god, a deity, explicitly described as personal. In developed religions the gods are personal beings.

All the great religions of the world have personal gods.¹ This was announced in Zenophanes' famous saying that all men's gods were in form like themselves. The limiting case, on one side, would seem to be found in the speculative and hyperlogical systems in which concrete personality is, for one reason or another, left behind or denied. In the systems of speculative pantheism and high-reflective mysticism personality no longer appears. These,

properly speaking, the "religious object"; (3) the cause, social, psychological, or other, which produces the religious experience in the devotee; this may be called the "cause"; and (4) the real existence or reality which religion may be held to disclose, discover, or reveal: the "religious reality."

1. Buddhism (cited by Durkheim as an exception to this statement) was a religion after its founder was deified; whether it was a religion before that seems to involve just the point at issue.

however, can not make good the claim to be religious, since the sentiments they excite are no longer pure, and the active rites of religious practice become altogether irrelevant. One does not expect personal consideration from the "universal order," nor does one worship "pure reason" or "new thought." In passing from the religious state of mind to the theoretical and speculative, something is changed, the religious shading is lost.

(2) At the other extreme, there is another limiting case: the case of a stage of culture so primitive, that religion, like other institutions, is reduced to its lowest terms. The religious interest is focussed directly upon a physical thing, which seems to exhale no meaning beyond itself, no suggestion of personality. To this we return below; but here we may remark that the relation of person to person remains the only available analogy for the interpretation of the actual facts reported by the anthropologists. This appears both from certain positive considerations and from the negative one that no other hypothesis has the same grounding in facts.

The attempts to define religion in terms that exclude the personality of the object do so by citing the extreme cases mentioned. On the one hand, the object becomes an abstract principle. The gods of theistic religions become temporary, incomplete, or secondary embodiments of this principle, as in the "absolute religion" of the Hegelian metaphysics, or of impersonal force, as in the Stoic and modern Positivist theories. Religion is no longer a matter of religious experience; it becomes a category of absolute being, an effect of cosmic laws, or a postulate of social utility.¹

The other extreme case, that of the primitive cult, is cited principally by sociological writers, who in their search for the root-motive or simplest form of religion, seek for some character of sufficient generality to include impersonal as well as personal objects in the religious interest. A typical attempt of the kind is that which makes the mark of religion the "sacredness" by which the primitive man distinguishes the religious objects from other things: sacred things and events are religious, secular things and events are not so; there is a fundamental cleft between the secular and the sacred, extending through the whole of nature.² Both

1. Of course a metaphysical theory of religion is legitimate in its place, but it can not take the place of a definition of religious experience. Religion as cause or effect, as category or postulate, is not the religion of the devout state of mind. That which causes religious fervour may not be at all that towards which this fervour is directed.

2. This theory, announced some time ago by M. Durkheim ("De la Définition du Phénomène religieux," *Année Sociologique*, II, 1897), is developed in his work *La Vie religieuse*. In order to sharpen the issue, we may observe that, in English usage at least, sacred is a term of the widest import: all things subject to any degree of religious respect are "sacred"

sociology and psychology, one citing anthropological facts and the other the psychological manifestations of religious interest, demand an account of *sacredness*.

If we are to escape the mere tautology of saying that sacred things are religious because religious things are sacred, we must give some actual and distinctive content to the concept of the sacred. The task of both these sciences alike is to discover this distinctive content or meaning. Given the same material thing, why is it sacred in some circumstances and in other circumstances secular or profane?

The task assumed by the advocates of the theory just cited is to show that in some cases sacred things do not have the suggestion of personality, although in such cases these things are the object of a veneration or respect truly religious. The latter part of the theory is essential, since even though lacking personality, such things may prove to be merely the symbols or emblems of a further significance in which the suggestion of personality does enter.

It is just on this latter requirement, the second part of the task, that this theory suffers shipwreck. It has no difficulty in showing that in primitive religions, of the totemic grade, for example, objects in themselves quite impersonal—the thuringa, the written sign, the external thing bearing the totemic name, etc.—are held to be sacred. But it then fails to prove the further point requisite to the definition: the point that the entire meaning upon which the religious interest terminates is devoid of personal suggestion or intent. Either it fails to subject to an adequate psychological analysis the notion of personality at this stage of culture, or it fails to state positively what the actual impersonal meaning of religious sacredness is. In both of these directions an adequate analysis serves, in my opinion, to show that the religious object, even in totemism, is not without the marks of animation or life, and that it is, in a crude sense but still positively, *quasi-personal for the consciousness of the devotee himself*.

As to the meaning of the totem—it symbolizes the clan, as all authorities agree. The important members of the clan, the true members, are persons. After the persons of the clan, come particular animals (the totemic animal or plant itself being a species, not a particular one or more), and finally the things found in the totemic area. The true reality of which the totem is the emblem (akin, in the words of Durkheim, to the flag in civilized countries) is

(such as the vessels of the altar), while the gods themselves are not only sacred but "divine," and persons (especially priests, saints, etc.) and places most intimately associated with the gods or with religious ceremonial, are "holy." The sacred, therefore, is the most extended, but the least significant, of the three terms.

the human or, at most, a human-animal group.¹ Now in what sense can this group, as distinct from its individual members, be called impersonal? Is it true that, in becoming the symbol or emblem of a group the sign, itself generally a living species, acquires a meaning from which the essential attributes of the members of the group are omitted? If the savage, who probably does not think in terms of logical classes, but of affective and social groupings,¹ were asked what the totem was, he would point no doubt to individual persons or animals that shared the totemic name and "participated," in the words of M. Lévy-Bruhl, in its meaning.²

No doubt the constraint exercised upon the primitive man by society is not attributed by him to single members of the clan; but in locating it in the totem, does he give it an altogether impersonal representation? Rather we should agree with Durkheim in ascribing to the totem a generalized vital force. If so, the conclusion seems to follow that it suggests the animate, as an essential part of its meaning, and that it is therefore—as we are to show—in so far crudely personal.³ That is to say, it cannot be properly described as "impersonal."

1. In which (Durkheim, *loc. cit.*, p. 366) mythical ancestral personages also figure.

2. L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Les Fonctions mentales dans les Sociétés inférieures*. It would be difficult to maintain that, even for us with our logical notions, the concrete flag floating before us is entirely impersonal in its meaning. As a social emblem, it stimulates just those collective emotional dispositions that lie at the root of our sense of personality. The flag-meaning, apart from the mere number of flags denoted, is an affective and social, not a logical class.

3. A close examination of M. Durkheim's personal theory leads us to wonder somewhat at the use he makes of his resources. He makes the social *rapport* the cause of the psychical manifestations in which religious excitement shows itself in most passionate form (as at social festivals). But then he asserts that the religious sentiments thus caused do not turn toward the group itself as its object, but toward an emblem or symbol of an impersonal character standing for the group. He thus finds that the "cause" is in an indirect way also the "object" of religious emotion; but that this object has now lost the essential character by which it acted as cause—the character found in concrete social relationships or *rapport*—and with it all suggestion of personality. The first of these positions, *i.e.*, that the cause is also the object, is essential to his general theory. For he holds (*loc. cit.* pp. 295 and 606 ff.) that the object of religion is nothing but society itself (taking on, in developed religions, a pseudo-individual form in the deity or deities). But the second position mentioned just above—that the cause is not the same as the object (*loc. cit.* p. 597)—is necessary to his view that the religious object may be impersonal. Why not say instead that in this case—however it may be in other cases of psychological interest—the cause of the mental state is the same in kind as its object; and that the character of animation or crude vital force is, in the case of the totem, evidence of this. The theory would then, I think, "square" better with all the evidence; and there would be the additional important advantage that the continuity between primitive animistic and later anthropomorphic religions would not be interrupted.

It remains to make good the statement that the theory in question, which is typical in this respect of the theories of primitive religion hitherto in vogue, fails to give thorough analysis to the meaning of personality.¹ Without this any theory is incompetent to decide whether or not a given symbol or emblem, such as the totem, possesses the meaning of personality.²

A true statement of religious animism would recognize a development on the meaning of the soul-principle, which the savage

1. It is a current criticism of the British "animistic" school that their psychology is out of date and untrue. They are for the most part associationists, who find in the sense of personality a "notion" of the self, an "idea," having always the same meaning (see Lévy-Bruhl, *loc. cit.*, and Baldwin, *History of Psychology*, vol. i, London ed., p. 16).

2. Writers of the French school in turn deliberately court this criticism in resorting avowedly and almost exclusively to the objective or sociological, and in showing a certain inhospitality to the psychological, point of view. In the result, there is a dislocation of factors which a sound psychological analysis would have articulated (such as that pointed out in M. Durkheim's view). By the use of the term "représentation," as in the phrase *représentation collective*, for example, colour is lent to the view that the self is an "idea," "notion," or cognitive state; and this is aggravated by the objective statement of social relationships in which a certain relative isolation of the individuals is established, a gap over which the association process has to leap. It is held possible to substitute the idea of oneself for that of another, or to put oneself in the shoes of another, as in the theory of Adam Smith. This sort of intellectualism shows itself, I think, in M. Durkheim's denial of all suggestion of personality to the totem (see also, for another instance, his criticism of M. Lévy-Bruhl's "law of participation," in *La Vie religieuse*, pp. 339-342). The latter writer, M. Lévy-Bruhl, though more aware of the psychological aspects of such a problem, still fails to do them full justice; as is his statement that the difference between primitive and civilized mentality is one of "kind." It would take a great deal of psychological evidence to justify the assumption of a break in the genetic continuity of psychical process between primitive man—however primitive he might be—and civilized man. Moreover, the psychology of individual development presents evidence, open to all the world, which refutes such a supposition, even while it strikingly confirms the sociological facts upon which the inference is founded (cf. the Preface to my volume, "Interest and Art," vol. iii, of *Thought and Things*, pp. x ff.). The pre-logical and mystic thought of primitive man presents striking contrasts to that of civilized man, not (as Lévy-Bruhl intimates) because his mentality is different in kind, nor yet (as Durkheim holds) because primitive man uses the logical weapons unskilfully and with excess (*loc. cit.*, p. 342) but because, in primitive man, certain of the essential human motives and interests—the affective, social, and religious—have a predominant development, while, in the civilized man, these have been in part superseded by the development of the logical and individual interests. The distinction between the pre-logical and logical stages is a real one, but, as in the child, these are genetic stages or modes in the development of the one human mind.

ascribes to things, from very crude beginnings. This principle passes from mere vital attributes up to the substantive and spiritual soul. Analogy drawn from the present-day genetic psychology of self-consciousness not only allows but requires this. It would be impossible for the savage, whose representation is pre-logical and whose interest is affective and collective, to isolate a "soul," as we understand the term, in the sense of something individual and spiritual, in himself or in anything else. He has no such "idea," no "notion" of the kind. But this fact does not refute the animistic interpretation, nor require us to resort to a "pre-animistic"¹ stage of religion. It does not even justify one in calling the totemic system non-animistic, whether or not we consider it religious.

For while the savage has no idea of soul as something different in nature from body, he still has a feeling, an interest, a collective intent that, so far as it is developed, is the way he apprehends the mental and animate, even though he may not "represent" it at all clearly.² He probably has no notion or idea of "inanimate" in contrast with animate, much less of body *versus* spirit, although, in his practical adaptations and social rites, he makes the actual discrimination of living and not living.

There are, in fact, no less than three different attitudes, on the part of primitive man, which may be described with some appropriateness by the term "animism," attitudes which, from the genetic point of view, it is easy to distinguish and estimate.

In the first place, the primitive "look" of things, before the distinctions of mind from body, and of inanimate objects from living beings arose, would be in a certain way animistic *just by lacking these distinctions*. The cognitive interest not having been differentiated from the body of affective and social interests, things would not be apprehended as constant, regular, and law-abiding in their behaviour; but would be interpreted by means of the only mental classes then operative, those which represented the larger affective and active movements of consciousness. Whatever active motives and interests were operative, it is to these that the external data would be assimilated. Things could only mean what

1. A term suggested, I understand, by Marett, whose paper, however, I have not seen. In what we may call animistic literature, the following works are important: Tylor, *Primitive Culture*; Caird, *The Evolution of Religion*; Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*; Höfding, *Outlines of Psychology*, Int.; Durkheim, *La Vie religieuse*; Lévy-Bruhl, *Les Fonctions mentales*, etc.; McDougall, *Body and Mind*. See also the literature of Totemism in general.

2. He represents it generally as a small material body, or a second more refined physical shape, or as something resident on the breath; all natural hypotheses taken up in the early stages of Greek speculation.

consciousness, at that stage of development, *could understand or intend them to mean.*¹

As a fact, this sort of interpretation, when present in the mind of the savage, would be shot through with emotional, active, and collective elements, and it would appear to the critical observer of primitive thought to be confused, mystical, and animistic. It is animistic in the sense that the first things of experience, the undifferentiated stuff of the inner life, would be charged potentially with the motives of a later dualism. The scientific observer is right in using the term "animism," but wrong in interpreting the facts in terms of a developed dualism. In view of its character as being first-hand and a-dualistic, we may call this first stage "spontaneous or a-dualistic animism."²

In the second place—and constituting a second stage—there is the sort of animism which arises through the processes of affective logic, that is, through the organization of feeling, interest, action under social conditions. It issues in the general interests of the personal and social life and their conversion and propagation in the social body. The process is that whereby the mass of affective interest, embodying an interpretation of things and events in emotional and active terms, is subject to "ejective" reading generally. This is practically unhindered by cognitive discriminations such as those which the dualisms of mind and body and animate and inanimate would impose. "Affective generals," "emotional abstracts"—technical terms suggested in recent literature for the moods, dispositions, and emotional habits thus formed—are passed back and forth in the give-and-take of social life, each individual using the common social interpretation to explain the acts and motives of others, and each applying the same rules to correct and justify his own acts and beliefs. This presents a very positive character to the sociological observer who, not being aware of the emotional character of the process, assumes the presence of a conscious process of animism. But it is not animism in the sense that an idea, image, or notion of soul or mind is attributed by the

1. It is remarkable that the savage (like the child with its doll) does on occasion treat things as mere things, even when interested in finding them full of a larger meaning. We can not say, with Lévy-Bruhl, that sense-perception is in his case incapable of accuracy.

2. The difficulty of naming it is the same as that felt, for the same reason, in the case of the early stages of reflection which issued in a-dualistic interpretations of the world. Early Greek speculation was not really materialistic nor physical, properly speaking, but a-dualistic. I have used the term "projective" (*History of Psychology*, vol. i) as a proper designation of this period, as preceding those to which the terms "objective" and "subjective" properly apply.

savage to things; such a process is still to be developed. Let us then call this stage "affective or emotional animism."¹

Finally, there is the full process of animism proper, arising with the development of the dualisms of persons and things, and mind and body, and made possible only by these dualisms. These distinctions arise through the differentiation of experience into logical classes, which replace the emotional and affective classes of the earlier period. When this is accomplished, or is in the way of accomplishment, all sorts of ambiguities and compromises arise. The case of animism is that in which the new event is interpreted in terms of a conscious attribution of life or mind. It is no longer simply a spontaneous or ejective apprehension of the thing in emotional terms, a first-hand construction of the thing as living or personal. It is rather a more or less reflective interpretation of it, following upon the apprehension of its positive marks or characters. This we may well call "reflective animism."

The principal characteristics of the primitive man's view of things are such as to justify the application of the term "affective animism."² There is a recognition of things, animals, persons, as possessed of a certain forcefulness, a dynamic quality akin to animation. It would not do to say that things are taken to be "living merely," for "living-merely" is too high and abstract a notion. It supposes the contrasted idea or meaning of something more than mere life, a sort of spiritual power. But we may say that to the savage the living shows the presence of those powers which become later on, in the more mature thinker's reflection, the signs of the spiritual. To the primitive man, the one dynamic centre stands for all the confused mass of meaning, which are still to be differentiated into the categories of inanimate,³ living, and spiritual.

The sort of animism described in these terms actually pervades primitive culture. But if the researches of anthropologists should reveal a culture still more simple—one quite a-dualistic and projective, in which experience is near the grade found in the perceptual intelligence and instinctive action of the higher animals—I

1. We find this in turn realized in the history of culture in the early pseudo-scientific interpretations of things which preceded true science. Astrology, alchemy, sooth-saying, magic, witchcraft—all sorts of "psychosophy," in short, to use a term of Dessoir's—are in this sense animistic: they assume the presence of occult, mystic, quasi-mental and vital forces. See Dessoir, *Umriss einer Geschichte der Psychologie*, and the present writer, *History of Psychology*, vol. i, chap. 2.

2. The second of the stages described.

3. The case of the inanimate first clearly distinguished by the savage—under the totemic régime—is probably the dead body, just after death. He thinks the soul has departed from it, leaving it in this condition. It is different from the things of nature, which still retain their mystic forces, while the dead body has lost them.

think we should still have to recognize a strain of animistic meaning running through it: animism of the first or "spontaneous" sort. For certain of the animals, though lacking the distinctions of human thought, still appear to apprehend the dynamic quality of nature, and to look upon movement and change as being the source of the same type of experiences as that which they derive from man and their fellow animals.

And to the child, even the most original panorama of the external, presented to the gaze of the mind, would not be a flat motionless sheet; but a scene of change, explosion, colour, vitality. And in it, moreover, by the very conditions of its perception, the vague lines of differentiation into parts would appear, which the dawning instincts, appetites, and interests would rapidly produce. It would be like the segmenting egg, in which the lines of cleavage, division, and partition, prophetic of the coming development, are just beginning to show themselves. The *Anlagen*, to pursue the biological figure, are present: the distinctions of life, mind, and things in their embryonic form. This would appear to the outside observer, to whom the distinctions themselves were clear, as a confused and mystical mode of animation.

The theory, therefore, that denies all suggestion of personality to early religious objects, the totemic in particular, fails at two essential points. It recognizes the symbolic or emblematic character of the mere thing, the totem or idol;¹ but in admitting that the religious meaning proper resides in the further suggestion of some sort of force or life, it allows an animistic interpretation. Further, the theory fails to show, by an analysis of the primitive man's representation and interest, that such an animistic apprehension is not a stage in the development of the animism of conscious personality.

We are able to say with confidence, seeing the results of genetic psychology, that it is such a stage, a necessary stage. If as psychologists we were called upon to construct in advance the sort of world-view primitive man as we find him—pre-logical, collective, mystical in his intuition—would entertain, it would be just this and nothing else. His gods could not be spiritual, individual, and intelligent agents; they could only be vaguely animistic, dynamic, collective, mystic presences, satisfying to the crude quasi-personal interest by which they are apprehended.²

1. The mere superficial fact of "sacredness" attaching to a thing means nothing. The sacredness of the inanimate thing is reflected, not original. It is sacred because it symbolizes a meaning beyond itself—vitality, personal force, God. The fountain of sacredness is to be found in that which is symbolized.

2. As I have said elsewhere, if the child, at a certain age, were asked the abstract questions the anthropologist puts to the savage, his replies would show the same puzzling confusion and incoherence.

III. THE RELIGIOUS OBJECT : ITS IDEAL MEANING.

In the current treatment of the ethical and æsthetic modes of experience, the characters attaching to ideals are much discussed. Both moral right and æsthetic perfection are ideals ; and the religious object shares the ideal quality with the moral and the æsthetic.

What this means will appear on a closer examination of the object set up for worship in this religious cult or that. As we have seen, the mere thing is not the object, but the symbol of the object. There is a further meaning, a signification beyond the mere symbol ; and this signification is one determined, not by representation or thought, but by emotional and active interest. It is not an associated idea, or a system of ideas, but a worth, a further value imputed to the concrete object. The sacred thing is the centre of worthful experiences ; the deity is well- or ill-disposed, capable of harm or benefit. All such unaccomplished, unfulfilled worths, presenting something to aim at, to live for, to desire, are ideals.¹ In this sense the religious object is an ideal.

But more than this. The religious object is always, as we have seen, endowed with the attributes of life and personality, however vaguely. It is a more or less developed centre of inner life and spiritual force. If this be so, then its ideal character must be that attaching to such an object : it is an ideal of personality, of what the worshipper himself is, a self in some more or less adequate sense. In what sense, we may ask, and by what process, can a meaning of selfhood or personality take an ideal form ?

In the development of the ethical ideal in the individual this movement is seen in operation.² The growth of the individual self-consciousness proceeds by an organization of factors which are, so to speak, prospective, forward-reaching, active. We have within us the actual self of habit, ready at any time for action, which finds, however, over against it a self of accommodation, of learning, imitation, adaptation. A better self—more adapted, better informed, more obedient, virtuous, just, generous, wise—hovers before our gaze, and serves as model, inspiration, imperative, and ideal. At the limit, this self is perfect, the all-good and the all-wise, the ideal Self.

The religious ideal is of this character. But it is not the same

1. See *Thought and Things*, vol. iii, "Interest and Art," chap. 5, §7 ; also vol. i, chap. 19, §8. This worth is embodied in the imagination by which the object is schematically developed and its possibilities brought out. The ideal is not a model of perfection, brought into the mind from some outside source ; nor is the process of idealization a special and mysterious faculty or intuition : it is simply the imagination in its assuming, schematising, and experimental rôle, running ahead of knowledge.

2. cf. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 4th ed., chap. 1.

as the ethical ideal; and the contrast between them is very instructive.

The ethical ideal is felt to be *ideal*, that is *not actual*. It is a norm set up in the mind, a rule of ideal conduct, imposed upon all persons, but not realized by any of them. We do not suppose our moral ideals to be actually fulfilled, except in God. This is to say that the personal ideal, *qua* moral, if it is to be realized, must become also the personal ideal, *qua* religious. It is, then, the religious ideal proper that is actually realized in God, not the merely moral ideal. Our moral nature postulates an ideal ethical value, but not an ideal ethical person.¹

The same thing appears also from the point of view of duty. The moral ideal is one of duty as between persons. It is a rule of social intercourse as well as of personal perfection. It could be realized in practice only in a society of perfected beings, a utopia, which does not exist. Such a society has been dreamt of, and written of, but never seriously postulated as existing, except in the realm in which the religious ideal is also imposed: the kingdom of God, the heaven of various religions, the state of perfection of religious mysticism. On the side of society, therefore, no less than on the side of the individual, the postulate of an actually existing ideal order of persons is not moral but religious.

Despite these differences, however, the two ideals are closely related. Their common trait is equally fundamental to both: the relation of the personal self to another self viewed in the light of ideal personality. In the ethical, both these selves are concrete, actual, social fellows, existing side by side; but the ideal of their relation does not exist save in their thought. In the religious, the second or "other" person, the deity, is one with the ideal, which is thus made actual, brought into human life, and symbolized concretely in the religious emblem that stands for God.

Thus understood, certain positive marks attach to the religious ideal.

(1) It is the fulfilment of the entire personality, not merely of this or that function or capacity of the self. The savage finds the power behind the movements of nature mysterious, awful, because he cannot anticipate or discount the resources or decisions of the Great Spirit. So the prophet of Jehovah commands, "Take off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground." The creeds of theology, which ring with terms of

1. It is on the basis of this truth that the historical argument of Anselm for the existence of God can be reconstructed. Instead of an idea whose infinity stands in the way of the omission of actual existence from its object, as argued by Anselm, we have the postulate of the ideal self, whose integrity demands its existence.

infinitude and juggle with synonyms of personality, are as inadequate to express the religious ideal, as are the groans of the terrified savage, or the genuflections of the awe-stricken pilgrim at the holy place. It is here that religious awe—a singular combination of fear, respect, and admiration—meets its object half-way. As perfect this object is admirable, as personal it commands respect, as powerful it is to be feared. But all of these attitudes are coloured by the glamour of the ideal. It is not ordinary fear, but fear of one having endless power; not ordinary respect, but respect for the morally highest, the supremely excellent; not ordinary admiration, but acquiescence in eternal wisdom and contemplation of divine beauty. These feelings are fused in one sentiment, one interest, as in the object the attributes are fused in one ideal person, God.

(2) In the religious interest, the social relation takes on a form analogous to that of superior and inferior in our daily life. The ideal of personality that we enforce upon ourselves as a moral ideal, we attribute to God as his by right of actual nature. Although he is one of the persons in the social relation, he is Divine, Ideal as well.¹

In presupposing the actual existence of its object, however, religious faith generates a relation of great import and real effect. God is an actual presence, like that of the child's superior—father, mother, elder brother, counsellor, friend—all designations realized in actual religious creeds. These are not mere figures of speech, but aspects in which the actual presence is symbolized to this believer or that, in this emergency or that. Through this personal communion the individual finds his forces renewed, his

1. Now that we have discussed the religious object, we are able to detect more clearly the elements of the religious interest. Religious "awe" is complex: it contains *fear with admiration* (*l'effroi dominé par l'admiration*, Leuba, in *Revue Philosophique*, October, 1913, p. 413). Mere respect too, even though personal, is not all, nor veneration (as due to excellence, age, experience, wisdom, etc.); it is *admiring respect*, æsthetic absorption and appreciation. This is seen in the historical bond between art and religious technique. The intellectual emotions as such—curiosity, logical satisfaction, etc.—are very subordinate, especially in the primitive stages, where religion is pre-logical and social. The savage's curiosity, so-called, in the presence of the religious symbol, omen, or portent, is more of the nature of an alertness or attentiveness, to get the first sign of the will of the god, similar to that of a player for high stakes, who watches the turn of the dice. And the theoretical interest as such, prominent in systematic theology, is rather a reflection upon religion than a direct participation in it. The dogmatic development of theology does not in itself involve personal religion; in fact, this latter involves dropping the critical and logical attitude of mind.

courage revived, his emotions purged, his aspirations directed, his visions of beauty and good clarified.¹

The dependence felt in the religious consciousness is therefore of the nature of dependence upon a superior person. It extends to all sorts of aid or succour, physical, moral, intellectual. And the superior person is one to whom the relation is also important. The dependence is in a sense reciprocal. In primitive societies, man protects the totemic animal, as the totem protects the man. In religion everywhere the sacred places and objects are committed to the guardianship of the priests; and the sacred truths are defended and enforced by the prophets and law-givers. The gods are represented as jealous of their rights, gratified by praise, pleased with offerings, and given to pursuing their own interests or glory² through human agencies. This means that the significance of the relation is not unilateral, so to speak, one to which one member is indifferent. On the contrary, the deity of the tribe finds his life and interest in those of the tribe; he pursues with unerring vengeance and direful penalties those who go out "after strange gods." He chooses a "peculiar people," who become the special instruments of his revelation as well as the special wards of his providence. They represent his interests.

In the more reflective stages of religious development, this concrete anthropomorphism tends to disappear, just as it itself follows upon the cruder animism of the primitive cult. The ideal takes on more and more refined form. But it never becomes an "idea of the infinite," except in our logical rendering, nor a formula of final perfection, except in our theory. It remains a feeling-forward, a prospective intent, a sort of drift or momentum in the actual organization of interest, toward the fulfilment of the full promise of personality. Hence the inadequacy of all symbolism, as well as the futility of all logical statements, of the nature of God. His nature as personal remains the same; but the sense of the sort of person he is, changes with the development of man. The human ideal is a re-statement always of the human fact.

IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS MEANING: ITS LOGIC.

Coming to ask as to the processes by which the religious interest

1. This is in contrast with the discouragement which comes from meditating upon unrealized ethical excellence and unperformed moral action. The religious ideal stimulates and inspires. It is no doubt this somewhat hidden motive in the whole that develops itself by making concrete the person of God in an incarnate form, as saviour, mediator, virgin mother, saint, etc. The need and the effect of the "Imitation of Christ" are very real; it means the absorption of the ideal by communion with it.

2. As in the Westminster Confession of Faith.

develops, carrying the religious object along with it, we find certain striking complications.

In considering the development of the cognitive function—its genetic logic—psychologists point out the familiar processes of memory, representation, conversion, generalization, etc., through which a given content or object normally passes. And in considering similarly the logic of emotion and interest, other processes are discovered more or less analogous to the former, but also having certain novel features.¹ In the latter, affective generalization, ejection, and idealization are the mental functions most in evidence; they take the place held in the development of knowledge proper by the cognitive processes mentioned, which culminate in conception, judgment, and reasoning.

Now in the religious life, we find a singular union of these two great modes of development within the mind, the logical and the teleological, as we have called them respectively. The logical erects classes, and establishes facts and truths, by its methods of proof; the teleological issues in affective interests and defines ends and values. Now, in the religious life we find the object, God, looked upon as *really existing, as if* established by processes of knowledge, while, at the same time, it is determined by the religious interest as *an ideal or end*. Religion claims to present both a system of truth and a system of personal and social values. God is *both fact and ideal*; not merely in the common way of a value attaching to a fact or truth, as utility attaches to my ink-stand, but in the peculiar way in which a meaning attaches to that which symbolizes it. The ordinary attributed values are real only in so far as the things in which they inhere are real; when unrealized they are ideal, and not actual. But the meaning of the divine, the sacred, the holy, is not "attributed" to the object in this sense; on the contrary, the objective symbol or emblem is attributed or assigned to this meaning, to represent it vicariously. The ideal exists and gives a new sort of reality to the thing taken as symbol.

As to the logic of religious interest, we may say that it is that of interest generally. It seems to be at first collective, traditional, socially propagated; the single person being the mere channel of its expression, a *locus* at which the personal forces are moulded into shape as the vehicle and instrument of the social will. The gradual refinement of the religious interest proceeds with the growth of the individual self in competence and independence. But it is just in the religious interests of mankind that the traditional forms hold their own most conservatively. The social processes of imitation,

1. The latter, the affective logic, has not been fully worked out; the author's contribution to it is to be found in vol. iii, "Interest and Art," of *Thought and Things* (the logic of cognition being treated in vols. i and ii).

contagion, ejection, constraint, dogmatic formulation of creed, all serve to increase the rigidity and solidarity of religious belief and practice. Myth and folk-lore are the antecedents of doctrine, mystic ceremonies precede the more reasonable rites of worship. A legitimate glamour is thrown over the whole by the elaboration of form in architecture, painting, and music, through which the motive of æsthetic admiration is developed. We see here, in short, all the processes of affective logic exemplified: the matter of the religious interest is affectively generalized in dispositions and modes of actions; it is ejectively converted from one mind to another and propagated through the established institutions; it is embodied in the highest æsthetic products of human art. The church presents the essential positive features of religion and morals as well as their limitations.

V. THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF RELIGION.

The result of our inquiry, so far as we have now gone, is in striking accord with those of sociology and anthropology. The collective character of the religious interest, as embodied in all that goes to form a cult or church, is universally conceded. But the newer researches in primitive culture show further that social organization itself, even in its most secular details, has been dominated by requirements and distinctions rooted in religion.¹

This fact has been utilized in different ways in theories of religion. Comte indeed anticipated the point, by recognizing a stage of "theology" in the general evolution of thought, a stage at which the religious point of view was adopted to explain the world generally. At this stage, man was still under the domination of the religious interest; his interpretation of things was theological. Only in later stages of the development of culture, the "metaphysical" and "scientific," was he to free himself. But not entirely, for in the last period, that of "positive" and scientific thought, the need of religion was to find its satisfaction in the concept of humanity, to which an altar was to be erected bearing the inscription, "Religion of Humanity." Man conserves the religious interest, therefore, but he contents himself with a very platonic friendship for God, taking the form of a certain flattery of himself!

Another theory, starting out from the same social presupposition—that of the union, in early times, of the collective and religious interests—suggests in its conclusion a different alternative. Humanity outgrows religion, we are told, in becoming scientific and positivistic. Hence our seeming progress towards the "non-

1. The totemic system of group organization is a very striking instance of this, as different writers agree.

religion of the future."¹ This shows itself in the gradual secularization of all our interests. There will remain no divine, no sacred, even no profane—only the secular.²

The facts recognized by sociologists to-day, however, confirm the conclusions reached above, and show that the social motives involved in religion are deep-rooted and essential. They are no other than those by which the individual self-consciousness itself is built up. To say, with Clifford and Romanes that God is a "world-eject," a socialized and idealized "other-self," is to say that God is recognized naturally and inevitably, in the same sense that our human fellows are, on the one hand, and society as such, on the other hand. The differentiation of the personal object into myself and other-self, ego and alter, takes form gradually in a larger whole of personal values which are social in origin. It is this body of self-values, collective, ideal, mystical, that is ejectively embodied in God.

If this be true, religion will persist in human life and the religious interest will receive an interpretation that recognizes these motives of man. Accordingly, another interesting theory springs up, in which society itself—the original "other" and persistent fellow, to the individual—is considered the true religious object. According to Durkheim, to whom the evidence of the social origins of religion owes so much, the social group, whether clan, tribe, or nation, is the proper object, as it is the original cause, of the individual's religious interest. This interest forms for itself a personal God because it is unaware, or only vaguely aware, of its social obligations. What it really means to recognize and worship is the self, the spirit, the immanent principle, of society.³

1. Guyau, *Non-Religion of the Future*.

2. The gradual secularization of social institutions is of course a very notable fact. The "divine right of kings," the "temporal power" of the church, the "establishment" in all its forms—these give place to the radical separation of church and state. Similarly, there is the rapid secularization of education, of law and moral consciousness, with the growth of political liberty. All this means, however, I think, not the decay of the religious sanction, but the shifting of religious authority from a political and social to a spiritual and personal source. A similar development has taken place in the passing of the civil sanction as such from theocracy to democracy. There is a freeing both of religion and of the state, through the freeing of the individual. The growth of the individual in autonomy of judgment, producing a true democracy of conscience, refines the religious interest, but does not necessarily lessen or impair it. A greater menace is to be seen, perhaps, in the decay of the active religious practices, in which the social motives of communion, revival, and common enthusiasm confirm and fortify the individual.

3. As intimated already, M. Durkheim seems to miss the real "cue" and leading-thread to this conclusion by denying, incorrectly as I think, the personal element in the meaning of the sacred.

We have here, in fact, a reasoned revival of a sort of religion of humanity—an interesting return to the line of tradition of French Positivism. It is sociological in spirit, a Comtean conception. Society "saves its face," as it were, in the presence of the individual in whom it has generated the religious need, by posing as God, under certain thin disguises (see Durkheim, *loc. cit.*, pp. 611-f.).

The present writer signalized, in an earlier publication, the fact of the close relation—it is not a real identity—between the god of a social group and its own national spirit, in terms which he ventures to utilize in the following paragraphs.¹

It appears in this way: the ideal self or deity to the individual, is the further carrying out, in the imagination, of the self-meaning; and this includes other individuals as well as the personal self. It is the ideal of a group, of a set of social relations, showing practical and moral oppositions, embarrassments and achievements. It is not the ideal held by other tribes and races. The deity shows the growth of the normal social relations, and reflects their character, because he is the projected personal ideal of the group. While the deity must be thought of by these individuals as apart from them, since he is personal, yet he is the controlling spiritual presence, the voice, the oracle of the group, and may be approached through the proper mediation with rites and ceremonies. The tribal deity is in this important sense, then, the tribal spirit; he is conceived in terms of the tribal self.² The ideal that hovers over the personal self of the individual and impregnates his spiritual life, is one with that of the tribal or national self-consciousness. 'Great is Diana of the Ephesians' is not only a formula of personal religious experience; it is also a proclamation of civic or national unity: and both are possible in one because, in the process by which the individual idealizes his life in community with others, he also, in common with them, erects a communal or national ideal. "The perfect self," he might say, "which I should attain, is the same as that which you also find you should attain; and it is the same that we both imagine as our national spirit, patron, or God. Deity may always be taken, therefore, to reveal the communal ideal of personality, as that develops continuously, while, at the same time, it supplies the appropriate object for the individual's personal worship. The

1. *Proc. Fourth Inter. Cong. Hist. of Religion*, Oxford, August, 1908, reprinted in *Darwin and the Humanities*, 1st ed., 1909, pp. 101 f.

2. cf. Espinas (*Les Origines de la Technologie*, 1897, p. 34 ff.), who says: "The God of a people is nothing else than its own moral consciousness objectified. Zeus represents what is common to the ideals of the Greeks scattered from the Euxine to the Pillars of Hercules. Later on, when reflexion became possible, Heraclitus seemed to understand this. 'The common reason,' said he, 'which is the divine reason, and through which we become rational, is the measure of truth.'"

Jehovah of the Hebrews is the embodiment both of the national aspirations, as voiced in the religion of the prophets, and of the ethical qualities of the Jews. What a contrast to the polytheistic Gods of the Greeks!

But it does not follow from this that the group, *as it exists*, is the object of religion. The existing group, the sociological group, is not what the religious ideal denotes, nor what the national aspirations celebrate. I do not sing to America *as it is*, when I sing the hymn "America"; but to America *as it should be*, its ideals fulfilled, its promises accomplished.

" My country, 'tis of thee,
 Thou land of liberty—
 Of thee I sing!
 Land where our fathers died,
 Land of the Pilgrims' pride,
 From every mountain side
 Let freedom ring! "

This is a hymn to liberty, to freedom, of which America is taken to be the symbol. The social ideal is symbolized by the group, just as the ideal self or god of the individual is symbolized in the concrete object of religious veneration. The two ideals are fused in one through the motives under which—as we have seen—personality is at once socialized and idealized. But under this common ideal, imposed equally upon both, the concrete individual and the concrete group live in all sorts of opposition and disharmony.

Religion of Humanity, then, to be a religion, must mean religion of ideal humanity; but this is what religion of divinity also means. For divinity is humanity idealized in both its aspects, individual and social.¹

The reason of the fusion of the two ideals, social and religious, is to be found in part, as has been remarked, in the factors by which they are in common established: factors intrinsic to the development of personality. But that is not sufficient. The outcome of idealization in the social realm is not a supreme personality, but an ideal group, a utopian social order, for which all the

1. Hence to find ground for identifying society with the religious object, with M. Durkheim, we must seize upon illustrations of high patriotism, in which ideals are embodied: the flag, the national hero, the incident of patriotic virtue, the holy war, the crusade, etc. These do invoke ideals that seem to merge themselves in that of religion. But when we come to look into the common prosaic life of society—its *de facto*, un-ideal, "seamy" side—how the religious ideal finds itself repelled! Tradition, public taste, art, justice, institutions of all sorts, in which the *ensemble* of the group life shows itself, are both un-ideal and non-religious—often worse.

individuals must be equally fitted.¹ This we have seen to be ethical in its character, not religious. Actually, it is realized only in part, and progressively, through the reflection in the group of the moralization of its members. How then does this ideal come to merge itself in that of the religious life?

It would seem to be in order, as we may surmise, speaking teleologically, to find for itself a concrete embodiment.² The utopian society is conceived in terms of its perfected unit. The formal obligation of morality does not suffice for the ends of ideal society, any more than for those of individual life. The postulate of the ideal group, even more than that of ideal individuality, must be reinforced by the assumption of the existence of a being who embodies them both at once.

In this sense again religion serves to bind together the actual and the ideal. Just as, for the individual, the reality of God substitutes a personal relation for the mere formal postulate of the ideal; so also for society it substitutes, for a utopian moral order, a

1. It is an interesting question whether, in an ideal society, each and all of the members would have to be ideal individuals.

2. This would seem to be in somewhat marked opposition to M. Durkheim's view (*loc. cit.*, pp. 600 ff.), who admits that it is ideal society that is symbolized in religion, but goes on to maintain that social ideals are in some way actually present in the social reality and are absorbed by the individual in states of "social effervescence." The "something more" presented to the individual on these occasions ("more," that is, than the usual social *rapprochement*) is the same as the "something more" by which, to the individual, the social ideal surpasses the social fact. That is an extraordinarily summary way of disposing of ideals! What are ideals, but imagined or desired ends set up in some consciousness? How can they be present in society before any individual conceives or imagines them?—unless, indeed, society be supposed to have an actual aggregate consciousness of its own. The ideal present in a society can only be the principle which seems to some thinker to explain its character and tendencies; but, so far as it is ideal, it is not yet realized in society.

Further, is it psychologically true that we conduct our ideals when we are lashed into social frenzy, carried away by social "effervescence"? If so, then the riot and the mob would present the occasion for the birth of social and religious ideals! This is to my mind nothing short of an affront to that fine and noble movement of consciousness by which it interprets its data forward to their fullest and richest meaning. It is irrelevant to deny, as M. Durkheim does, a mystic faculty of idealization; for it is not at all mystical, nor is it a special faculty. It is, on the contrary, the normal counterpart to the judgment of fact; it is the assumption of value, out of which, in the form of confirmed hypotheses, new judgments are established and selected. This assumptive, idealizing movement of the imagination is just as normal as the judging, believing movement is; and it is as essential to the development of knowledge. See the treatment of the entire subject by Meinong, *Die Annahmen*, 2nd ed, and the writer's *Thought and Things*, vol. 1.

genuine concrete end. The injunction, "Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect," means more, both to the individual and to society, than if it read, "Be ye perfect as a moral individual and in your social relationships." The element of justice in the social ideal, for example, has progressed through concrete historical stages, and is taking on specific international form to-day in law, arbitration, treaties, etc., through the progress in the ideals of individual right; but these, in turn, have a further sanction and represent a stronger motive when, leaving the domain of pure ethics, they enter into the sphere of religion. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself," is the counsel of justice, equality, and right of the religious ideal.

We are obliged to conclude then, that instead of disappearing, religion will abide. In the higher union of the motives of personal and social interest in that of religion, there is a return on another plane to the early state of things noted by sociologists in primitive culture, where religion dominated both individual and social life. The sacred symbol was the emblem of clan and tribe and also the badge of individuality and personal relationship. It is interesting to see that, after the successive differentiations of motive in the special interests of civilized life and reflective thought, the resulting ideals fuse together again in the postulate of Deity.

How far this postulate makes itself good, either in practice or for reflection, is, however, another question. It requires detailed study. It is the philosophical question as to whether and how far the religious consciousness is really the organ of the apprehension of reality in the form of God.¹

J. MARK BALDWIN.

1. Enough has been said, however, to show that primitive religion was not, as is often claimed (see Durkheim, *loc cit.*, p. 340), a first attempt at a logical explanation of the world. It was, on the contrary, an emotional and social interpretation, from which the logical and scientific points of view only gradually freed themselves.