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Pindar, Pythian II

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onethinks of in connection with them—and speaks of. Thus, Euripides speaks of the *λόγῃ σπαρτὸς* (*Suppl.* 583); and, again, in the *Phoenissae* (670) he has

ἐνθεν ἐξανῆκε γῆ
πανοπλον ὄψιν.

So, too, Ovid (*Met.* III. 105 ff.):

glebae coepere moveri
primaque de sulcis acies apparuit hastae,
mox umeri pectusque onerataque brachia telis
existunt crescitque seges clipeata virorum.

CALLIMACHEA.

(a) *H. VI.*, 133 :

ταῖσι δὲ Δηῷ
δωσεῖ πάντ' ἐπίμεστα καὶ ὥς ποτὶ ναὸν ἴκωνται

The pronoun *ταῖσι* refers to those initiated women who, owing to age or infirmity, are unable to accompany the procession all the way to Demeter's temple. If they walk as far as they can, the goddess will show them favour. But how precisely?

Stephanus, in his edition of 1577, writes: 'Puto ἀλλεῖπειν hic particulam ἐάν, quam subaudiendam reliquerit: ut sit sensus, Ceres omnia illis cumulate dabit, et tamquam si ad ipsum usque templum venerint.' Since this view appears to have the support of Professor Mair, as well as other critics, it must receive the respect of notice; but until instances in support of the alleged omission of ἐάν are produced, we can only acquiesce in Blomfield's comment 'quem sensum an ferat lectio vulgata, equidem nescio.' Indeed, even if there be such instances, it seems to me that in this case the preceding context has made it so clear that these women will not reach the temple, that any Greek would have written, not ἐάν ἴκωνται, but εἰ ἴκοντο. In the same edition grammar is respected by Frischlin's translation: 'Ceres dabit omnia abunde plena ut etiam ad templum perveniant'; but it fails in sense, since it is clear that the aged and infirm will *not* reach the temple. And Ernesti's amended form 'utque post ad aedem ipsam veniant' (whether right or wrong in making καὶ a conjunction) cannot be accepted without an equivalent in the Greek for *post*. Bergk and Meineke thought to counter this objection by reading ποτε (ποκα) for ποτί; but it may still be asked why δωσεῖ is here followed by a final construction instead of an infinitive and whether Demeter is particularly likely to have rewarded her votaries by restoring them to health and strength.

No one seems to have paid any attention to the scholion (ταῖς ἐλθούσαις καὶ ταῖς μὴ ἐλθούσαις ἴσον

If Pindar, instead of calling his Sparti ἀκαμαντόλογχαι had called them αὐτόλογχαι, he would have made them like the Sparti of other poets. And I suspect that he did so, and that we should write here—

ἡ ἀμφ' Ἰόλαον ἱππόμεντι
ἡ Σπαρτῶν κάμακ' αὐτολογχᾶν;

'The shaft of the Sparti who sprang to birth spear in hand' gives us at once a genuinely distinctive characterisation.

H. W. GARROD.

μισθὸν δώσει), except perhaps G. Hermann, who proposed (ap. Schneider) to read δωσεῖ πάντ' ἐπίμεσθ' ἃ καὶ αἶς ποτὶ ν. ἴ. In the absence of explanation I can only guess that he was introducing an attraction of the relative scarcely to be justified by the examples in Kühner-Gerth, §555, n. 4. I suspect that what Callimachus wrote was δωσεῖ πάντ' ἐπίμεσθ' ὥς καὶ ποτὶ ναὸν ἴκωνται (= ὥς καὶ ἐκεῖναις αἶ). For the omission of ἂν compare II. 10, ὅς μιν ἴδῃ, μέγας οὗτος. I assume an accidental transposition, perhaps facilitated by the resemblance of the abbreviations used for ὥς and καί. If the scribe had ἐπίμεστα unelided before him, the error would be still more natural.

(b) *Epig.* LXIV. 3, 4:

οὕτως ὑπνώσας, ἀδικωτάτῃ, ὥς τὸν ἐραστὴν
κοιμίζεις, ἐλέου δ' οὐδ' ὄναρ ἤντιάσας.

If this is right, the poet, as Schneider says, 'pendenti orationi substituit liberam.' The objection is not to this form, but to the sense assigned to ἐλέου ἤντιάσας; I should as soon expect to find ἐλέου ἐνυχες used actively. Schneider quotes κατάλεξον ὅπως ἤντησας ὀπωπῆς (*Od.* 3. 97 = 4. 327); but (1) it is not quite clear that in Homer ὀπωπῆ is an exact synonym for ὄψις, (2) ἄντᾶν is not the verb used here, and (3) one feels that an active use of ὄψεως τυχεῖν (to get a sight of) would be much less surprising than a similar use of ἀκοῆς τυχεῖν, because, I suppose, we are accustomed to desire and receive the one but not the other. Moreover, the fact that ἀντιάζειν is used of supplicants would naturally affect the poet's sense of the word's function. Liddell and Scott illustrate the use of ἀντιάζειν (or, as they will have it, ἀντιᾶν) with the genitive pretty fully, and I fancy that anyone who examines their examples with attention will conclude that ἐλέου ἀντιάζω is just an alternative for ἐλέου τυγχάνω. Boissonade's correction, ἤντῖασα, is better on palaeographical grounds and more elegant than Hecker's ἀντιάσας, and is doubtless right.

GILBERT A. DAVIES.

PINDAR, PYTHIAN II.

THE interpretation of Greek Lyric Poetry has made much progress in the last hundred years, but all the many explanations that have been offered of

the Second Pythian have led little further to a real understanding of the poem. It is now universally admitted that the ode is no real Epinician, but

as to its purpose and meaning few commentators agree, and some go so far as to deny it any unity at all. Dissen says that the *motif* of the poem is to be found in ll. 57 ff. Croiset maintains that the whole is a lecture on moderation, *Χρὴ κατ' αὐτὸν ἀεὶ παντὸς ὀρᾶν μετρὸν*. F. D. Morice declares that Hiero had been acting unwisely, that he was ambitious, avaricious, and suspicious, and Pindar warns him against his faults. Luebbert makes the poem a philosophical disquisition on life. Drachmann dates the ode in 467, and makes it an attempt to heal the breach between Hiero and Pindar. Kleanthes finally refers the whole from the beginning to end to Bacchylides, and having forced the poem into this Procrustean bed, says: *οὐδεὶς δύναται νᾶ εἶπη ὅτι ἡ συνέχεια τῶν ἐννοιῶν οὐκ ἀρίστη*. It may be so, but the *ἐννοιαὶ* are not Pindar's.

Let us see what happens if we make the whole ode Pindarocentric. This means that Pindar wanted to talk of himself and took the opportunity of a victory to do so. The ode is a sort of letter, which it was left to Hiero's discretion to perform or not; and the introduction of so much personality is not as surprising as it would be in a genuine panegyric.

In form and matter alike we shall find that, with Pindar as the centre, the ode becomes a whole. Just because he did not want the discussion of himself to be too obvious or too blatant, much is left vague and tentative, which Hiero, with a full knowledge of the facts and seeing the abnormal quantity of First Persons used, would have little difficulty in understanding. After the invocation comes immediately the mention of Cinyras, an obvious prelude to the mention of Pindar himself. 'Cinyras is sung by the Cyprians'—'I sing you' must have been expected. Instead there is a slight change: 'The Locrians sing you in gratitude, for all wise people are grateful'—*i.e.*, 'I am not forgetting myself, and I should be a fool if I failed to learn the lesson of Ixion, who is the worst example of ingratitude, made worse by the fact that he was *αἰδρις* and did not know how to keep his place.'

This is, however, by no means the

usual interpretation of the myth, about which there are as many opinions as men. Thus Christ says it is entirely irrelevant, while the lecture on ingratitude is referred variously to the Locrians (Fennell), to others helped by Hiero (Mezger), to Hiero (Boeckh), to Anaxilas (Hermann), to Pindar himself (Thiersch, L. Schmidt).

The myth must be connected with the main thread of the ode, and we may deny at once, as against Christ, that Pindar used any myth which occurred to him or to which he took a fancy. But we must equally deny, as against Dissen, that every part of the myth must refer to some event in the history of the victor, his ancestors or his city; and we may reject the fabrications, which have appealed to many, of the prospective crimes of Hiero towards the wife of Anaxilas, to account for the introduction of Hera. A study of the myths will teach us, always remembering that there was a limited number to select from, that there is also a limited number of types: (1) The city or ancestor myth, *P. IV.*, *O. VI.*, etc.; (2) the 'games' myth, *N. IX.*, *O. X.*, etc.; (3) the 'moral lecture' myth, *P. II.*, *N. VII.* In practically every case, the relevance of the myth is pointed out or hinted at at the end of the story, though sometimes the poet mentions that he has digressed, *P. X.*, *XI.*, but this does not occur in the 'moral lecture' myths.

The Ixion myth belongs to this third class. It is a lecture on gratitude. But what of its end? Does that refer to gratitude? This is a perfectly legitimate objection, but it is easily met, and we can thereby explain a further important point in the discussion of the Pindaric myths. There are some whose application changes in the middle. So here we have, first a discussion of gratitude, which leads naturally in the case of Ixion to the omnipotence of God and the need for acquiescing in His will; (and incidentally the consequence of violating it, here exemplified by the Centaurs).

The lessons which Pindar wishes us to draw are two: (a) I am not ungrateful, so let not Hiero imagine that what I am going to say is a token of it;

(b) the world is a place of ups and downs, according to God's will, as Archilochus knew and told us many times. (The mention of Archilochus is probably due to a verbal similarity in that poet's works and to the recollection of his fate (cf. Hauvette, *Mélanges Perrot*, 1901.) So I am not going to be spiteful, if I happen to be 'down,' but will put up with my fortune and avoid the misfortune of Archilochus, who did not realise that wisdom and good fortune are the best things we can have.

This line, whose precise meaning is doubtful, comes so abruptly that it is difficult to trace the connexion of thought exactly. We suspect that the ambiguity is due to the fact that Pindar does not feel quite comfortable in what he is saying, and this suspicion is confirmed by the irrelevant piece of flattery which follows and which the most adulatory of Pindar's enemies would find it hard to beat. It is an interlude while he plucks up courage to reach his climax. It may be that he had Xenophanes in mind and the famous retort of Hiero to him on his complaint of poverty, and Pindar may hint that his remarks are not to be taken as implying any misplaced independence or excess of sincerity. He was an honest man of course, but he did not wish to lose a valued patron. So ll. 57-71 are simply a preparation for the real object of the ode, the expostulation and apologia of Pindar. Anyone who has read the poet with care must feel that he is dealing here with personal matters; cf. *P. IX.* 75-96, *X.* 51-64, and that the agitation of the verse is not affected. Here Kleanthes may be right and Pindar may have feared to be superseded, though there is no reason for suggesting Bacchylides or saying that Pindar was piqued at not getting the order for a poem. The final preparation for the private part of the ode, *Strophe D*, etc., which can be omitted and still leave the poem performable, comes with *πρεσβύτεραι βουλαί*. Anyone with a knowledge of Court etiquette must have known this was a prelude to something its author feared might give offence. When Hiero is strung up to the highest pitch, Pindar begins solemnly *γένοι' οἷος ἔσσι*. 'Du sollst der werden

der Du bist,' as Nietzsche put it, slightly altering the famous *γνώθι σεαυτὸν*. The extreme knife-like sharpness of all that follows signifies its importance. *Μαθών* (which Headlam, *inter alia*, takes as qualifying the ape, though why emphasise the learning of the ape, when it does nothing to help the interpretation?) adds to the Nietzschean ideal that of the Dorian 'Erziehungsideal' (for which cf. Wilamowitz *Herakles*, I. 287), and being intentionally vague, is meant to imply many things, such as 'when you have learnt the truth about everything,' 'as you have taught yourself to be by developing your own nature' and so on. The definite meaning which Hiero is to bear in mind is: 'Remain at your highest level of wisdom, while you are judging me, for the matter requires a wise judge. Children, you know, call an ape beautiful; they are no judges and are taken in by all sorts of follies on the ape's part. But Rhadamanthys was quite different, for he used his wisdom wisely, so he is now free from all the deceitful wiles of the base; be like him and hope for his reward.' (Comparetti wants to take *καρπὸν φρενῶν* as meaning that Rhadamanthys has the privilege of judging the souls of the blest, but the evidence he quotes is weak, and in Pindar Rhadamanthys is not yet the judge solely of the good.)

The remainder of the ode is taken up with a self-justification and a calm conviction that he will triumph in the end. The good man has his bad times, but as the myth has told us, his bad times will end, and the wicked man will find that all his wiles do him no good, that his prosperity is insecurely established, and that he will be hoist with his own petard. If he is patient, Pindar's lot will change; only as he does not now kick against the pricks, may he always have good men for his friends.

That such is the explanation of the last passage, there can be little doubt. But it has been sadly obscured by irrelevant introductions of *πιθηκισμός*, and fox-myths from Archilochus. The fox is itself a myth in this ode, and Galen is sufficient authority to show that the mention of the ape does not imply flattery. Children, he says, are

foolish enough to find an ape a source of amusement; they lack judgment. Is not this enough without controversies, whether Hiero or the children are to be identified with the ape, and whether the children are pleased with the ape or the ape with the children? Judgment is

the key to the passage, and it is only natural that Pindar should refer to Rhadamanthys, when he wished to claim a fair decision from Hiero on a matter that required calm and dispassionate wisdom for its solution.

E. H. GODDARD.

AN UNRECOGNISED EXTRACT FROM MENANDER'S EPITREPONTES?

IN one of the most striking¹ passages of the *Epitrepontes* Menander has portrayed the emotions of the young husband Charisius on overhearing a dialogue between his neglected wife Pamphile and her father Smicrines. She has refused, under great pressure, to leave him, and he is overwhelmed with remorse for his treatment of her. It is not quite certain that any such scene between father and daughter² took place on the stage: but it is clear that Smicrines makes more than one attempt to carry her off, and it is unlikely that Menander refrained from staging a debate so suitable for Euripidean rhetoric. Moreover, we possess a small and mutilated fragment (Z) of the great Cairo papyrus which Sudhaus³ (followed by van Leeuwen and Allinson) believes to come from this very scene: these critics differ only in this, that while Sudhaus would place it in the first act, van Leeuwen and Allinson more plausibly suggest the end of the third or the beginning of the fourth. Z certainly contains scraps of a dialogue between a father and his protesting child, and Sudhaus seems to be right in maintaining that this child is a daughter and that her name is Pamphile. If so, the fragment is almost certainly from the *Epitrepontes*. Almost the first words

used by the father (in Z¹, which Sudhaus and Allinson place before the verso Z²) are these: *εἰ δὲ καμὲ δεῖ λέγειν, | ἐτοί-
μ[ό]ς [εἰ]μ[ι], τρία δέ σοι προθήσομαι.* He proceeds to elaborate his case in a *ῥῆσις*, which Sudhaus calculates to have been rather over forty lines long (more than half has perished). Before he can finish what he has to say, the daughter, despite his protests, retires into the house. If Sudhaus is right in his general interpretation of the passage, he is probably justified in his further inference that the father's *ῥῆσις* answers and balances a similar *ῥῆσις* delivered by the daughter at a slightly earlier point.

The object of this note is to suggest the possibility that we possess forty-four lines of Pamphile's *ῥῆσις*, and have possessed them unrecognised for more than forty years. I refer to the *ῥῆσις* contained in the Didot papyrus published with partial facsimiles by H. Weil in 1879, and included by Nauck (T.G.F.² 1889) as *frag. incert.* 953 of Euripides. The passage begins *ὦ πάτερ, ἐχρῆν μὲν οὖς ἐγὼ λόγους λέγω | τοὺτους λέγειν σέ.* This papyrus, ascribed by Weil⁴ to the second or third century B.C., contains a number of extracts from tragedy and comedy, some epigrams, and some money accounts. The *ῥῆσις* (which is much the longest extract) is repeated, less correctly, on the back of the papyrus. The papyrus appears to ascribe the *ῥῆσις* to Euripides, for the second copy (that on the back) is said to be headed ΕΤΡΕΠΠΙΔΟΤ. The principal copy (which alone is shown in Weil's facsimile) has a mutilated heading, which Weil reads as ΕΤΡΙΠΠΙΔΟΤ; and at its

¹ Sudhaus² 494-547; Koerte 457-501 must be supplemented by *Ox. Pap.* X. 1236^v 1-9.

² The view that Pamphile is a *persona muta* has been abandoned by all recent editors. She undoubtedly appears in l. 470 ff. Sudh.² = 432 ff. Koerte; cf. Jensen in *Rh. Mus.* 1910, p. 365, and Wüst in Bursian's *Jahresber.* 174, p. 203.

³ See especially *Menanderstudien*, 1914, p. 1 ff. In Koerte² Z is printed with *frag. incert.* before *Georgos*. Rennie (*C.R.* XXXVI., p. 79) accepts Sudhaus' view of the character of Z, but agrees with van Leeuwen and Allinson in putting it at a later point of the play.

⁴ Dr. E. H. Minns has kindly examined the facsimile for me, with Mr. H. I. Bell, and informs me that there is no doubt that the papyrus is earlier than 162 B.C.