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THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

OCTOBER, 1916.

MARRIAGE REGULATIONS IN THE *REPUBLIC*.

I.

THE ideal city of Plato could only come true if three great and unlikely changes were made in the state. Neither Plato's contemporaries nor later generations have been able to breast the second of these 'waves,' which brings in a new order of marriage for guardians. The scheme is condemned as not only not good or possible—the Platonic tests—but as inconsistent with itself and with the account given in the *Timaeus*. The parts under censure are the so-called table of prohibited affinities and the sanction of infanticide. It would be strange to find discrepancies in a proposal so important for Plato's state that details cannot well be left to some Damon, and I hope to show that difficulties arise only when critics do not place themselves exactly at Plato's point of view. He conceived a certain problem with sharp outlines, and his answer is precisely adapted to that. The first wave left the guardians as a family of men and women living in common. How was it possible to preserve this communal life and provide for the future of the guardian class? If the rulers failed to choose aright here, an oracle foretold the decay of the city (415b-c). Therefore Plato's rigid preoccupation in the second wave is to secure for the archons¹ entire control over the birth of guardian children. Otherwise the community will sink into mere promiscuity and the stock will degenerate. In short, Plato tries to ensure that, apart from the necessary getting of children for the state, the guardians shall be friends and not lovers. Our special problems arise from the two questions—*πὼς παιδοποιήσονται, καὶ γενομένους πῶς θρέψουσι*; (449e). Let us begin with the first of these.²

¹ I shall use this word of those who administer the marriage regulations.

² This paper, being interpretative only, does

not touch upon the historical background of Plato's scheme.

II.

The archons who select husbands and wives are guided by the rule of utility that breeders of animals would follow. These selections are to be made at certain festivals, ostensibly by lot, though the lots are manipulated by the archons. The festivals themselves are accompanied by songs and sacrifice and prayer. Marriages are arranged with an eye to the number of children required. In short, their sole purpose is to provide guardian children, and they seem to last only for the marriage festival. Then follow certain prescriptions about conduct, which are intended to prevent all but the legal procreation of children. As the meaning and purpose of these have been misunderstood, I shall give a full analysis of the passage.¹

The age for marriage extends from 20 to 40 for women and from about 25 to 55 for men. (1) No one older or younger may interfere with births for the commonwealth—that is an impious offence. (2) No man in his prime shall touch a woman in hers, unless the archon joins them. (3) Men and women over the prime are free to form unions with whom they will, (4) *except* with daughter and mother, daughter's daughters and female ancestors, as regards the man, and with the equivalent relations as regards the woman. They shall be strongly discouraged from having or rearing offspring.

Glaucon asks how shall a father know his daughter, and the answer is that he cannot. Then follows the law of relationship (5). 'From whatsoever day one of them become a bridegroom, he shall call male children born in the tenth—yes, and in the seventh—month after that his sons, and females his daughters, and they shall call him father; so their children in turn he shall call his grandchildren, and they call him and her grandparents; while those who are born during that time in which their fathers and mothers are engaged in begetting they shall call brothers and sisters, so that, (6) as we have just said, they must not touch one another. (7) But the law shall give brothers and sisters to cohabit if the lot fall in this way and the Pythian priestess add her sanction.' So end the rules laid down by Plato.

They cannot be interpreted at all unless the law of relationship (5) is understood, for all the other clauses depend upon it. The late Mr. Herbert Richards pointed out that 'brothers and sisters would be all persons born, roughly speaking, within thirty years of one another.'² As Plato could not possibly mean to forbid all unions whatever, and indeed permits marriages of brothers and sisters (7), the prohibition must, he thinks, apply to the unions (3) of those over their prime. 'Plato would seem absolutely to forbid irregular unions between persons who may possibly be near relations.' The difficulties of this view, which will be discussed presently, are set aside by the suggestion that Plato does not seem to have thought out all the consequences of his scheme. Mr. Adam accepts this interpretation with a difference. He too thinks that the veto on brothers and sisters (6) applies to the irregular unions

¹ *Republic*, 460e-461e.

² *Classical Review*, IV. 6-8.

(3), but argues that not all marriages are excluded ; for example, the son of old parents is not forced to marry his sister. Let us examine the effect of the rule, so interpreted, upon marriage and then upon the irregular unions.¹

'A son,' says Mr. Adam, 'who is born when his mother is 21 and his father 26 cannot marry till he is 49, because he is 29 before his bride can possibly be born, and she cannot marry under 20 ; whereas a son whose father is 54 and mother 39 when he is born can marry a girl only one year younger than himself, because his father and mother retire at 55 and 40 respectively.' I do not know why it should be impossible on Mr. Adam's premises for a man in the first case to marry a woman a year or more older than himself, still less why any principle laid down by Plato compels us to play with figures in this way. Push the calculation a generation back, and ask how many men of 26 would be eligible to marry the girl of 21. It is clear that the archons would be hampered by a network of useless taboos, and that the law of relationship would strangle the law of utility. Adam almost admits this when he adds that 'Plato did well to introduce a saving clause' (6), allowing brothers and sisters to marry. What function could the law of relationship possibly fulfil in controlling marriages? The archons required no such guide, for they knew who were blood relations and obeyed the law of utility. A definition flung so widely as this must be meant for minds with no exact knowledge—that is, for the guardians in general rather than for the archons.

Does the law then apply to the irregular unions? Adam thinks that the effect of the prohibition 'would be greatly to restrict, but not to abolish, unauthorized liaisons.' But why should Plato desire this effect, or choose such inconsequent means to bring it about? If he desires to prevent consanguineous matings, why forbid so many that carry no such stigma? if to restrict free unions, why permit any? and in either case, why draw a line between the permissible and the illicit on no rational principle? To take Mr. Richards' view first, all guardians may be divided into two groups, according as their age is within or above 30 years of any particular guardian who has passed the prime. But under rules (4) and (6) he or she may unite with neither class, so that the liberty which Plato appears to grant by rule (3) is precisely cancelled! This contradiction nullifies any attempt to base the law upon the age of any individual guardian. If, with Mr. Adam, we try to reason from the ages of the parents of any individual, still another difficulty besets us. *Ex hypothesi* the guardian forming a free union has no clue to the ages of the four people upon whose years of marriage the legitimacy of the union is said to depend. Was Socrates jesting when he gave Glaucon the formula by which a man might know his kin? It is evident that this second interpretation gives no guide, while the first guides to nothing. But Plato's text admits of neither rendering, for how can the veto on the union of brother and sister apply primarily to free unions, when Plato says that he is repeating a prohibition just made (ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν)? Any mention of brothers or sisters was pointedly avoided in the

¹ *Republic*, 461c.

restriction actually laid on these liaisons (3). As that is only two sentences back, we cannot lightly accuse Plato of such a wanton contradiction. Indeed Adam admits that 'the discrepancy is hard to explain, especially as the list of relations in 461d seems intended to be exhaustive.' It is exhaustive for Plato's purpose, as will be seen.

Consider how these views make Plato end his marriage plan. He leaves guardians who have passed their prime at liberty to form free unions, but forbids intercourse with older or younger generations. Then he states a law of relationship which covers this, and now forbids them to unite with brothers and sisters as well, though he imagines that he has already done so, which is not the case. Having in this roundabout way revoked the licence he had given, he discovers that the new law gravely affects marriage, and interjects a saving clause permitting marriages of brothers and sisters under conditions. If Plato wrote like this, would not his scheme collapse in ridicule? In truth these interpretations are ambiguous on two points. They have not decided whether the law of incest depends upon the Greek family or the divisions of the guardian family, and so have set an obscure penumbra round the old principle forbidding consanguineous unions. Consequently they have not assigned to the law any precise function, whether it is to direct the archon or to deter guardians from unholy acts. If the latter, then the rule must be so comprehensible that he who runs may read. We should expect, and we shall find that the law conforms to the natural divisions of the Platonic family.

Undoubtedly all of a generation are to be counted as brothers and sisters, for we have seen that any calculations which might pick holes in the general rule could not possibly be made by those who fall under it. But how is a generation reckoned? The answer must be that the definition is based upon the generation in their prime. The guardians form a family all of whom are related as parent to child or brother to sister. We must not be misled by the humorous particularity of the law mentioning the 'tenth—yes, and the seventh month,' but consider for whom the law is meant. Now the *Timaeus* puts this beyond doubt, for it states that the archons are to 'devise that all shall consider themselves all as kin, those who come within the age of prime as brothers and sisters, those beyond and above as parents and the progenitors of parents, those below as offspring, and the children of offspring' (18c-d). This conception is implied by the *Republic* itself, where the marriage period or entry on marriage are the datum points from which relationship is reckoned (5). It is clear that we must cast aside the idea that relationship and marriage are mutually exclusive—that is, tenable only so long as relationship implies close consanguinity—and admit that none but brothers and sisters can marry. What then is the purpose of the law of relationship? In order to establish this it is necessary to consider the effect of the prohibitions laid down by Plato.

The first two prohibitions give little difficulty. Jowett and Campbell make Plato forbid anyone over or under the marriage age to bring forth for the state. But they cannot, for the archons select only children of those who are

legally married. Bearing for the state is a function performed by selected women between 20 and 40. What Plato does forbid is interference by *men* over or under their prime with such births,¹ and the real offence is meddling with guardian women between 20 and 40. It is characterized as impious because such unions are formed surreptitiously and without due rites. So far, then, women in their prime are protected from men outside the marriage age. The second prohibition equally safeguards them from men of their own generation. Its effect is to confine the sexual relation between such to legal marriage. Together these laws adequately protect women reserved for bearing guardian children. They do not form the marriage law proper—which directs archons to mate men and women within the specified ages according to the law of utility, but they prevent any violation of that law on the part of the guardian family. The danger of such infractions would be that adulterine children might be foisted on the pure guardian stock, and that promiscuity might break down the brotherhood. But it is one thing to forbid, another to gain obedience to a new code of morals. Plato speaks of such unions as impious (461a) and their offspring as unholy (461b). How will he persuade the guardians to feel that it is so?

It is at this point, I think, that interpretation has gone astray. Next follows the dispensation (3) to men and women past their prime to make what liaisons they will with certain restrictions. If the law of relationship in all its detail is intended to apply to these free unions, the plan is put together out of focus, and seems, as was seen, to be riddled with contradiction. Our clue must be the fact that Plato is fortifying his marriage plan against specific dangers. His two prohibitions have forbidden two types of liaison which threaten the state mothers. Now the liberty accorded to older guardians is simply a consequence of the limitation of the marriage age. If men and women within that age can be joined by the archon only, the archon can join no others. Hence those who may no longer marry are left free to follow their own inclination.² "Οταν δὲ δὴ . . . ἐκβῶσι τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀφήσομέν π ο υ αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέρους, κ.τ.λ. This is not the language of a law. *The law is contained in the restriction that follows.*

This restriction (4) prevented cohabitation with parent or grandparent, child or grandchild.³ The reason why brother and sister are omitted from this careful list must be connected with the relation of one generation to another.

¹ Οὐκοῦν ἐάν τε πρεσβύτερος τούτων ἐάν τε νεώτερος τῶν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν γεννήσεων ᾗσεται, οὔτε δσιον οὔτε δίκαιον φήσομεν τὸ ἀμάρτημα. . . . This refers to a certain act, and not to the purpose of the act. Indeed, it is beyond the power of any individual to try to get his child into the fold. τῶν γεννήσεων is abstract for concrete τῶν . . . γεννωσῶν.

² Even the disposition of children is left to them, though there is no doubt of the wishes of the archons (see part III.).

³ Adam's remark that the relations named

here are in the direct line, and that Greek law permitted marriages between uncle and niece on the father's side is not in point. As the sole relationships recognized in the guardian family will be those of parent and child, or brother and sister, the only question is why Plato specifies the former here and omits the latter. Nor is it relevant to mention the 'revolting views' of the Cynics on the marriage of blood relations. Both of these references treat the Platonic scheme in terms of consanguinity, which is not in question.

This rule would prevent guardians past the age from casting their eyes upon either those in their prime or those approaching it, and conversely the latter would be constrained to look upon the older men and women as parents only. The fact that Plato mentions more than one generation upwards is evidence that he is not thinking primarily of the older guardians but of the state parents, who are to be kept inviolate. Here indeed is the sanction which is needed to fortify the first prohibition. The 'older' or 'younger' who intrude upon the state births have now the nature of their impiety made manifest. The law safeguards marriage solely, and is concerned with free unions only so far as they threaten it and its purposes.

After the definition of relationship, Plato repeats his command that brothers and sisters shall not touch (*ἄπτεσθαι*) one another (6). As this cannot refer to the free unions for reasons already given, it must supply the missing religious sanction for the second prohibition, which forbade state parents (*οἱ ἔτι γεννῶντες* and *αἱ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γυναῖκες*) to touch (*ἄπτεσθαι*) one another unless the archon joined them (461b). If there could be doubt of this, the *Timaeus* would resolve it by echoing the language of both prohibition and its proper sanction in one phrase—*ἀδελφὰς μὲν καὶ ἀδελφοὺς ὅσοι περ ἂν τῆς προεπούσης ἐντὸς ἡλικίας γίνωνται* (18c-d). There are thus two prohibitions which effectively secure marriage from the risks that the common life of the guardians might entail. Then Plato crowns each prohibition with its proper religious sanction to ensure due respect and awe. Only this hypothesis, so far as I can see, will explain why Plato separated these sanctions, and why the restriction in the direct line is appended to the licensing of free unions, while the second sanction, affecting those of marriageable age alone, is delayed till it can be placed alongside the marriage-law proper (7).¹ They serve his purpose only because his definition of relationship embraced the whole guardian class in its three stages—before, during, and after the physical prime. To his living imagination it *was* a family, and he took over the names of parent and child, brother and sister from the patriarchal group and adapted them to their new setting.

This scheme of relationship brings every irregular union of men and women who are or may be state parents under the ban of incest, by extending the bounds of the Greek family to the limits of the guardian family. Now Plato is able to do so under his theory of the *γενναῖον ψεῦδος*. His first great difficulty had been to reconcile the whole state to the division of classes, which was a complete innovation and involved friction, because citizens were shifted from one class to another according to the principle of function. He fortified the new plan by the hoary myth of the four races and the autochthonous origin of man (*πεῖσαι δὲ συγχῆς πειθοῦς* 414c). All in the state were brothers sprung from earth, but brothers with a difference, according to the metal the god had mixed in (415a). In Book V. he proposes an even more dangerous change, since his guardians were thrown together in intimate friendship by the

¹ See the interpretation of rule (7) below.

first wave. He must be certain of some stored inhibition strong enough to withstand the *ἔμφυτος ἀνάγκη* (458d) which might wreck the community, and this he draws from the family that his scheme is destined to supplant. The way is prepared at the outset. Socrates warned Glaucon that a courageous doctor would be needed to administer the necessary drugs (458c-d), and this direct reminiscence of the medicinal lie¹ prepares for some *συχρὸν ψευδὲς καὶ ἀπάτη* (c) which will ensure respect for the new laws. The archons manipulate the lots according to the law of utility, but the guardians are to believe that chance is responsible. But the 'right deception' hardly stops there. So far, if it is believed, guardians will accept marriages that are decreed. But what will prevent the disappointed from forming unlawful connections? The *δόξα* implanted in all guardians that they are brothers and sisters, parents and children, is intended to have this effect, because it is founded on a sanction drawn from an immemorial tradition and fortified by religious awe. Plato's regular word for any such device is *μηχάνη*, and consequently *μηχανᾶσθαι* is used in the *Timaeus* to describe the archons' task.²

But Plato did not merely divert a residual fund of feeling to sustain a new system. The conception of brotherhood compacted and grappled his guardian family together in the bonds of friendship. This was the positive result of the first wave, now deepened by the second. If he was successful in combining these, then guardians would be friends, and friends only,³ except for the period when religion ordained marriage for a special purpose.⁴ But marriage is only episodic in the more permanent state of kinship. The religious sanctions are therefore intended to safeguard both marriage and friendship. That is why

¹ Cf. 382c, 389b.

² *Tim.* 18c. *μηχανωμένους ὅπως . . . νομοῦσιν δὲ πάντες πάντας αὐτοὺς ὁμογενεῖς κ.τ.λ.* (cf. *Rep.* 460c). Note the use in 18c of *μηχανᾶσθαι* about the lots. Also *Rep.* 415c of the myth of the four races.

³ As this conception must seem somewhat unreal, it may be illustrated on a small scale by the feeling of many people about the Deceased Wife's Sister Bill. They argued that the Bill disturbed the comfortable custom whereby the wife's sister could bring up her brother-in-law's children without suspicion of indecorum. Even if they did not believe in the religious sanction, they thought it a convenient *δόξα*. This appeared to be the view of the leader of one of the Scottish Presbyterian Churches. Now some of Plato's guardians might hold the belief like Lord Hugh Cecil and others like Mr. Matthew Arnold, but either attitude would serve his purpose. In the light of English experience, we should not too hastily call Plato's device visionary.

⁴ The strict limitation of marriage in a circumambient atmosphere of *κοινωνία* is a direct corollary of the thesis about the nature of 'same' and 'different' in the first wave. There Plato argued that the difference of sex was an incident

in natures that were essentially alike, because capable of the same *ἐπιτηδεύματα*. He therefore makes of the difference a special restricted function in order to give full scope for the 'guardian' function. Are not Jowett and Campbell, followed by Adam, mistaken in taking 456b to refer to the marriage of guardians? They suppose that Plato recommends guardians who are like in nature (*συγγενεῖς*) to marry, and the Oxford editors find that this passage contradicts the *Politics* and *Laws*. But the passage simply concludes from the previous argument that like natures shall live and exercise guardianship together (*συνοικεῖν καὶ συμφύλαττειν*). *συνοικεῖν* is qualified by the word that follows, and refers to the common life, not to cohabitation as in 457d or 461e. This seems to be certified by the question in 451d, to which the answer is given here—*πότῃρα συμφύλαττειν οἰόμεθα δεῖν ἅπερ ἂν οἱ ἄρρενες φύλαττωσι . . . καὶ τὰλλα κοινῇ πράττειν, ἢ τὰς μὲν οἰκουρεῖν ἔνδον, ὥς ἀδυνάτους διὰ τὸν τῶν σκυλάκων τόκον τε καὶ τροφήν κ.τ.λ.*; Of course the women are to bear children for the men, but the relevant question is whether they are to share their full life; *συνοικεῖν* is the alternative finally preferred to *οἰκουρεῖν ἔνδον*.

Plato's justification of the scheme naturally turns into a hymn in praise of friendship.

There is now no difficulty about the so-called 'exemption' or 'saving clause' (7)—ἀδελφούς δὲ καὶ ἀδελφὰς δώσει ὁ νόμος συνοικεῖν, εἰάν ὁ κληρὸς ταύτῃ συμπίπτῃ καὶ ἡ Πυθία προσαναιρῇ. Ὁρθότατα, ἢ δ' ὅς. This follows the veto on the union of brothers and sisters, answering to the phrase μὴ συνέρξαντος ἄρχοντος in prohibition.¹ The marriage scheme ends fittingly with the regular and only law of marriage—as the guardians are to know it. The archons will follow the law of utility, but their μηχανάιναι shall have every possible sanction. Both Richards and Adam find προσαναιρῇ difficult because they consider that particular cases are in question, and both presuppose that the priestess must give her sanction in advance and once for all. But the present tense, the force of προσ-, and the order of the verbs, exclude any such interpretation. Nor are we forced to give it. For Plato describes the normal procedure to be carried out at each marriage festival. First the drawing of the lots,² then the solemn embassy to Delphi with the full list of marriages, and then the festival of prayer and sacrifice—such are the 'devices' which surround the occasion with awe.³

It is hard to avoid importing the categories of consanguinity into Plato's scheme, yet we cannot interpret it till we conceive his terms as he did. He wished to carry over the *feeling* though the *fact* was no longer the same. It is misleading to talk of a 'law of incest' or of 'prohibited degrees,' because our law prevents marriage or any other sexual relation, while Plato's law protects marriage. Both our law and his have in common only the fact that they are conceptions based on deep inhibitions which guard the family against instincts that might otherwise wreck it. Nor is it strictly correct to speak of marriage; for there is no state of marriage but a state of brotherhood with holy marriage seasons intercalated, as it were. Lastly, there is a risk in talking of the 'community of wives' if it makes us ignore the 'community of women.' The community reached beyond this special relationship, which was indeed strictly limited in order to leave room, as Plato thought, for a deeper fellowship. This is the unity of the guardian family, based on the common nature and pursuits of the two sexes. Συγχωρεῖς ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίαν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἣν διεληλύθαμεν, παιδείας τε περὶ καὶ παίδων καὶ φυλακῆς τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν . . . [δεῖν] πάντα πάντῃ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν κοινωνεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα πραττούσας τὰ τε βέλτιστα πράξειν καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ θήλεος πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν, ἢ πεφύκατον πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ κοινωνεῖν; Συγχωρῶ, ἔφη (467c-d compare 451d). This is how Plato ends his proof that the second wave is 'best.' It is best, he thinks, because the strict limitation of

¹ Jowett and Campbell.

² 'It is strange,' says Richards, 'that Plato should say "if the lot so fall" because it could not fall otherwise.' But the function of the lot was to fall upon *this* brother and *that* sister (ταύτῃ). Otherwise no brother could touch any

sister. The condition is necessary in view of the veto imposed in the previous clause.

³ The mention of the *ιεροὶ γάμοι* also appears to link Plato's innovation with the immemorial feast held at Athens in Γαμήλιον, at the *σύνοδος* of sun and moon.

marriage and the prohibition of other sexual relations among the marriageable has enabled him to preserve the full *κοινωνία* between the sexes.¹

To sum up, the clue to the marriage regulations lies in the fact that there are two sets of laws, one of which guides the archons, while the other is intended to control the minds and passions of the guardians. Both aspects are connected in the phrase *εἶεν δ' ἀν' ἱεροὶ οἱ ὠφελιμώτατοι* (458e); for a set of *δόξαι* based on religious sanctions induce the guardians to acquiesce in the law of utility.² The effect of the laws conjointly is to get the best offspring for the fold, and to secure, at a price, the unity of feeling which the 'first wave' required. So far as he could, Plato abstracted the 'difference' of the sexes from their 'likeness.'³

III.

The sole purpose of marriage was the production of fit children. The best of these are selected for the 'fold' or *σηκός*, where future guardians are first to be reared. What happened to the rejected, or rather, on what principle were the children disposed of? Of the three following sets only the first are put in the fold at birth:

- A. { (1) Children of the better guardians. } V. 459d-e,
 (2) Children of the worse guardians. } 460c.
 (3) Maimed children of the better.

There may be added the wider classification, which includes A:

- B. { (4) Children who are promoted (or recalled) to the guardian }
 class from a lower class. } III. 415b.
 (5) Children who are degraded from the guardian class to }
 a lower class.

It will be seen at a glance that in Book V. the only criterion is physique and pedigree, while Book III., which discusses original *φύσις* and education,

¹ I may add a word on a criticism of Aristotle's, which presupposes some of the confusions referred to above. He asks how crimes against a relative can be guarded against or expiated when the author does not know his father or mother; this will be especially difficult, he thinks, owing to the interchange between classes, where newcomers will not feel themselves full members of the class and will be more likely to commit such crimes. The answer is that Plato's system made any crime against a fellow-citizen, and particularly against another guardian, an impious act. As the greater includes the less, impieties done in ignorance are now impossible, since all citizens are *ὁμογενεῖς* (378c . . . *οὐδ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο δοῖον κ.τ.λ.*, 415a, and for guardians e.g. 463c-d). Plato's scheme might be open to the criticism that impieties would be common—though constant training (378c) and the religious *δόξαι* were to inhibit them—but there could be no unconscious impieties. But of course Aristotle argues

from the ordinary religious feeling of the day. In truth, the force of the first two waves was expended in order to secure the ideal which Aristotle sets up against the community of women—*φιλιαν τε γὰρ οἰόμεθα μέγιστον εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεσιν* (*Pol.* B. 4. 1262b 7). *Κοινωνία* is simply Plato's word for the spiritual relationship that Aristotle called *φιλία*.

² Compare *τὸ μὲν ὠφελιμον καλὸν* [457b] with *συχνῶ τῷ ψεῖδει καὶ τῇ ἀπάτῃ κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν δεήσειν χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἀρχόντας ἐπ' ὧ φελλία τῶν ἀρχομένων* [459c].

³ How far did the prohibitions apply to those over their prime? Just as far as Plato laid down. He was careful to secure that these unions should have no offspring, but they did not interfere with marriage or with the *σηκός*, which were his main care. He could hardly have contemplated a general breakdown of sanctions, but in Book V. he is legislating solely for the protection of marriage.

sifts the children of all classes. For the second wave is concerned solely with new-born infants of the guardian class, but Book III. brings in the relations between the classes. What is the fate of groups (2) and (3)? It has been held that these, with the offspring of guardians over the marriage age, are condemned to exposure, although the *Timaeus* definitely states that (2) are to be removed to the other part of the town.¹ Adam attempts to surmount the supposed disagreement of the two dialogues by asserting that the *Timaeus* refers to Book III., which it seems to echo. This may be so, but even more decidedly it echoes Book V., as the following parallelism proves :

<i>Rep.</i> 459d-e.	<i>Rep.</i> 460c.	<i>Timaeus</i> 19a.
α. καὶ τῶν μὲν [ἀριστῶν] τὰ ἔκγονα.	τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν [ἐκγονα] . . .	καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὰ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν.
β. τρέφειν.	λαβοῦσαι εἰς τὸν σηκὸν οἴσουσι παρά τινας τροφούς . . .	θρεπτέον ἔφαμεν εἶναι.
γ. τῶν δὲ [φαυλοτάτων] μὴ . . .	τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων . . . καὶ εἴαν τι τῶν ἐτέρων ἀνάπηρον γίγνηται.	τὰ δὲ τῶν κακῶν.
δ. καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γιγνόμενα λαυθαίνειν πλὴν αὐ- τοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας.	ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσιν ὥς πρέπει.	εἰς τὴν ἄλλην λάθρῃ διαδοτέον πόλιν.

A difficulty that Adam felt now disappears. He saw that τὰ τῶν κακῶν (col. 3) did not precisely fit the ἐκγονος ὑπόχαλκος ἢ ὑποσίδηρος of Book III., and invoked the not infrequent inaccuracy of Plato's cross-references to overcome the discrepancy. But the reference to Book V. is almost verbally exact. The *Timaeus*, in fact, professes to tell what happened to offspring of guardians in groups 1, 2, 4, and 5 above; groups 1 and 2 were placed in their appropriate class at birth, while 4 and 5 also contained children who were redistributed according to merit at a later date.² The résumé confirms the distinction already noted between Books V. and III., while the omission of the maimed is easy to account for, *de minimis non curat—collectio*. This result endangers the structure of Usener and Brandt's chorizontic theory. According to them, the earlier edition of the *Republic* is represented by Book III. but not by Book V., and the *Timaeus* refers to the former edition. But we find that the recapitulation echoes both Books III. and V. in a single sentence.

Now it would be strange if an echo pointedly contradicted its original. Why have scholars accepted the contradiction as fact or ignored the allusion to Book V.? The reasons are (1) the opposition of τρέφειν and μὴ in 459d, (2) the coupling of the children of the worse guardians with the maimed in col. 2 above, and (3) the ill-omened ending of that clause. Another reason,

¹ For literature, see Adam, *Republic*, I. p. 357, and notes on Book V.

² 19a, καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὰ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν θρεπτέον ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ τῶν κακῶν εἰς τὴν ἄλλην λάθρῃ

διαδοτέον πόλιν· ἐπαυξανόμενων δὲ σκοποῦν-
τας αἰετὸς τοὺς ἀξίους πάλιν ἀνάγειν δεῖν, τοὺς δὲ παρὰ
σφίσιν ἀναξίους εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐπανιδόντων χώραν μεταλ-
λάττειν.

which has nothing to do with the offspring of marriages, will be discussed in its proper place.

Unless *τρέφειν* has a specialized sense, the most natural alternative would be death. But the *Timaeus* shows that there are other alternatives, for the rejected children are simply placed in another class. If we interpret the *Republic* by itself, *τροφή* should be that which the official *τροφοί* or *τροφῆς* supply to the children of the fold (460c), and need not exclude any other rearing outside that. Indeed Plato so defined the word at the beginning of this discussion; for the question raised is *γενομένους πῶς θρέψουσι*, [449d] or *τίς ἡ κοινωνία τοῖς φύλαξιν ἡμῖν παίδων τε πέρι καὶ γυναικῶν ἔσται καὶ τροφῆς νέων ἔτι ὄντων, τῆς ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ χρόνῳ γιγνομένης γενέσεως τε καὶ παιδείας*, ἥ δὴ ἐπιπονωτάτη δοκεῖ εἶναι.¹ So while Nettleship² says a little too much in suggesting that *τροφή* is used in the emphatic sense of educating as guardians and auxiliaries, either here or in the *Timaeus*, he is essentially right. But the second wave is dealing with *τροφή* and not with *παιδεία* at all. Its question is, 'Who shall enter the nursery?' not 'Who shall enter the school?'

It is argued, however, that the sentence in col. 2 shows that the alternative is death. The whole matter turns on the reason why the children of the worse are coupled with the maimed. If they are to share a common fate, then the phrase would be hard to get over. But it is explained in the next sentence that the object of the severance is to keep the race of guardians pure. So the vital point is who shall and who shall not be admitted to the *σηκός*, and the question about infanticide is subsidiary, in fact a modern issue. If the *Timaeus* is right, the children of 'the worse' were merged in another class. What happened to the maimed is a different matter. Plutarch³ says that the fate of Spartan children who were weaklings was to be cast into the *Apothetai*, and there is no good reason for doubting that the crippled in Plato's state were to suffer the same fate. To spare the one group and to sacrifice the other is in accord with the law of function. The strictly negative terms in which their lot is indicated may not be merely euphemistic, but possesses the ambiguity of a 'compromise formation,' as it has to cover two cases, the secret conveyance of group (2) to another class, and the exposure of group (3). The *Timaeus* gloss on the first alternative, where secrecy is vital, seems to be *λάβρα*, for it is said there that the rejected children are to be 'secretly' placed out. Now *ἀπορρήτη* is proper to state secrets; *ἀδήλη* suggests the difficulty of tracing a child or retracing an origin, and *κατακρύψουσι* emphatically means 'to conceal.' Though all these words may contain a darker meaning for one case, that does not exhaust their significance. If *λάβρα* does not refer to this, why is such an individual touch added in a short résumé? It cannot well be disposed of as a mere echo of *λανθάνειν* in 459e, for that covers *all* the

¹ 450c. Compare the common phrase *τροφή* καὶ *παιδεία*, e.g. 423e, 424a, 451d, noting the force of *ἀποδιδόντες* in the last passage.

² *Lectures on the Republic of Plato*, p. 174.

³ *Vita Lycurgi*, XVI. His discussion appears to show the influence of the *Republic*.

arrangements for marriage and birth, whereas 460c and *Timaeus* 19a still further specify the manner in which children unneeded by the *σηκός* are disposed of (see parallelism above). The reason for this secrecy is that faction arises when people are discontented with their station. Further, *λάθρα* cannot refer to the older children who have been found unworthy, for they would remember the place whence they had fallen. Hence they are summarily 'thrust out' without 'pity,'¹ even though they are the sons of those who expel them.

'Aristotle also understood infanticide to be intended,' writes Mr. Adam, 'when, in criticizing Plato's community of children, he wrote, *ἀδελον γὰρ ᾧ συνέβη γενέσθαι τέκνον καὶ σωθῆναι γενόμενον* (*Pol. B. 3. 1262a. 5*). We have here an argument that it is not possible for guardians to regard each child as 'my child.' It turns on the question, 'Is my son, if I have one, among these whom I am to call "my children," or is he not?' The word *σωθῆναι* is taken to suggest infanticide. But Aristotle certainly did not mean that all rejected children of guardians shared this fate—*ἀλλὰ μὴν περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν τὰ γιγνόμενα τέκνα, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τεχνιτῶν εἰς τοὺς φύλακας, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκείνους πολλὴν ἔχει παραχῆν, τίνα ἔσται τρόπον* (*Pol. B. 4. 1262b. 25*). Consequently he understood that there was a regular transference of rejected children to the other classes.² This criticism can only apply to the sifting of new-born children (*τὰ γιγνόμενα τέκνα*). We must therefore translate *σωθῆναι* in the light of Aristotle's proved interpretation. If it means 'saved alive,' then the word covers both those who died and the maimed, but no others, and the criticism, though minute, is valid. But the parent's question is much wider. 'Is my son here among my so-called sons?' This is the broad argument from *ἄγνοια*, and Aristotle was probably making it. It is an anachronism to assume that he, any more than Plato, was particularly moved over infanticide.³ On the contrary he proposed for the maimed exactly the fate that Plato seems to allow.

The sense of the texts is confirmed by Plato's general principle of selection. In choosing the infants, the archons are to be guided by the same considerations as breeders of horses or of dogs. The 'worse' guardians are simply worse in comparison with the latter, but they are superior to other classes.⁴ For they have been selected, and, as time goes on, are the offspring of the doubly and trebly sifted. Their children are the marginal products of

¹ This is conclusive against the view that the *Timaeus* refers solely to Book III.

² It is not to the point to ask whether Aristotle was justified in supposing that new-born children of other classes were at once admitted to the *σηκός*. All that matters is whether he interpreted Plato like Adam in respect to infanticide, since Adam claims his support. It is clear that he understood the interchange between classes to begin at birth. Since the guardians would supply plenty of physically fit children for the *σηκός*, here is no need to suppose that the offspring of

farmers and artisans were promoted till the education began. This is the inference to make from the *Timaeus* and Book III.

³ This interpretation gains some support from the parallel phrase in 1288b 20—*ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πῶς ἂν γένοιτο [πολιτεία] καὶ γενομένη τίνα τρόπον ἂν σφύζοιτο πλεῖστον χρόνον*. Here the word seems to mean, not 'saved from destruction,' but 'preserved in its proper type.'

⁴ Cf. 459a where the animal analogy is explained, the worse being good—*καίπερ δυντῶν γενναίων*.

the best class, and are superfluous only because it is limited. The foals a breeder does not retain find their level; most certainly they are not killed. This analogy of the animals does not help the view that Plato sanctioned a wholesale slaughter of children not selected for the fold at birth. The law of utility surely dictates that children not needed as guardians shall be used elsewhere. Usener argues that the *Republic* has no mention of colonization as a means of keeping down surplus population, as in the *Laws* (740), and so must resort to infanticide. This is a desperate argument from the choric. The *Laws* prescribes for a city, and emigration is the one way of getting rid of an absolute surplus; but our Book V. legislates only for a limited class within a city, and for new-born infants of that class, so that the overflow can be directed into other groups, though it must not swamp them. This may be one reason why the archons control the number of marriages. It would be not only inhuman but silly if Plato killed off all children that one select class did not want; nor are we obliged to commit him to the absurdity when he himself explains what is done with the sound surplus.

A word may be added about the children of guardians who have passed their prime and are permitted to form free unions. There is no official τροφή for such (461c), and their probable destiny was exposure, if they came to birth. But it is instructive to note that the archons took no part in the disposal of these, beyond exhorting the parents to deal with them. This was a relatively private matter and could not endanger the fold.

It is submitted that the *Timaeus* accurately represents the proposals in the *Republic*.¹ Plato neither forgot what he had said,² nor changed his mind,³ nor referred to another book than V.,⁴ nor to an earlier edition.⁵ His critics have grouped the passages that seemed to point to infanticide instead of asking on what principle Plato made his distinctions. It is clear that Book III. deals with παιδεία, and includes the interchange between classes consequent on the revelation of the children's character, while Book V. considers τροφή only. Therefore the latter is limited to the original φύσις of young guardians, and other questions are not material. Plato has simply answered the question γενομένων πῶς θρέψουσι?

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¹ If it is asked why a summary should specify more clearly than its original, the answer lies in the purpose of each passage. Book V. was interested solely in the qualifications admitting infants to the fold, and the clauses dealing with the excluded had to cover more than one case. But the summary had to draw together two passages which showed the distribution of all the children of guardians both at birth and after. Its question is, 'How and where will

any particular child of guardian birth serve the city?'

² Jowett. Since the *Timaeus* echoes Book V., Plato could not forget.

³ Zeller. It is not reasonable to look for a change of mind in a synopsis which is otherwise accurate. A summary ceases to be itself when it contradicts its original.

⁴ Adam.

⁵ Usener and Brandt.