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THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO
PSYCHOLOGY.

The creation of a new science is a difficult task. Seldom does a happy inspiration turn its early investigators into the right paths. Bad terms, confused ideas, misleading analogies and the inferences and methods of other sciences constantly lead them astray. Sociology is particularly open to such inroads of foreign ideas and terms. To some it is a physical science and these describe human history as a mode of dissipating solar energy. To the believers in astrology it was an astronomical science and they thought that human events were determined by the course of the planets. To those who held the doctrine of the association of ideas it was a chemical science. They thought that the only real things were ideas, the combining and blending of which created knowledge and belief. To those who hold that society is an organism it is a biologic science and they try to describe it in terms of cells, nerves and ganglia. And now Professor Giddings would make it a psychologic science and finds a social mind, a social will and a social memory among its

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phenomena.* He would have us believe that the social mind perceives and reflects, that it is self-conscious and has the other attributes of individual minds. He admits that the description of society in biologic terms is a mistake, but I am unable to see in what respect his psychologic terminology is an improvement. There are often better terms than those he uses, and when not, better words could easily be found. Social memory is not so good a term as race knowledge, nor is social will so definite as social control. Professor Ross has set a good example by coining terms that will endure because so appropriate.† What could be more expressive than "social ascendancy," "social control" and "social influence." They fill a gap in sociologic terminology and will increase the definiteness of the thought of any one who uses them. Sociologic terms must be developed from those in use in social life just as economic terms have been developed from economic life. Analogies are barren and they bring up trains of thought that mislead the user. Even the best of distinctions lose their force if the words convey a double meaning because used in two sciences. Occasionally an imported word holds its own in a new habitat, but such cases are so rare as to prove the rule that each science must make its own terms and be built up from its own data.

The use of analogy may have some utility in what may be called the kindergarten stage of a science, but it is out of place in advanced instruction or in books intended for mature minds. A recent scientific book has for one of its chapter headings, "The Brain as a Central Telephone Station." I can imagine how some youthful student, restricted to the physical sciences, can by this illustration get some aid in breaking out of the ruts in which his thought has moved, but it seems odd to me that any one should seriously propose such an illustration to the general public as a means of increasing its knowledge. It assumes on its part an

* "Principles of Sociology." Book i, Cap. ii.

† See his article on "Social Control," *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1896.

absolute blank in all that relates to the scientific study of mental science. What more can be said in favor of the solar energy theory of history, the chemical theory of ideas, or the biologic theory of sociology? They may do for novices, who are startled by the thought that human society has laws, but are a block to progress as soon as this concept is acquired. Nor is the theory of a social mind much in advance. The essence of this doctrine is contained in Professor Giddings' statement that psychology is the science of the association of ideas, while sociology is the science of the association of minds.* I take this to mean that the fundamental facts of psychology relate to the chemistry of ideas and those of sociology to the blending of minds into a higher unity. If this be true, simple or unsociologic psychology has to do with nothing but ideas, while advanced or sociologic psychology includes all other forms of mental activity. Beings become social as soon as mental activity becomes complex. Sociology is thus based on psychology, and society needs no outside conditions to promote its growth.

I cannot accept this double psychology because I do not accept the distinction on which it is based. It assumes the truth of a particular theory of psychology which is not above question. The traditional psychology is the creation of a group of sceptical idealists. In the endeavor to get unity and simplicity, they have thrown out all the complex forms of thought that do not fit their theory. Nature, atoms and other objects have been eliminated and the universe is so emaciated that its only content is a single series of ideas. If these sceptical idealists cannot find a place for the objective world or any proof of the existence of other minds, still less can they find a basis in their psychology for the social relations which grow up between men. If the non-self cannot be put on a par with the self, society loses its reality. This mode of reasoning admits of nothing but a crude individualism which pictures each person in a world

* *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

of his own as complete and independent as the series of ideas which makes up his mind.

A reaction from these notions has created a school of transcendental idealists who seek to gather up the fragments thrown out by the sceptics and to make of them a higher mind conditioning these lower minds and determining their activity. Professor Giddings uses the methods of this school when he seeks to introduce into sociologic literature a social mind similar to the higher mind of the transcendentalists. By so doing he joins his forces with theirs and makes his success depend on the truth of their doctrines. No science should, however, have its terms and ideas so constructed that they depend on a particular theory in a related science.

The real evil lies not in his agreement with the transcendentalists but in his acceptance of the narrow dogma of the sceptics that the individual mind has no phenomena but the chemistry of its ideas. Such a psychology must be discarded before a solid basis for sociology can be found. When a more complex concept of the mind is worked out in which other elements of human nature are on equal footing with its sensory ideas, there will be no need of such hybrid concepts as minds above minds or a social will above that of individuals.

The emphasis of a few simple distinctions will make a resort to such a psychology needless. Psychic progress may be either sensory or motor. Progress in the motor powers increases psychic control. In low forms of life each motor centre acts for itself and thus prevents the co-ordination of movements necessary for quick effective adjustment to the environment. Gradually these centres are subordinated to some one centre through which psychic control is exercised. The organism can then affect complicated adjustments and increase its power to sustain life or to avoid pain.

Progress on the sensory side of the mind gives clearer ideas of the environment. The sensory powers should indicate

the presence of any object and the qualities of which it is made up. The perception of any of these qualities should, through the association of ideas, bring up all the ideas the object usually excites. These ideas become clear and numerous by the analysis of objects into their elements and by the associations that grow up between these ideas. Trains of thoughts are ideas so bound together that each idea brings up the next. Long series of ideas are thus formed, the perception of any one of which starts a train of thought bringing up the whole series. Sensory activity starts other forms of sensory activity. It thus tends to perpetuate itself and to check motor activity. Circles of ideas are created, differentiation after differentiation is made, but the ideas perceived are so loosely connected with the motor side of the mind that they do not lead to activity.

Ideas of this kind can properly be called sensorial because the activity they excite is confined to the sensorium. They lead to no movements and cause no adjustments to be made between the man and his environment. A growth of sensorial ideas is the chief result of a purely sensory development. Such ideas, instead of making men more social, reduce the tendency to be social by weakening the connection between ideas and the motor activity which should follow their perception.

It is not then the psychic progress of men that makes them social. Their motor development belongs to an earlier period and their sensory development by itself weakens the social tendencies. From a psychic standpoint, social ideas are not higher ideas, but ideas due to a distorted development of the sensory powers. Society is made, not by any psychic or physical necessity, but by certain complex aggregates of psychic and physical phenomena. The formation of these aggregates and their influence on social phenomena can be explained only by a study of the environment. Although the environment creates the conditions which determines both the sensory and motor activity, yet the

environment of the sensory powers is different from that of the motor powers. Sensations are created by the direct influence of natural forces on the organism. From the vibrations of ether we get sensations of light; from those of the air we get sounds. We can taste only that which has been dissolved in water, and smell only that which has become gaseous. We learn of the coarse aggregates in which the forces and elements of nature are united only by inferences. They are not the elementary forms of sensorial knowledge. The motor reactions, however, do not depend upon these elements isolated and refined, as they must be, to become objects of perception, but to the aggregates into which they are united. Motor reactions are rather excited by rocks, fields, food, houses, animals and similar aggregates, animate and inanimate, of which the world is made up. The sure-footed animal must step from rock to rock. Animals or men find good fields and select the proper food; friends must be aided and enemies destroyed or avoided.

The sensory powers thus depend on universal forces and elements or those so abundant that they rarely become conditions of survival. The motor powers, however, are stimulated by the presence of the limiting aggregates—those complex sources of pleasure that are scarce or those evils that are superabundant. All motor activity tends to remove, modify or create these limiting aggregates. By changing them or decomposing them into their elements pleasure is increased or pain removed. To their peculiarities every motor reaction is due and upon them all motor activity is exerted. There is thus an environment of elements and an environment of limiting aggregates. The elements and natural forces excite sensations. The limiting aggregates create the motor reactions. Each environment has its laws and relations which control the psychic phenomena created by it. Motor activity and sensory activity should therefore be independent in their growth because normally they depend on different conditions. The sensory powers, however,

have been checked in their development by the fact that the limiting requisites have not been among the elements and forces of which the world is made up, but among the aggregates into which these elements are combined. Rarely or never are light, heat, water, air and other forces and elements the conditions of survival. They are usually present in superabundance. The determining conditions are certain aggregates such as soils, rocks, mineral deposits, rivers, seas, peculiar plants, animals and combinations of moisture and heat. Sensory phenomena cannot acquire an importance unless they indicate some limiting aggregate and are joined with some motor reaction which affects an adjustment. The mental units formed by contact with these aggregates are complex, partly motor and partly sensory. The social concepts belong to this class. They are not the outcome of mere contact with the forces and elements of nature, but are due to the necessities and relations of the limiting aggregates. Sociology has nothing to do with sensory or motor phenomena as such, nor with any isolated development of either sensory or motor distinctions. Psychic phenomena become social only when motor reactions of some kind accompany sensory perceptions. The sensory ideas stimulated by external conditions must, to become social phenomena produce feelings of pleasure or pain, of fear or love, of desire or antipathy, of attraction or repulsion. The social unit is an aggregate of these two elements and the form of the social phenomena depends on the way they are compounded. Every social element is thus partly sensory and partly motor.

Such a study is no more a part of psychology than the study of the limiting aggregates is a part of physics. It is true that these aggregates are made up of atoms controlled by physical laws, but the interest of the sociologist is not in the atoms nor in the chemical and geological laws by which they are arranged, but in the complex result. A plant grows because of certain combinations of physical and chemical elements in certain soils and the growth of the right plant

depends on still more special combinations. There is just as much physics, chemistry and geology in a poor soil as in a good one. So also the psychic phenomena of an unsocial man does not differ from that of the social man. The psychologist would find the same elements and ultimate principles in both men. The difference between them lies in the peculiar ways in which the ultimate sensations are aggregated or in the type of reaction which takes place when certain sensory impressions are present. A psychologist could if he chose examine these peculiar groups of impressions and the accompanying reactions just as a geologist could examine a cultivated field, but if either of them did this, they would waste their energies on poor material unless their primary interest was social or economic.

Only one class of ideas can be called social, those whose perception starts motor reactions. In pure sensorial knowledge, all ideas and distinctions are of equal importance. It is like the classification of plants on the Linnæan system, in which unimportant plants get the same attention as the more important, and the differences by which the varieties and species are distinguished are, usually, of a trivial nature. Only the important sensorial distinctions become a part of the race knowledge by which men are kept in touch with the essentials of their environment. Such knowledge is connected more closely with the motor powers than with the pure sensorial ideas. Its essentials thus receive more emphasis, and are so adjusted as to become the starting points of motor reactions.

The art of riding a bicycle illustrates the type of motor adjustments upon which the growth of society depends. When a man walks, the sense of falling starts motor reactions which restore the equilibrium. In riding a bicycle these motor reactions are weakened or lost, and in their place new motor reactions are developed through which the wheel is turned. The equilibrium is restored by a motion of the arms instead of a motion of the body. This change of

instinct does not, however, make a rider of a bicycle physiologically superior to a walker. On the contrary a physiologist might decide that the habitual cyclist was physiologically inferior to a walker.

Social changes are of this kind. They imply different motor reactions, but not those of a higher kind. New objects become limiting requisites and the perception of them creates motor reactions which harmonize with the conditions set by these requisites. The non-social man must be able readily to distinguish differences in objects because they are his best means of detecting enemies, and of avoiding pain. His motor reactions are started mainly by the feeling of fear which the perception of these differences excites. To the social man, similarities are more important than differences. His prominent motor reactions are caused by the recognition of similarities, because they indicate the presence of the agreeable, the pursuit of which is his main object. The attention of the one man is concentrated upon the disagreeable, that of the other upon the agreeable. The differences between the two men are due to differences in limiting aggregates by which they are surrounded, and not to differences in their psychic experiences.

Motor reactions caused by pleasure are not different in kind from those caused by pain. In either case the first contrast is between the agreeable and the disagreeable, between objects causing pain and those giving pleasure. This contrast creates for men their concept of self. The self is not a mere sensory impression with an unvarying content. It includes all those feelings whose perception produces no motor reactions. The non-self is created by motor reactions which eject from the self all ideas associated with the disagreeable. From the first the notion of the self is confounded with the agreeable. We contrast ourselves with the sources of pain and identify ourselves with the sources of pleasure. Pleasure extends the feeling of identity; pain contracts it. In states of pleasure we perceive agreements and harmonies;

in states of pain differences and discords attract the attention. The feeling of identity expands and contracts with changes in the conditions which determine the extent of the agreeable and the disagreeable.

In advanced beings there is a narrower or analytic self and a broader or synthetic self. When pleased, beings expand their personality so as to include all that is pleasurable, while in pain they contract it so as to exclude all causes of pain. The self of man thus depends upon his moods and these in turn upon the environment. This expansion and contraction of the self is also much greater in a pleasure economy than in a pain economy. In the latter the self cannot be extended beyond a limited group of similar objects because so many of them have pain associations. Nor can it be contracted so as to exclude the bodily organism; the identity of the self and its organism is a necessity to beings so situated that their first thought must always be of the organism. The synthetic self might however be so expanded as to include the whole universe. Many tendencies in this direction show themselves as soon as the thought of a pure pleasure economy is acquired. It is only the realities of a world of pain that check their growth. In a pleasure economy the organic self does not demand first attention and its parts may be isolated from the self. This tendency is strengthened by the fact that the evils of a pleasure economy are largely due to the weakness or over development of bodily organs. Such men must learn to distinguish between the flesh and the spirit and in this way the analytic self becomes an abstract concept with no sensory qualities.

This thought of a variable self may perhaps be made clearer by representing the scope of the possible variation in the feeling of identity as a plane with two extremities. At one extremity the self is contracted so as to be purely abstract; at the other it is so expanded as to include every thing within itself. The self identifies itself with the universe. In a given environment the plane of identity is much more contracted.

Its synthetic extremity would be the point of greatest expansion in the feeling of identity of which the agreeable elements of the environment will admit; its analytic extremity is at the point of greatest contraction in the feeling of identity consistent with the being's welfare. In such a society there would be an equilibrium of identity somewhere between these two extremities towards which the feeling of identity in its members would tend. Those whose feelings of identity correspond to this equilibrium would be normal; all others would be abnormal because they include too much or too little in their concept of self. Individuals are sceptics if their concept of self is abnormally small; they are mystics if this concept is abnormally large. The mystic cannot see how the sceptic can contract his personality so much and the sceptic is equally at loss to know how the mystic can include so much in his personality. There is thus a gulf between them which reasoning alone cannot bridge. Changes in the environment move the equilibrium of identity nearer to one extremity or the other thus making new classes of men normal and abnormal. The sceptics or the mystics of one age may seem to have the opposite qualities to people of another age merely because the equilibrium of identity has changed. The normal self is relative to the conditions of existence.

Social reasoning depends on the content given to the self. Only as the feeling of identity is expanded can the organism, the material world, society and the universe become real to men. Should their attitude become strictly sceptical all these would become unreal. Trains of sensorial ideas alone would remain. It is the synthetic self that is the basis of society. To the analytic self individualism is the only logical system. It regards the social forces as unreal. The synthetic self is the active self; the analytic self is due to our passive states. We are therefore synthetic in activity and analytic in passive enjoyments. Our interests in activity are more extensive than in the enjoyment of the reactions due to the contact with external objects. Enjoyment being thus more

individual than activity the equilibrium of identity even in the normal man moves toward the one extremity or the other as he increases or decreases his activity. In his active states he becomes more synthetic and by identifying himself with more objects becomes more social. To become social thus means an expansion of the feeling of identity and not an extension of the consciousness of kind. The one means an enlargement of motor activity and reactions and hence social solidarity, the other means merely an increase in sensory impressions which need give rise to no social phenomena.

The emphasis which Professor Giddings gives the latter concept is well deserved, but it is not the original and elementary fact upon which society is based. Consciousness of kind is a variety of the class of likenesses, and likeness depends upon the recognition of a common element in a complex aggregate. In two objects certain elements among many are seen to be alike. This attitude of mind, however, by which the complex of objects is first recognized, and then the points of agreement, is characteristic only of rational men in advanced societies. The primitive man sees only a few qualities in each object and he identifies them if they have points of agreement. Red objects are to him not alike; they are identical. All reds are red. He does not have the power to recognize a complex aggregate of qualities. If nothing else, the inability to count would prevent this. Objects are known by some one quality for which there is an interest in the same way that they are recognized by children. To the child a shining plate is not *like* the moon; it *is* the moon. To the primitive man also objects are identical whose dominant qualities are the same.

The kinds of the primitive man therefore are not the organic classes which rational men recognize; nor are they due to common blood and ancestry. Those things are of a kind that have a prominent element in common. Differences in which there is no interest do not come clearly enough

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into consciousness to prevent the rise of the feeling of identity. The primitive man puts himself in a class with a hawk, a wolf, or any object in which he sees some quality common to it and to him. The shadow, the image in water, the dreamed-of spirit are identified with the self for similar reasons. The self is in all objects that are similar and agreeable. Any injury done to them is an injury to him and any power over them extends also to him. Classes based on heredity and ancestry come much later when an analytic attitude is acquired. Until it is known that sexual intercourse is the cause of child bearing, ties of blood cannot be recognized. Descent from an animal or plant seems as natural as from a human being. The primitive man was more apt to see a resemblance between himself and a wolf or bear than between himself and his offspring.

We can understand this state of mind only by recognizing the differences between ourselves and the primitive man. We classify objects and beings by the sensory impressions their presence creates. Objects are known by their length, weight, color, shape and other physical qualities. They are in essence so much material and are made by the blending of certain sensory elements. The primitive man recognized neither objects nor beings in this way. He conceived of every thing as living and classified it according to its movements and activities. Those objects were of a kind whose acts were alike. If a man put himself in the same class with a hawk, a bear or a fish it was because he recognized a similarity between his actions and those of the animal. His sensory powers were not well enough developed to classify by sensory distinctions nor had they an importance to him that demanded such a classification. His thought was concentrated on the activities of surrounding objects and naturally his classifications were determined by the necessities of his situation.

Consciousness of kind, however, depends on the sensory impressions which beings make. It is a recognition that

men have the same feelings, ideas and characters. A man is a man because he lives, thinks and feels and not because of his activities or occupation. The recognition of kind through activities and occupation is a mark of the unsocial man. The fellow feeling between bakers, builders, farmers and members of other trades produces clans and factions which do not indicate the true likenesses and furthermore are obstacles to the growth of a society. Such classifications and contrasts must disappear before a true consciousness of kind emerges. It is a product of the sensory development of men and has appeared only in recent times. To me it is an important contribution to sociology because it is the antithesis of the concepts and ideas of primitive men. It gets its force and clearness because it sweeps away all those narrowing concepts which depend upon affinities generated by common activities, occupations or ties of blood. We need a term that connotes none of these and has no associations that bring up historical relations or primitive conditions. Consciousness of kind should express the broadest relations that unify the race. But it cannot be used in this way and at the same time be made the basis of primitive societies and the cause of the first bonds which held men together.

If we would be true to history we must seek the first social forces in the conditions of the environment in early ages. When men began to live in social groups the bonds holding them together were external. The primitive man, it must be kept in mind, was in a pain economy. He was powerless before objective conditions and helpless in the presence of enemies. In the open world he had to struggle and to fight like other animals and be dominated by their motives. His only relief was in some hidden nook into which he could escape from his enemies. Even the animals had their lairs in which they were free to follow other inclinations than those dominant in the outside world. Here the beginnings of a pleasure economy were made, and about it a group of associations were formed that made society. The word home now conveys the

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ideas that the early lair, cave or hidden nook made possible. Home and kindred terms are environment ideas. They call up a place, a local habitat free from the evils of the outside world. The early man tolerates another man not because of any recognized similarity, but because the latter is associated with some place and bears a mark that calls it up. The bond is in objective space, in local conditions, and not in any subjective idea. Animals check their hostility and recognize a friend not because of any purely organic odor or similarity, but from the odors of the lair, place odors which cling to them because of their contact with its objects. Wash them thoroughly and they become strangers. He is an enemy who has another place odor.

For these reasons place and pleasure are inseparably associated even in the animal world. The primitive man, therefore, starts with instincts which make him friendly to any one that bears the marks or arouses any thoughts of his home, his place of refuge. Primitive kinship is based on ties of place and not of blood. Those are friends who have the same place of refuge from which all pain activities are excluded. Habits, movements or marks acquired in such places were the original means of identification. They brought up pictures of a common home and checked those antagonisms which otherwise would be supreme. A group of such individuals would, however, form but an economic aggregate, among whom there would be no bond but their temporary interests. A true society must have some permanent hold on its members, some means through which the common interest can assert itself and check the self-assertive tendencies among its members. There must also be some form of control through which the few can compel the many to accede to their wishes. Social control is limited by the utility of the society to the individual, and before it can be exerted efficiently there must be some important pleasure or pleasures from which the leaders of the society can exclude refractory individuals.

Of this fact, the social control exercised through fire is a good example. In primitive times isolated individuals could not preserve fire and very few knew how to create it. The formation of permanent groups being a necessity the tenders of the fire became a special class, ruling the group and fixing its customs. The home now had an objective reality in the altar on which the fire was preserved, and to move it was a difficult process. Attachment to home was thus increased, and the fire became sacred because it was the objective bond of social unity. This sacredness was extended to those who tended it and to all who were near it. The altar and the home were places of refuge in or around which no acts of violence could be committed. Special fire marks became totem signs, carrying with them the sacredness of the home and altar. That the fire and the altar were at least early bonds creating permanent societies is shown by the persistence of these ideas in all religious and family life. Within historical times the perpetual fires were kept burning, guarded by a special class. In religious services the altar and burning odors still persist. The Roman family had its altar, and even in modern times the hearth has a sanctity. If fire-worship was not the first religion it certainly dates as far back as any.

Thus we see that the home, the family and society are environment ideas. They are due to the place relations, which the early types of a pleasure economy created, and are changed and developed with the changes it has undergone. To these common pleasures the different forms of control are due. Men subordinate themselves to external conditions or to other men, so that they can participate more fully in the enjoyments of a pleasure economy. Impulses are thus generated, which expand the feeling of identity, and thus bind the individual to all the objects and persons in his pleasure world. He acts with them and through them as naturally as though their dictates originated within himself. The earliest type of control is objective. The feeling of identity

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is so extended that outer objects are included in it. The self is made to include all pleasurable objects, and the non-self is co-extensive with painful objects. Both groups of objects are personified, and men feel that their welfare depends upon them. These objects thus exert a control over men and cause them to modify their activities so as to conform to the conditions which their relations to these objects create. This state of mind causes the fetish worship of the early races.

Social control comes later, and cannot be made effective until certain group or home pleasures have become requisites for survival, and the resulting societies are enough differentiated to place these pleasures under the control of individuals. The relation of ruler and subject is developed and feelings arise which will make each class identify itself and its interests with the other class. A feeling of partial identity results. The ruling class is necessary to the happiness of its subjects, and at the same time it appropriates so many sources of happiness that its interests are opposed to those of its subjects. Where group interests are involved the feeling of identity is so extended that ruler and subject feel themselves to be one. In matters of wealth, however, where their attitude is analytic and their identity is severed, the temptations and dissipations of a pleasure world affect the ruling class, and make them so selfish that they cease to identify themselves with their subjects. In time the same causes narrow the feeling of identity of the subjects, so that it includes only the members of their own class and then social control in an objective form is an ineffectual means of promoting social welfare, or even of preserving society.

Social control becomes diffused with the progress of society. The more objective and centralized it is, the more coercive is its power. Each of the older institutions in its beginning was a requisite for survival, and those who exercised control through it were absolute in power, and could thus mould society and determine the instincts and impulses of its

members. This power, however, is lost when new requisites for survival arise and the old means of control become more common. The early priest through the sacred fire, the altar and the church exercised an absolute power over society. But each new form of control has reduced this power, until now the clergyman has little to distinguish him from the layman. The forms remain, but the power is gone. The early king in turn was equally absolute, but this power is so much lost that the English kings now have little but the name that resembles their predecessors. The soldier has in a like manner had his day, and now drops to the level of other citizens. The control exercised through wealth has a like history. No form of wealth was so powerful as landed property in early times. It shaped society and determined who should survive, and what should be his qualities and sentiments. Capital in the form of food is a less effective means of social control than in land. It dominates the workman less than the landowner did his serf. Fixed capital in buildings and machinery is still less powerful. The workman is now much less under the influence of the large capitalist who furnishes him tools and a working place, than he formerly was under the influence of the small employers who gave him food and shelter. Each new form of wealth is less easily controlled by a class or by a firmly united group, and it is more difficult for this class or group to keep the wealth in its hands for any length of time. Land as property is more stable and enduring than capital. Fixed capital in machinery and buildings is subject to more risks than supplies of food. Stocks and bonds in great corporations are even less secure and less likely to remain in the same hands for a long time.

The more objective forms of social control are in a pain economy. They become less stable and extensive with each transition to a pleasure economy, in the end must be displaced by a diffused subjective control through which each individual checks the inclinations of other individuals to subordinate society to their interests. This diffused control

is the ideal of a democratic society, and would in a pure pleasure economy displace, or at least transform and disguise, other forms of control. There would still be the church and priest, but they would not stand between the individual and his God. The ruler and soldier would exist, but without a will of their own. Wealth and culture would be as powerful as ever, but every one would participate in them and share in the control they exert. There would still be a nobility, but every one would feel the stimulus which family and heredity give.

It is only in cases of diffused control that a feeling of the consciousness of kind displaces the feeling of identity upon which earlier societies are based. Objective social control cannot be exercised except when the subject, in a measure at least, identifies himself with his ruler. He magnifies the points of similarity and neglects the differences between himself and others. Only in democratic societies do men think of others as having points of similarity and yet differing in many particulars. Primitive people cannot endure people *like* themselves. They demand that every one with whom they come in contact shall be identical with themselves. He is a friend who has the same faith, habits and activities. A single conscious contrast makes him a foe.

Although it is customary to speak of the common qualities of men, it should not be forgotten that these qualities are abstract concepts. They are the products of an advanced civilization, and demand for their visualization a more analytic attitude than the primitive man possessed. It has taken a long education for men to separate that which is accidental or peculiar to individuals from those race characteristics which all men possess. Without this distinction upon which the thought of a species is based, men cannot think of others as like themselves. There is either a feeling of identity or of hostility.

The common qualities in men only become vivid after repeated transitions from environment to environment. Each

transition brings out new requisites for survival, separates the temporary from the permanent and concentrates the attention upon those features which are essential to the new conditions. The ideas created by the new conditions are not thought of as new and acquired, but are projected backward into the past and thought of as though they were the ancient possessions of the race. A race thinks of itself as always having existed in its present environment, and hence ideas really new are assumed to be old and a fabulous history is constructed to account for their origin. In an unconscious way each race constructs a history which conforms in a measure to the order of events which would have taken place if its whole development had been in the present environment. A superior sanctity is thus given to the principles and rules of conduct which present conditions demand.

This tendency is emphasized by the gradual transition from a pain to a pleasure economy. The race assumes that in the distant past it had a golden age in which the advantages of a pleasure economy were realized, and from which the ideas and rules of conduct necessary in the new conditions are supposed to be derived. A natural state of man is merely a visualization of men's concepts of a pleasure economy. It varies with each stage in the development of a race because the new conditions demand new principles and ideas. A natural right is a rule of action or a safeguard which would have developed naturally and consciously if the race had always been in a pleasure economy. In a pain economy men have no natural rights. There is merely the rule of force. In escaping from such a society men picture a pleasure economy and draw from it the rules and principles by which they are governed in their new conditions. Had the development of men taken place in a pleasure economy, government might have been the result of a contract and each natural right might have been acquired in a conscious way when the race advanced to a point that made its possession vital to future progress. The necessities of a pain economy

did not permit progress to be normal, and hence the rights of men are based on a fictitious history created after the need of the rights is felt.

Liberty and equality, for example, were not among the concepts of primitive men. They were acquired only at a late stage of progress after a partial transition had been made to a pleasure economy. Their basis lay in the conditions of the present environment and not in the history of the race. A logical development of these ideas out of present conditions does not satisfy men. They prefer to visualize and idealize the principles vital to present prosperity, and to do this they picture the past in a way that does not conform to reality. If the race had developed normally on the logical basis upon which the principles of government and of social activity rest, it would coincide with the historical basis upon which men prefer to base them. The historical order in which ideas and principles arose would be the same as the logical order in which a rational being would develop them. The two series cannot present ideas and principles in the same order if society, beginning in a pain economy, is gradually transferred into a pleasure economy. The visualization of ideas which takes place under these circumstances is true to the logical order. The concept of a golden age or of a natural state gives men a logical basis for action, and aids them to develop principles suited to present conditions, but it forces them to be false to history.

Men cannot visualize an idea without constructing a picture of a concrete condition in which this idea has a prominent place. When an ideal environment is once made, it is so much more vivid than the one in which history shows the race to have been, that the former displaces the latter, or, at least, is so blended with it that its features are much more prominent. Through this process of visualization, men reconstruct history and make it subserve their present needs. It is seen to the best advantage in periods of transition, because in them new types of men come to the front and

acquire a prominence which they could not have if progress were normal and in a single environment. We are apt to think of a race as developing by steady accretions. Each age would then preserve the leading elements in the national character and add to them some characteristic helpful in the new conditions. Progress of this kind is normal and in such a society some one type of men continue in a leading place. A marked period of transition, however, destroys the superiority of the dominant type. Some of the characteristics of the race are no longer of use, or at least they lose their distinctive superiority, while the characteristics demanded by the new situation may be more developed in a type of men who were at a disadvantage under the old conditions. Judged from the standpoint of the old society, an inferior man now tends to survive. Instead of a regular progress, society reverts to a more primitive type and then begins to move along a new track.

There is also a degeneration among individuals of the dominant type in the old society. The safeguards against the temptation and vice of the new society are not sufficiently developed in them. The soldier, for example, is well suited to the vicissitudes and hardships of a campaign, but yields readily to the temptations of peaceful prosperity. The transition from a period of war to one of peace is marked therefore by a degeneration and a practical extinction of the type of men that carried the nation safely through the earlier epoch.

If the new type of men is compared with the earlier type at its best period, the tendency to revert can be easily measured. The dominant class, and especially its leaders in the struggle which the transition brings on, are men of a more primitive type than were the men they displaced. Compare, for example, the leaders of the great religious awakening in England during the eighteenth century. Value the services of Wesley as highly as we may—yet it must be admitted that he is a man of a much more primitive type than Butler, the leader of the rational movement.

Wesley has little understanding of natural law; he believes in witchcraft, and in his reforms he tries to restore the doctrines and conditions of the primitive church and the anthropomorphic concepts which prevailed in it. Yet he succeeded in transforming the religious thought of his age because industrial transition displaced through degeneration the dominant class of the earlier period and left the nation in the possession of more primitive men who were capable of a development in harmony with the new conditions. Take again the leaders in the French revolution. Rousseau was a man of a more primitive type than the leaders of the preceding epoch of French thought. He had many of the characteristics of a savage and his concept of nature belonged to a much earlier epoch. The other leaders in the same movement had similar characteristics and they could not have succeeded but for the fact that the great industrial changes destroyed the superiority of the dominant class of the earlier epoch and caused them to degenerate. Primitive men and primitive concepts could thus assert themselves and create the basis and motives for a new civilization.

It is, however, an exaggeration to identify the leaders in new social movements with primitive men. It would be better to call their ideas primal than primitive. Primal ideas are the sources not of meditation and analysis, but of activity. No sooner are they perceived than motor reactions begin, resulting in some action or motion. These ideas, like those of primitive men, have few or no sensory reactions bringing up series of associated ideas. They differ widely from the sensorial ideas that revive each other without leading to activity. Ideas usually have one or the other of these kinds of associations dominant. Either their connections with the motor reactions are strong or they are closely associated with other ideas and merely excite long trains of thought.

The difference between the two can be illustrated by the effect of the word "attention" on a soldier and on a school

boy. The word to the soldier starts motor reactions creating certain activities. To the school boy, however, the word is associated not with activity, but with reflection and analysis. He expects his teacher to analyze a plant, to solve a problem or to perform an experiment. He has, therefore, a series of analytic ideas put before him which he must remember, but with which no activity is associated. The work of school boys is largely confined to the acquisition of sensorial knowledge. They acquire merely a series of associated ideas without any outlet in activity. A table of dates, long numerical calculations and languages acquired merely for discipline are examples.

The analytic type of mind creates a multitude of such ideas. Objects are divided into parts and redivided without end. A great number of ideas are formed which are never excited, except as parts of a long series of concepts. They are clear and definite, but their presence in consciousness merely arouses other ideas of the same series. A circle of ideas is thus formed which promote discrimination, meditation and delay. Men whose ideas are of this type are clear thinkers, but weak in action. They become dominant in advanced societies, and it is among them that degeneration takes place in periods of transition. Their activities do not harmonize with their knowledge. They lose sight of the essentials to life in a multitude of minor distinctions. In the process of degeneration these circles of sensorial ideas are broken up. Many of them are lost because they are never aroused except as parts of the circle of ideas to which they belong. Those that remain do so because they are directly connected with the sensations coming from the outer world or because they are associated with motor activities. The circles of thought become shorter and the motor reactions direct and vivid. The ideas are those of advanced men and are clear and definite, because they are the products of analytic thought. They are, however, shorn of the associations connecting them with the ideas from which they are

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derived or to which they are related. Their strong associations are now with motor reactions, and their perception leads to activity and not to the analysis of their content or to the history of their growth. In this respect they are like the ideas of primitive men, and the men who perceive them in their full force act with the promptness and efficiency of primitive men. Such ideas are the starting points in men's thinking, but not the first ideas they held. Primal ideas are thus primitive in form, but their content is like those of advanced men. Social ideas are of this class. They have their origin in complicated sensorial reactions and discriminations, but when once formed their sensorial associations are weakened or lost. They become independent of the circles of thought by which they were created, and form the connecting link between sensations coming from the outer world and the motor reactions which adjust men to it. They have, therefore, the simplicity, directness and independence of primitive ideas and are easily mistaken for them. The thought of equality and fraternity appears simple and primitive, yet they are based on analyses which only advanced men can make. Although the sacredness of life and the golden rule seem to have great age they are concepts foreign to primitive men, and arise only when mental analysis has made great progress. Nothing seems simpler or older than the thought of nature, of God, or of heaven. Yet the ideas associated with these words were changed many times before they acquired their present clearness and the power to direct the activities of men. Such ideas have gone through many periods of degeneration and reversion, in which they lost their original sensorial connections and were brought into closer touch with the motor powers.

Men with such ideas are synthetic in their thought and feel more keenly the harmony between themselves and other objects and beings. The concept of self is enlarged because more ideas relate to objects that are agreeable and hence capable of being joined to the self and identified with it.

The consciously disagreeable may be more pronounced but it is concentrated in fewer objects. The mass of objects become indifferent or so universally agreeable that in their enjoyment no contrast is made between the self and the non-self. The world, it is thought, would be a paradise but for a few prevailing evils. When men perceive that evil lies not in the nature of things but in a few discordant elements, they identify themselves more fully with society and the universe. Men who believe a personal devil to be the source of evil are more social than men who believe that natural objects, being impure or unclean, are the cause of their woes. It is better to believe in witches than to attribute the evils of life to the inanimate objects with which men come in contact. So also men who think that their evils are due to oppression, to their rulers, to particular measures or policies have a larger personality than if they believed mankind to be depraved and all their associates to have evil designs. Such men do not differentiate themselves so sharply from the persons and objects with which they come in contact. It is no wonder that when they become leaders in great social movements they pervert history. Real history is not sharply contrasted with their fancies. The lines between the two are so vague that it is easy and natural to change the order of events to suit their own ends. They view the past more as a picture than as a series of events. By such men the historical order of events is converted into the logical order and through their influence men picture the past in a way that harmonizes the two possible bases upon which social doctrines and institutions can rest.

Professor Giddings encourages this transformation when he makes the consciousness of kind a member of the logical series of ideas and at the same time gives it a place in the actual series of social ideas which have been developed in the history of the race. It cannot from the circumstances of the case be the first member of both series. If it is the original subjective datum of society in the sense of being the first in

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the historical order, it cannot be the elementary datum in the sense of being the source from which men derive their principles and institutions. There can be no doubt as to where it really belongs. It is an idea of late origin projected backward into an ideal past, just as other ideas of the logical order are. The consciousness of kind is not the cause of society but is the product of social evolution. It is made the basis of society by a conscious process and gets its age in the same way that other ideals and natural rights acquire their alleged antiquity. With a different emphasis and a more vivid setting it may become as cogent a force in social progress as any of the group of ideals to which it belongs. But such work is for the reformer and not for the scholar. The latter should isolate the elements which the former strives to blend and visualize.

If this analysis of social phenomena is correct, the connection between psychology and sociology is not that of dependency. Social ideas are not simple psychic elements, but complexes due to the blending of certain sensory ideas with motor reactions. The sociologist must perceive that the feeling of identity is not indecomposable and unvarying, but is capable of change, and corresponds to the conditions set by the environment. There is a social self to be contrasted with a non-social self, but not a social mind to be contrasted with the individual mind. The psychic qualities distinguishing the social from the unsocial, lie within each man and not in any higher psychic unity which their relations to each other create. The requisites for survival which succeeding environments create determine the direction of social progress, but the peculiarities of each epoch are due to the kind of social control which its requisites make possible. Social control is exercised through objects necessary for all men and yet capable of monopolization. The more objective these requisites are and the more they are under the control of a few individuals, the more does society seem like a social mind. This concept is merely the personification of

social control. When social control is objective and concentrated, such a personification is easily made; it becomes increasingly difficult, however, in advanced societies in which social control is diffused. There is, therefore, no good reason for calling sociology a psychologic science. It is much better to assert its independence and to develop its terms and ideas out of its own material. In this way progress may be slower, but it will be surer and in the end will give sociology a place in the hierarchy of the sciences equal in rank with physics, chemistry, or any other independent science.

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