The Classical Quarterly

<http://journals.cambridge.org/CAQ>

Additional services for *The Classical Quarterly*:

Email alerts: [Click here](#)

Subscriptions: [Click here](#)

Commercial reprints: [Click here](#)

Terms of use : [Click here](#)

Some Problems in the Grammatical Chapters of Quintilian

F. H. Colson

The Classical Quarterly / Volume 10 / Issue 01 / January 1916, pp 17 - 31

DOI: 10.1017/S0009838800004390, Published online: 11 February 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0009838800004390

How to cite this article:

F. H. Colson (1916). Some Problems in the Grammatical Chapters of Quintilian. The Classical Quarterly, 10, pp 17-31 doi:10.1017/S0009838800004390

Request Permissions : [Click here](#)

SOME PROBLEMS IN THE GRAMMATICAL CHAPTERS OF QUINTILIAN.

IN January, 1914,¹ I published in the *CLASSICAL QUARTERLY* an article on the Five Grammatical Chapters of Quintilian, in which I endeavoured to set out the general scheme of the writer and his relation to the educational practice of his time. In the present paper I propose to deal with some of the numerous difficulties of detail—difficulties both of text and meaning—which crop up in chapters 4-7. The technicality of the subject and the abbreviated method of treatment produce much obscurity, even when we have no reason to doubt the text. And as to the text, one can but echo the words of Varro with regard to philological and grammatical questions, ‘*librarios haec spinosiora indiligentius elaturos putavi.*’ The result is that these chapters provide perhaps more problems than are to be found in the same limits in any first class Latin writer—problems which, though not perhaps of much intrinsic importance, have that interest which must always attach to questions which have baffled generations of commentators. I have divided the questions which I have treated into two classes. The first consists of passages in which I feel some confidence in the text which I have adopted or the meaning which I have proposed. The second consists of those which I fear must be left unsolved, though I hope that I have been able to advance the discussion a few steps.

I.

(I) 4, 20 :

adiciebant et adseuerationem ut ‘eheu’ et tractionem ut ‘fasciatim.’

Quintilian is here speaking of two other parts of speech which certain unknown grammarians wished to add to the received eight. Although these additions did not obtain acceptance either from Quintilian or posterity, we must suppose that they were more or less in harmony with the general principles of Latin and Greek grammatical science, and shall expect to find some trace of the distinctions which they represent.

¹ As in that article I stated that no scholar appeared to have treated these chapters since 1886, it should be said that this statement, though true as far as the scope of that article was concerned, requires some qualification when we speak of the problems of detail, with which I am dealing here. There has been a

certain amount of discussion of some of these questions in German and American periodicals, and Meister's edition of 1886 has been followed by Fierville (1890) and Radermacher (1906). But Meister and Radermacher give no commentary, and that of Fierville solves few or none of the difficulties.

I pass over the 'asseverations' for the present, and come to the mysterious 'tractions' exemplified by 'fasciatim.' The older editions and some MSS. had 'tractationem,' which was amended by Stoer to 'attrectationem,' and this remained the accepted reading till Halm. Spalding explained it as follows: 'talibus aduerbiis utimur, cum singulas res aut manu aut mente quasi apprehendimus et contrectamus.' So Lewis and Short give "'attrectatio," a term applied to words which denote a taking of many things together, e.g. "fasciatim," Quint. I, 4, 10.' Fierville read 'attractionem,' to which he gave the same meaning. Halm, who was followed by Meister and Radermacher, restored the 'tractionem' of the MSS., but none of the three attempt to explain the meaning.

Apart from the question whether any of the suggested words can bear the meaning attached to them by the editors, it seems to me almost incredible that any grammarian, however misguided, should have segregated 'collective adverbs' as a separate part of speech. I find the solution in quite another direction. It is to be found, I believe, in these words of Diomedes, which are paralleled in various forms in other grammarians: 'aduerbia aut suae positionis sunt aut ab aliis partibus orationis trahuntur.' Compare the following passage, from Heliodorus (*Gram. Graec. Hilgard*, III. 96):

τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν (i.e. adverbs) πρωτότυπα, τὰ δὲ παραγωγὰ· πρωτότυπα μὲν οἶον ναί, οὐ, νή, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔχεται ἀφορμῆς ἐτέρας, ἀλλὰ πρωτόθετά ἐστι. παραγωγὰ δὲ οἶον ἑλληνιστί, ἐπεὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑλληνίζειν παρῆκται.

Heliodorus goes on to show that these παράγωγα are derived from all parts of speech—e.g. from nouns, *βοτρυδόν*; from verbs, *κρύβδην*, etc.

'Tractum' (tractio) then is a synonym for 'deriuatum' ¹ and a translation of παραγωγόν (παραγωγή), and here signifies an adverb derived from a noun, verb, etc., as the case may be, in contradistinction to adverbs, which have no such origin, such as 'nuper,' 'heri.' A little reflection will show that this distinction corresponds to a necessary stage in the evolution of grammatical ideas. Amongst the parts of speech the adverbs were 'discovered' late.² Before this adverbs like οὐ or νή must have been regarded as conjunctions, while *βοτρυδόν* and the like belonged to the parts of speech to which they were attached. Early grammar did not clearly distinguish between declension (ἑγκλισις) and derivation (παραγωγή). Indeed even Varro regards 'Romae' as being a 'declinatum' of 'Romulus' as much as 'Romuli,'³ and Quintilian speaks of verbs in -ito as 'declinata' from the parent verb.⁴ *Βοτρυδόν* then was not merely derived from a noun, but *was* a noun, and *κρύβδην* *was* a verb. When the conception of the adverb as that which 'fills up and explains the signification of the verb' was reached, it is not surprising that grammatical thought boggled at the idea of bringing together words which had belonged to such different

¹ Cf. Quint. 8, 3, 32, and the grammarians frequently.

² Dion. Hal. *de Comp.* 2.

³ *L.L.*, 9, 37.

Quint., 9, 1, 12.

categories, and that some were for a compromise by which the adverbs which had been conjunctions were regarded as adverbs proper, and the others were classed together as *παράγωγά*—hybrid adverbs in fact which belonged partly to the adverb genus, partly to the parts of speech from which they were ‘tracta.’¹

Thus the fact that ‘fasciatim’ is a collective adverb—a fact which, if I am right, has misled all the commentators—is a mere accident. It may be asked why Quintilian gives so odd an example, instead of the ordinary adverbs in *-e* and *-iter*. The answer is, I think, very simple. An account of the ‘tractions’ would naturally begin with the ‘tracta a nominibus.’² These would begin with the 1st declension, and the only adverbs formed from the 1st declension are these adverbs in *-tim*. ‘Fasciatim’ therefore probably headed the list of examples in the authority which he consulted.

(2) 4, 28 :

‘itur in antiquam siluam’ nonne propriae cuiusdam rationis ? nam quod initium eius inuenias ? cui simile fletur. accipimus aliter ut
‘panditur interea domus omnipotentis Olympi’
aliter ut
‘totis usque adeo turbatur agris.’

Here ‘quod initium eius inuenias?’ means no doubt, as Spalding says, ‘We can find no 1st person to “itur.”’ Quintilian proceeds: ‘We take it in one way as “panditur domus,” in another as “turbatur,” etc.’ Take what ? Spalding appositely remarks that ‘were the two “ut”’s absent, the object of “accipimus” would be the two quoted lines.’ As it is, we must understand ‘passium huius modi.’ This, he says, is ‘duriusculum.’ Halm apparently felt the difficulty, for he notes that Spalding would omit the ‘ut’s. It seems to me that there is a very easy correction ready to hand. I read either—

cui simile fletur. <tur> accipimus aliter ut, etc.

or

cui simile fletur. accipimus aliter <tur> ut, etc.

I prefer the former, as giving a better position to ‘tur.’

Compare “‘ris” syllaba” (6, 14) and “‘tis” syllaba” (5, 62). If it is objected that in these cases the word ‘syllaba’ is added, it may be answered that Quintilian constantly varies his use or non-use of ‘litera’ with letters of the alphabet, and therefore may do the same with syllables. Also here we are thinking of ‘tur’ not so much as a syllable as an inflexion with a meaning. Compare also ‘Consentius’ (K 370), ‘uerba impersonalia . . . aut in e et t literis finiuntur aut in tur exeunt.’

¹ So Quintilian (1, 4, 29) speaks of ‘noctu’ as a ‘uocabulum’ (i.e. noun) ‘in aduerbium transiens.’

² As in the example from Heliodorus quoted above.

(3) 5, 21 :

nam 'mehe' quoque pro 'me' apud antiquos tragoediarum praecipue scriptores in ueteribus libris inuenimus.

Lindsay (*Lat. Lang.* p. 422) would read 'mi' for 'me.' This view, which otherwise seems to me hardly consistent with the sense of the whole passage, is rendered impossible by a consideration of Quintilian's usage. Quintilian *never* adopts the practice which is commonly found in Varro and also in Cicero ('in "optimus,"' *Or.* 161) of prefixing a preposition governing an ablative to a quoted noun in another case. His practice is as follows: (a) when possible he brings the noun into the construction of the sentence—e.g. 4, 13, 'Valesii Fusii in Valerios Furiosque uenerunt'; 6, 23, 'si "sulpuri" et "gutturi" subicerent in genetiuo litteram o mediam, quia esset "eboris" et "roboris"; (b) when the noun has to be expressed in a case which will not come into the construction, he regularly prefixes some substitute for the article¹—e.g. :

5, 22 : in hoc 'Camillus.'

7, 27 : 'cui' tribus, quas proposui, litteris enotamus, ut ab illo 'qui' distingueretur.

6, 24 : in eo quod est robur roboris.

In 5, 21, therefore, 'me' must be retained, and it also follows that it is ablative, not accusative.

(4) 5, 68 :

iunguntur autem aut ex duobus Latinis ut 'superfui' 'subterfugi,' quamquam ex integris an composita sint quaeritur, aut integro et corrupto ut 'maleuolus,' 'aut corrupto et integro' ut 'noctiuagus,' aut duobus corruptis ut 'pedisecus.'

Quintilian is here describing the four methods of forming Latin compound words, according as the two elements are 'integra' or 'corrupta'—i.e. altered or not from the original form. The words 'quamquam—quaeritur' have been misunderstood, I think, by the commentators. Gesner supposed that the persons who raised this objection considered that as 'fui' in 'superfui,' and 'subter' in 'subterfugi' lost their accent, they ceased to be 'integra.' Spalding and Fierville repeat the explanation. Spalding remarked that in this case no compound word could be 'ex integris,' and he might have added that on the same theory 'noctiuagus' would be 'ex duobus corruptis.' But as

¹ Except when the case required by the construction is nominative or accusative.

I may take this opportunity of correcting a slip in my article of January, 1914. Incidentally I explained the words "'gladia" qui dixerunt genere exciderunt' (5, 16) to mean, 'those who use "gladia" in the 1st declension. Quintilian

might say "'dixerunt 'gladia'" (nom.), if the point lay in that particular case, but as here he is speaking of a noun as a whole, he would have said 'gladium' if he meant the 1st declension. 'Gladia' must be neuter plural, but the point did not affect my argument.

Quintilian merely mentions the theory in passing, this is not a fatal objection. It is more to the point that on this explanation 'composita' is superfluous. It seems to me that what the objectors meant was 'if both elements are "integra," is the word really "compositum" (σύνθετον)? Is it not rather to be regarded as two words, "apposita"?' So Apollonius (*De Cons.* IV. 316) thinks it necessary to show that τὰ ἐκ τελείων φωνῶν συντεθειμένα have really σύνθεσις, and not merely παράθεσις.

(5) 6, 4:

eius (i.e. analogiae) uis est ut . . . incerta certis probet: quod efficitur . . . comparatione similium in extremis maxime syllabis, propter quod ea, quae sunt e singulis, negantur habere rationem.

Fierville's note on this passage, the silence of other editors, and the fact that I for long misunderstood it myself, have induced me to include it in my list. Fierville quotes Varro, *L.L.* 10, 79, 'in uerbis quae non declinantur analogia non debet quaeri ut in his "nequam mox uix."' He then adds that 'Quintilian has changed the meaning of the passage by restricting the category of words where one must not look for analogy to monosyllables.' He might have said that Quintilian had made nonsense of the passage—for nonsense it seems at first sight. If analogy holds good at all, why, one asks, should it not hold between 'flo' and 'no' or 'res' and 'spes'? I was for some time disposed to bring the passage into harmony with Varro by supposing 'e singulis' ('casibus' perhaps having dropped out) to be a translation for μονόπτωτα,¹ and to mean 'indeclinables.' But the following passages from Charisius (K. 138), "'os" monosyllabam extra analogiam esse Plinius scribit,' and from Martianus Capella (III. 299) "'as" et "mas" cum sint monosyllaba analogia non tenentur' show that monosyllables are really meant. It follows, I think, that 'extremis syllabis' above means the whole syllable, and not the termination—i.e. the laws of analogy hold between 'funis' and 'panis,' but not necessarily between 'funis' and 'puppis.' On this assumption monosyllables would be 'extra analogiam' because no two monosyllables, unless they are identical, can have the same last syllable.

The point has some bearing on Nettleship's theory, against which I argued in my last article, that this chapter is taken from Pliny. If Charisius is right, and Pliny held the theory that monosyllables were 'extra analogiam,' he must have held presumably the theory about final syllables, with which the other is bound up. But Quintilian holds no such theory. He mentions it indeed here, but not only does he qualify it with 'maxime' and perhaps dissociate himself from it by 'negantur,' but he argues throughout in a way in which no one who held Pliny's theory could argue. Thus in 6, 25 he gives the couples 'uirgo, Juno,' 'fusus lusus,' 'cuspis puppis,' as examples of 'similes positiones'—i.e. words with similar nominatives—which are yet

¹ Cf. Mart. Cap. iii. 242, 'monoptota ut "nequam."'

declined differently. Pliny might possibly have quoted the last two pairs as exceptions to his own rule, but would he have coupled them with 'uirgo Juno,' which on his theory 'non debent analogiam'? And this is by no means the only case in chapter 6, where Quintilian regards similarity of termination rather than identity of the final syllable as the proper basis of analogy.

(6) 6, 13:

illi autem idem cum interrogantur cur aper 'apri' et pater 'patris' faciat, illud nomen positum, hoc ad aliquid esse contendunt.

The thoroughgoing analogists, when challenged to give a reason why two nouns with such strong general resemblance as 'aper' and 'pater'¹ should be declined differently, reply that they belong to different classes, 'pater' being 'ad aliquid' and 'aper' not.

The idea of relative or 'ad aliquid' nouns appears regularly in the grammarians, and can be traced back to Dionysius Thrax, who gives us as a class:

πρός τι ἔχον ὡς πατήρ υἱός φίλος δεξίος.

It is explained by Consentius, K. 339, as well as anyone:

haec enim alium intellectum secum trahunt. patre enim dicto intelligas simul filium et magistro dicto intelligas simul discipulum necesse est.

But the word 'positum' has given difficulty to editors, who have mostly supposed that some adverb has been lost. Thus Obrecht inserted 'simpliciter,' and this was adopted by Burmann, Spalding, and others. 'Nude' has been proposed and 'per se,' this last being based on the definition of 'ad aliquid' nouns as nouns 'quae per se intellectum non habent' (K. 5, 148).

I believe, on the contrary, that 'positum,' or possibly 'positivum,' is right, and that no insertion is required.

The opposite of *πρός τι ἔχον* is *ἀπόλυτον* or *ἀπολελυμένον* (absolutum). Cf. Dionysius Thrax, § 12, *ἀπολελυμένον ἐστὶν ὃ καθ' ἑαυτοῦ νοεῖται, οἷον θεός λόγος*; Priscian, 'absoluta ut deus ratio.' The scholiast is perhaps right in saying that *ἀπόλυτα* exclude other nouns besides *πρός τι ἔχοντα* such as patronymics or comparatives, but at any rate no *πρός τι ἔχον* can be *ἀπόλυτον*.

'Positivus,' on the other hand, though I have never seen this recognized in any Latin dictionary, is the Greek *θεματικός*. *Θέμα* and *θεματικός* are used by Apollonius¹ in the sense of a word which stands by itself, and is not formed from another either by derivation or inflection. Thus *οὗτος* is said

¹ Why should 'aper' and 'pater' be expected to show analogy? Perhaps the answer is to be found in the canon of Aristophanes (Charisius, K. 1, 117) that (1) gender, (2) case, (3) termination (exitus), (4) number of syllables, (5) 'sonus' must be the same. 'Sonus' may mean accent or perhaps general similarity of sound. If the latter, the *ā* in both nouns counts. In either case the genitives of 'aper' and 'pater'

on these principles 'debent analogiam.' Chari-sius in this case makes a mistake when he says, 'pater patris cum faciat et mater matris, cur dissimiliter aper apri et caper capri solet quaeri' (K. 83). For 'mater,' and 'aper' being different genders do not 'owe analogy.'

² A good account of the use of these words in Apollonius will be found in *Gram. Graec.* (Schneider), vol. i., fasc. 2, p. 21.

not to be 'thematic,' but derived from the article. The personal pronouns are said to be 'thematically' declined. Properly speaking, I imagine, *ἀπόλυτος* is applied to function or meaning, and *θεματικός* to form. But the two ideas are easily interchanged. Thus Apollonius says that the nouns and verbs are more 'thematic' than the other parts of speech, meaning that they can form a sentence by themselves, while the others cannot. So, too, while Servius speaks of an adjective used as a substantive as used 'absolute,' Macrobius describes it as 'positium.' Underived nouns or verbs, as opposed to derivatives, are usually called 'primitiva'; but in Priscian, K II. 427, 428, they are 'positiva,' and in Charisius (K I. 268) 'absoluta.' But the interchange between the two is most striking in the case of the 'positive degree' of adjectives. Here 'positive' and 'absolute' constantly replace each other. It is perfectly natural therefore that Quintilian should describe nouns which are not 'ad aliquid' as 'positive.' No insertion is required, and at the most we need only make the small correction of 'positum' to 'positium.'

But is even this necessary? I think not. In the first place, there is great facility of interchange between adjectives in -us and -ivus. Thus we find 'absolutivus' as well as 'absolutus,' and 'infinivus' as well as 'infinitus.' In the second place, we should expect the form 'positum' to be found as a translation for *θέμα*, which appears in Apollonius, as well as *θέσις* (positio) and *θεματικός* (positivus).¹

(7) 5, 17:

contrarium ei uitium, quod *συναίρεσις* et *συναλοιφήν* Graeci uocant, nos complexionem dicimus, qualis est apud Varronem.

tum te flagranti deiectum fulmine, Phaethon.

I add this somewhat trivial point, chiefly to show with what caution much of the dogmatism of German editors and critics of Quintilian must be received.

The text as above, with some variations as to the spelling of *συναλοιφήν*, is read by all MSS. In 1879 Birt, in an article in the *Rheinisches Museum*, pointed out that several of the later Latin grammarians describe this treatment of the vowels as 'episynalifa,' or 'episynaliphe,' and that they also give the same example. On the other hand, they reserve the name 'synaliphe' for the elision of a final vowel before another initial vowel. Accordingly Birt stated positively that *ἐπισυναλοιφήν* should be read in our passage. Meister, in his edition of 1886, adopted this correction. Kiderlin spoke of it as certain in his review of Meister. Radermacher, in his edition of 1906, also adopted it. None of them give any reason for the change beyond a bare reference to Birt, and the ordinary student of Quintilian would conclude that *ἐπισυναλοιφήν* was to be regarded as undoubtedly what Quintilian wrote.

¹ Radermacher has a discussion of this passage in *Rhein. Mus.*, 1905, in which he also arrives at the conclusion that 'positum' is right. But the

article shows to my mind a complete misconception of the meaning of the terms.

As a matter of fact, the correction, so far from being certain, is, I think, almost, if not quite, impossible. Quintilian is telling us what the Greeks called this phenomenon, but none of the critics seem to have troubled themselves to find out the Greek usage. To do this, it is not necessary to ransack the Greek grammarians, for the evidence will be found at considerable length in Stephanus, and indeed in Liddell and Scott. There is no such word as *ἐπισυναλοιφή* known to the lexicographers, and on the other hand *συναλοιφή* was used and continued to be used to describe or at any rate to cover the phenomenon with which Quintilian is dealing here. I submit one typical passage :

ἡ μὲν συναλοιφή γένος ἐστίν, ἔχει δ' εἶδη ἑπτὰ, τρία μὲν ἀπλᾶ, τέσσαρα δὲ σύνθετα. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπλᾶ εἰσι ταῦτα, ἔκθλιψις, κρᾶσις, συναίρεσις . . . ἡ συναίρεσις . . . οἶον παῖς παῖς, αὐῶ, αὔω, Δημοσθένει Δημοσθένι (*Gram. Graec.*, III. 146).

How 'episynalifa' or 'episynaliphe' came to take root in the later Latin terminology I have no idea. It is not indeed difficult to understand that the phenomena of Latin elision, differing as they do from Greek, should have produced some change of terms. It is natural enough that the Greek term for elision, *ἐκθλιψις*, should be felt to be inappropriate to a process in which the 'elided' vowel was retained, at any rate in writing, or to be needed for the elision of the final 'm,' and that accordingly the elision of the vowel monopolized the general term 'synaloepha.' Why, however, the Latin grammarians were not contented with 'synaeresis' to describe the phenomenon of the dissyllable 'Phaethon' I do not know. They may, of course, have followed some side-strain of Greek grammar, now lost. But on all the evidence we possess, when Quintilian says 'quod *συναίρεσιν* et *συναλοιφήν* Graeci uocant,' he gives the correct version of the facts.

II.

I pass on to a few passages, most of which have been much discussed off and on during the last century in Germany, without, I think, any certainty being reached. As I said above, all I can hope to do in these cases is to advance the discussion by some steps.

(1) 4, 10 and 11 :

Atque etiam in ipsis uocalibus grammatici est uidere an aliquas pro consonantibus usus acceperit, quia 'iam' sicut 'tam' (edd. 'etiam') scribitur et quos (edd. mostly 'uos') ut cos (edd. 'tuos'). at quae ut uocales iunguntur aut unam longam faciunt, ut ueteres scripserunt, qui geminatione earum uelut apice utebantur, aut duas, nisi quis putat etiam ex tribus uocalibus syllabam fieri, si non aliquae officio consonantium fungantur. quaeret hoc etiam, quomodo duabus demum uocalibus in se ipsas coeundi natura sit, cum consonantium nulla nisi alteram frangat. atqui littera i sibi insidit : 'conicit' (or 'coniicit') enim est ab illo iacit, et u, quomodo nunc scribitur 'uulgus' et

'seruus.' sciat etiam Ciceroni placuisse 'aiio' 'Maiiam' que geminata i scribere: quod si est, etiam iungetur ut consonans.

As regards the first sentence of this 'locus difficillimus,' as Spalding calls it, I have nothing new to say. I accept in principle at any rate the corrections usually proposed of 'etiam' and 'tuos.' Variants are possible, but the meaning must be that we write 'i' and 'u,' whether they belong or do not belong to the same syllable as the vowel following. The main difficulty lies in the second sentence.

Before dealing with this, however, it will be well to explain the third sentence, which is obscure at first reading through the technicality of the language, though the meaning is not really open to much doubt. The grammarian, says Quintilian, will ask how it is that two vowels only have the property of repeating themselves in a syllable ('in se ipsas coeundi'), while in other cases it is always different vowels or different consonants¹ which come together—i.e. how is it that we find 'ii,' 'uu' in a syllable, but not 'aa,' 'bb,' etc.? Now though the word 'quaeret' suggests at first sight that this is another in the series of 'quaestiones' which Quintilian is proposing for the study of the grammarian, this cannot, I think, be the case. The answer to the question is of course that the first 'i' or 'u' are not vowels at all, but consonants, and the problem would therefore be one which has already been solved. It is clear that this sentence does *not* introduce a new problem, but gives another reason for the belief that 'i' and 'u' are sometimes consonants. Is it likely, he asks, that 'i' and 'u' should be exceptions to the law which otherwise holds of all vowels and consonants, that there can be no repetition in the syllable? and they would be exceptions, if they were not sometimes consonants.

The connection between this and the fourth sentence I take to be as follows: If anyone objects that we do not actually write 'ii,' I reply that Cicero did so write 'aiio' and 'Maiia'; and if we accept this as right, 'i' as well as 'u' must come into the syllable as a consonant ('quod si est,² etiam iungetur ut consonans'). This connection will require that we should read 'conicit,' not 'coniicit.' Spalding preferred 'conicit,' but as a matter of fact, though A gives 'conicit' and the editors elsewhere use this and similar forms, they all here print 'coniicit.' I share Spalding's feeling that in this case the addition 'est ab illo iacit' has no meaning. I understand Quintilian to mean, 'conicit' really has two 'i's,' for it is derived from 'iacit.' If this seems too harsh, there is an easy correction. We might read—

atqui littera i sibi insidit <ut conicit>, coniicit enim est ab illo iacit (as 'conicit,' for that is really 'coniicit,' from 'iacit').

¹ This use of 'frangere' to express the action of one consonant upon another following it in the same syllable is found also in 12, 10, 29, 'illa quae est sexta nostrarum (i.e. f.) quotiens

aliquam consonantium frangit, ut in hoc ipso "frangit" multo fit horridior.'

² I am inclined to think that 'i' has fallen out between 'est' and 'etiam.'

The conclusion that the third and fourth sentences continue the argument to show that 'i' and 'u' are sometimes consonants confirms the natural impression that the second sentence also gives an argument for this belief. But what is the argument? Two views, I think, are possible. It may be as follows: Vowels in the same syllable, if not a mere symbol for a single long vowel, make a diphthong; but these ('ia' in 'iam' and 'uo' in 'uos') are not diphthongs. 'Duas,' however, cannot mean a diphthong, and accordingly Ständer and Ritschl corrected 'duas' to 'diphthongum,' a correction which, though not actually adopted in any edition, has been received with respect.¹ Ritschl accounted for the corruption by the caprice of a copyist, who, supposing 'syllabam' to be understood with 'unam,' altered 'diphthongum' to 'duas' to correspond. This is surely somewhat arbitrary. Perhaps the same result might be obtained more easily by supposing 'aut du < plicem in unum sonum confusas du > as.' But if we are to proceed on these lines at all, I would venture to suggest another solution as being both nearer to the MSS. and an improvement to the sense. Quintilian's argument will be clearer, if we suppose him to have intended to tell us that two vowels in a syllable do *not* really make two, but a single sound. I suggest that he may have written—

aut duplicem sonum² non autem duas.

It would be natural enough that the eye of the copyist should pass from 'aut du' to 'aut du' a few words on, and 'aut duas' would easily be reduced to 'aut duas' to balance 'aut unam' above. This will also give a good meaning, quite in accordance with Quintilian's use of 'nisi' to the words 'nisi—funguntur.' The meaning will be 'to suppose that there can really be two vowels in a syllable, and that also "i" and "u" are never consonants, will land us in the absurdity of supposing that syllables like "iae" and "uae" are made up of three vowels.'

The argument may, however, be something different. It may be: 'There cannot be more than two vowels in a syllable (there is no such thing as a triphthong), and therefore "i" and "u" must be sometimes consonants, for otherwise we should sometimes get three vowels.'³ In this case I would suggest that the sentence be written:

aut unam longam faciunt . . . aut duas (nisi quis putat etiam ex tribus uocalibus syllabam fieri) < quod nequit fieri >, si non aliquae officio fungantur.'

Here the 'quod' will refer to 'duas faciunt,' and the meaning will be this result—viz. that the 'uocales iunctae' make two, and not more than two

¹ Radermacher attempted to improve upon it by printing—

aut < diphthongum, 'non iungimus autem plures quam > duas.

Apart from the arbitrary nature of this insertion, it seems to me to make the sentence still more incoherent. Radermacher, however, confidently says 'restitui sententiam.'

² As a translation of course of διφθογγος.

³ I imagine that editors have usually understood these words to mean, 'No one supposes a syllable to consist of three vowels, unless one of them is really a consonant.' But apart from the question whether this has really any bearing on the argument, it would surely require 'aliqua fungatur.'

cannot be obtained, if 'i' and 'u' are not sometimes consonants. There are two strong reasons for this view. Firstly, much the same reasoning is found in Priscian (K. II. 44): 'nulla syllaba tres uocales habet, unde "u" et "i" non aliter iunguntur diphthongis nisi loco positae consonantium'—i.e. since there can be only two vowels, we infer that 'u' and 'i' before a diphthong must be consonants. Secondly, a good many MSS., though not usually regarded as the most valuable, have the words 'quod nequit'¹ after 'fieri.' In fact, the older editions, including Spalding, retained these words, though the later editions have rejected and ignored them. On the other hand, no doubt this way of treating the passage involves some harshness and obscurity. I do not feel inclined to decide between this and the line proposed above. Only one thing I feel sure of. Quintilian often expresses himself confusedly, but I believe that his thought, if you can get at it, is always logical, and if the common text, as found in Halm and Meister is, as it seems to me, illogical, it cannot be right.

(2) 4, 20:

adiciebant et adseuerationem ut 'eheu.'

I have already discussed the words that follow this. Here the term 'adseueratio' raises no difficulty. It is presumably an extension of the process by which the Latin grammarians created the interjection. The interjection was obtained by segregating from the adverbs those which Dionysius Thrax calls *σχετλιαστικά* and *θαυμαστικά*, of which he gives as examples *παπαί* and *βαβαί*. The Latins define them as 'significantes adfectum animi.'² It is not to be wondered at that some should wish to extend this segregating process to the *ἀπωμοτικά* as *μά*, the *κατωμοτικά* as *νή*, and the *βεβαιωτικά* as *δηλαδή*. But it is difficult to think that 'eheu' can be the right example. It is true that Charisius and others say that 'heu' is sometimes an 'aduerbium respondendi,' but 'responsio' is not quite the same as 'adseueratio,' and if it was, no grammarian doubted that 'heu' and 'eheu' were also interjections. It does not seem likely therefore that it would have been taken to illustrate a class which must have stood in contrast to the regular interjections.

The difficulty was felt by Caperronier, who proposed either 'ne,' which would of course do well enough in sense, or 'hem,' which like 'heu' is sometimes classed as an 'aduerbium respondendi.' It appears to me that something may be said for 'euhoe.' The corruption would be easy. It is against it that the Latin grammarians, as we have them, call 'euhoe' an interjection. But this view may not always have been taken. Dionysius does not class *εὐοί* with the *θαυμαστικά* and *σχετλιαστικά*, but as an adverb *θειασμοῦ*. It might fairly be argued that it was not so much an expression of the emotion of the

¹ Spalding understood 'fieri' after 'nequit' from the former 'fieri,' quoting Livy 6, 37, 7, 'obtinendum esse, quod comitiis nequeat,' sc. 'obtineri.' I have suggested 'quod nequit fieri' as more likely to account for the omission

through the two 'fieri's' from some MSS. and the retention in the form 'quod nequit' in others.

² E.g. Charisius (quoting Cominianus, K. I. 238).

worshipper as a means of emphasizing the praise of the god, and this view would find support from the line of Virgil, which Charisius quotes—

euhoe, Bacche, fremens, solum te uirgine dignum
uociferans.

(3) 5, 22:

difficilior obseruatio est per . . . accentus . . . cum acuta et grauis alia pro alia ponuntur, ut in hoc 'Camillus,' si acuitur prima, aut grauis pro flexa ut Cethegus . . . et hic prima acuta nam sic media mutatur; aut flexa pro graui, ut *†*apice circumducta sequenti, quam ex duabus syllabis in unam cogentes et deinde flectentes dupliciter peccant. sed id saepius in Graecis nominibus accidit, ut Atreus, quem nobis iuuenibus doctissimi senes acuta prima dicebant, ut necessario secunda grauis esset, item Nerei Tereique.

This is perhaps the most disputed passage in all these chapters. In the fourth line the MSS. are divided between 'ut circumducta sequenti' and 'aut apice circumducta sequenti.' The fact that 'apice' does not make sense (it cannot mean 'circumflex'), coupled with its absence from so many important MSS., has led editors almost universally to the conclusion that it is an attempt to correct something which was unintelligible in the archetype.

Spalding suggested 'Appi,' which was accepted by Halm. Though this suggestion has been rejected with scorn by some critics, I do not think that it should be altogether ruled out. The case for it rests on the fact that Varro, followed by nearly all the grammarians, declared that proper names in 'ius' ought to make their genitive in 'ii,' so that the genitive should not be shorter than the nominative. The case against it is that as a matter of fact such proper names continued in common practice to contract the genitive, and it is doubted whether Quintilian, with his respect for 'consuetudo,' would speak with such condemnation of a general usage. Still people are not consistent, and the strongest advocate of the claims of usage may find some particular usage intolerable. An additional reason against 'Appi' is that no explanation is forthcoming as to why anyone should accentuate it on the 'i.' Further, the sense of 'second' which must be given to 'sequenti' is not to my mind altogether satisfactory. Quintilian does use 'sequens' for 'second,' but always in relation to 'prior' and 'primus,' and the 'primam' above can hardly be brought into the argument. It is one thing to say 'the first syllable of "magister" is short and the next long,' and another to say 'the first syllable of "magister" is short and the next of "dominus" is also short.' Still, this is not conclusive, and unless some better solution can be found 'Appi' has claims to consideration.

Birt, in *Rheinisches Museum*, 1879, proposed 'Marcipor.' This, he says, Quintilian 'hat ohne Zweifel geschrieben.' Meister seems to have shared his confidence, for he actually prints it in his text, and Kiderlin, in his review of Meister's edition, pronounces it 'sicher.' It seems to me that there is very

little to be said for it. The case rests on a passage of Consentius,¹ where dealing with what he calls² 'episynaliphe' or contraction of syllables he instances Orpheüs for Orphëüs, and among Latin names Marcipor for Marcipuer. Birt gives so little argument (and his followers give none at all) that I do not know what he would have said to the objections that occur to me. I suppose the resemblances of 'Marcipor' to 'apice' are enough to make the corruption possible. Whether they are enough to lend any weight to the suggestion, I will not venture to judge. But one of the objections to 'Appi' applies also to 'Marcipor.' Consentius says nothing about accentuation. What reason is there for supposing that anyone circumflexed the last syllable? Further, what meaning is to be given to 'sequenti'? Whether it can mean 'second' or not, it surely cannot mean 'third.' The strongest objection seems to me to be that Quintilian says that the persons who contracted this word went wrong in doing so. Surely this is quite inapplicable to a word which, as he himself has told us in 4, 26, had gone out of use. Did he really wish that people who read of a 'Publipor' in Sallust's History should pronounce it 'Publipuer'?

I should prefer to approach the problem from another side. It seems to me that there are two *prima facie* probabilities. The first is that as the phenomenon described happened more frequently 'in Greek names like Atreus,' it happened also in Latin words in '-eus.' The second is that the phenomenon was caused by a tendency to imitate Greek accentuation. I infer this from the fact that Quintilian above uses the words 'in hoc "Camillus,"' not 'in Camillo.' This, as I have said above,³ suggests that the persons who accentuated Camillus on the first syllable, did not carry this through the whole noun, but only when the ultimate was short. In fact, they adopted the Greek accentuation. And this is intrinsically probable. For Quintilian tells us, I. 1, 13, that the practice of giving undue weight to Greek in the education of boys at Rome resulted in many 'oris uitia in peregrinum sonum corrupti.' Now these two suggestions—(1) that the phenomenon in question appeared in words in 'eus'; (2) that it was some imitation of Greek accentuation are of course by no means certainties, but they have the merit of converging to a point. The Latin adjectives in 'eus,' though much more extensively used, correspond both in form and meaning to the Greek adjectives in 'eos.' 'Aureus' is formed and accentuated as χρύσεος. But χρύσεος, contrary to common usage, becomes in Attic χρυσοῦς. In Quintilian's words the Greeks 'ex duabus syllabis in unam cogunt et deinde flectunt.' I suggest then that the tendency to adopt Greek pronunciation made some Romans do the same with 'aureus.' Can we on these lines supply the missing word? I do not think it necessarily invalidates my suggestion if we cannot, but I will hazard two guesses. Quintilian may have quoted 'piceus' with perhaps some other word to show that the usage was extended to words which had no regular Greek equivalent, as well as to those which had. The second is still

¹ K. 389² v. p. 8.³ v. on 5, 21, p. 4.

bolder, and I write it with fear and trembling. Suppose the archetype of our MSS. had 'ut appositis e circumducta sequentique, quam,' etc., 'as when the adjectives have the "e" and the following syllable circumflexed' (*cf.* 2, 14, 3, 'rhetorica uno modo fit adpositum, altero nomen rei'). A blot in the middle of the word would leave decipherable 'ap . . . ise, and I need not delay over the ease with which the 'que' would be absorbed in the following 'quam.' I repeat that I put this forward as a guess only, and do not think that its rejection need involve the rejection of the general explanation.

(4) 6, 38:

quidam non dubitarunt etymologiae subicere omnem nominis causam, ut ex habitu, quemadmodum dixi, 'Longos' et 'Rufos,' ex sono 'stertere' 'murmurare,' etiam deriuata, ut a uelocitate dicitur uelox, et composita pluraque his similia, quae sine dubio aliunde originem ducunt, sed arte non egent, cuius in hoc opere non est usus nisi in dubiis.

The general meaning of this passage is clear enough. What is meant by 'etymology'? It inquires into the origin of words. But does this include the relation of an ordinary 'deriuatum' to its 'primitium,' or of a compound word to its elements? To take instances from passages discussed above, is it an 'etymology' to say that 'fasciatim' is derived from 'fascia' or 'noctiuagus' from 'nox' and 'uagus'? Quintilian thinks not. There must be some further element of difficulty—either some introduction of special historical or antiquarian lore, as the legend of the death of Argus, to explain the name Argiletum; or some ingenious philological manipulation, as 'lepus' from 'leuipes.' This is satisfactory enough. But can Quintilian really have thought of 'uelox' as a 'deriuatum' from 'uelocitas' instead of the reverse? Kiderlin and Meister regard it as impossible. The former rightly quotes 8, 3, 32, where 'beatitas' and 'beatitudo' are spoken of as 'deriuata' or 'tracta' or 'declinata'; and 1, 6, 17, where 'frugalitas' is said to be 'made' from 'frugalis.' He might have added that Priscian¹ in his fourth book, where he deals with 'deriuata,' lays down at length that 'probitas,' 'nouitas,' etc., are from 'probus,' 'nouus,' etc. But he has failed to notice that Varro actually holds the doctrine which he thinks impossible. In *L.L.* VIII. 15, Varro appears to hold that 'prudens' is a 'declinatum' from 'prudencia,' and 'strenuus' from 'strenuitas.' In the face of this, we can hardly say with certainty that the text as we have it is wrong. On the other hand, the rest of the evidence leaves it under suspicion, and critics are justified in considering whether it can be emended with probability.

One way out of the difficulty, which seems to me possible, though I do not ascribe to it any high degree of probability, would be to suppose that the words 'ut a uelocitate dicitur uelox' have been transposed, and should be placed after 'Longos et Rufos.' In this case Quintilian would be giving another example of an adjective used as a 'cognomen.' I do not think it

¹ K. III. 128.

would be any objection to this suggestion, that 'uelox' is not, so far as I know, found as a name. On the contrary, he may have wished to suggest some epithet which had not, as a matter of fact, become a family name, but might easily become attached to some individual. It is a more serious objection that I see no reason to account for the transposition.

Kiderlin boldly suggested 'ut a ueloci uelocitas ducitur.' He supposes the successive stages of corruption to have been: (1) 'ut a uelocitas ducitur,' (2) 'ut a uelocitate ducitur,' (3) 'ut a uelocitate ducitur uelox.'

Meister prints in his edition 'uelo' for 'uelocitate,' relying on Priscian (K. II. 140), 'in "ox" uerbalia uel denominatiua "uoco uox," "uelum uelox".' Kiderlin objects that Quintilian would not have thought this connection obvious enough to be classed amongst the 'non dubia quae non arte egent.' I am not sure that this objection is very serious. Different minds work differently in such matters. Quintilian may have seen nothing forced in the connection of meaning, and there is no difficulty as to form.

If we may accept this suggestion of Meister in principle, I should prefer to bring it into harmony with the MSS. by reading 'uelo citato.' This suggestion has been made by Bonnet,¹ but from a different point of view. Bonnet, who does not, I think, completely understand the passage, supposes that Quintilian means that 'uelox' is derived from the two words 'uelum citatum.' This, he says, would be a 'derivation moyenne' from the fantastical ancient point of view. I do not mean this at all. I suggest that Quintilian means that 'uelox' is a derivative of 'uelum'—i.e. that a person who is 'uelox' possesses the qualities of a 'uelum.' Then 'citatum' is added as an explanation. For clearly the 'uelox' does not possess the qualities of a 'uelum' under all circumstances, but only when it is 'citatum'—in rapid motion. If I was explaining the word 'lobster-coated,' and said that it came from a 'boiled lobster,' I should not of course mean that 'boiled' had anything to do with the formation.

F. H. COLSON.

CAMBRIDGE.

¹ *Revue de Philologie*, 1892.