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***A Realistic Universe. An Introduction to Metaphysics.* John E. Boodin. The Macmillan Co. 1916. Pp. xxii, 412.**

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A more significant comment may be made on Miss Sinclair's superficial reference (p. 289) to the contrast between the Absolute and God. Truly, philosophy is not religion, and the object of the one is not necessarily identical with that of the other. Yet reasoned thinking may supplement personal feeling or loyalty; and nothing forbids the religious attitude toward the Absolute, conceived in Miss Sinclair's terms as Self or Spirit. A final comment has to do with Miss Sinclair's teaching about the self. As the preceding summary has shown, this is a concept basal both to Miss Sinclair's doctrine and to her method. Reality, in her view, *is* a Self manifested in selves; and the argument for this conclusion throughout makes appeal to every man's experience of himself. It is to be regretted, therefore, that at the outset of Chapter III, Miss Sinclair presents so needlessly confused an account of that "ultimate fact," as she later (p. 297) truly calls it, the self. For though "irreducible," the self is not therefore indescribable. And it must be added that, as Miss Sinclair proceeds, her conception of self gains definiteness and precision as that of a unifying, changing, persisting perceiver, imaginer, thinker, feeler, or willer. There is danger, however, in her reiterated assertions that the self is a "pure" self (p. 318), a self "over and above its own experience" (p. 317). Miss Sinclair may mean no more by these statements than that the self is "more than the sum of its states" (p. 297), that it is no mere impersonal "totality" of experiences, memories, feelings, and the like, regarded without reference to any self. She runs the risk, however, by the words "pure" and "beyond" and "over" of being interpreted as if she subscribed to the outlawed doctrine of soul-substance, non-conscious self. For though one cannot too emphatically assert the existence of a self that is not a mere "percept" or "feeling," one must insist with equal fervor that the only real self is a self who is conscious, a perceiving, thinking, feeling, or willing self.

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A REALISTIC UNIVERSE. An Introduction to Metaphysics. JOHN E. BOODIN. The Macmillan Co. 1916. Pp. xxii, 412.

In a previous work, *Truth and Reality*, Professor Boodin had already described himself as a "rabid realist." Truly enough, he is a realist as tested by the one point of doctrine on which all realists agree, namely, that neither the existence nor the qualities of objects

depend upon or are constituted by their being apprehended by a mind. But beyond this point Professor Boodin's realism parts company with that of all other realists known to me. Though, like them, he describes his book as "an attempt to apply scientific method to philosophical problems," he does not employ the logico-analytic method of mathematics which, if we are to believe Mr. Bertrand Russell, is the only truly scientific method and the only salvation of philosophy. So far from atomizing the universe into ultimate simples, Professor Boodin describes the "neutral entities" of his fellow-realists as survivals of an antiquated metaphysics, and insists that things always occur in concrete empirical contexts, and that we must study them by "taking account of the whole situation." Thus, the entry of a thing into a "cognitive context," that is, its becoming an object of "interest" to a mind, makes, for him, a most important difference to the thing, which thereby acquires "significance or meaning." Clearly, Professor Boodin's realism is so little "rabid" that he will very likely be accused by his fiercer fellow-realists of having dressed up the old idealistic donkey in the skin of the neo-realistic lion.

As a matter of fact, it is not easy to discover why Professor Boodin calls his method "scientific." Is it because he talks in terms of "energy-systems" and incorporates much scientific theory in his metaphysical edifice? Or is he merely following the strange fashion which leads so many modern philosophers into aping the gestures and accents of science? Or, lastly, does he mean no more than that to be scientific is to be "empirical and critical"? At any rate, if he is right — and I believe him to be right — in regarding philosophers as "men who can think in terms of the whole," then philosophy has nothing to learn from science. For science is simply not "empirical" enough in this sense. Scientists never think in terms of the whole, nor do they ever use the whole range of experience. They work with specific concepts on selected groups of data. *A fortiori*, if Professor Boodin is right in saying that philosophy "exists in part for ennobling life" ("the function of both art and metaphysics is to idealize life"), it is not easy to see in what way the procedure of the sciences offers any model whatever for philosophy. Is it not high time that philosophers acquired the courage to preach what, anyhow, they practise, namely, that philosophy has its own method and does not need to live on the crumbs that fall from the table of science?

In addition to being scientific, Professor Boodin is also "pragmatic." Sometimes he appears to mean no more by this than

making one's intuitions and beliefs clear and consistent. If so, we are all glad enough to be pragmatists of this sort, and to welcome an old friend under a new name when we read of the "pragmatic postulate . . . that reality is what it manifests itself to be in its varying contexts." But when we read elsewhere that pragmatism requires us to judge the nature of reality "by the consequences to the realization of human purposes," and, hardly less vaguely, that "philosophies must do justice to our whole human nature; they must satisfy our emotional and volitional nature, as well as our intellectual," we feel bound to enter a *caveat* that philosophy has no business to satisfy any demands of our nature until it has first interpreted what they mean and by arduous and searching criticism given to them the form in which alone they deserve to be satisfied. Else our so-called ideals will shelter nothing but foolishness and self-will. What, I think, Professor Boodin means is that no philosophy can hope to stand which declares moral and æsthetic experience to have no foundation in the nature of things, and religion to be a mere whim and superstition. Still, when he talks of metaphysics as "idealizing," and as building "air castles for the spirit, as we build houses for the body, to keep out the blast and cold of an unfriendly and fickle cosmic weather," I feel that he comes altogether too near the dangerous doctrine of protective make-believe. He looks like running away from the problem whether the cosmic weather is "really" fickle and unfriendly; that is, whether for one who can think in terms of the whole, the universe, even with actual evil and misfortune in it, does not after all embody the eternal values. He is too fond of the phrase "taking things at their face-value," where I should have thought that the first lesson to be learned from the great thinkers whom Professor Boodin too acknowledges as his masters, is that first appearances are not to be trusted in philosophy.

Five "ultimate and generic concepts" characterize Professor Boodin's universe. They are energy, consciousness, space, time, and form. In a finely imaginative first chapter he describes these five pillars of the world of his philosophic vision with the eloquence of a prose-poem. In a strictly technical last chapter he presents the same vision in the austere severity of a learned terminology. The general impression which one carries away is of a universe of energy-systems in spatio-temporal relations. Space conditions "translation" or "free mobility." Time conditions "transformation," that is, change, growth, decay; the flux-aspect of reality, which, notwithstanding relative identity and stability, yields ever the different and the novel. Energy-systems are of different sorts and types, material,

mental, social; and some presuppose others. Energy is the "stuff character" of the universe, what gives it "being." But with the evolution of a certain type of energy-system, there is added, as (so to speak) a free gift by grace of the universe, the "light of consciousness," a neutral awareness without variety, color, or direction of its own but illuminating all else in the world which without this light would have no significance or value. What, lastly, of form? Form is the principle of direction and organization in the "world of stuff and process." "Energy moulded into form, form expressed in energy — the perfect life." Form inheres in process, and shapes it "not by production but by elimination." It is selective; it conditions survival. In our consciousness it appears as the ideals which we ever seek to realize and to find realized in the world. In these ideals we become conscious of "the law of the whole." Ought is "the consciousness of the form-character of the universe." "The untiring search of our mind for order, faulty and stumbling though it is in execution, is somehow a reflex of the world of which mind is the conscious expression." By this concept of directive form, Professor Boodin claims to "make purposive significance possible without stopping the universe," and thus to escape "between the Scylla of materialism and the Charybdis of static idealism." It must, by the way, always remain a puzzle how Professor Boodin, in a book dedicated "to my friend and teacher Josiah Royce," can write, in the manner of William James' "moral holiday" argument, of the absolute as fit only for "tired souls, who want rest above all other things." What, one wonders helplessly, was it in the life and teaching of Royce that suggested so ludicrous a travesty of his strenuous and manly thinking?

About Professor Boodin's way of fitting religion and God into his universe I am not very clear. From his emphasis on time, activity, and ideals one expects him, like James, to be a meliorist. Yet in his account of religion I seem to catch the voice of the mystic rather than the meliorist. "In our religious loyalty we feel that our ideals are concretely realized. Religion . . . adds the sense of completeness, of unification, and of conservation to our finite ideal strivings. . . . The end of life is to transcend finality, in the sense of abstract ideals with their sense of obligation, and to reach spontaneity — unity of form and content, perfect activity. . . . This living unity we worship as God."

Philosopher-wise, I seem to have used most of my space for critical growls at a few things with which I disagree, and to have said over-little of the countless good things in this book. The chapters on

the existence and knowledge of things seem to me excellent throughout. The theory that consciousness is distinct from mind, which latter is an "energy-system," is very original and ingenious, and deserves a much fuller and more technical discussion than I can give it here. The same is true of the contents of the chapters on space and time. Incidentally, I noted some striking observations on immortality, individual and social. Altogether Professor Boodin has written a book of exceptional interest and value, accurate and ample in scholarship, rich and varied in range, original in its total vision of the world. It is much to be hoped that the distractions of the war will not rob it of the audience whose attention it will generously reward.

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THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF EDWARD EVERETT HALE. EDWARD E. HALE, JR.
2 vols. Little, Brown, & Co. 1917. Vol. I, pp. 390; Vol. II, pp. 442.
\$5.00.

This biography should have appeared at least a half-dozen years ago in order to meet the public's interest at its flood tide. Dr. Hale died in 1909, and this volume bears the date 1917. In those eight intervening years many of his associates have died, and the world has moved on, forgetfully, so that the book will not receive so wide a reading as it deserves.

The two volumes are interesting chiefly because the subject himself was an interesting personality. His life extended through a period of eighty-seven years, and the records which he left — letters, diaries, books, and magazine articles — furnished abundant material of a most readable sort for the hand of his son and biographer.

Readable as the book is, however, specially to those who knew Dr. Hale in person, it could have been made much more attractive and expository if its author had not almost wholly eliminated incidents and anecdotes. He has held, quite conventionally, to the epistolary method. But he might have interspersed, among the letters, some of the scores of interesting and illuminating anecdotes which his father's friends could have contributed, and the book would thereby have been greatly enriched. Such material does accomplish much toward the revealing of a man's character. Indeed, this was Dr. Hale's own belief. On page 57 of Volume II he is quoted as saying that a good way to write a biography would be for a hundred friends to write one incident, each, of the man. This method the son did not approve; and the result is that the book