VIII.—ON MR. S. WATERLOW'S PAPER.

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WHEN a logician or a mathematician brings forward a philosophy of Logic, or of Mathematic, or seeks to show—the one that Philosophy is Logic, the other that Mathematic is Logic,—I seem to hear them both alike pleading as advocates before the tribunal of Philosophy, and why? Because Philosophy is the only branch of Knowledge which has nothing but Knowledge itself in the widest sense as its object-matter of enquiry, nothing but the discovery of Fact as its purpose, no *special* object-matter, and consequently no special intellectual discipline or doctrine to justify or recommend. I seem to hear the advocates of any such *special* branch of Knowledge saying:

“Laugh (in our sleeve of course) where we must; be candid where we can,

But vindicate the ways of (Logic or Mathematic, as the case may be) to man.”

But why do I make these remarks? It is because I think we are in danger of forgetting that Philosophy takes Knowledge in the widest sense as its object-matter of enquiry, and that this enquiry is that which alone justifies the existence of this, the Aristotelian, Society; and moreover, that Philosophy has a definite character and history of its own, a history dating—in our Western world at least—from Parmenides, Socrates, and Plato, and plainly marking it out from any of its own dependent parts, such as Logic, as well as from any positive physical or psychological Science.

The forgetfulness or neglect of these facts—those, I mean, of the nature and purpose of Philosophy, and of its history and development as the pursuit of that purpose—leads to the basing of all the sciences generally called mental or moral upon *concepts* which *thinking* introduces into experience, instead of

basing them, ultimately, upon the experience which concepts themselves pre-suppose. Endless and fruitless logomachies may be expected to follow from such a method. But on this, of course, I cannot now enlarge.

But here I must say, that I know not whether or not Mr. Waterlow, the reader of the present paper, is to be classed among those logicians who hold, or who would, on occasion arising, seek to show, that Philosophy is Logic. It may be that it is only in the present paper that he adopts the method of arguing on the basis of concepts, in order to meet Mr. Russell on his own ground. At any rate, in the concluding sentence of his paper he reminds us that he has proved the "abstract possibility of a whole composed of an infinite number of parts, no one of which is indivisible"; which is like a crumb of comfort let fall from his table for the behoof of the humble experientialist, to whom it seems obvious that, so long as we take anything whatever to be perceivable, we *ipso facto* suppose it to be divisible *by thought*.