imagination of the student and of the artist. The ultimately great historian will so suffuse his painfully sought knowledge with the vivifying power of his artistic imagination that the past is brought compellingly, or even irresistibly, into the general active interest of our life and thought. In this way is achieved the historian's lofty ambition worded so unforgettably by Thucydides. It would ill become a modest reviewer to venture any prediction as to how near Professor de Sanctis will come to this final goal; but one is sure that if the Fates will vouchsafe the completing of his work, he will leave a notable and abiding monument.

As a very business-like conclusion one ought to state that in addition to the extensive notes and appendixes mentioned above there will be found a good index and a chronological table. Not the least praiseworthy feature is the series of very usable plans and maps at the close of the second volume. Most of the typographical slips have been caught up in the list of *errata*, so one has little to complain about under this head. It will be nice to bind the volumes in old-fashioned heavy calf, if such luxuries ever become accessible again.

F. B. R. HELLEMS

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO

The Doctrine of Literary Forms. By ROY KENNETH HACK. Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. XXVII, 1916, pp. 65.

The reprint before us contains a better-executed piece of work than is suggested by the rather awkward sentence in which the writer summarizes his project:

Hence the subject which I wish to investigate in this paper is the doctrine of forms in its application to criticism: first, to sketch the history of the criticism of the *Ars Poetica* of Horace, then to show that there is a basic error in the critical method which has commonly been followed, and lastly to trace that error to its source and to indicate the necessity of a change in critical procedure.

Mr. Hack believes there has been altogether too much stress upon "genres" in the study of Latin literature; and his onslaught upon the representatives of this mistaken emphasis upon *εἶδη* and *γένη* is marked by a thoroughness that is both whole-hearted and effective. On this point one will congratulate the author most heartily; the only question is whether the critics of this misguided type were worth the expenditure of wide-ranging scholarship and protestant energy he has devoted to them, since even some years ago their malignant influence seemed to be on the decline. Perhaps, however, it was worth while dealing them this vigorous downward thrust.

In the second part of his study Mr. Hack attempts to prove that Plato is responsible for the erroneous method of literary criticism that is based upon the "doctrine of propriety" found in Cicero and Horace. Plato's doctrine of imitation implies that we must judge a thing "by the degree in

which it corresponds with or approaches to the perfect form or εἶδος." This must apply to poetry and to rhetoric as to everything else. Hence the later slavery to εἶδη and γένη and the ambitious scientific definitions of form. Such is Mr. Hack's contention, and in one sense, of course, it is true; but that it is true in the close sense insisted upon by him I cannot see. However, this would be an argument longer than the reprint in question, and in the meantime our readers may care to ponder on the full meaning of two such sentences as these.

It is not true that Platonic idealism, when applied to literature, tends to encourage sanity: on the contrary, it produces results which are apparently paradoxical, either excesses amounting to mania, or a faith in mechanical routine which amounts to death. I am not arguing; I am calling attention to the fact that Platonic idealism has, for reasons which have been explained above, the same effect upon human life as the most materialistic and naturalistic philosophy.

With Mr. Hack's next conclusion, that definitions of literary forms have not the validity of "laws" in the world of science, nobody will quarrel; but we need not refuse to concede the possibility of a working value to everything that falls short of final truth. We may even concede that in ultimate strictness "it is impossible to establish a scientific and objective definition of any form of literature"; but we must always find it not only convenient but necessary to have a working definition of the various forms, unless we are to waste a lot of time. We do not have to become slaves to a convenient formula, and Mr. Hack himself, after proving to his own satisfaction that Horace was the child of Aristotle, slavishly devoted, like his father, to εἶδη, graciously admits that Horace rose above his own rules; and if the Roman critic-poet could emancipate himself, the intelligent modern critic of poetry may succeed in keeping himself fairly free. Incidentally, our author runs a tilt against "mechanical *Quellenforschung*," a point on which there will be no debate, for the whole question turns obviously on the spirit and method of the student. It would be unfortunate if we should discourage intelligent investigation of sources just because a legitimate function has been abused.

If it is not out of place, the reviewer would like to record his pleasure in reading a study of this type, which serves as a welcome reminder that *litterae humaniores* are occasionally concerned with literature. Also, he would be glad to know whether it is to deliberate antinomianism or mere human weakness that we owe the use of "is" in the following: "The fact that the poet and the critic is the same man affords us the ideal conditions for such a test."

F. B. R. HELLEMS

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO