soul of B whenever he visualizes B? Or is it Mr. Crawley's contention that the savage does so — that his very memory is at all moments infested with terrifying ghosts of other men and things, to which he ascribes just the same sort of effective reality which he ascribed to the grosser objects of perception of which the 'souls' are images? Some such consequences seem properly implied by the hypothesis; and they appear sufficient to reduce it to a good deal of an absurdity.

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MENTAL FUNCTIONS IN PRIMITIVE PEOPLES.

Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures. L. LÉVY-BRUHL. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1910.

Bruhl's work appears as the third volume of the *Travaux de l'Année Sociologique* published under the direction of M. E. Durkheim. B. endorses the motto of the school of writers headed by that *savant*, that social phenomena have laws of their own (p. 2). The same applies to those 'collective representations' which lie at the root of social facts. B. sets out to determine the most general laws which govern such representations (p. 3). The interpretations of primitive life and thought given by Tylor, Frazer, Lang, and others, must be condemned, for they have disregarded the fundamental question: can the facts of primitive life be explained along the same lines as the facts of civilized life? (pp. 6-7). Led by the postulate of the psychic unity of mankind, these authors assume a general animism (p. 14). But that animism is invariably derived from the psychology of the individual. The resulting interpretation of primitive man's beliefs and institutions is necessarily artificial. If we want a firm foundation for our researches, we must remember that collective representations impose themselves upon the individual. They are for him a matter of belief and not a product of his reasoning (p. 16).

The rest of the volume falls into four parts. Part I. deals with "Les représentations collectives dans les perceptions des primitifs et leur caractère mystique." The representations of primitive peoples are not, B. believes, in a strict sense representations at all; for into the make-up of each representation enter emotional and volitional elements which form with it an indecomposable whole (p. 28). Not a single object is represented without such an emotional setting. For this reason the primitive man perceives nothing as we do (p. 37). Mystic properties form an integral part of his representations and cannot be excluded from them (p. 39). Thus an object and its material copy, for instance, are not regarded as one and the same thing

on account of a mental confusion, nor as a consequence of an animistic creed, but they are so regarded because the same mystic elements enter both (p. 44). Other well-selected illustrations from many peoples are adduced. Facts contradictory to his beliefs do not in the least shake the confidence of the primitive man, for these facts can always be explained away on the basis of these same beliefs (p. 61).

Primitive representations being different from ours, the connections between these representations are also different, for they are not guided by logic but by a mystic rapport or participation between beings and objects, etc. (p. 70). Thus it happens that sequences in experience which to us seem all-important, are overlooked, and, on the other hand, sequences which never actually occur are believed in (pp. 74-75). This stage in man's mentality may thus be designated as *prelogical* although it need not for that reason be either antilogical or alogical (p. 79). The distinctions between one and many, in direct contact and at a distance, etc., are often not made, in this stage (p. 81). These considerations lead B. to attack Tylor's doctrine of a universal belief in a soul as expressed in his animism. At the hand of a not very extensive but well chosen material, B. demonstrates that the prevalent belief of primitive peoples is in several souls, not in one soul or double. These souls, moreover, are concepts of such indefiniteness and instability as not to be really comparable to our concept of soul (pp. 81, 82, 83). The conclusion arrived at by B. at this stage of his enquiry is worth quoting in full: "Orientée autrement que la nôtre, préoccupée avant tout des relations et des propriétés mystiques, ayant pour loi principale la loi de participation, la mentalité des primitifs interprète nécessairement d'une façon différente de la nôtre ce que nous appelons la nature et l'expérience. Elle voit partout des communications de propriétés, par transfert, par contact, par transmissions au loin, par contamination, par souillure, par possession, par une multitude d'opérations, en un mot, qui font participer, instantanément ou au bout d'un temps plus ou moins long, un objet ou un être à une vertu donnée, — qui le sacralisent, par exemple, ou le désacralisent au commencement et à la fin d'une cérémonie" (p. 104). The collective representation which underlies this mentality is a belief in a mystic *continuum* which pervades nature. Personalities, souls, spirits, are of later origin (pp. 109-110).

The mechanism of prelogical mentality is particularly differentiated from that of our own in that the connections between representations are, in that stage of mentality, given with the representations themselves. The latter are not isolated and analyzed, as they are with us,

to be then logically connected. "Elles sont toujours engagées dans des préperceptions, des préconceptions, des préliations, on pourrait presque dire des préraisonnements : et c'est ainsi que cette mentalité, précisément parce qu'elle est mystique, est aussi prélogique" (pp. 114-115). When each object has a mystic significance, abstraction must obviously be reduced in its functions; memory, on the other hand, becomes the dominant factor (pp. 123 *et seq.*). Some pages are devoted to illustrations of the marvellous development of that faculty among primitive peoples. Abstraction and generalization, although exercised, are thoroughly different from ours, for again the mystic connections are the determining factor; as, for instance, among the Huichol who assert that the deer is a feather because the former is possessed of the same mystic qualities as are the latter (p. 135).

We should expect to find the distinctive qualities of primitive mentality reflected in language. (Part II.) Thus we discover that instead of one plural a great many primitive languages have separate forms to designate various kinds of plurality (pp. 153 *et seq.*). The number of verbal forms in some of these languages is enormous; the same is true of adverbs, especially of those indicating spacial relations. B. endorses Gatschet's conclusion that the categories of position and distance are as important for the representations of primitive peoples as the categories of time and causality are for us (p. 165). The great variety of verbal suffixes and affixes, especially of those connected with verbs designating motion, is mentioned and illustrated in the same connection (pp. 165 *et seq.*). The common tendency of primitive languages is not to render the general impression received from an object, but to designate its exact shape, outline, position, motion, mode of activity in space, etc. In this characteristic, primitive speech approaches sign-language used by so many primitive peoples. In the pages that follow B. attempts to draw a close parallel between those two types of expression (pp. 175 *et seq.*). All objects have mystic properties, and the spoken word used to designate objects and actions has mystic properties of its own (pp. 199 *et seq.*).

In the concluding chapter of this part, number is treated very much in the same way as speech was in the preceding chapter (pp. 204-257).

Part III. is devoted to the "Institutions ou sont impliquées des représentations collectives régies par la loi de participation." A series of illustrations is brought before the reader showing the magical processes employed in the chase (pp. 263-275), at fishing (pp. 275-281), in war (pp. 281-283), as well as the magical ceremonies intended to increase the food-supply, or in other ways to influence the

course of nature (pp. 283-296). Further examples illustrate the mystic rapport between husband and wife, parent and child (pp. 296-304). The art of the medicine-man is discussed under the same heading, followed by a few pages devoted to divination and magic proper (pp. 304-352). An entire section is devoted to the relations between the living and the dead, in which B. tries to demonstrate that the concepts of life and death are among primitive peoples by no means as clearly differentiated as they are with us (p. 358); and, on the other hand, these concepts are full of mystic content which determines the character of the practices at death, burial, birth, initiation, etc. (pp. 352-421).

The fourth and last part is short. In it B. indicates in general outline the "*Passage à des types supérieurs de mentalité.*" No sharp line can be drawn between prelogical and logical mentality. The former is not utterly foreign to the most elementary logical connection; while the latter, as we find it among the most civilized peoples, always retains representations, collective in character, which rest on a more or less disguised mystical background. The transition from one mentality to the other occurred gradually. As mystic participations tended to become represented, the objective character of experience came gradually to the fore. Concepts crystallized into definite and objective categories. But while man's mentality was thus becoming transformed, interpretations and reinterpretations of concepts were made, as for instance in myths, which renders the task of reconstructing the course of this evolution an almost hopeless one (p. 440).

B. discards the doctrine of the psychic unity of mankind. If primitive society is to be understood, its life and soul must be interpreted along the line of collective mystic representations, a radical difference between the two mentalities being a necessary assumption. B. regards his own work, together with the works of Durkheim, Huber and Mauss, and some others, as the first attempts in that direction (pp. 425-455).

An interesting book might be written in answer to Professor Lévy-Bruhl. We doubt whether he has always correctly compassed the bearing of his argument. The mystic character of primitive feeling and thinking is laid bare by the research of modern ethnology. But is this mysticism all-pervading? Does not the primitive man himself draw distinctions between the mystical, the powerful, dangerous, sacred, and the ordinary, objective, indifferent reality? Many facts could be adduced to indicate that he *does* draw this distinction. Again, the prelogical character of primitive mentality is ably demon-

strated by B. But is the whole of primitive mentality thus prelogical? Are not many of its conclusions arrived at by mental processes as logical as our own, *some* of our own?

A still more fundamental objection must be made. Is the procedure of B. quite logical in so far as he brings the collective representations of primitive man into juxtaposition with individual mental processes of the civilized? If he were to take our own collective representations, with the far from logical character of their content and connections, a comparison with primitive mentality would not yield results so unfavorable to the latter. It seems also that B. rather weakens his position by his attack on the doctrine of the psychic unity of mankind. For this doctrine applies to man as an individual who, under similar physical and social environment, would presumably act the same all over the world. The social environment of primitive communities differs from that of the civilized; hence the mentality, which is mainly a product of social environment, is different. B.'s attitude on this question reminds us that the veil which rests on the relation of the individual to the social factor in society is as yet far from lifted.

As a whole, however, the book is an excellent one and may even be considered remarkable. The rationalistic tendency which still pervades so many works on primitive society is categorically set aside by B. He duly emphasizes the great complexity of the factors which coöperate in the development of any institution or any body of beliefs. He challenges with great force the monopoly of the doctrine of animism in doing service as a universal principle of interpretation of primitive belief. Nor does he deal any more gently with the associationist interpretation of magic. He emphasizes, finally, the great importance of the collective factor in all matters social and most matters individual. The numerous illustrations of the customs and beliefs of savages are drawn from the most reliable sources.

Needless to say, the anthropologists will join the psychologists and the sociologists in their impatience for Professor Lévy-Bruhl's next contribution to the subject of the mentality of primitive man.

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ANTHROPOLOGY.

Psychological Problems in Anthropology. FRANZ BOAS. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1910, XXI, 371-384.

Professor Boas indicates a number of fields in which anthropological inquiry brings back data of interest to the psychologist. The