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A VOLUNTEER BRIGADE CAMP.

By Major B. A. SATTERTHWAITHE, 2nd Battalion L.N. Lan. Regt.

THE establishment of the Volunteer brigade system in 1888 marked an important period in the organization of the troops for home defence. It is not too much to say that this system granted a new lease of life to the Volunteer Force, and renewed its vitality to an enormous extent. The element of reality, which the Volunteer (highest and lowest) loses, has been brought home to the whole force; the battalions encamp alongside those who will be their comrades in war, and under the leaders and staff appointed to command and direct them. The go-as-you-please nature of the old regimental camp has given place to a more methodical and practical training; the assembly of larger forces has in itself done away with many unrealities in manœuvre. The battalions have learned, not only from their staff but from one another; those whose camping experience has been limited to occasional regimental camps have learned much from rubbing shoulders with their more experienced neighbours, and a general process of levelling up has undoubtedly been inaugurated.

Of course, the time of training in brigade (eight days) is all too short, especially when the waste time is taken into consideration; the days of entering and leaving camp, the Sunday, and in some cases the inspection day, are not available for the tactical training of the troops. Thus four, or at most five, days are at the brigadier's disposal, and such are the conditions of the previous battalion training that in many cases, especially in scattered corps, two-thirds of each day have to be devoted to battalion drill under the regimental officers. Many of these battalions only come together in their camp week, some only assemble at other times at very rare intervals, and none can be considered to be thoroughly grounded in battalion drill and manœuvre.

Many brigades are unable, from financial and other causes, to avail themselves of that best of all trainings, a week's work at Aldershot, and are consequently thrown on their own resources—on their brigadier for instruction, and on their staff for administration.

Though less valuable than a week's training under the Aldershot staff, such a camp has its advantages; indeed, it tests the administrative capacity and self-reliance of the brigade staff even more highly than a camp with Regular forces, where so much is done for the Volunteers by the Regular departments.

The planning of the instruction to be given on the four or five days available requires careful consideration beforehand, and it will probably be granted that the whole of the time should not be devoted to ceremonial and close brigade drill. An account of a camp held

under rather favourable local circumstances will probably be of interest to the officers of other Volunteer brigades.

The Portsmouth Volunteer Brigade is composed of five battalions, with an enrolled strength (31.10.93) of 4,096; of these, four battalions only, with an enrolled strength (31.10.93) of 3,514, were able to be present, and the number of men who passed a minimum period of three days in camp was 2,679; the daily average was 2,412.

A very good camping ground was secured, at a rental of 45*l.*, at Talbot Village, 2 miles from Bournemouth. The acreage allowed full room for a drill field for each battalion, in addition to its camping ground, as well as a brigade field of suitable size. The manœuvre ground, roughly, 3 miles by 2, was close at hand, and was kindly placed at the disposal of the brigade by the several landowners; it was composed of rough moorland, covered with heather and fir copses, with sufficiently varied features to give excellent practice in minor tactics.

Water was supplied from the main of the Bournemouth Waterworks, which ran along the road in front of the camp. The cost was, roughly, 2*s.* 6*d.* per 1,000 gallons, the charge for stand-pipes, &c., extra.

The supplies were obtained by tender in the neighbourhood, and, with the exception of wood, were very satisfactory; the prices were as follows:—Beef 7*d.*, mutton 7½*d.* per lb.; bread, 8*d.* per 2-lb. loaf; butter, 1*s.* per lb.; milk, 11½*d.* per gallon; oats, 21*s.* per qr.; hay, 6*s.* 9*d.*, straw, 4*s.* 6*d.* per cwt.; wood, 22*s.* 6*d.* per load, 18*s.* 6*d.* per bundle.

The average cost per man per day was 1*s.* 5½*d.* gross.

The outlay for rent, water, and sundry brigade expenses was partly met by a generous contribution of 131*l.* 5*s.* from the Town Council of Bournemouth.

The supply detachment undertook the issue of rations, groceries, fuel, and forage from the brigade store—a barn on the farm. The ration board assembled at 6.30, and fatigue parties from units paraded at the store at intervals of 15 minutes. After the first morning, these arrangements worked smoothly.

The transport was furnished by the W, P, and B battalions, who respectively supplied for the whole week—

	Vehicles.	Horses.	Officers.	N.C.O.'s.	Men.
W	6	16	2	4	50
P	2	6	—	2	12
B	7	15	1	3	17
Total	15	37	3	9	79

For the first and last days the B battalion provided extra teams. The wagons and teams were lent by the local farmers and contractors, and were rationed during the week by the brigade. The transport encamped in its own lines, and drew rations as a brigade unit, the accounts with the several battalions being subsequently adjusted.

The brigade bearer company was newly raised this year from the W battalion. It also encamped separately, and performed all the duties of a field hospital in camp and at manoeuvre. It was provided with "The Tortoise Field Hospital Equipment" (a tortoise tent-wagon with store), the property of the officer commanding the bearer company.

The machine-gun (Maxim), the property of an officer of the W battalion, was considered a brigade unit for tactical work.

The work of the cyclists will be fully described hereafter, but for administrative purposes they encamped with their own battalions, coming under the senior cyclist officer for brigade parades. A small marquee for storing and cleaning cycles is desirable in each battalion, and a brigade workshop for repairs.

Three of the battalions sent advanced parties to pitch their camps, dig kitchens, &c., the fourth was able to get its men early on August 4, and so carried out these duties as a battalion. No outside help was used for this work in any of the battalions, except the preparation of seated and covered latrines, a point on which especial stress is laid.

All the battalions were assembled in camp by 9 P.M. on August 4.

Sunday, August 5.—The brigade assembled for Divine Service under the senior chaplain of the local battalion on Sunday morning, and subsequently the brigadier inspected each camp in detail.

On subsequent days the system was, as a rule, to leave commanding officers to exercise their battalions at their discretion at the two morning drills, and to assemble the brigade for manoeuvre in the afternoon.

In addition to its drill field, each battalion was assigned a portion of the manoeuvre ground for use in the morning: a different portion being allotted to each in turn.

Monday, August 6.—Monday morning broke hopelessly wet, and the early morning drill was perforce abandoned. The weather cleared after breakfast, and the grass being very long and wet, the brigade was ordered to parade at 10.30 A.M. for route marching. Headed by the cyclists and followed by the bearer company and transport, the column marched through and round Bournemouth, returning at 1 P.M.: the Brigadier-General saw the battalions defile before him on to their regimental parades on their return.

The instruction in brigade attack, which had been projected for this afternoon, was abandoned, and battalions were handed over to their commanding officers for the afternoon drill.

The cyclists, however, carried out the work originally allotted to them, the reconnaissance of the River Stour.

The general idea for this and the following days' work was as follows:—

PORTSMOUTH VOLUNTEER INFANTRY BRIGADE.
BOURNEMOUTH, 1894.

Scheme of Operations.

GENERAL IDEA.

An invading force landed at Bournemouth is encamped at Talbot Village.
A defending force is assembling at Wimborne.

Monday, August 6.—Reconnaissance of River Stour by cyclists of invaders.

Tuesday, August 7.—The defenders reconnoitre towards Bournemouth, and are attacked by the brigade.

Defenders—brigade cyclists. Invaders—brigade.

Wednesday, August 8.—The force at Talbot Village is covered by an outpost line, which follows the line of the Stour as far west as Longham Bridge, and thence runs south-west towards Poole. Defender at Wimborne and Broadstone.

Defenders—1st V.B. and brigade cyclists. Invaders—2nd, 3rd, and 4th V.B. and machine-gun.

Thursday, August 9.—The invader seizes Poole Harbour and pushes northwards towards Broadstone Junction.

The defender at Wimborne is reinforced.

Friday, August 10.—A convoy of stores landed by the invaders at Poole is sent to Talbot Village, escorted by the 4th V.B.

The defender advances a brigade to Canford Magna.

Defenders—1st, 2nd, and 3rd V.B. and their cyclists; machine-gun. Invaders—4th V.B. and its cyclists; brigade transport.

Throughout the operations the defenders, including cyclists, will wear white haversacks as a distinguishing mark; the invaders will not wear haversacks.

At 2.30 P.M., therefore, the cyclists assembled to act on the following orders:—

Monday, August 6.

Reconnaissance of the River Stour by Invaders.

(Orders.)

TALBOT VILLAGE,
2 P.M., August 6, 1894.

O.C. Cyclists P.V.I.B.

1. Reconnoitre the line of the Stour from Longham to Holdenhurst with a view to the advance northwards of a force of all arms.

(a.) Report on the bridges and other existing means of crossing; also on the best positions for pontoon or other temporary bridges.

(b.) Report on the nature of the country north of the river as far as East Parley Common and Avon Common, and on the roads running north and north-east.

(c.) Report generally on the River Stour between the points named.

2. (a), (b), and (c) should be allotted to different groups of cyclists.

3. Reports to be rendered to the brigade office by 9 P.M. to-night.

By order,

(Signed) A. B. C., D.A.Q.M.G.,
Invading Force.

The cyclist officer divided his command (104 cycles) into groups, which were ordered to move independently to their several tasks and

to rendezvous with their reports at 5 P.M. at Longham Village. The brigadier rode to this point and watched the conduct of this part of the exercise.

At 9 P.M. the report was rendered as follows, and at 10 A.M. the next morning the following remarks were hectographed and issued:—

From Officer Commanding Cyclists,

To Sir W. Humphery, Bart., K.C.B., Commanding the Portsmouth Volunteer Brigade.

In accordance with instructions I paraded the cyclists at 2.30.

2.40. I despatched the 3rd Hants Cyclists and half of the cyclists of the 4th Hants to Holdenhurst, with instructions to gain any information they could concerning the River Stour from that point to Muscliff on the south, and East Parley on the north.

2.43. I despatched the 2nd Hants Cyclists and the second half of the 4th Hants to Longham, with instructions to survey the River Stour from that point to the same villages as above.

2.53. I despatched the 1st Hants Cyclists to Holdenhurst, with instructions to survey the roads running north and north-east of the River Stour, and also the country north as far as East Parley Common and Avon Common.

All had instructions to report themselves to me at Longham by as near 5 o'clock as possible.

Reports were handed to me at Longham between 5 o'clock and 5.45.

1st Hants reported themselves to me at 6.45. They found that the road from Blackwater Ferry to East Parley Common is excellent for all arms; no steep gradients. Cultivated ground between Merritown and Merritown Heath. The ground at East Parley Common is high, with more than gradual descent to Avon Common.

Troops of all arms crossing at Red Hill or Herne Bridge (private bridge) could advance on good roads to Herne Bridge Station, covering their advance with artillery posted on St. Catherine's Hill and a range of hills known as the Rhododendron Forest.

Artillery could also be posted on Merritown Heath, which would command any advance north or north-east.

It was found that troops could not possibly cross at Blackwater Ferry.

It was found that troops could cross the Heron Court Bridge, but the approaches could not be governed by any artillery. We must consequently give up the idea of getting any men across this part: we have already secured the upper roads.

Troops could not cross the river at Longham Mill Bridge if artillery were stationed at Dudsbury Camp, which is a hill about 70 feet above the river, and thoroughly commands the bridge and the country as far as Ensbury.

I should recommend Red Hill Fort as being the most likely place in which an invading force could cross the Stour, provided the advance were covered by guns stationed on the rising eminence there. They would govern a very flat country. The ford there is about 100 feet wide; the depth of the river there was ascertained by sending a native through the water, and the deepest part was found to be 3 feet 6 inches. The ford would probably be impassable if heavy rains were coming down, and I fear it would be useless pontooning under those circumstances, owing to the marshy state of the banks on the north side.

In the case of flooding, I should imagine the only available place for pontooning would be at Thorp Ford. This ferry is screened, to all intents and purposes, from artillery fire. Ford 100 feet wide.

River Stour—runs about 3 to 4 miles an hour; width is from 40 to 100 feet. Bed of river—gravelly. Banks on both sides—reedy.

I enclose a few reports showing that the ground was thoroughly examined.

GEO. CAPPER, *Captain,*
Comm. of Cyclists.

MEMORANDUM.

1. The reconnaissance of the Stour was conducted yesterday by the cyclists with great intelligence: it was well organized by Captain Capper, and well carried out by the cyclists under his command. The report was clearly drawn and punctually rendered.

2. The following points in regard to the report were, however, noted for future guidance:—

- (a.) All names of places and proper names should be printed (thus: LONG-HAM.)
- (b.) The construction, &c., of the various bridges require rather fuller detail.
- (c.) Temporary bridges comprise not only pontoon, but spar and barrel bridges: the places suitable for these were not clearly indicated: the materials available for the construction of spar and barrel bridges were not noted.
It must be remembered that an invading force would have to use many points of crossing.
- (d.) In stating how a crossing can be covered by artillery fire, it is well also to mention at what range.
- (e.) Reports rendered on notebook leaves should be numbered and pinned together.
- (f.) The arrival of the 1st V.B. Cyclists at Longham should probably be 5.45, not 6.45 as stated in report.
- (g.) The fact that Blackwater Ferry is reported unsuitable for troops renders it all the more necessary that the positions for temporary bridges should be selected, in order that the good road may be made use of.
- (h.) The position of Redhill Ford not being marked on the official map, should have been minutely described in the report.

Talbot Village,
8.8.94.

On this day two other methods of using cyclists were initiated. The first was the use of carrier pigeons in connection with reconnaissance. The President of the Hants and Dorset Flying Club kept some young birds at Talbot Village, which he kindly placed at the disposal of the brigade. Strapping the baskets to their machines, the cyclists were able to report to camp their arrival at distant points in a very short space of time; this time would have been shorter had not the birds been disturbed by some transport horses which were quartered in the stable under their traps.

The other branch in which cyclists were exercised on this day was in photography. The country was almost entirely unknown to the several commanding officers; on the subsequent days they would have to rendezvous at places several miles from camp, where they had never been before. It was a distinct help to them to receive with their orders a photograph of their rendezvous point. This work was carried out with great zeal, rapidity, and intelligence by two cyclists of the S battalion, and was all the harder as they had to go to Bournemouth to develop and print their work. A portable developing plant will no doubt be forthcoming another year.

Tuesday, August 7.—Tuesday morning was devoted to battalion work, the brigadier riding round and watching the drill in attack formation of the S and B battalions.

In the afternoon the brigade was exercised in the following scheme,

which was designed to initiate a brigade attack over fairly easy country. The cyclists formed the enemy (defenders).

Tuesday, August 7.

Reconnaissance by Defending Force.

(Orders.)

WIMBORNE,

2 P.M., August 7, 1894.

O.C. Cyclists.]

Reconnoitre the invader's position, first at the waterworks, then towards Talbot Village. Endeavour to draw him out, and make him show his strength. If attacked, your line of retreat is by Canford Magna, on Wimborne.

By order,

L. M., *Brigade-Major,*
Defending Force.

N.B.—Your force is at the northern boundary of Knighton Meath, at 3 P.M.

Tuesday, August 7.

TALBOT VILLAGE,

2.30 P.M., August 7, 1894.

G.O.C. Portsmouth V.B.

The enemy's cavalry and cyclists are advancing from Canford Magna.

Advance and drive them back, and find out if their movement covers the advance of infantry and artillery.

By order,

D. E. F., *A.A.G.,*
Invading Force.

N.B.—Your force will not leave the western boundary of the camp before 3 P.M.

The road to the waterworks formed the pivot of attack, the waterworks being the preliminary objective. The right half-battalion of the W battalion, with its centre (and machine-gun) on the road, was the directing unit of the 1st line; its left half-battalion prolonged to the left, and the S battalion to the right. The P battalion formed 2nd line, and the B battalion 3rd line.

The attack progressed as the cyclists fell back on the waterworks, which the 2nd line assaulted, and the 3rd line then took up the pursuit through High Wood. The cease fire sounded at 4.30.

Casualties were ordered to fall out freely, individual officers and men being "killed" by the assistant umpires, this system being considered more true to nature than the wholesale slaughter of sections and companies. A "killed" mounted officer collected the casualties after the 3rd line had passed to the front.

The assistant or "fire discipline" umpires were appointed from the dismounted officers of the brigade, and one was attached to each battalion. In addition to their "killing" duties, they were ordered to report on the various points of the fire discipline of the battalion to which they were attached. This system proved very successful—an interesting experience to the company officers chosen for the work, and a valuable assistance to the chief umpire.

At this day's conference the following points were noticed :—¹

Units of 1st line were needlessly concentrated previous to deployment; full advantage was not taken of existing cover at this point.

An attack on the left flank of the advancing troops was promptly dealt with by one company of the W battalion, who worked rapidly across an intervening valley, and drove in the small party whose fire was causing the annoyance.

The distances between the various lines were well kept, and the usual fault of the lines advancing too close on one another was avoided.

The attack was carried out without hurry or confusion.

The cyclists as enemy were well handled, but showed a tendency to move too far from their machines, thus having a long retreat under fire to their machines when it was necessary to regain them. The retreat generally was well organized, and units supported one another.

The umpires and "fire discipline" umpires reported: "Silence in ranks generally good, but too much talking by officers and N.C.O.'s; officers and section leaders too often standing; words of command generally good; judging distances fair; alteration of sights on advancing indifferent; 'rest' position not consistently used; reinforcements well conducted; transfer of command when leaders were 'killed' satisfactory; mounted officers dismounted too late, but used no undue interference."

Wednesday, August 8.—Wednesday's exercise in outpost work seemed at first likely to be spoiled by the rain, and the troops stood by for an hour. However, by 9.45 all were under way to act on the following special ideas, the times being post-dated one hour. On this and the two following days two Regular officers were good enough to assist in the umpiring.

Wednesday, August 8.

Outpost Orders.—*Left front, Newtown to Longham Bridge.*

TALBOT VILLAGE,

8 A.M., August 8, 1894.

V. Inf. Drill, 1893, para. 164.

1. Enemy at Wimborne (infantry), Canford, and Broadstone (light troops). Country, rough moorland.
2. Section 1 (Col. P.), P battalion, Newtown to waterworks. Responsible for left flank.
Section 2 and reserve (Col. V.), S and B battalions and machine-gun. Waterworks (including road) to $\frac{1}{4}$ mile north of Shoulder of Mutton (P.H.).
Section 3, thence to Longham Bridge (imaginary).
3. Main body invading force will advance north at 1 P.M., so your line of defence (on high ground facing west) must be stoutly held.

¹ The long list of faults noticed at this and the subsequent days' conferences must not be considered to have been generally prevalent. The writer has recorded as far as possible every count in the indictment framed by each of the umpires; the daily improvement showed the criticism had good effect.

4. Report half-hourly to O.C. outposts at waterworks, who will report half-hourly to brigade office, Talbot Village: times of receipt of all reports to be registered.
 5. Patrol well to the front, on and off the roads.
 6. Right flank secured by 3rd section and north front troops.
 - 7-8. Water-carts with battalions; field hospital with reserve.
 9. Patrol from reserve (about one company) reconnoitre towards Broadstone, 11 A.M.
 10. Signalling officer will arrange to connect laterally, and with brigade office. Six cyclists per battalion assist as orderlies.
 11. Examining guards on all roads. Flags of truce to be sent to O.C. outposts.
 12. Number piquets from left of sections.
 13. Outpost headquarters at waterworks. In absence of Brigade-General, Col. V. to command.
 14. Password, "Waterloo."
- Section Commanders will occupy their positions independently by 10.30 A.M. Col. V. will issue orders to both battalions in his command. The Brigade-General will inspect the line commencing from the left at 11 A.M. Outposts will fall back on the camp at 1.30 P.M., without further orders.

By order,

G. H., *Brigade-Major.*

Wednesday, August 8.

The defenders (W battalion and brigade cyclists, less six from each of the other battalions) are assumed to arrive by rail at Broadstone Junction at 10.30 A.M., under Col. C., and are at 11 A.M. at the cross-roads, $\frac{1}{2}$ mile east of Broadstone Junction.

(Orders.)

WIMBORNE,

9 A.M., August 8, 1894.

O.C. W battalion.

1. The enemy's outposts are reported to be (facing west) north and south of the waterworks.
2. Attack and harass this outpost line in several places, and by so doing prevent the main body of the invading force from advancing northwards. We learn that this movement northwards is intended to commence about 1.30 P.M.
3. These attacks are to be confined to the manœuvre area, and are not to be pushed within half a mile of the Newtown-Longham road before 12.30. Reconnaissance may commence at 11.
4. The enclosed letters will be delivered under flag of truce to the enemy's piquets at different places before noon.
5. The direct track to the waterworks is reported bad for cyclists.

By order,

L. M., *Brigade-Major,*

Defending Force.

In Section I, which looked down into the Waterloo valley, the lines of observation and defence were well marked. In Section II, with broken ground in front, the lines were more difficult, but in the main the general scheme adopted appeared to be sound. It was over this section that at 1.15 the attacking force advanced, and was eventually stopped at the line of defence near the waterworks.

While the general line taken by the outposts was good, many defects in detail were pointed out, and it was evident that company officers and men required much more practice in this work.

Among the faults noted were:—

Formation of reserve faulty.

Too many sentry posts.

Sentries insufficiently coached.

Sentries badly linked, and sometimes badly posted.

In the piquets, organization too casual; numbering of piquets neglected; arms not piled; piquets not told off; no ranges measured from line of defence; piquet in one case exposed on the skyline; reliefs not properly carried out; patrolling fair.

On the other hand, the connection with the headquarter office by signallers and cyclists was efficient, and the resistance when attacked was successful, and piquets mutually supported one another.

The result pointed to the necessity of company officers receiving more practical instruction in outpost details.

This evening, in the lines of the W battalion, a cook's competition took place. The cooks of the competing companies paraded with a pail of water, six kettles, fuel, and tools. On the word "Go," the cooks of each company dug a trench, lit a fire, and distributing the water among six kettles, proceeded to boil them. All six kettles had to boil before the superintending officer reported to the timekeeper. Two companies completed in $21\frac{1}{2}$ minutes, and a third in $22\frac{1}{2}$.

Thursday, August 9.—This was a busy day all round. At 10 A.M. the B battalion started for the manoeuvre ground, to practise outposts regimentally in the morning, and to join in the field-day in the afternoon. The transport detachment of this battalion carted out kettles, stoves, and rations. Wood was cut on the ground, kitchens dug, and dinners (roast and boiled) served at 2 P.M.

The cyclists were employed on this day in connecting with those of the Western Counties Brigade encamped near Weymouth, a distance of $33\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

The scheme formulated was as follows:—

v. MAP II.

1. Scheme: the lateral communication between invading forces landed at Weymouth and Bournemouth; the defenders have cut the telegraph in all directions: the headquarters of the respective cavalry divisions on the night of August 8 were at Cerne Abbas and Blandford.

2. The cyclists of the Western Counties Volunteer Brigade will establish connecting posts as under.

I. Lodmoor (brigade office).

II. Foxwell.

III. Milestone 10 miles west of Wareham.

Those of the Portsmouth Volunteer Brigade—

IV. Wool railway bridge.

V. Milestone three miles west of Wareham.

VI. Wareham station.

VII. Kings Bridge, near Marsh Green.

VIII. Upton cross roads.

IX. Newtown chapel.

X. Talbot Village (brigade office).

3. Each post will consist of 1 N.C.O. and from 4 to 7 cyclists, an officer being detailed to every 3 or 4 posts.

4. The posts will be stationed on the high road at a bridge or other easily distinguishable place, which must be passed, and will be marked by a bundle of hay or straw on a pole by day (and a lantern by night). Cyclists must not stray from their posts.

5. Each orderly will be given clear directions by the N.C.O. as to his road and the pace he is to travel; and on reaching the next post will receive a receipt for the dispatch carried, and return at once to his own post.

6. A register will be kept on the form on the back of this paper at each post, and will be frequently inspected by the officer.

7. The pace at which the message is to travel will be marked on the outside as follows:—

X. 6 miles an hour.

XX. 8 to 10 miles an hour.

XXX. As fast as possible.

8. The posts will all be occupied by 11.30 A.M. on Thursday, August 9, and, unless previous orders are received, will be evacuated at 3 P.M.

9. Cyclists will carry cooked rations.

10. The officer detailed for Wool railway bridge post (IV) will see that the time as indicated at Wool station is communicated to the posts east and west: watches will be set in accordance with this time.

REGISTER.

Connecting post, No.
Stationed at
N.C.O. (name).
Cyclists (names).

(Rank)

(Regt.).
(Regt.).

”
”
”
”
”
”

”
”
”
”
”
”

Date.	Detail of letters.	Arrived.			Sent.			Remarks.
		When.	Bearer.	From.	When.	Bearer.	To.	

Examined,

A.M.
A.M.
A.M.
P.M.
P.M.
P.M.

Cyclist officer,

V.B.

The arrival of the Portsmouth cyclists at their farthest point (21 miles) was announced by carrier pigeon. All the posts were punctually occupied, and several messages passed through each way. As will be seen from the table, the time varied from 2 hours 43 minutes to 3 hours 25 minutes.

Several of the messages sent from Bournemouth got hung up at about No. V post, as the sergeant in charge of No. X did not start sending until 12.30 p.m., thinking he had to wait until the official time came through.

Part of the road indicated between posts VIII and IX was also found to be unrideable, and a detour had to be made.

Experience shows that it is better to number each message thus: 1W, 2W, i.e., No. 1 from the west; 3E, No. 3 from the east. These numbers are easily entered in the registers.

The time of sending from the original station should be marked on the outside of the envelope. The envelopes should be stout linen, lined, as they get wet and dirty in the passage, and in wet weather would wear out.

When two brigades practise this exercise, the farthest post of each brigade should be ordered to communicate immediately with its neighbour of the next brigade, the cyclists at these frontier posts being slightly strengthened to ensure this overlapping.

In the morning the brigadier visited the P battalion at attack drill, and subsequently rode to No. IX post, sending back thence to hurry up the messages.

The chief of the staff of the southern district visited the camp on this day, and saw the afternoon operations.

No programme had been devised beforehand for this day, it being kept open in case the weather had necessitated the postponement of one of the former day's work.

The following scheme was therefore issued to commanding officers at 2.45 :—

Defender.—Orders to be opened by the O.C. S battalion on arrival at the waterworks.

From G.O.C. Wimborne.

Take up a position at or near the waterworks to hold the Newtown-Longham road, at all costs; the invaders are in force at Newtown. It is doubtful if reinforcements can reach you; they will come from the west if at all.

Defender.—To the O.C. B battalion (already on the manœuvre ground).

From G.O.C. Wimborne.

Conceal your battalion on or near the track leading from the waterworks to Broadstone Junction. If the enemy advances from the south to attack the S battalion at the waterworks, make a vigorous counter-attack on his left flank.

Invader.—To the O.C. W battalion, in command of the P and W battalions and machine-gun. Orders to be opened at Newtown Chapel.

From G.O.C. Poole.

Clear the road to Longham Bridge.

The position at the waterworks, looking south, is an easy one to defend, as it commands a boggy valley which the attacking force must cross on descending from the higher ground beyond.

Message number.	From	Post I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.	VI.	VII.	VIII.	IX.	X.	Pace.	Total time.	Remarks.
		Miles 4	4	3½	3½	3½	4	2½	6	2½	Total	33½		
1	Weymouth	11	11.32 11.35	11.45 12.3	12.25 12.25	12.38 12.38	12.50 12.50	1.4 1.9	1.19 1.22	1.53 1.55	2.25 2.25	x x	h. m. 3 25	The upper number at each post gives the time of ar- rival—the lower of departure.
2	Do.	11.15	11.46 11.47	11.50 12.15	12.39 12.39	12.47 12.47	1 1	1.14 1.15	1.27 1.32	2.10 2.12	2.33 2.33	x x	3 18	
3	Do.	11.30	11.55 11.57	12 12.21	12.47 12.47	12.57 12.57	1.10 1.10	1.25 1.27	1.38 1.41	2.14 2.16	2.33 2.33	x x	3 3	
1	Wool	By pigeon			11.30						12.20 1.7			The upper number is the time the bird was sighted —the lower the time message ar- rived in camp.
3	Do.	Do.	Do.		3.15						3.43 4.5			
4	Weymouth	1.40	2.20 2.22	2.34 2.35	2.52 2.52	3.2								
1	Bournemouth	3.18	3.9 3.12	2.52 2.53	2.25 2.25	2.15 2.15	1.54 1.54	1.26 1.30	1.14 1.15	12.43 12.45	12.30	x x	2 48	
2	Do.	3.18	3.10 3.12	2.52 2.53	2.27 2.27	2.17 2.17	1.55 1.55	1.34 1.36	1.20 1.23	12.45 12.47	12.35	x x	2 43	
3	Do.			3.24 3.25	2.52 2.52	2.29 2.29	2.15 2.22	1.35 1.37	1.27 1.30	1.4 1.6	12.40	x x		

Message number.	From	Post I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.	VI.	VII.	VIII.	IX.	X.	Pace.	Total time.	Remarks.
		Miles 4	4	3½	3½	3½	4	2½	6	2½	Total	33½		
4	Bournemouth				3.21	2.43 2.43	2.18 2.20	1.55 1.56	1.30 1.43	1.12 1.14	12.45	x x		
5	Do.					3.3	2.40 2.42	2.13 2.15	2.2 2.4	1.24 1.26	1	x x		
6	Do.					3.3	2.40 2.42	2.14 2.17	2.1 2.2	1.39 1.40	1.20	x x		
7	Do.					3	2.34 2.37	2.15 2.18	2.5 2.6	1.45 1.46	1.25	x x		
8	Do.						3	2.30 2.41	2.26 2.28	1.55 1.57	1.30	x x		
9	Do.							3.10	2.33 2.40	2.8 2.10	1.45	x x		
	Lod-moor		Pox-well.	MSIO W of Ware-ham.	Wool Rly. Bridge.	MS 3 W of Ware-ham.	Ware-ham Station.	Kings Bridge.	Upton Cross Rds.	New-town Chapel.	Talbot Village.			

The O.C. S battalion advanced one company beyond the boggy ground on to the farther hill, and with his other three companies took up a commanding position in front of the waterworks wholly to the west of the road.

The attacking force advanced northwards; the P battalion on the left, the W battalion in the centre and right.

At 4.45 the P battalion drove in the advanced company of the defenders: it had caused little delay, and had considerable difficulty in retreating across the boggy ground. The P battalion early drew the fire of the defenders at the waterworks, and was pressing down into the valley, when the B battalion sprang from the heather on its left and poured volleys into its flank. The P battalion hesitated and curled back to the road; the counter-stroke had rolled back this part of the attack.

The W battalion on the right meanwhile pressed on towards the cross roads. Two companies were drawn into the fight on the road, but the remaining six steadily crossed the boggy ground hardly touched by the enemy's fire, which was all directed on the west of the road.

Ammunition now failed the S battalion at the waterworks; and the P battalion, recovered from the shock of the counter-attack, was now holding its own facing west in the hollow road. The W battalion was pushing on steadily when the cease fire sounded (5.25).

At the conference the following points were dwelt on:—

The defensive position taken up by the S battalion should have been astride the road, not merely on one side of it; the advanced company was practically useless. Ammunition was wasted by this battalion by opening a heavy fire too soon.

The counter-attack was well concealed and vigorously conducted; its effect on the attacking force was local demoralization.

That this local demoralization did not become general was due to the fact that the invading commander, keeping his head, refused to be flurried by the check on his left, and held to his main objective. This success was not immediately appreciated by the men of the W battalion, few of whom fired a shot during the afternoon, but, as an exercise, it afforded valuable training to leader and to men—to the leader to hold to his objective, in spite of a local reverse, and to the men to work steadily, first through wooded and then through boggy country.

Various points of fire discipline were also noted.

Friday, August 10.—Friday morning was fully employed. At 10 A.M. the transport paraded for inspection by the brigadier.

After the salute and inspection in line, the wagons (15 in number) marched past by half companies and then ranked past. Subsequently one face of a laager was formed; in $2\frac{3}{4}$ minutes wagons were laagered, horses unhooked, and fire opened; one horse broke away; column of route was re-formed in $1\frac{3}{4}$ minutes. The transport then joined the B battalion to practise for the afternoon's work. By this time the cyclists were formed up for inspection, and, as they moved

off, the W battalion marched into the brigade field, and were watched at their work by the brigadier.

At this drill an attempt was made to practise officers and section leaders in assuming command of portions of the firing line when the companies get mixed, and of practising the men to obey officers and section leaders to whom they were not accustomed.

One company was for this purpose fully extended, and commenced the advance; then another company was piled on to it, and captains, subalterns, and sergeants redistributed the firing line among them as the advance continued; a third company was then brought up, and subsequently a fourth; the whole line finally charged and re-formed. The other half-battalion had practised the same "disorder" parade in the morning, with good results, and the way in which each half-battalion silently accommodated itself to the difficult circumstances on the first time of asking showed that the week's steady work was already having a marked effect.

In the meantime the progress of the scheme was continued as follows:—

On August 9 the invader seizes Poole Harbour and pushes northward towards Broadstone Junction. The defender at Wimborne is reinforced.

At 2.30 P.M. the troops left camp for the final manœuvre, based on the following special ideas, which were designed to give practice to the departments as well as the troops:—

INVADERS.

(Orders.)

O.C. B Battalion.

POOLE, 3 P.M., *August 10, 1894.*

Your battalion and machine-gun will act as escort to a convoy of wagons just landed here. March by Newtown and the waterworks to Talbot Village.

The enemy (infantry) is at Wimborne and Canford Magna; our cavalry has just seized Broadstone Junction.

By order,

J. K., *A.Q.M.G.*

N.B.—The brigade transport will represent this convoy, which may move at 2½ miles an hour; your convoy and escort will be at Newtown (A), south and west of the chapel (photo enclosed), at 3.45, at which hour it may advance.

DEFENDERS.

(Orders.)

CANFORD MAGNA,

3 P.M., *August 10, 1894.*

O.C. Portsmouth V.B. (W, S, and P Battalions).

The enemy is landing stores at Poole, and forwarding them to Talbot Village.

Watch your opportunity, and you may intercept one of his convoys.

By order,

P. Q. R., *A.A.G.*

N.B.—The point of your advanced guard, marching as from Canford, will be at the keeper's cottage (B) on Kingston Heath (photo enclosed) at 3.45 P.M., at which hour it may move.

The chances of this day required a rather nice calculation of distances. The road to be taken by the convoy involved its passing northwards to the waterworks, and thence turning east to the camp; the other and more favourable routes were assumed to be occupied by other trains. If the larger body of cyclists of the defenders could seize the important cross roads at the waterworks, the chances are that the convoy would have been headed, forced to form laager, and fight for dear life.

A brief narrative of the action will show the details of a dramatic little field day.

Leaving Newtown Chapel at 3.45, the cyclists of the B battalion raced ahead, split into groups at the cross roads, and scoured the various tracks to find the enemy; four men passed down the road through High Wood, which led towards the enemy; when clear of the wood they dismounted and left their machines, one moving to the left of the track, two to the right, and one advancing along it.

4 P.M. The defender's cyclists now appeared on the crest of the hill (c), and, though forty strong, were checked for some three minutes by the energetic action of these four men.

The stronger number then came on, and took prisoner the centre man, who was going back with the information, but the delay caused by these four men turned the evenly balanced fortunes of the day, and prevented the defenders from occupying the all-important cross roads in time.

A curious incident now occurred. The quick movement of opposing cyclists renders an actual collision on a road a very probable contingency; the manœuvres of cyclists of opposing forces in peacetime are on this account most difficult to umpire; the troops in winding lanes are on one another like the flash of a rifle, and the greatest care is necessary to prevent an actual collision.

In this instance, at 4.5 P.M. the advanced guard of the convoy was nearing the cross roads when it heard the cyclists firing to its left front. It inclined to the left to join in the fight, and left at the head of the column the Maxim gun.

The gun detachment halted at the cross roads, sheltered under a bank in the south-east angle, and unlimbered ready for action, no enemy being in sight.

In the twinkling of an eye the W cyclists, having overcome their four men difficulty, debouched from the wood, rode up to the cross roads, and, before either side were aware of it, had dismounted in the same angle of the field as the machine-gun, actually surrounding it before they became aware of the value of their prize.

The convoy was seen coming on, the gun had to be dragged away, and this party of cyclists not actually barring the road was held to be insufficient to check the march of the escort.

The *mêlée* at the cross roads demanded free "killing" by the umpires, but the wagons pressed on, and by 4.10 passed the dangerous angle, and showed their tailboards to the waterworks.

The defender's raiding infantry was now pressing through High Wood, and the escort was soon involved in a rear guard action from

the waterworks to the camp—a running fight, in which they must have suffered heavily in spite of a well-ordered retirement. Later an officer, who understood the working of the captured Maxim, was found, and it was turned on to the retreating column, but at so long a range as to be ruled ineffective. The attack and retreat continued as far as the cultivated ground.

At the conference several points of fire discipline were again commented on; the delay caused by the bluffing action of the invader's cyclist patrol, and the failure of the defender's cyclists to hold the cross roads, were pointed out.

The troops now marched back to the brigade field, and for the first and last time marched past very steadily in presence of a large number of spectators. The cyclists, brigaded in rear of the infantry, made a fine show, it being calculated that 1,000*l.* worth of machines were on parade. The transport and bearer company brought up the rear. The troops returned in quarter column, and then marched to their regimental parades, a thunder shower preventing the advance in review order.

Saturday, August 11.—The next day saw the camp struck, and the various battalions entrained for the return journey.

The trains, though the rolling stock was actually in the station sidings, started late as follows:—

1st train	12 minutes.
2nd train.....	1 minute.
3rd train.....	33 minutes.
4th train.....	55 minutes.
5th train.....	65 minutes.

The reason of this delay was that the railway authorities, being unaccustomed to the carriage of troops, failed to make up beforehand the horse-boxes, baggage vans, and wagon trucks to suit the various trains and the platforms at which they were to be loaded. The troops were all punctually at the station and entrained quickly, in no way interfering with the ordinary traffic, but the want of organization in advance of the horse-boxes and trucks created a delay in starting which augurs ill for a similar operation in war-time unless controlled by the military staff.

The transport service, augmented by several extra teams, worked excellently on this day.

It remains to be stated that the general health of the camp was most excellent, only 24 cases, inclusive of accidents, being reported in the eight days.

This paper may be concluded with an extract from the final order issued on the breaking up of the camp.

"The Brigadier-General wishes to express his great satisfaction with the behaviour of the troops during the encampment. He was glad to see the interest taken by all ranks in the daily manoeuvres, and the cheerful way in which the fatigues of each day were borne. There was no falling out on the march, and during the manoeuvres he was glad to watch the daily improvement of officers and men, and considers the fire discipline of the brigade was fairly satisfactory; he was also pleased to note a marked improvement in the manner in which the guard duties were performed throughout the brigade."