The Foreign Policy of England¹ under Walpole

PART III.

THE feeling excited in England and France by the treaties of Vienna was almost akin to panic. This was, no doubt, partly due to the fact that, from what was known of the treaties, still more was suspected; the only part of the treaties that was officially made known was that Spain and the emperor had guaranteed the treaty of the quadruple alliance and had settled their differences in minor matters, but the rumour of an alliance by marriage between the two courts was very positive, and it was naturally imagined that they would not have entered into such an engagement without having some far-reaching plan calculated to stir up Europe from its foundations. The feeling of suspicion was only increased, perhaps advisedly, by the wild talk of Ripperda at Vienna and by the king and queen of Spain. Ripperda boasted in all companies of the designs he entertained of setting up the Pretender on the throne of England, of recovering Gibraltar, and of laying France low.² The king and queen of Spain, as we have seen, demanded the restitution of Gibraltar as soon as the completion of the treaties was known; and at the same time Stanhope reported that, according to the talk of Madrid, the treaties contained secret articles stipulating the marriage of an archduchess to Don Carlos, the emperor's promise of help in recovering Gibraltar, assistance from Spain to the emperor in a religious war arising from the oppression of the Polish protestants in Thorn, and advantages in trade to be given to the emperor, especially in reference to the Ostend Company.³ Even the emperor, though at first much more careful of the susceptibilities of England, subsequently increased the feeling of alarm by coolly offering his mediation to settle the commercial disputes outstanding between England and France, a proposition which was indignantly refused, 'there being

¹ Owing to the author's absence abroad this article has not enjoyed the advantage of his revision in type.—ED. *E.H.R.*

² See Syveton, p. 127; Stanhope, vol. ii. ch. xiii. p. 121.

³ Add. MS. 82748, f. 295 (June 1725).

no difference but what has been since created by the court of Vienna itself between the two crowns.'⁴ At any rate, apart altogether from the ill-digested schemes of Ripperda, sufficiently serious results would have followed for England and France if the policy initiated by the treaties could have been carried out. The emperor's chief objects in it were the development of his Ostend trade, which he seemed to have obtained by the commercial concessions granted to him by Spain; and the security guaranteed to his scheme of succession by Spain's acceptance of the Pragmatic Sanction. Spain, on her side, hoped to establish Don Carlos in Italy without having to call for the assistance of England and France, and to pay them their reward in commercial guarantees, to recover Gibraltar with the help of the emperor, and lastly, if the Austrian marriages took place, to reunite under one head the vast dominions of Charles V in Germany and Spain.

One immediate result of the alliance was to strike a fatal blow at a cherished object of both France and England; it deprived them of their power of holding the balance between the contending factions in Europe, and of maintaining a secure position by which they could only profit from the differences of other nations. Instead of being the arbiters of Europe they had to seek allies to defend themselves against a combination which seemed at least to be as strong as their own. In other respects the dangers to France from the alliance were less pressing than to England. The only points which affected France were the confirmation of the Pragmatic Sanction, by Spain and the prospective marriages of the arch-duchesses. If these marriages took place under the Pragmatic Sanction the house of Hapsburg would again join together all the vast dominions of Spain and the empire, to prevent which had been a prominent motive with France in the long war of the Spanish succession; and although the Hapsburgs would thereby be fused with the Bourbons the course of the last ten years showed how little France could depend on the assistance of even such a loyal Bourbon as Philip V. But this danger was not very immediate, as there seemed at present no certainty that the marriages would take place; and as to the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction by Spain much might happen to weaken its effect before the emperor died. To England, on the other hand, the danger was more immediate. By Spain's sanction of the Ostend trade she was touched in her tenderest point of commercial supremacy, and her allies the Dutch were even more hardly hit, for Spain's objection to the traffic had hitherto been her strongest support against it. An alienated Spain meant also a considerable interference with, if not a total cessation of, the West Indian trade;

⁴ Duke of Newcastle to Lord Townshend, 18 Sept. 1725 (Coxe, *Walpole*, ii. 475).

an attack on Gibraltar and Minorca must inevitably lead to a war with Spain, and possibly with the emperor; and finally there was always the danger of internal disturbance from an effective Spanish support of the Pretender. For these reasons it was clearly necessary for England to seek support to counteract the very dangerous alliance constituted against her.

Although there was thus some ground for alarm, the great perturbation displayed both in Paris and London at the sudden alliance of Spain and the emperor appears to have been somewhat unnecessary in view of subsequent events. Not only were the interests of the two powers hopelessly at variance at points where they met, but their ultimate ends were so divergent that a mutual bargain had in it no elements of permanence. The emperor's was essentially a land power, Spain's a naval power; and in Italy, where they met as it were on common ground, the emperor was never likely to welcome the advent of a Spanish prince. Nevertheless there was considerable excuse for the apprehension that was felt. Europe was still in such a state of flux and unrest that it seemed impossible to calculate what each nation in its new circumstances might come to regard as its most profitable outlet of development. But the negotiations which were the outcome of these treaties helped to make the various aims of the European states plainer, as the two groups of allies, England and France, and Spain and the emperor, attracted to themselves almost every other country in Europe, according to the interests of each. For a short time Europe was divided into two huge camps that hurled defiance at one another, and then drew apart to seek their objects by more pacific methods. It is worth attempting to set out what led each nation into either camp, and what principles besides the immediate subject of dispute were guiding their policy.

From the date of the treaty of Vienna a notable change in the relative attitudes of France and England to one another is to be observed. So far in the discussions and negotiations about Spain and the emperor, both before and during the congress of Cambray, England had been content quietly to follow the lead of France. It was France that had first made the separate treaty with Spain in 1721, and she brought England into it. Again, the whole question of the investitures was managed by Dubois, who first brought England and Spain to his point of view, and then by his cogent reasonings and determined despatches brought the emperor to agree to the allies' demands.⁵ In despatches to Lords Polwarth and Whitworth Lord Carteret explicitly stated that in the various matters relating to Don Carlos the English plenipotentiaries are to act according to

⁵ Baudrillart, ii. 526 *sqq.*

the wishes of the French ministry,⁶ and the duke of Newcastle followed the same system when he succeeded Carteret as secretary of state. Thus in a despatch of 9 June 1724⁷ the duke not only impresses on Horace Walpole the necessity of loyally co-operating with France, but tells him that the English ministers at Madrid and Vienna have been instructed to follow the directions of their French colleagues; on 30 Aug.⁸ of the same year he leaves it to France to decide on two alternative answers to the emperor's pretensions about Parma;⁹ and even in the dispute about the Ostend traffic, which concerned England far more directly than France, he leaves that power to take the initiative.¹⁰ The reason of this was, no doubt, partly, as the duke of Newcastle said,¹¹ that the object of the whole negotiation was the establishment of a Bourbon prince in Italy, which concerned France more than England; but there were other more important reasons.

Until the return of the infanta to Spain by the duc de Bourbon England felt that her alliance with Spain depended on that with France, who seemed more closely bound than ever by family ties to Spain since the marriage of the regent's daughter to Louis of Spain and the betrothal of the infanta to Louis XV. Another reason was that the impression of Dubois's vigour in taking the lead had not evaporated immediately after his death, and it required some time to penetrate the duc de Bourbon's feebleness. A further reason was that England, especially during Carteret's time, was very much preoccupied in settling the 'affairs of the north,' and it was recognised that the only way of obtaining the much-desired treaty with Russia was by the help of France; and Carteret made England for the time still further dependent on the good graces of France, and anxious not to offend her, by his ill-advised negotiation for the comte de St. Florentin's dukedom. It is true that even at that time the subservience of England to France was more affected than real in matters which England had seriously at heart. Owing to the representations of Horace Walpole France told the czar in April 1724 that he could not have an alliance with her unless England were also made a party to the treaty,¹² and England was constantly urging France to bring the czar to reason by means of her ambassadors at St. Petersburg and Constantinople.¹³ France was also asked to assist England's ally, Portugal, in a dispute with Spain;¹⁴ and the deduction was drawn by the duke of Newcastle, from the frequency of applications made by such foreign powers as Portugal and Sardinia for Horace Walpole

⁶ P.R.O. France, 366 (4 and 16 March 1724).

⁷ Add. MS. 32739, f. 184.

⁸ *Ibid.* 32740, f. 253, and cf. 32741 *passim*.

⁹ *Ibid.* 32738, f. 360.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 32741, f. 19.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 32738, f. 212.

¹² Add. MSS. 32738, f. 194, 32739, f. 287.

¹³ Add. MS. 32739, f. 117.

to settle for them their disputes with France, that the opinion held about the influence of England at Paris was very high.¹⁴ Nor did England hesitate, when a complaint came of French encroachments in Newfoundland, to enter the strongest protests against such conduct.¹⁵ But on the whole it may be laid down that in matters of European politics France rather carried England with her than the reverse.

But the altered condition of affairs created by the return of the infant and the treaty of Vienna, joined to a recognition of the duc de Bourbon's weakness, made manifest England's superiority in the alliance. The positions of France and England in relation to Spain had become reversed, and England could, on Philip and Elizabeth's first outburst of anger at the insult, have made her peace with Spain by deserting France. This superiority of England was still further illustrated in the whole course of the negotiations connected with the treaty of Hanover. English commercial objects, both in relation to the emperor and to Spain, were the guiding principle for all these negotiations undertaken by England in concert with France. The Ostend traffic affected French merchants very little; their interest in Spanish commerce was, in many respects, more on the side of Spain than of England, and yet the French government docilely followed most of the proposals made by England to regulate these matters in her interest, and throughout it is England that takes the lead. In going through the correspondence that passed between the duke of Newcastle and France during the years 1726 and 1727 one cannot but notice the frequent evidence there is of the fact that England is now the life and soul of the alliance. It is England who spurs on France to win over some of the protestant princes of the empire,¹⁶ it is England who urges the movement of French troops into the Empire,¹⁷ who takes the initiative in checking Spain by the West Indian fleet,¹⁸ and who suggests and pushes on the various negotiations with Prussia, Russia, and Denmark; while the French have to be constantly brought up to the mark for their timidity in declaring war and for their general unreadiness.¹⁹

In England one of the chief sources of Sir Robert Walpole's strength in opposing the allies of Vienna was the support given, or supposed to be given, by them to the Pretender. In this respect the enemies of England seemed quite uninfluenced by the lessons which they might have learned from history, for William III found that nothing so much strengthened his hands in England as the proclamation of the old Pretender's title by Louis XIV at the out-

¹⁴ Add. MS. 32741, f. 867.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 32747, f. 258.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 32748, f. 156.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 32741, f. 72 (15 Oct. 1724).

¹⁷ *Ibid.* f. 282.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 32749, f. 340, and *passim*.

break of the war of the Spanish succession. At the present crisis Sir Robert Walpole professed that the only excuse for going to war for which he would have the country's support would be the proclamation of the Pretender.

If we are to be engaged in a war (he writes to Lord Townshend on 19 Oct. 1725), which I most heartily deprecate, 'tis to be wished that this nation may think an invasion by a sovereign power, or an evident design of such an invasion, the support of the Pretender, and the cause of the protestant succession are the chief and principal motives that obliged us to part with that peace and tranquillity and the happy consequences thereof which we now enjoy.²⁰

Though there was no actual stipulation in the treaty of Vienna for putting the Pretender on the throne, there is no doubt that active intrigues were carried on in his favour. Besides Ripperda's vague and boastful promises of support to the cause, the English ministry had evidence from intercepted letters that Russia and Spain, and probably the emperor, were concerned in attempting to restore him. Lord Townshend, writing from Hanover on 4 Oct. (N.S.) 1725, states that three Russian men-of-war had been carrying arms to Cadiz for the Pretender, and that Spain had remitted vast sums to Amsterdam, partly to pay for these arms and partly for additional assistance;²¹ in November Stanhope informs Lord Townshend of Jacobite intrigues in Spain, and writes that Philip's object, a characteristic one for that bigoted king, was to re-establish the Roman catholic religion in England;²² and for the next few months the foreign correspondence contains frequent allusions to the Jacobite intrigues, especially in Russia, although Sir Charles Wager's fleet soon stopped any danger from that quarter. In April 1726 the plan of operations appears to have been changed, and it was rumoured that the Pretender, supported by the emperor and Spain, was threatening an attack from Ostend.²³ But this, like the other plans, came to nothing. The fact was that the Pretender had brought disrepute on his cause by his absurd quarrels with his wife, Clementina Sobieska, and by the foolish choice of counsellors which he made.²⁴ Among others the duke of Wharton, who had lately joined his cause, was given a high place in his confidence. He was a shifty, untrustworthy man, whose changes of party and religion and intemperate habits brought him into contempt everywhere. He was sent on various missions to Spain and to the emperor, but at the Spanish court he appears to have only succeeded in blabbing the secrets of his party to the observant Keene. In July 1726 Stanhope was able to send to England the account

²⁰ Coxe, *Walpole*, ii. 486.

²¹ *Ibid.* ii. 480.

²² Add. MS. 32744, f. 439.

²³ Add. MSS. 32745, f. 491, 32746, f. 71.

²⁴ See Stanhope, vol. ii. ch. xiv.

given by Ripperda of Wharton's proposals for a treaty to be made between the Pretender and the emperor, whereby the Pretender was to agree to give up Gibraltar and Minorca to Spain, and to allow the emperor to have the Ostend trade, and other commercial facilities, while, in consideration for these promises, he was to be sent over to Scotland from Russia and assisted with the armed forces of Spain and the emperor.²⁵ Walpole was certainly right in thinking that nothing could help him better in creating an enthusiasm for the war in England than a knowledge of support given by England's enemies to a Pretender who would concede so much against England's interests.

This fear of the Pretender was a very effective instrument in the hands of the ministry in obtaining that support from parliament without which their plans of alliance would have been of no avail. And the menace to trade involved in the Ostend Company, combined with a danger to the protestant succession, touched the most influential classes not only in the house but also in the country, and made them enthusiastic to forward any schemes which the ministry might think necessary. Thus in April 1725, even before the existence of the treaties of Vienna was known, although the rupture of Spain with France had rendered foreign complications probable, the house voted a large addition to the civil list to cover the expenditure on the secret service fund; in the following year the treaty of Hanover was approved of by a large majority and an increase of supply was voted; in 1727 the ministerial measures for an increase of the army and navy were agreed to by still larger majorities and their attitude on the continent heartily supported. Thus the ministry had no anxiety about parliament and were left with a free hand to make England respected on the continent. In this respect they had a great advantage over the French government, who had no certain means of finding out how far they were supported by the nation, and who were carrying out a policy which found little favour with the commercial classes. But although the ministry were at one with the nation and among themselves in opposing the ambitious schemes of the Vienna allies they were not without their differences as to the method in which this should be done. It was obvious even from the first that the bond uniting Spain and the emperor was not strong enough to stand too great a strain. If one of the two allies were attacked it was not certain that the other would assist him unless his own interests were more deeply involved with his ally than they were as yet by the terms of their alliance. The English cabinet were agreed in thinking that a demonstration of force should be made chiefly against one only of the two allies, but

²⁵ Add. MS. 32747, f. 35.

there are indications that they were not so well agreed as to which should be chosen.

The advocates of a vigorous policy against the emperor had many excellent arguments to rely upon. The emperor himself is stated to have had various reasons for annoyance with England, such as the king's steadiness to the French alliance, his opposition to any arbitrary rule by the emperor in the empire, and his refusal to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction without knowing what settlement was intended.²⁶ On the English side there was considerable soreness against him for his unreasonable conduct at the congress of Cambray, where, although he had owed his deliverance from the Spanish invasion of Italy almost entirely to the intervention of the mediators, he obstinately refused all means of accommodation, as though he had been the victor. In the second place England had nothing which she was willing to give to buy off the emperor, and without concessions he was intractable. There were besides two distinct matters of dispute with him in which he was not likely to yield without good reason: one was his persecution of the protestants of Thorn, which from wild talk heard at Vienna and Madrid was imagined to be only a prelude to no less a scheme than driving protestantism out of the empire or even out of Europe;²⁷ the other was the far more dangerous and insidious attack on English and Dutch trade which the Ostend scheme of commerce seemed to indicate. This last danger was one which appealed especially to the whole mercantile community in England, as by the privileges granted to the company by Spain they feared that their own West Indian trade would be ruined. Another reason why the emperor seemed a better enemy to choose than Spain was that there appeared to be a serious danger from Russia's restless condition. The czar was intriguing to get Sweden entirely into his power, so as to have absolute command over the north of Europe and to be able to put a stop to English trade in the Baltic, and he was known to be giving support to the Pretender. The alliances, however, in Germany, especially those with the king of Prussia and Denmark, which were to be opposed to the emperor's combinations, would serve a double object by also keeping Prussia in check. Lastly, an important consideration, which undoubtedly had weight in the minds of the ministry, was that not only would the French troops be much more useful in the empire than in Spain, but France would be much more likely to co-operate heartily with England against the emperor, for France had never abandoned the hope of reconciliation with Spain,

²⁶ Add. MS. 32687, f. 155 (letter from duke of Newcastle to Lord Townshend describing the council which took the treaty of Hanover into consideration $\frac{20}{20}$ Sept. 1725).

²⁷ *Ibid.* 82746, f. 345.

nor had she given up her traditional enmity to the Hapsburgs. Against these arguments could only be set the following considerations: that whereas France had not yet thrown off her hostility to the emperor England still regarded him very generally as her traditional ally, sanctioned by the glorious memories of Marlborough's wars; so that it seemed almost unnatural to be at war with him, and the 'old system,' as the alliance with him was familiarly called, was thought of as the traditional and proper policy for England. This feeling was made all the stronger by the consideration that our chief strength lay in our fleet, and that whereas the fleet could help us against Spain it was perfectly useless against the emperor alone.

As to Spain, there were always two questions which might precipitate a quarrel with that power—Gibraltar and trade disputes—and in contrast to the emperor Spain was always particularly vulnerable to our attacks from our command of the sea. But, in spite of the comparative ease with which she could be attacked, the arguments against making her the objective of our combinations were very strong. Whereas the Ostend Company was a direct act of aggression on the emperor's part, we were already in possession of Gibraltar and of the West Indian trade, and although the Spanish government had used threats against us if we did not restore Gibraltar, and had talked of confiscating our trade, they had at present shown no signs of carrying out their threats. In the interests of our trade and of Gibraltar it was obviously better to avoid a rupture as long as possible: when the rupture came, whatever might be our relations to the emperor, our fleet would be free to deal with Spain. Moreover there was always the bribe of a settlement for Don Carlos in Italy wherewith to attract Spain. It was true the emperor had promised that too, but he had shown no intention as yet of fulfilling his promise, while France and England, though the congress was at an end, never wavered in their support of part if not of the whole of Spain's claims in Italy. There was, lastly, the consideration that of the two Spain would be less likely to have to fight alone if attacked; for the emperor had very few means of inducing Spain to assist him effectually, whereas Spain, who was paying a subsidy to the emperor, could always withdraw it if he did not come to her assistance.²³

In the cabinet Townshend was decidedly of opinion that the emperor was the more dangerous enemy, and that the principal measures must be directed against him. At first, indeed, he seems to have actually conceived the visionary scheme of conquering the Low Countries and of dividing them between England, France, and Holland;²⁴ but happily that idea did not detain him long. Sir

²³ Add. MS. 32748, f. 205.

²⁴ Coxe, *Walpole*, vol. ii. ch. xxviii. p. 246.

Robert Walpole, on the other hand, though not exactly opposed to Townshend's views, thought that he was over-precipitate in his vast network of northern alliances, objected to the amount of the subsidy which Townshend proposed to spend on gaining Sweden, and doubted the excessive danger of Russia's designs. He also was of opinion that more trouble should have been taken in securing the alliance of Portugal, and evidently counted from the first on a possible rupture with Spain. The duke of Newcastle, whose opinion was certainly not very valuable for deciding an important question of policy, seems to have trimmed between two views. In October of one year he was convinced of the necessity of first attacking the emperor,³⁰ while in the following March he was equally certain that it was better first to declare war on Spain.³¹ For the moment at any rate Townshend carried the day: his view was supported by the king, who strongly resented the emperor's attempts to take too much upon himself in the empire, and when he accompanied the king to Hanover in the autumn of 1725 he got the whole conduct of the negotiations into his own hands. But though he was triumphant for the time, and it is due to him that the strong confederation against the emperor, which began with the treaty of Hanover, was formed round England and France, this question of alliance with or hostility to the emperor became more instead of less acute in the cabinet, and became mixed up with the personal question which eventually led to Townshend's resignation. The duke of Newcastle, a sure barometer of the winning opinion in the cabinet, became more and more in favour of an alliance with the emperor in preference to Spain, and perhaps even to France, and the views of the old system finally triumphed after Townshend's departure. The reasons for this change, however, will be told in their place: it is now necessary to examine the combinations which England and France under Townshend's influence on one side and Spain and the emperor on theirs formed against one another; and, inasmuch as almost the whole of Europe became involved, directly or indirectly, in these two groups of allies, it may be well to take the states of Europe in order and explain the motives of policy which induced each to make its choice of group. From the date of the treaty of Vienna until the end of 1727 Europe was the scene of manœuvres and counter-manœuvres of the contending parties to secure all the countries of Europe in their confederation.

When Townshend went over with the king to Hanover in the summer of 1725, his first efforts were directed to securing the alliance of Frederick William, king of Prussia. This ruler had already by his careful finance, by his wise administration of the country, and by his splendid army, laid the foundations of

³⁰ Add. MS. 32743, f. 205.

³¹ *Ibid.* 32749, f. 265.

that greatness which in the middle of the century Frederick the Great won for Prussia. This was so conspicuously the case that his alliance was already sought after in Europe, while by his unwillingness to commit himself he often obtained promises and advantages from both rival claimants for his friendship. Thus in 1715, when he had only been two years on the throne, the French minister Torcy signalled his untrustworthiness in an instruction to the French ambassador De Croissy.

Le roi de Prusse fait aisément des avances, et s'il désire d'un côté de faire des traités avantageux d'autre part il craint également de s'engager dans de mauvaises affaires. Occupé sans cesse de la passion de s'agrandir, il est toujours incertain des voies qu'il doit prendre pour y parvenir. S'il en choisit une, à peine est-il déterminé à la suivre qu'il en reconnoît les dangers, et pour l'ordinaire il aime mieux abandonner le parti qu'il a pris que de travailler à surmonter les obstacles qu'il y rencontre. . . . On se tromperoit donc si l'on comptoit sur la fermeté de ses résolutions. Il croit qu'il est d'un habile politique d'en changer souvent.³²

But his policy was not so foolish as Torcy seems from this passage to have imagined it to be. Already in 1720, after very little exertion on the part of Prussia, Frederick William had secured by the treaty of Stockholm with Sweden a large slice of Pomerania, the islands of Usedom and Wollin at the mouth of the Oder, and the important town of Stettin, and had thereby won for Prussia a long-coveted outlet for her commerce and a bulwark against the disquieting growth of Russian power. But the object which lay nearest to his heart in continental affairs was the succession to the duchies of Juliers and Berg, which would have conveniently rounded off a Prussian slice of territory in the west of Germany, consisting of Guelders, which was acquired at the treaty of Utrecht, and of Cleves. His claim to the succession arose in the following way.

In 1609 John William, duke of Cleves, Juliers, and Berg, had died without issue, and, after much dispute, it had been settled in 1666 that Juliers and Berg should go to the duke of Neuburg, who was descended from John William's second sister, and Cleves to the elector of Brandenburg, who was descended from John William's eldest sister, but that if there were a failure of issue in either line its share should revert to the other. The present duke of Neuburg had no issue, and Frederick William, as successor to the Great Elector, claimed the reversion of Juliers and Berg; but there was another claimant in the person of the prince palatine of Sulzbach, who was heir to the duke of Neuburg and descended from John William's third sister. After the treaty of Stockholm the guarantee of this succession to himself was the chief object of all Frederick William's diplomacy; and the willing-

³² *Recueil*, &c., Suède, p. 259.

ness and capacity of a prospective ally to secure it for him became the touchstone for the value of a proposed alliance.

It had been evident some time before the treaty of Vienna that England and Prussia had a certain community of interest. As early as September 1723 Lord Townshend had drawn attention to the advantage of a close alliance with the king of Prussia as 'a neighbouring prince, so nearly related, so well affected to the protestant cause, who has a standing force of 80,000 men and such an extent of dominions,'³³ and both England and Prussia, the one by her acquisition of Bremen and Verden and the other by that of Stettin, had an interest in maintaining treaty engagements with Sweden and in removing or overcoming the antagonism of Russia. Accordingly the treaties of alliance between England and Prussia had been renewed by the treaty of Charlottenburg in 1723, and one of the first acts of the duke of Newcastle as secretary had been to impress on Horace Walpole the expediency of the French and Dutch joining in the new treaty,³⁴ which after some hesitation France agreed to do in November 1724.³⁵ It had also been arranged that the bonds of consanguinity between the two crowns of England and Prussia should be tightened by a double marriage between the heirs to the thrones. When, therefore, Townshend began looking about Europe for alliances to set against that of Spain and the emperor, Prussia was the first power he drew into his net, and by the treaty of Hanover on 3 Sept. 1725 he started the vast European coalition he had imagined. In its wording this treaty seemed innocent enough: there was a clause guaranteeing the respective dominions of the allies and another for the redress of protestant grievances in Thorn, and it was stipulated that justice should be done to Frederick William with regard to Juliers and Berg.³⁶ But the real objects of the treaty covered by the vague guarantee clause were to preserve Gibraltar, Hanover, and France against attack, to destroy the Ostend East India Company, and to form a balance of power against Spain, the emperor, and Russia. But Frederick William's constancy proved very short-lived. On hearing of the treaty of Hanover Spain and the emperor, in spite of pacific assurances from the English and French ministers, had not been slow to perceive that it was aimed at them; but instead of intimidating them, as had been hoped, its immediate effect had been to draw them still closer to one another.

Alarmed for his own dominions at the emperor's signs of vigour, and still more at the accession of Russia to the treaty of Vienna in 1726,³⁷ the king of Prussia deemed it prudent not to

³³ Coxe, *Walpole*, ii. 266.

³⁴ Add. MS. 32738, f. 360.

³⁵ *Ibid.* 32741, f. 206.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 32741, f. 492.

³⁷ *Ibid.* 32745, f. 306 (duke of Newcastle to T. Robinson, March 1726); Coxe *Walpole*, ii. 499 (Pozzobuono to Ripperda, July 1726).

break entirely with the emperor, and before the treaty of Hanover had been signed six months he adopted the singular policy of attempting to deter Sweden and other powers from joining an alliance of which he was himself a member.³⁸ The French attributed this change of front to a quarrel which had arisen between George I and Frederick William about the marriage of Prince Frederick and a Prussian princess, and suggested that George I should make peace by waiving his scruples and sanctioning the marriage.³⁹ The duke of Newcastle on the other hand suggested that a much more effective way of overawing him would be to send a French army across the Rhine.⁴⁰ However neither suggestion was acted upon, and Frederick William, free to give rein to his prudence, signed the treaty of Wusterhausen with the emperor on 12 Oct. 1726, by which he guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction and promised him 10,000 troops, receiving in return nothing but loose assurances from the emperor that he would persuade the Sulzbachs to give up their claim to Berg and Ravenstein to the king of Prussia.⁴¹ Indeed, these assurances could not well be other than loose, for only two months before the emperor had made a treaty with the elector palatine by which he had guaranteed the succession of Juliers and Berg to the Sulzbach house.⁴² However Frederick William was not the only one fooled, for in February of the following year he appears to have begun again to think so badly of the emperor's chances as to be on the point of deserting him,⁴³ and it was not until December 1728, after peace had been restored, that he entered into a definite treaty with the emperor on the assurance of his guarantee for Berg and Ravenstein or of an equivalent. The net result, therefore, of Prussia's part in these negotiations was that she received absolutely valueless guarantees for Juliers and Berg from both parties, but nevertheless considerably gained in prestige by the earnest bids made for her support by powers of the importance of England, France, and the emperor, whereas to England and France the Prussian alliance was, from its uncertain character, more of a burden than an advantage.

The immediate effect, as has been stated, of the treaty of Hanover was to draw closer the allies of Vienna. The emperor; who had so far been very lukewarm in his alliance with Spain, now became thoroughly alarmed at the danger which threatened him from the Hanover league, and he at last consented to enter into engagements with Spain which proved him in earnest. He would

³⁸ Add. MS. 82745, f. 207.

³⁹ Add. MSS. 82746, f. 87; 82747, f. 282 (May and Sept. 1726).

⁴⁰ Add. MS. 82746, f. 480 (July 1726).

⁴¹ Baudrillart, p. 270; Add. MS. 82748, f. 156.

⁴² *Recueil, &c.*, Bavière, pp. 419-21.

⁴³ Stanhope, vol. ii. ch. xiv. p. 161.

not, it is true, go so far in the matter of the marriages as the queen of Spain asked, but he agreed by the second treaty of Vienna of 5 Nov. 1725 that if his eldest daughter should be under the age of marriage at his death she should be betrothed to Don Carlos (Art. II.); and even with this very moderate concession he still insisted that the thrones of France, Spain, and the empire should always remain absolutely distinct (Art. V.) On the other hand he committed himself entirely to Spain's policy in case a war should break out. He not only promised to use his good offices to obtain the restitution of Gibraltar and Minorca, but went so far as to engage himself to help Spain to recover them by force if war should break out (Art. XI.), and he guaranteed the Spanish trade to the West Indies in return for a Spanish guarantee of his Ostend Company (Art. XII.) At the same time he and Spain actually settled between themselves the dismemberment of France which should follow a successful war: the Belgian provinces in the hands of France, Alsace, and the three bishoprics were to fall to the emperor's share; Franche-Comté was to go either to Don Philip, Elizabeth's second son, or to the emperor; and the duke of Lorraine was to recover his possessions as they were in 1698, while Roussillon, Cerdagne, and Navarre were to revert to Spain (Art. X.) In minor matters, such as the elections of the king of the Romans and the king of Poland and the succession to Juliers and Berg, there was to be complete harmony between the two powers (Art. VIII.), and generally they promise one another the most effective support in all possible circumstances (Art. VII.)⁴⁴ The terms of this treaty, which were never exactly known at the time, but which were pretty accurately guessed, more than justify the alarm felt both in France and England at the alliance of Vienna. It is an indication of the great results which Elizabeth and her agent, Ripperda, expected to follow even from the very qualified promise of Maria Theresa's hand that they should have persuaded Philip to agree to a treaty containing such almost unnatural schemes for the dismemberment of his native land. But although the first move of England and France in gaining Prussia was thus countered they were not checkmated, and under the impulse of Townshend's enthusiasm they pursued their policy of gathering together a formidable system of alliances to meet such menaces.

Prussia in fact was only the first in the group of alliances comprehended in Townshend's scheme against the emperor. Not content with a doubtful ally in the heart of the empire, he wanted to hem the emperor in with enemies on all sides; and France appeared to offer him just the allies he wanted to do this. For more than a century Sweden, Poland, and Turkey had formed an

⁴⁴ The text of this treaty is given in Syveton, *app. i.* p. 288.

almost continuous chain of allies to France in the north and east of Europe against the emperor. Of these Sweden had been the most important, owing to the commanding position acquired for her in Germany by Gustavus Adolphus. Besides possessing on the east of the Baltic Finland, Carelia, Ingria, Esthonia, and Livonia, with all the islands at the entrance of that sea, she had at one time no less than a hundred and thirty-two fortified places in Germany.⁴⁵ Thus as a German and a protestant power she could enforce respect from the emperor, while by her control of the entrance to the Baltic she was able to give valuable protection to the French Baltic trade against the Dutch commerce and fleet. But at the same time that France's need for this protection against Holland had passed away with her alliance to the maritime powers Sweden's usefulness as an ally in any other capacity had been suddenly and irrevocably extinguished. The treaties of 1719, 1720, and 1721 had put a seal to the misfortunes which Charles XII's wild adventures had brought on his country. By the treaty of Stockholm of 1719 Sweden had agreed to George I's retaining Bremen and Verden for a money consideration; by the second treaty of Stockholm with Prussia in 1720 Sweden lost Stettin and part of Pomerania; by the treaty of Frederiksborg of the same year Schleswig had been left to Denmark, and finally by the calamitous treaty of Nystadt in 1721 Sweden gave up to Russia all her Baltic provinces except Finland. To make matters worse there was a disputed succession between the actual king, Frederick of Hesse Cassel, who had married Charles XII's second sister, and the duke of Holstein, son of Charles's eldest sister; and a change in the constitution, whereby the king had given up all authority to the senate, had made the government incompetent and powerless.

On the other hand Russia since the peace of Nystadt had suddenly stepped into the position of command in the north vacated by Sweden. Barely rescued from barbarism by Peter the Great, she had not yet impressed herself on the rest of Europe, but Peter had already very clearly realised what must be her main lines of development. He wished, first of all, that Russia should become a member of the European family of powers, and by his acquisition of the Baltic provinces at the peace of Nystadt, which gave him his 'window' to the west, he had made a step towards this consummation. Freed in the north by this peace he saw in the next place that Turkey was the power which put bounds on Russian expansion in the south, and that Turkey must either be beaten or pacified. Lastly, although Russia's views on Germany were not so aggressive as Sweden's had once been, she had begun to understand that the indeterminate frontier made by Poland and

⁴⁵ *Recueil*, &., Russie, p. xii.

an unexpanded Prussia must be further defined, and in the process of definition it was clear that the emperor and Prussia would have to be reckoned with. At this time England showed by the anxiety with which she watched Russia's development that she perhaps more than any other country suspected her possibilities. But there were several questions which rendered an alliance between England and Russia difficult. In the little upheaval of Europe which had taken place under the influence of Alberoni and the Swedish minister Goertz, Peter had cast in his lot with Sweden against England, and he had proposed to Dubois that France should assist him in putting the Pretender on the throne of England.⁴⁶ George I's purchase from Denmark of Bremen and Verden, which had formerly belonged to Sweden, was a sore point with him, all the more as it was inextricably mixed up with the thorny question of Schleswig. In the late war with Sweden this province had been taken from the duke of Holstein and annexed by England's ally Denmark; but the duke of Holstein, who had married a daughter of Peter the Great, was supported in his claims to it by the Russian government, whereas George I, as one condition of receiving Bremen and Verden, had undertaken to support Denmark's possession of this province. There was yet another cause of difference between England and Russia about the duchy of Mecklenburg. Here the reigning duke, another connexion of the czar's, had quarrelled with his nobles, and by a sentence of the emperor had been turned out of his dominions; and, while the czar espoused the duke's side, George I, having been made joint guardian of the duchy with the duke of Wolfenbüttel, was bound to oppose him. France, on the contrary, was being constantly wooed by Russia to enter into alliance with her, and Peter had done all he could to effect this object both by a personal visit to Paris and by active negotiations. A French alliance would, he saw, be of considerable service to Russia for several reasons. In his aim at playing a part in the councils of Europe there was no power able to give him such valuable aid as France, who by her prestige and former glories was still reckoned so much the leading power in the world that recognition by her was alone sufficient to give consideration. Moreover France by her commercial interests and treaty rights had more influence in Turkey than any other nation, and Peter foresaw that occasions would often arise when this influence might be very usefully exercised in the interests of Russia; and although the emperor had an equal interest with Russia against Turkey his policy of opposing all Russian control over Poland made France a better ally to Russia for German affairs also. But in France even after the treaty of Nystadt there was hardly any curiosity about Russia, and certainly

⁴⁶ Add. MS. 82741, f. 483.

no readiness to meet her pressing advances for an alliance. France, in fact, during the first twelve years after the treaty of Utrecht, light-heartedly and on several occasions rejected the chance of securing a strong ally in the north, whose fidelity, based on gratitude and on interest, would have stood a test such as Prussia, for example, never did.

When the congress of Cambray began its sittings, relations between England and Russia were in a very strained condition, owing to their various points of difference, and there seemed a very great danger that matters might become worse through a coalition between Russia and Sweden. In July 1724 the duke of Newcastle wrote that the czar's intrigues in Sweden were so menacing that the king of Sweden might be forced to resign the throne in favour of his rival the duke of Holstein.⁴⁷ Such a result would be serious to England's interests in the north, since not only would there be the loss of an ally in Sweden, but we should probably by our treaty obligations have to defend Denmark from an attack by the duke of Holstein, who, strong in the czar's support and with the resources of Sweden at his command, would certainly attempt to recover Schleswig by force of arms. Indeed, the czar's intrigues had been so far successful that he had concluded a treaty with Sweden, whereby it was agreed that compensation should be found for the duke of Holstein's loss of Schleswig, and that he should succeed the present king on the throne of Sweden. In these circumstances the English ministry made an excellent use of the czar's anxiety to conclude a treaty with France. Though the French government showed no warmth in welcoming his overtures, they were on the whole inclined to give in to them; but the duke of Newcastle persuaded them to refuse to come to terms with him unless he would make up his differences with George I and include him in the proposed treaty of alliance. They even went further, and, again at the duke's suggestion,⁴⁸ gave orders to the French ambassador at Constantinople to persuade the Turks to put pressure on Russia, and to make her so uneasy in the south that she should be only too glad to settle difficulties in the north with England.

Unfortunately for England it happened several times in the course of the Anglo-French alliance that French envoys not only took a different view of the best French policy from that officially recommended to them from Paris, but even acted on that view. The negotiations with Russia during 1724 and 1725 were considerably hampered by this peculiarity. Campredon, the French envoy to Stockholm and St. Petersburg, was a frequent subject of complaint by the duke of Newcastle for his lukewarmness in

⁴⁷ Add. MS. 32739, f. 287.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 32738, f. 194.

promoting the treaty between England, France, and Russia,⁴⁹ and Bonac, the French envoy in Constantinople, consistently used his influence with the Turks to deter them from an attack on Russia.⁵⁰ But the English representations against this double-dealing forced the French ministry to bring their ambassadors to order; and Campredon at last consented to act according to the instructions dictated to his court by England, and nearly succeeded in obtaining the treaty. One day, towards the end of 1724, he stopped Peter on his way to church, and, appealing to his gratitude, reminded him that it was only due to the interposition of Bonac that he had not been attacked by Turkey. The czar showed himself so sensible to this appeal that he agreed to sign the treaty with the proviso that the dukes of Holstein and Mecklenburg should be admitted into it.⁵¹ However his death in January 1725 prevented the accomplishment of this intention, and his successor, Catherine, though at first inclined to accept the treaty, became so disgusted with France's rejection of her project of marriage between Elizabeth and Louis XV that she espoused more strenuously than before the claims of her son-in-law the duke of Holstein, and put all idea of a joint treaty between England, France, and Russia out of the question.⁵² Another reason for this action on the part of Catherine was that for some time after her accession the English ministry, under the mistaken idea that her tenure of the throne was insecure, relaxed their efforts to gain Russia;⁵³ and without England to urge her on France made no progress in that direction. All this time the emperor had his agents at the Russian court, who were correspondingly earnest in representing the advantages of an imperial alliance. Russia, as has been pointed out, would not have chosen this alliance, but in view of the almost insulting way in which France threw cold water on her advances, and of the serious causes of difference with England, there was nothing left for her to do but to join the emperor's side. Already in the autumn of 1725 the news of assistance offered by Russia to the Pretender and Spain⁵⁴ showed that the allies had irretrievably lost her, and in August 1726 she gave in her formal adhesion to the treaty of Vienna.

When it had become apparent that nothing was to be hoped for from Russia for the Hanover allies, the English ministry tried to neutralise the value of this alliance to the emperor by keeping Russia well occupied both in the north and the south; and in the south they again tried to turn the French alliance to profit.

⁴⁹ *E.g.* Add. MSS. 32743, f. 163, 32744, ff. 351, 407.

⁵⁰ *Recueil, &c.*, Russie, p. 255; Add. MS. 32745, f. 99.

⁵¹ *Recueil, &c.*, Russie, p. 255; Add. MS. 32740, ff. 291, 426.

⁵² *Recueil, &c.*, Russie, pp. 256-8; Stanhope, ch. xiii. p. 122.

⁵³ Add. MSS. 32742, f. 515, 32743, ff. 1, 3, 32744, f. 523.

⁵⁴ Add. MS. 32744, f. 543; Coxe, *Walpole*, ii. 482, 487.

The Turks had for a long time been closely bound to the French monarchy. Although the kings of France, not so much on account of religious scruples as from a fear of public opinion in Europe, had never ventured to make a formal treaty with the Grand Signior, they occupied an exceptional position of power at the Porte. Their ambassador took precedence of all other ambassadors, had absolute jurisdiction over the French 'nation,' and had almost the position of an independent power. The importance of French commerce in the Levant, and the common interest of France and Turkey against the emperor, were the causes of the proud position for France at Constantinople, where the French king was almost regarded as the natural counsellor for the sultan to turn to in matters of European policy. It is true that France was beginning to feel the effects of English energy even in the Levant, but she was still the predominant power there. It was this influence with Turkey which the duke of Newcastle was trying to bring into play; and it seemed all the more easy to do so as the Turks had causes of complaint against Russia as well as against the emperor. As regards the emperor the Turks were still very sore at the crushing defeat they had sustained in the last war, resulting in the treaty of Passarowitz of 1718, by which they had been obliged to give up Belgrade and the banats of Temeswar, Wallachia, and Servia. But they had been so badly beaten then that there seemed at present no prospect of their attacking the emperor without a very favourable opportunity. Russia also, under the energetic rule of Peter the Great, had suddenly become a menace to Turkey on the Black Sea, the Caspian, and even on the Danube, and at the present moment there were some troubles going on in Persia, by which the English saw that a diversion could be created against Russia by the Turks.

In 1723 a revolution had occurred in Persia by which Russia, under pretence of supporting the reigning dynasty, had profited by seizing the important ports of Baku and Derbend, on the Caspian Sea. The Turks, naturally alarmed at these successes, made a treaty with Russia in June 1724, by which both parties profited at the expense of Persia and agreed to abstain from further interference in Persian affairs. However at the end of the following year the troubles in Persia broke out again, and Turkey saw in them an excellent opportunity of seizing Gilan, the province on the south-west of the Caspian, next to the new Russian possessions, and talked of denouncing the treaty with Russia, though the prospect of an alliance between Russia and the emperor rather alarmed the Turks, and they hesitated to break with Russia if there was a chance of it. But such a diversion against Russia was exactly what England wanted; Stanyan, our ambassador at Constantinople, was ordered to encourage the Turks in this idea, and strong representations

were made to the French government to induce them to follow the same policy.⁵⁵ The French, however, were slow to move; they argued that a rupture between Turkey and Russia would free the emperor from any fear of a Turkish invasion and give him additional confidence, whereas the duke of Newcastle pointed out, with a truer knowledge of the Turkish character, that the martial ardour of the Turks, when once aroused by a war against the infidels, was apt to develop in all directions, and the emperor would be more rather than less likely to be involved in war with them if Russia were attacked.⁵⁶ The French in the end grudgingly gave in to these views,⁵⁷ but their ambassador again thought he knew better and would not at first co-operate with Stanyan even to the limited extent of his instructions. In the end the Turks, although they might have gained confidence by the despatch of the English fleet to the Baltic against Russia, made no attack on the Russian possessions, but contented themselves with obtaining considerable advantages at the expense of Persia, and with signing a secret article by which they bound themselves not to assist Russia against Persia.⁵⁸

Thus two failures in the negotiations of this time were due partly to the slowness of the French government in making up their minds, partly to their inability to enforce their decisions on their own ambassadors. In both cases they were themselves the chief sufferers. Russia, it is true, was to some extent lost to them by their loyalty in not making a treaty without England, but if they had understood the increasing importance of Russia, and thought it worth while, the Russian desire for an alliance was so strong at first that they could easily have insisted on carrying England with them; but they failed to see this importance, and by their failure not only lost Russia for the present crisis but found Russia firmly established on the side of the emperor in the Polish war and the war of the Austrian succession. In the former war especially Russia did considerable harm to the French cause, and in both wars England was really the gainer by Russia's enmity to France, as in both England's sympathies were rather on the side of the emperor. In Turkey, too, the hesitating note struck by the French envoy, instead of the triumphant tone of dictation assumed by Louis XIV, was probably the first step in that decrease of French influence at Constantinople which became more and more marked as the century proceeded. The Turks no longer felt sure what France wanted, and lost confidence in their support, so that they began gradually to look on the English ambassador

⁵⁵ Add. MS. 82745, f. 99.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 82745, f. 461.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 82747, f. 214.

⁵⁸ An interesting account of this Persian affair can be found in Stanyan's official correspondence with the secretary of state (P.R.O. Foreign Office, Turkey, 25 [1716-1728], 26 [1728-1729]).

as almost the equal of the French, after seeing him take the lead in the alliance of the two powers. As, however, Russia was lost and Turkey was not as useful as it might have been, Townshend had nothing to do but to try and checkmate the alliances against him by further combinations.

Poland was the centre of the chain of allies which France formerly had against the emperor, and, though internal dissensions had considerably weakened her power, her union under the same ruler with Saxony made Augustus, king of Poland and elector of Saxony, a useful ally against both Russia and the emperor, a fact which was recognised by the allies on both sides. There were actually three questions which seemed likely to have a determining influence on the king of Poland's decision with which side he should cast in his lot. The first was that of the protestants of Thorn. An attack had been made by the protestant inhabitants, apparently with the connivance of the protestant magistrates of that town, on a Jesuit college there. The Jesuits complained to the government at Warsaw, and the chancellor gave their judgment in the following terms:—

- i. All the guilty parties were to be punished.
- ii. The protestants were to restore a certain church to the catholics.
- iii. The magistracy was henceforth to be composed half of protestants and half of catholics.

This judgment had aroused an extraordinary degree of indignation among the protestants of the empire, who saw in it a threat to protestant liberties generally; and the king of Poland was actually engaged in considering whether he should uphold the judgment or not.⁵⁹

The second matter, and Augustus's chief preoccupation, was as to the succession to the throne of Poland. He was very anxious to make the throne hereditary in his own house, and for that reason was intriguing with all his power to obtain the succession for his son, the electoral prince.

There was also a third question which, though not a subject of very immediate importance, might be expected to have some weight in the king's eventual policy. The electoral prince had married a daughter of the emperor Joseph, who by that emperor's arrangement of the succession should have succeeded to the Austrian possessions before Charles VI's daughters. It is true that this arrangement had been upset by the present emperor's Pragmatic Sanction, but the original claim, in spite of renunciation on marriage, might always prove a useful weapon against the emperor in the hands of the house of Saxony.

The question which chiefly exercised the kings of Prussia and

⁵⁹ See Finch's Instructions, P.R.O. (Poland).

of England was that of the Thorn protestants. As the leading protestant powers in the empire they made energetic protests against the decision pronounced against them, and for this reason alone made great efforts to detach the king of Poland from the emperor, who would be only too likely to induce him to satisfy the decision. On the other hand they were inclined to favour the confirmation to Augustus's successors of the Polish crown, and were not slow to use the argument of the electoral prince's eventual claim to the Austrian possessions as a reason for keeping clear of any engagements to the emperor.

Even before the treaty of Hanover the duke of Newcastle had called upon France to co-operate heartily with England in Poland, on the somewhat strange plea that the French being catholics and the English protestants they would have a good field for combined action in Poland, where the catholics and protestants were mixed up.⁶⁰ But besides this France had always had a peculiar interest in Poland for the value of her alliance against the emperor, and when Augustus became king Torcy had inaugurated the very wise policy of favouring his claims to the hereditary succession, in order still to preserve a steady ally in the east of Europe. But Louis XV's unfortunate marriage with the daughter of Stanislaus, a former king of Poland and still a claimant to the throne, upset this system, as it was considered necessary for the dignity of France to support his claims. But the French ministers did not yet dare to put forward his candidature openly, and the consequence was that in the instructions given to the abbé de Livry in 1726 there was the note of hesitancy which was now becoming so common in French diplomacy. He was told to talk secretly with the partisans of Stanislaus and to give them some encouragement, but at the same time not to break openly with Augustus and even to appear not to oppose his views. Thus neither was Augustus himself really satisfied, as the policy of France indicated that he should be, nor was a strong party formed for Stanislaus. It is true the abbé was told to insinuate to Augustus that the claims of his daughter-in-law should restrain him from joining the emperor, but in the affair of Thorn the same lamentable indecision was shown. Although it had been stipulated by a separate article of the treaty of Hanover that redress should be obtained for the protestants, the French government told their representative to cool the ardour of the Prussians and English, and virtually to take no sides in the question. It is true the French as a catholic power were in a delicate position, but apart from the treaty of Hanover their guarantee of the treaty of Oliva called on them to prevent any innovations in the matter of religious administration.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Add. MS. 32742, f. 290.

⁶¹ See *Recueil*, &c., Pologne, vol. i. pp. lxvi, 300 *sqq.* (abbé de Livry's Instructions.)

Here again then France, more from a want of policy than from a wrong policy, prevented an alliance for the Hanover coalition, and when in the following year Poland made overtures to the king of England he loyally refused to have anything to do with the negotiation about a country in which France was interested almost more than any other nation. Consequently Augustus had nothing else to do than to close with the emperor's offer of a guarantee for succession to Poland, and declared the neutrality of his dominions.

There remained Sweden in the north, the sadly weakened third of France's old allies against the emperor. But though Sweden was almost impotent France, more from a blind instinct of tradition than from chivalrous loyalty, remained true to the old allegiance; and since the treaty of Nystadt England had come to regard Sweden as the best counterpoise to the power of Russia, especially as that treaty had transferred England's difference with Sweden about Bremen and Verden and Schleswig to Russia, where Frederick of Holstein found shelter. Thus in 1723, when an attack on Sweden by the czar was imminent, Sir Robert Walpole was forced to yield to Carteret and Townshend's demand of a subsidy of 200,000*l.* for Sweden;⁶² but by the peace of Stockholm in the following year between Russia and Sweden satisfaction was promised to the duke of Holstein at the expense of Denmark, and consequently of England also. However the treaty of Vienna seemed to upset all previous settlements, and Townshend immediately realised the importance of keeping Sweden out of the arms of Russia and of preventing the emperor from being allowed to accede to the treaty of Stockholm. But Sweden was not strong enough to choose for herself, for under the peculiar oligarchic system of government adopted there since 1720 the government was only influenced by bribes, and the country had no policy but that dictated by fear. There was, therefore, considerable danger that the combined influence of Russian armies and Russian bribes might compel Sweden to fall in with her neighbour's views. To meet these difficulties Townshend in the first place persuaded Walpole to empower Poyntz, our envoy at Stockholm, to draw advances up to 50,000*l.* for judicious distribution among the Swedish senators;⁶³ but he did more, for in the spring of 1726 he had a fleet sent to the Baltic under Sir Charles Wager to overawe Russia and give Sweden confidence. These efforts were not immediately successful, for in May Sweden allowed the emperor to accede to the treaty of Stockholm.⁶⁴ The reason of this was partly that France again was not loyally seconding England's policy, in spite of the excep-

⁶² Add. MS. 32686, ff. 284, 286 (Coxe, *Walpole*, ii. 254, 263).

⁶³ Townshend had been anxious to make it 100,000*l.*, but Walpole objected to such a large sum (Coxe, *Walpole*, ii. 471, 473).

⁶⁴ Add. MS. 32746, f. 6.

tional influence which her long-standing alliance with Sweden gave her at Stockholm: in fact Campredon, who was *chargé d'affaires* there as well as at St. Petersburg, adopted in both places the same anti-English attitude; and there also were delays made by the French government in undertaking a share of the subsidies without which nothing could be done in Sweden.⁶⁵ At last, however, the duke of Newcastle's reiterated remonstrances prevailed on the French court to replace Campredon by the comte de Brancas, who was given the strictest injunctions to act in concert with England and to prevent Sweden from listening to Russia's insinuations in favour of the duke of Holstein.⁶⁶ These vigorous instructions, aided by the impression made by the English fleet, which returned to the Baltic in the spring of 1727, were at last successful, and on 26 March 1727 Sweden acceded to the Hanover alliance on the understanding that England and France should each pay her an annual subsidy of 50,000*l.* for three years, and that she should keep up a force of 5,000 men, to be increased to 15,000 in case of emergency;⁶⁷ and England succeeded in excluding from the treaty any stipulation in favour of the duke of Holstein's claims to Schleswig.⁶⁸

This question of Schleswig, which played so important a part in the negotiations with Sweden and Russia, was also useful to the allies of Hanover in gaining them the support of Denmark. After Charles XII's death, as has been seen, Denmark had obtained as her share in the spoils of Sweden the duchy of Schleswig, which had been guaranteed to her by England, and more reluctantly by France. But the active support given by Russia to the duke of Holstein was always a menace to its possession, and the possibility of a Russian alliance with the emperor made the Danish government quite ready to fall in with the desire of England for a stricter alliance. Already in February 1726 they had rejected the emperor's proposal to them to become parties to the treaty of Vienna,⁶⁹ and in April they had still further committed themselves to the other side by sending ten ships to join Sir Charles Wager's squadron in the Baltic.⁷⁰ These dispositions on their part could only be strengthened by the rumoured intention of an invasion of Schleswig by the combined forces of the emperor, Russia, and Poland; and the English ministry became convinced that Prussia, who had not yet gone over to the emperor and was also menaced by such an attack, could only be rendered secure by the assistance of Danish troops.⁷¹ There was, however, some delay in concluding a definitive treaty, owing chiefly to the hesitation of France, who had never quite forgiven Denmark for not assisting her in the war of

⁶⁵ Add. MS. 32747, ff. 1, 245.

⁶⁶ *Recueil, &c., Suède*, pp. 298 *sqq.*

⁶⁷ Add. MS. 33006, f. 492.

⁶⁸ *Recueil, &c., Danemarck*, pp. 132-3.

⁶⁹ Add. MS. 32745, f. 223.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* 32745, f. 416.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* 32746, f. 71.

the Spanish succession and had broken off diplomatic relations on some trifling question of etiquette. However in 1726, partly owing to the persuasion of the English ministry,⁷² the French envoy Camilly was sent to Copenhagen to join Lord Glenorchy in negotiating a treaty. Even then hitches occurred. In the first place the French were unwilling to part with the money required for a subsidy to Denmark, and in June the duke of Newcastle had to point out to them that they were clearly responsible for it, as the English had the expense of the Baltic fleet and of the subsidy to the landgrave of Hesse, whereas the subsidy which France had undertaken to pay the elector of Bavaria had fallen through.⁷³ A further difficulty was made by France in entering into a guarantee for paying part of any equivalent which it might ultimately be decided to give the duke of Holstein for Schleswig.⁷⁴ Finally, however, all difficulties were swept away by the duke of Newcastle's persistence, and on 16 April 1727 a treaty for four years was signed, by which England and France agreed to support Denmark against Russia and to pay two-thirds of any equivalent which the duke of Holstein might be allowed; and Denmark on her side agreed, on payment of an annual subsidy from France of 350,000 dollars for four years, to keep up a force of 24,000 men, to be further increased to 30,000 if necessary.⁷⁵

Holland was another very necessary link in the chain of alliances against the emperor, and she had been specially singled out in the treaty of Hanover to be invited to join it. Holland, it is true, had already become of little account as a power by herself: her feverish energy seemed to have been fundamentally sapped by the wars of the last century, and though the wealth she derived from commerce was still considerable, and her fleet and army were not to be despised, she had lost the power of taking any initiative in action. In policy she now invariably followed England's lead, not always with perfect readiness, but rather like the weak man who thinks it necessary to protest to save his dignity while doing what the strong man orders him. Thus she had become a party to the triple alliance, and afterwards to the quadruple alliance, and there now seemed every reason to induce her to join the alliance of Hanover, as she was almost more interested against the Ostend East India Company for the sake of her trade than either England or France. There was never, it is true, very much doubt that the Dutch would accede to the treaty;⁷⁶ but, owing to their peculiar constitution, under which a separate vote from each state of the confederation had to be taken before any joint action could be

⁷² *Recueil*, &c., Danemarck, p. xlviii.

⁷³ Add. MS. 32746, f. 164.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* 32748, f. 363.

⁷⁵ *Recueil*, &c., Danemarck, p. xlviii; Add. MS. 33036, f. 492.

⁷⁶ Add. MSS. 32744, f. 543, 32745, f. 223.

carried out, and the difficulty of negotiation with the states, from the publicity and dilatoriness which attended these proceedings, nearly a year elapsed before their formal adhesion was given in August 1726. Their help was particularly useful to the allies not only for the ships and the 50,000 men which they contributed, but from their position in the north of the empire and from the command which they had over the Austrian Low Countries through their garrisons in all the frontier fortresses, given them by the barrier treaties of 1715 and 1718.

But Sweden, Denmark, and Holland only commanded the north, and Townshend saw that it would be necessary to raise up enemies against the emperor more in the heart of the empire. There were various petty German princes at that time who had no particular policy except the pursuit of pleasures, and were always willing to sell the lives of their subjects for an addition to their treasury. Among these was the landgrave of Hesse, the father of the king of Sweden, who kept a serviceable body of men and occupied a commanding position on the Rhine, between France and Germany. Already in October 1726 Townshend had made overtures to him,⁷⁷ and in the following February the duke of Newcastle engaged to secure him if the French would negotiate a treaty with Bavaria.⁷⁸ The French treaty with Bavaria and another proposed with Würtemberg⁷⁹ fell through, but in March 1726 the English made a convention with the landgrave of Hesse by which, on payment of a subsidy of 125,000*l.*, he allowed 12,000 of his troops to be taken into English service. However the duke was not so successful in persuading the French to let the landgrave occupy Rheinfeld, a strong position near Bâle, on the Rhine, commanding the entrance into Alsace. The French ministers, possibly because of this very proximity to Alsace, objected to the occupation of a fortress on their own frontiers, in spite of the duke's argument that its only effect would be to facilitate their own invasion of the empire.⁸⁰

Meanwhile the emperor had not been inactive in counter-negotiations. Already he had, in August 1726, secured Russia's accession to the treaty of Vienna. Prussia followed suit in October, deserting England and France for the emperor, and the three electors of Treves, Mainz, and Cologne had also ranged themselves on the same side. The elector palatine too had joined the Vienna alliance in 1725, and had obtained the emperor's guarantee for Juliers and Berg to descend to his relative of Salzbach; but when the emperor gave a similar guarantee to the king of Prussia the elector's zeal for the imperial cause cooled, and in 1727 he began to listen to the overtures of France. There remained the elector of Bavaria, who was of considerable importance,

⁷⁷ Coxe, *Walpole*, ii. 480.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* 32747, f. 258.

⁷⁹ Add. MS. 32745, f. 129.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* 32748, f. 448.

as he commanded the way into the emperor's dominions, and his traditional alliance with France against the emperor seemed likely to secure him for the Hanover allies. In February 1726 the duke of Newcastle proposed that France should negotiate a treaty of subsidy with Bavaria by which the elector should provide an army against the emperor.⁸¹ This plan was agreed to by France, and after some delay the marquis de Maillebois was instructed to open the negotiations. The elector's four conditions were—

- i. That the subsidy should be paid immediately even in time of peace.
- ii. That it should be increased in time of war.
- iii. That he should be allowed to place some reservations on his adhesion to the article in the treaty of Hanover about the protestants of Thorn.
- iv. That France and England should support his pretensions to the Austrian succession, founded on his marriage to a daughter of Joseph II.

To the first demand the French replied that the English parliament would object, but, as they had already agreed to pay the whole subsidy, this was evidently a subterfuge to escape payment; the second demand was agreed to; about the third nothing was said, and to the fourth they again suggested that England would not agree, for fear of alarming the emperor too much.⁸² The real fact of the matter was that France, as the duke of Newcastle pointed out, hesitated about paying the subsidy agreed upon with England,⁸³ and the consequence was that the elector, who was in considerable financial straits, signed a treaty of friendship with the emperor on 1 Sept. rather against his will, and chiefly because the state of his treasury could not have warranted a rupture with the emperor. However this time France took the alarm at the alienation of such a near neighbour and made a renewed effort to obtain at least the neutrality of Bavaria on a promise of renewing a treaty of 1714 about support for obtaining the Austrian succession and the imperial crown and of paying a subsidy; and in the result Bavaria agreed by a treaty with France in 1727 to remain neutral. However this treaty was not signed till November of that year, and during the whole of the critical year 1727 the emperor could count on the assistance of Bavaria.

The duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel was another example of the curious morality and the want of political conviction among those smaller German princes who treated their subjects as so much meat for cannon to be sold to the highest bidder. He had previously been made, with George I, joint administrator of Mecklenburg, so that one might have supposed their interests similar to a certain extent; but his support did not necessarily follow. The position of his territories in Germany made his aid particularly valuable to

⁸¹ Add. MS. 32745, f. 129.

⁸² Add. MS. 32746, f. 164.

⁸³ *Recueil, &c.*, Bavière, p. 161 *sqq.*

both parties, as Brunswick was on the direct road between Hanover and Schleswig and the Austrian dominions. The emperor made the first successful bid for his assistance, and, seduced by a subsidy of 200,000 florins, the duke promised to allow the town of Brunswick to be garrisoned by the imperial troops, who thus secured a clear road into Hanover.⁸⁴ No doubt as part-payment for this compliance a suggestion was made in August 1726 that George I should be put under the ban of the empire and Hanover handed over to the duke of Wolfenbüttel.⁸⁵ This was naturally regarded with the greatest alarm in England, and the English ministry spared no pains to bring him back to his ancient alliance. English diplomacy finally carried the day, and the duke agreed to keep up a force of 5,000 men for England's benefit in consideration of a subsidy of 25,000*l.* for four years.⁸⁶ But in this instance also the change of front was not effected until the signature of the preliminaries had removed the most pressing danger from England.

All the negotiations described in the preceding pages were made with the prospect of a war in Germany, to enable the Hanover allies to withstand an attack on Schleswig or Hanover, or to carry hostilities into the emperor's dominions. It was natural that the English ministry should have devoted most of their attention to securing allies in the north, where lay the chief interests of England, Hanover, and the Dutch; but the advantage of creating a diversion against the emperor in Italy, where he had 41,514 troops, and where Parma and Tuscany, the seed of the present troubles, were situated was not left out of sight.

Italy was, during the eighteenth century, a sort of *remainder* from which disappointed candidates for universal dominion had compensations carved out for them. By the treaty of Utrecht the Spaniards had been entirely swept out of the peninsula; the kingdom of Naples, with the Milanese and Sardinia, went to the house of Austria; the Papal States, Tuscany, Parma, and the trading republics of Genoa and Venice were left under their own governments; and the duke of Savoy and Piedmont had obtained the title of king with the island of Sicily, which had fallen to his share as a reward for his services to both sides in the war. Alberoni's plans had included the reconquest of Italy for Spain; he actually succeeded in occupying Sardinia and Sicily; and by the quadruple alliance in 1718 the map of Italy was again recast. Sicily was restored to the emperor, and the king of Savoy received in exchange for it Sardinia, which, though less rich, was nearer to his other dominions, and was, on the whole, more advantageous to him, though

⁸⁴ P.R.O. Treaty Papers, 116 ('Observations on the Abstract of the Treaties, 1725-7').

⁸⁵ Add. MS. 32747, f. 265.

⁸⁶ P.R.O. Treaty Papers, 116 (paper marked 'Mutual Succours stipulated by various Treaties').

he did not think so at the time. Spain was thus robbed of her recent conquests, and had to be content with a promise of the succession to Parma and Piacenza, and to Tuscany for Don Carlos. The interest of England in Italy was of a secondary order, chiefly to maintain the balance of power; and the reason for the destruction of the Spanish fleet by Byng in 1719 off Cape Passaro was to prevent the Spanish army being conveyed to Spain and forming the nucleus of an attack on England in favour of the Pretender.⁸⁷

Of all these various states in Italy the only one which had any vitality in it was the kingdom of Savoy, as the natural advantages of Savoy's position in the north-west corner of Italy had been turned to such good account by the astuteness of her rulers that their alliance had become sought after by the different powers that were struggling for possessions in Italy. With France on one side of them and the Milanese on the other they could prevent any effective operations either of the French or of the emperor by refusing leave for the passage of troops through their possessions; and failing an active co-operation their passive assistance became a necessity. For their services to either side they always expected and received more than a due reward, as their position made it possible for them to obtain most of their demands by deserting or threatening to desert one side for the other at the critical moment of a war. Almost every dispute in Italy gave the dukes of Savoy an opportunity of adding to their own territories without much exertion on their part, and they were gradually laying the foundation of that power which enabled their successors to secure the whole of Italy. But, although as a rule Savoy gained by the cynical indifference to the engagements of her princes, such a habit did not tend to make them popular in Europe; and, when the opportunity came, the other powers welcomed the chance of giving Savoy a rebuff. Thus, when Charles Emmanuel was forced by an imposing demonstration of strength to agree to the terms of the quadruple alliance, by which he had to give up Sicily in exchange for Sardinia, there was a universal chorus of satisfaction that he had been made to pay for some of his treacherous dealings.⁸⁸ But such reprisals were rare, and the rulers of Savoy, by their cleverness in turning their position to advantage, generally made the best of a bargain.

In the broad lines of policy, although the emperor was, from his strength in the north of Italy, Savoy's most formidable neighbour, the dukes of Savoy were more in sympathy with the emperor's aims than with those of France during this century. As far as France had an Italian policy of her own at all, its general idea was in conformity with that expounded by the marquis d'Argenson in his

⁸⁷ *Recueil*, &c., Naples et Parme (Chevalier de Vincettes, 1710), p. 46.

⁸⁸ Baudrillart, ii. 291, 303.

'Memoirs,'⁸⁹ to expel the foreign element from Italy and to encourage the growth of independent Italian states on a federal basis, which should be accustomed to look to France as their natural leader and protector; and while the majority of French statesmen thought of little else than the gratification of Spain in supporting the claims of Elizabeth's semi-Italian sons to estates in Italy their success was not incompatible with the general policy indicated. The dukes of Savoy also no doubt had, as their ultimate aim, Italy for the Italians, but by the Italians they meant Savoy, and regarded the establishment of strong Italian states in Italy as an even greater obstacle to their designs than the power of the emperor. Until they could expel the emperor from his Italian possessions, which they could not hope to effect by force, but were very slowly accomplishing by obtaining small slices of the Milanese in exchange for services promised and often not rendered, they were quite willing to exploit for their own profit the emperor's objection to the establishment of new Spanish or Italian states in Italy. But Savoy was not a bigot in policy, and if she could see a temporary advantage in opposing the emperor she did so. In the actual state of affairs brought about by the treaties of Vienna the emperor had been obliged to abandon his opposition to Don Carlos's establishment in Italy, so that Charles Emmanuel might be expected to oppose the strong combination of Spain and the emperor. The English ministry on their side did not fail to see how important his alliance would be, since his territories bordered on Parma and Tuscany; and, after a proposal had been made to the French ministry that an attempt should be made to gain him,⁹⁰ our envoy, Hedges, was instructed to negotiate at Turin in that sense. As usual the king of Savoy would do nothing without a bribe, and the chief object of the negotiation seems to have been to reduce his terms as much as possible. He first asked for the Milanese as the price of his coming into the treaty of Hanover, but it was represented to him that even if it could be conquered from the emperor it would be very difficult to retain it, and it was suggested that he might be content with the recovery of Sicily, or if he insisted on a bit of the Milanese that it should be treated as an equivalent for the loss of the Vigevnasco. In this negotiation the French seem again to have acted with a certain want of openness to the English, but now it was in the direction of going beyond the English offers, for they agreed to confirm any conquests that Savoy might make in the Milanese. It is true that the French had greater interests at stake in Italy than England, and so were more inclined permanently to reduce the emperor's strength there; and in November Hedges was ordered to agree to the concessions made by France. But then the king of Savoy raised another point; he

⁸⁹ *Mémoires*, iv. 266 sqq.

⁹⁰ Add. MS. 32747, f. 245.

wanted to get his price whatever happened, and so after drawing a pitiful picture of the exposed condition of his dominions to the emperor he demanded a guarantee that he should gain something by acceding to the treaty of Hanover, whether a war took place or not. By December the duke of Newcastle had realised that nothing could be done with him,⁹¹ but he was anxious not to break off the negotiations, which were alarming the emperor; and Charles Emmanuel, persuaded that he was indispensable, went on raising his terms until in February 1727 he actually proposed that some territory should be given to him out of France, with special mention of Monaco, and that security should be given him that he would be helped to get the Milanese. However finally in March he broke off the negotiations by announcing that, as there would probably be no war, he would enter into no engagements, and thus he effectually preserved his freedom of action until some more favourable opportunity should increase the bids for his support.⁹²

All the alliances hitherto mentioned were made or projected chiefly with the object of holding the emperor in check. On land Spain was neither so capable of attacking nor so assailable, because of her peninsular position; and what neighbours she had were against her. France had in Roussillon an army of 34,774 men,⁹³ which was to be ready to invade Catalonia;⁹⁴ and her other neighbour, Portugal, had already come into the state of semi-vassalage to England, which was her condition during the greater part of the century. By the treaty of 16 May 1703, which was still in force between England, Holland, and Portugal, it was stipulated that if France or Spain attacked Portugal the English and Dutch were to defend her, and especially to protect the Portuguese ports with their fleets; and Portugal was under corresponding obligations in return.⁹⁵ Of course the assistance given by Portugal to England in a continental war was not likely to be of much value, but England's profit in the engagement lay in the very profitable commercial privileges given to her by the Methuen treaty of 1703. By this, in return for the admission of Portuguese wines into England, English cloth and wools were admitted into Portugal on the most-favoured-nation terms, a privilege which resulted, as a French author complains,⁹⁶ in the whole Peninsula being inundated with British goods through Portugal as well as Gibraltar. The close alliance of the two crowns of England and Portugal is constantly illustrated in the course of the century. The excuse, for example, on which Townshend sent Horace Walpole to Paris in

⁹¹ Add. MS. 32748, f. 448.

⁹² An account of this negotiation can be gleaned from the correspondence in the Public Record Office, F. O., Savoy and Sardinia, 43 (1726-7).

⁹³ Add. MS. 32750, f. 231.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* 32750, f. 229.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* 32787, f. 184.

⁹⁶ *Recueil*, &c., Portugal, p. xli.

1723 was to negotiate the admission of Portugal to the quadruple alliance; and in the following year the Portuguese invoked the mediation of England to settle a long-standing diplomatic dispute with France.⁹⁷ But at this time, though there was so little expectation of a land war with Spain that no special trouble was taken with Portugal, Sir Robert Walpole was annoyed that Townshend had not brought Portugal to definite terms.

As a result of all these negotiations the whole of Europe could by the middle of 1727 be divided into one of two camps. On the one side Spain and the emperor could reckon on Russia, Prussia, the four electors of Cologne, Treves, Mainz, and Bavaria, Wolfenbüttel, and a neutral Poland and Saxony. On the other side England and France had secured Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Hanover, and some Hessian troops; they could also be free from anxiety on the score of Portugal, while the attitude of Turkey made it necessary for Russia and the emperor to keep watch on their southern frontiers. While the Vienna allies by this division had a slight superiority in land forces, the Hanover allies had an immense advantage at sea, where the English fleet, aided by French, Dutch, and Danish ships, far outnumbered anything Spain could provide. A fairly accurate estimate of the forces at the disposal of each side can be arrived at by comparing a paper drawn up for Colonel Armstrong, the English commissary, by Marshal Berwick in May 1727,⁹⁸ and the calculations made by Lord Hervey in his 'Memoirs.'⁹⁹ It appears from Marshal Berwick's paper that the imperial army, consisting of 166,814 troops, was distributed in the following manner:—

Naples	11,914	Empire	9,000
Sicily	10,600	Bohemia and Austria . .	28,568
Lombardy	19,000	Transylvania	18,284
Flanders	19,400	Hungary	60,048

while the French troops, which he estimated at 230,038 men altogether, provided the following services among others:—

Rhine army	82,691	Dauphiné army	24,499
Roussillon army	84,774	Flanders army	14,274

and among them the French had 592 pieces of artillery.

Lord Hervey's estimate of 160,000 regular French troops corresponds almost exactly with the numbers in these four frontier armies, and his mention of an additional 60,000 disciplined militia makes his total tally pretty closely with Marshal Berwick's official account. This lends probability to his statement that by reckoning in the new levies the emperor's armies came up to 200,000 men; and one may safely take his figures as the basis of the calculation by which he arrives at the following results:—

⁹⁷ Add. MS. 92741, f. 807.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.* 82750, f. 285.

⁹⁹ Chap. iii. *sub fin.*

Vienna allies :

Imperialists	200,000	Muscovy	30,000
Spanish (besides their naval power)	60,000	German princes	27,000
Prussia	70,000	Amounting in all to	387,000

Hanover allies :

French (not including the 60,000 militia)	160,000	Elector of Hanover	22,000
Danish, 24,000, to be in- creased if required to . .	80,000	King of England (be- sides 20,000 seamen) } Hessians in English pay }	26,000 12,000
Swedish, 5,000, to be in- creased if required to . .	15,000	Holland (besides 18 men- of-war)	50,000
		Amounting in all to	315,000

But though these figures show an inferiority in the troops of the Hanover allies it must be remembered that the principal land operations contemplated in these negotiations were to be in the empire, and there the troops of the emperor showed a corresponding inferiority to the others, for the emperor could not safely move his armies out of Hungary and the Turkish border or from Italy, so that even by adding to the others the 30,000 new levies, besides the Prussian, Russian, and electoral armies, he could only muster about 212,250 troops in the empire, while the Vienna allies, without reckoning the 60,000 French militia or army in Roussillon, could bring up 276,464 men against him.

The success of England in creating such a strong confederation against the emperor is to be measured not merely by the number of troops raised, but also by the ease with which they were obtained without imposing any serious new burdens on the country, whereas the emperor's expenses must have been almost ruinous. By the treaties which he made with the electors of Bavaria, of the Palatinate, and of Cologne, and with the duke of Wolfenbüttel, he engaged himself to pay large subsidies, and he also had the expense of raising 30,000 additional levies. If it had not been for the 3,000,000 florins sent by Spain to the emperor in 1726, he would have been quite unable to meet his obligations, as the imperial treasury was notoriously at a low ebb. England, on the other hand, kept her establishment of land forces stationary at 18,000 men in 1726, and in the following year only raised them by 8,000 to 26,000, with a corresponding increase of expense of about 330,000l.¹⁰⁰ Besides, the only troops which England engaged by the treaty of Hanover to send to the continent were 12,000 men, and these, in 1726, she bought from Hesse at the exceedingly cheap rate of 125,000l.; and in addition to these it was only proposed to send

¹⁰⁰ Chandler, vi. 357, 383.

12,000 English troops in the following year to co-operate with the Dutch, unless some unforeseen circumstances occurred. The accession of Sweden cost England 50,000*l.* for three years, but there was a corresponding advantage in the fact that, after Sweden had thus been strengthened, England was saved the expense of a fleet to the Baltic to keep Russia in awe. In reality the chief burden of the land forces and the alliances fell on England's allies. France raised 30,000 regulars and 60,000 militia of additional troops, Holland increased her army from 20,000 to 50,000, while Denmark was to provide 30,000 troops in case of war; and the expense of the subsidy to Denmark fell on France, who also paid another 50,000*l.* to Sweden.¹⁰¹ But in spite of the moderate amount of land forces contributed by England to the alliance, which was, no doubt, partly due to the extraordinary alarm at that time shown by parliament on any hint of a large standing army, England showed no inclination to shirk her share in the burdens of the war, and amply made up for any deficiency in military expenses by the activity of the fleet. In March 1726 *carte blanche* was given to the ministry to increase the numbers of seamen,¹⁰² and no less than three fleets were fitted out for the Baltic, the coast of Spain, and the West Indies, a demonstration which enhanced the credit of the Hanover alliance, kept Spain in check, and prevented Sweden from being overawed by Russia.

Altogether the formation of this confederation was a triumph for England, and especially for Townshend, and all the more when it is remembered how great were the difficulties which England had to contend against. In Russia, Turkey, and Sweden, England found the envoys of her French allies more than lukewarm in the common cause; in Denmark there was the same difficulty at first, while in the empire all the combinations entrusted to French diplomacy broke down. At a critical moment Prussia deserted, and even the Dutch gave trouble before they would come in. Nevertheless by persistence, by a judicious use of money, and by the overwhelming impression made by our fleets, Townshend scored this great diplomatic triumph. And the triumph was all the more complete because the issue never came to the test of war with the emperor and his allies, and when the Hanover confederation had been completely formed the day was practically won.

BASIL WILLIAMS.

(*To be continued.*)

¹⁰¹ P.R.O. Treaty Papers, 116 ('Observations on the Abstract of the Treatie 1725-7').

¹⁰² Chandler, vi. 370.