II.—MR. BRADLEY'S VIEW OF THE SELF.¹

By J. S. MACKENZIE.

WHEN an important philosophical work, like Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, is first brought out—a work in which a fresh construction is attempted, with little direct reference to other writers, and at many points without a full development of the lines of thought that are suggested—it is natural that there should be many misrepresentations of its meaning; and it is probable that the criticisms I am about to put forward are of this nature. But perhaps in the case of such a work it is only by incessant criticism and partial misrepresentation that one can hope to get the meaning of the writer at length brought fully to light; and Mr. Bradley, at any rate, is a philosopher whom it is pleasant to criticise; since, if he is misrepresented, he is pretty sure to make the fact known. One feels with him, more than with almost any one else, that writing may be made to combine its own advantages with those of Socratic discourse. Lest, however, what I am about to say should seem more of the nature of an attack on Mr. Bradley's position than it is really intended to be, some little prefatory explanation of what I purpose to do may not be out of place.

In dealing with Mr. Bradley's treatment of the Self, it is not my intention simply to discuss one special point in his metaphysical system. Still less do I aim at a criticism of his metaphysical system as a whole. My object is rather to touch on a particular aspect of his philosophy, which appears to be central and fundamental, and in this way to suggest a criticism which might be extended so as to cover his whole conception of metaphysics. In doing this, my attitude towards Mr. Bradley's work must be in the main negative; but it will, I fancy, be obvious enough that my view of his work is very far from being a hostile one. Mr. Bradley's book—especially when read along with the other parts of his writings that bear upon metaphysics—seems to me to be the most considerable piece of constructive work in philosophy of an independent kind (as distinguished from that suggested in commentaries) that has been attempted in England in this century; and if I were to add in England in any century, and in any country since Hegel, it would be rather my ignorance.

¹ Read before the Aristotelian Society on April 16, 1894.

than my knowledge that would make me feel the commendation to be overstrained. And, indeed, even on those points on which Mr. Bradley's work strikes me as least satisfactory, he so often suggests the correction of his own errors and imperfections of statement, that one is led to doubt whether any defect that is to be found in his workmanship is not, after all, rather appearance than reality; and whether, in criticising him, it is really possible to do more than set one part of his writing against another. I may at once confess, for instance, that a good deal of what I felt to be defective in some of the earlier chapters of his work receives its necessary complement in the highly significant passage (chap. xxiv.) on "Degrees of Truth and Reality," and leaves in my mind little more than a lively regret that that chapter was not introduced at an earlier stage in the work, and that its results were not more fully incorporated in the system. On the whole, in fact, it remains doubtful to me whether any really penetrating criticism of Mr. Bradley's book would not affect his method rather than his substance; and, as Mr. Bradley himself lays no claim to excellence of method—seems, indeed, to be rather sceptical with regard to the possibility of any finally satisfactory method in philosophy—one has hardly the heart to make any attack upon him on that ground. Yet I am convinced that the lack of scientific method is the source of a great part of the difficulty of Mr. Bradley's work. His *Appearance and Reality* is, for instance (it is hardly too much to say), a sealed book to any one who does not know his *Principles of Logic*. Yet the *Logic* is not explicitly treated as an introduction to the *Metaphysic*, or the *Metaphysic* as a sequel to the *Logic* (I understand Mr. Bradley to deny even that there is any such definite connection); and, indeed, the *Logic* itself begins, avowedly, in the middle. Moreover, I am inclined to think that a criticism of some fundamental points in his method would lead, in the end, to a correction of some inadequacies in his results; and I believe, in particular, that a consideration of his treatment of the Self—which is largely a question of method—would in this way be instructive. If it does not lead to any ultimate disagreement with the most important of his conclusions—and I am not at all sure that it does—I cannot but think at least that it will lead us to lay the emphasis on different points. If it does not materially alter the picture, it will at least affect the disposition of the lights and shades.

What I intend to do, then, is, in the first place, to give a brief account of Mr. Bradley's theory of the Self, so far as I

have been able to understand it; then to suggest what seems a needful correction or extension of his view of it; and finally to indicate, somewhat generally, in what respects this correction would lead to an alteration in his metaphysical results, and in his treatment of Psychology and Ethics. This is, no doubt, "a large order"; and some of the points on which I have to touch will require to be dealt with in a very sketchy way; but, after all, I think it will appear that my main criticism is a single and even a simple one, and that the working of it out is only a matter of detail. And over details, following Mr. Bradley's own example, we need not linger. In particular, it is not necessary to detain ourselves long with Mr. Bradley's positive conception of the Self, which can easily be found by reference to his book, and which, at any rate for our present purpose, is interesting rather for what it omits than for what it contains.

Mr. Bradley's view is, briefly, as follows. He begins (chap. ix.) by distinguishing different senses in which the term "Self" is used, and succeeds in discriminating no less than eight—a number which could probably have been, without very much trouble, still further multiplied. The interest attaching to several of these senses of the term is, however, almost purely dialectical. They are selves of straw which Mr. Bradley sets up merely for the purpose of knocking them down again. His interest in them is simply that of showing that no one of them, taken by itself, contains any ultimate reality; and especially that no one of them can be regarded as *the* reality, in opposition to the mere appearance of the not-self. Now, as it is no part of my object to controvert this conclusion—which, indeed, I regard as incontrovertible—it is hardly necessary for me to trouble the reader here with an enumeration of Mr. Bradley's selves. The enumeration, even as he has given it, and even for the special purpose which he has in view, is probably incomplete. Its interest for us now, at any rate, lies only in the broad lines of demarcation; and these can be pretty shortly explained. The first sense of all, one which Mr. Bradley dismisses (p. 77) without even giving it a number in his list,¹ is what may be called the *Biological Self*. A human being—or, as Prof. Karl Pearson would say, "a human"—impresses us first as a particular physical organism, which we class along with other animals and with plants. In so

¹ Because it is obviously a mere object; and cannot even claim to be a more direct object of experience than other objects. Mr. Bradley is considering, in this chapter, the possibility of regarding the Self as something more, and more real, than a mere object.

far as each such organism can be regarded as a unity, it may be described as a Self. Such a Self, of course, is in no sense an *ego*. So far from being an "I," it is scarcely even a "me"—scarcely even an object apprehended directly as *this-mine*. It is a Self only in the sense of being an object which can be regarded (by some subject) as an organic unity. It is, so to speak, the mere *an sich* of a Self. The second sense in which we may speak of a "Self"—or the first in Mr. Bradley's enumeration (p. 77)—is what may be called the *Psychological Self*, i.e., the states of an individual consciousness at a particular time. This sense takes us farther in, as it were, and brings us nearer to the "I". It includes, we may say, both the "I" and the "me" at a particular moment in their existence; but it also includes the presentation of objects not specially regarded as mine. This is still a comparatively unimportant sense, so long as it is taken merely as an aggregate of psychical occurrences at a particular time. Such an aggregate is still not a unity for itself; and even for the psychological observer it has only, on the one hand, the unity of a moment of time, and, on the other hand, that of a certain continuity or coherence (which remains as yet undefined), and that of occurring in connexion with a particular animal organism—i.e., with a Self in the first sense. If the psychological observer wishes to find any higher unity than this, he will soon discover, like Hume, that, in the mere series of psychical states as such, he can never at any moment "stumble upon" anything that can be truly described as an *ego*. Accordingly, we are led to try to give unity to the Psychological Self by introducing some conception of system; and this may be done in various ways, some of which are discussed by Mr. Bradley. Thus, we may introduce the idea of a *Normal Self* (p. 79), a character which is in some sense permanent in the midst of changing conditions. This character may be thought of as the *average* state (p. 78) of the individual consciousness; or, it may be described, in the language of a recent German writer,¹ as the "compact majority" of our psychical states, the more or less coherent general body of our inner life. Or, again, we may think of the Psychological Self as constituted by our *interests* (p. 88), by those objects with which, as we say, we "identify ourselves"; or, again, simply by what we *remember* (p. 83). Or we may think of it as a Leibnizian monad (p. 86), or, in some other way, as an independent soul. These are various ways in which we may try to con-

¹ Simmel, *Einleitung in die Morawissenschaft*.

struct a Psychological Self for ourselves ; *i.e.*, various ways in which we may give to our inner life a unity which shall exist for the psychological observer—which shall be for the psychological observer a “me,” when he treats his own inner experience as an object. But, again, we may insist that the Psychological Self must be an *ego*, a unity *for itself* and not merely for the observer ; an “I” for itself and not merely a “me,” when it is itself the observer. This we may express by saying that the true Self is that which is always subject and never object in our experience (p 88 *sqq.*) : But if we use such an expression as “that which,” we are still making it into an object¹ ; we are thinking of it as a thing ; and with reference to such a thing we shall still experience the difficulty of Hume, that we nowhere “stumble upon” any such subject-object in the midst of our psychical states. So much, then, for the *Psychological Self*, *i.e.*, the attempt to give unity to our inner life regarded as a whole. But now we come upon what is properly another sense of the term ; though it is placed by Mr. Bradley (p. 80) in the middle of the preceding group, standing third in his enumeration. The Self in this sense consists in the mere fact of Cœnesthesia, the mere feeling of individual oneness, which comes to us perhaps especially in the consciousness of pleasure and pain, as *my* pleasure and *my* pain. This Self differs from any of the preceding, inasmuch as it is not a method in which the psychological observer tries to impose unity on the manifold of our inner experience. It is, on the contrary, a unity that exists only for the being who feels it, and only at the moment of feeling. Such a Self is more nearly an “I” than any of the foregoing ; it is at least not a mere “me,” if we mean by that a mere object identified with our particular individuality. It is, so to speak, an “I-me”—subject and object indistinguishably blended. But, just for this reason, it falls short of being a pure “I”. In the mere immediacy of feeling the antithesis between *ego* and *non-ego* has not yet arisen. It is, we might perhaps say, the pure *Fürsichsein* of the Self. This Self I should be disposed to characterise as the *Sentient Self*.² Finally, Mr. Bradley speaks of yet another sense of the term “Self”—a sense in which it is negative rather than positive (p. 100). This is the sense in which we speak of

¹ Cf. also pp. 321-322. Mr. Bradley's argument at this latter point seems to apply only to the phenomenal Self, taken as subject—though he states the argument as if he intended it to have a wider application.

² It might perhaps also be called the *Animal Self*, as contrasted with the mere *Vegetable Self*, which is simply the unity of the physical organism ; but these terms would be somewhat misleading.

the "merely subjective," as opposed to the objective; the sense, I suppose, in which we speak of a "personal equation"—a rectification that has to be made in passing from the point of view of the individual focus to the point of view of the universe which we seek to know; the sense in which *πρὸς ἑμᾶς* is opposed to *τῇ φύσει*. We might describe this as the *Pathological Self*, representing the disease of subjectivity. It is the Self that intrudes where it is not wanted. It is with reference to the Self in this sense that Hegel uses his favourite pun about mere opinion (*Meinung*) being that which is specially *mein*. It is, I suppose, in this negative sense also that the term "selfish" is used in morals. This sense of the term, then, is the sense in which the Self stands in its own light; or in which, as we may say, the unity of our own individual life stands in the way of the attainment of a larger unity. Thus, on the whole, there are four main senses of the term "Self" that are recognised by Mr. Bradley; which we may roughly characterise as the *Biological Self*, the *Psychological Self*, the *Sentient Self*, and the *Pathological Self*.

The first and the last of these, however, are quite unimportant—at least for our present purpose. The last is merely negative, and, as such, is simply the reflex of some one of the positive Selves, recognised as finite; and the first is merely a particular object of experience, regarded as an organic unity. Practically, therefore, it is only in two senses that the Self plays any conspicuous part in Mr. Bradley's philosophical work—as a sentient unity, and as a psychological construction. In the former of these senses, it is for Mr. Bradley the type of that ultimate unity in which reality is to be found. The pure immediacy of feeling—the mere *Fürsichsein*, if we may so call it¹—is an undifferentiated totality (undifferentiated at least so far as regards the distinction between subject and object) such as is nowhere else to be found in experience; and the ultimate unity which we seek must be thought of as a similar totality, only raised out of its simple immediacy—transformed, in Hegelian language, from a mere *für-sich* to an *an-und-für-sich*. On the other hand, however, when Mr. Bradley speaks of the Self in the course of his work,² it is generally the Psychological Self to which he refers; and, in this sense, he insists that the Self is simply an ideal construction; not anything which we find

¹ Perhaps this is not quite a Hegelian use of the term; but my meaning will, I fancy, be sufficiently obvious.

² *K.g.*, p. 524. etc.

in immediate experience, but something which we make for ourselves in the effort to introduce unity into the manifold of our psychical life.

Now, it is no part of my object to criticise Mr. Bradley's treatment of these different senses of the Self. At least the only criticism that I would wish to make is that which is already implied in my restatement of his view, in which I have found it necessary to alter his arrangement, and perhaps even at some points to modify his meaning.¹ The chief defect of his list—as of so many other parts of his work—seems to me to be that it is made without method. One does not see why there should be eight senses rather than a score. When they are methodically arranged, one can see them, I think, as forms of unity that advance progressively inwards; starting from the merely objective unity of the bodily organism, advancing from that to the “me” as a psychological object, and ascending gradually to the “I-me” of immediate sentiency. I do not, however, wish to press this criticism at present; since, as Mr. Bradley's aim at this point is mainly dialectical rather than constructive, it is not so important for his purpose as it is for ours, that the place of the different senses of the Self should be definitely seen. It is enough that all the Selves, when taken as independent existences in opposition to the Not-self, should be shown to lack reality; and in showing this Mr. Bradley certainly seems to me to be successful enough. Even from this point of view, it might be urged that Mr. Bradley's dialectic is not the best kind, since it is purely subversive. A dialectic which, in overturning the more inadequate conception, should at the same time lead us on to a higher one—even if that, in its turn, should also require to be overthrown—would be more satisfactory, even for dialectical purposes. But this is a point to which I intend afterwards to return. In the meantime, what I wish to urge is not any objection to Mr. Bradley's treatment of those senses of the Self which are explicitly recognised by him; but rather that there are some other senses which are equally important, and which indeed are implicitly involved in his own work. My complaint, in short, is that Mr. Bradley has practically treated of the Self only under the head of Appearance. He has subverted the Phenomenal Self, in all its forms, in so far as it sets up to be an independent reality;

¹ I have, for instance, separated Memory from Cœnesthesia; and I am not at all sure that I have fully grasped what Mr. Bradley intends to imply by the latter term, which he does not appear to use quite in its ordinary psychological sense.

but he has not shown, in the second section of his work, how it is to be reconstituted as the necessary implicate of all experience.¹

It is no doubt a somewhat thankless task to seek to multiply the meanings of such a Protean conception as that of Self. Students of Kant and his commentators would probably be glad to apply a sort of Occam's razor, by insisting that Selves *non sunt præter necessitatem multiplicandi*. I can only hope that I may in some degree atone for the additions to Mr. Bradley's list by the restrictions which I have made on his own enumeration. The series need not be so very alarming, if we recognise clearly that what we have at every point is simply a method of reducing the fact of our experience to some form of unity. Even the Pathological Self is a form of unity, though it is a form that is irrelevant—a form whose essence consists in its irrelevance—a form that stands in the way of a larger and more perfect unity. Moreover, when we have in this way recognised that the Selves enumerated by Mr. Bradley are forms of unity that may be regarded as constituting a progressive series, we are already prepared for the acknowledgment of the existence of further terms in the same progress; and we have even a certain clue to the discovery of the other terms that are required. The obvious defect in all the Selves that we have yet had to consider, is that not one of them can properly be described as an *ego* at all. Not one of them, we may say, is a Self *an-und-für-sich*. The Sentient Self and the Psychological Self regarded as subject are the two that approximate most closely to the required form; but they both fall short of it. The effort to regard the Psychological Self as subject is doomed to failure from the first. The very effort to distinguish it from the object, as that which is always subject, inevitably turns it into another object, and lands us in contradiction. It is not subject for itself, but for the psychologist who contemplates it—i.e., it is object, and not subject at all. It is no wonder, therefore, that in the fierce onslaught of Mr. Bradley's dialectic it is ruthlessly devoured, and leaves not a jot behind. The Sentient Self is reserved for a better fate; but it also can lay no claim to be taken as an *ego*, since within its limpid immediacy the antithesis of

¹ Mr. Bradley's fundamental objection to the Self is that, in whatever sense we take it, it cannot be finally separated from the Not-self, and consequently cannot be affirmed as an independent reality. This objection vanishes at once if the Self be taken simply as the principle of unity in experience. In this case we do not affirm the independent reality of the Self, but only deny the independent reality of the Not-self.

ego and *non-ego* has not yet emerged. It is still, according to the Hegelian metaphor, only the dew-drop, in which "the lightning of subjectivity" lies concealed. We remain, therefore, in want of an *ego*; and it is this lacuna that I wish, if possible, to fill up.

It may perhaps seem rather trite if I now introduce, as additional Selves, two old acquaintances, who must look at first, I am afraid, as if they had stepped out of Kant's *Critique*. But though the cry "Back to Kant!" has sometimes a savour of obscurantism, yet I cannot but think that Mr. Bradley has, at least in the form of his work, if not in its substance, somewhat unduly neglected the Kantian analysis of experience and the subsequent developments that have sprung immediately from it. Accordingly, though I feel a little as Falstaff must have felt about his ragged recruits (though I feel, I mean, that I am introducing somewhat threadbare conceptions, which would really require to be restated in a way that I cannot here attempt), yet I do not hesitate at this point to bring in those two venerable figures, whom I choose for the present to describe as the *Epistemological* or *Transcendental Self* and the *Ontological* or *Ideal Self*. These are not Kant's names;¹ and, after all, they do not come quite so immediately from him as one might at first suppose. But wherever they come from, and however it may be best to name them, they seem at least to be essential for our present purpose. In proceeding to explain what I mean by them, I wish it to be distinctly understood that I do not believe that I am introducing much change into Mr. Bradley's work. The change which the introduction of these two Selves would make is, primarily, rather formal than material; since they are, in a manner, recognised by him in the course of his metaphysical construction, though they are not enumerated in his list. I believe, however, as I have already hinted, that the explicit recognition of them would lead to a change which, in the end, would be material as well as formal.

By the *Epistemological Self* I mean the simple fact that our experience is thought as a unity. This point has been so fully insisted on by Kant and the Kantians, and is, in a manner, so fully recognised by modern philosophers, including Mr. Bradley himself, that it is needless to dwell upon it now. What it is important to notice, however, is that the emphasis must be laid on *thought*. It is for us *as thinking*

¹ Kant's "Transcendental Subject" is of course different from what is here referred to; it is here (as by Mr. Bradley) entirely rejected.

that experience is taken as a unity ; and this fact leads us to the recognition of a Thinking Self, as distinguished from the merely Sentient Self to which we have already referred. For sentiency experience is not a unity, except in the sense of an immediate undifferentiated¹ content. In thought—or, if you prefer the term, understanding—this immediate unity is broken up. Content and form fall asunder. In Mr. Bradley's language, the "that" is set in opposition to the "what". Nevertheless, experience is for thought a unity. Thought means, we may say, the effort to connect a manifold which has fallen asunder, so as to make it into a whole or system. The idea of a system is the fundamental postulate or presupposition of thought ; and nothing is properly thought or known at all, except in so far as it is somehow brought within the unity of a systematic experience. Now, it may be said that this unity of experience does not involve anything that can properly be described as a Self ; since the unity to which our experience is referred is simply that of *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, consciousness in general, not the consciousness of this or that individual. In a sense this is true, and the truth that is contained in it will have to be borne in mind in connection with what follows. But it is not the whole truth. Though experience is referred to consciousness in general, it is yet, so to speak, focussed for the consciousness of the individual ; or, as Mr. Bradley puts it, "for a finite centre". If we may avail ourselves again of Hegel's pun, knowledge is not *mere* opinion (*Meinung*) ; but it is *at least* opinion ; it is *mine* and something more. I know only as I think ; the "I think," as Kant says, accompanies all my conceptions. It is this "I" or "I think" that I describe here as the Thinking Self, or the Epistemological Self, the Self of Knowledge. It is with this Self that we first reach what can properly be called an *ego*. It is not at all a "me," *i.e.*, it is not any object of which we are aware, as constituting our particular individuality. It is simply the subject of knowledge, the focus to which our experience is brought ; and this focus is not simply the limpid unity of the Sentient Self, but is a unity in which form and content are set over against one another, in which *ego* and *non-ego* are definitely opposed. But this opposition has to be broken down ; and the consideration of the way in which this is accomplished, leads us to what I have called the Ideal or Ontological Self.

¹ The extent to which it is possible to regard pure sense (1) as an actual experience and (2) as entirely undifferentiated, is a point that may be neglected as irrelevant to the present argument.

At the level of understanding, i.e., at the level of the ordinary categorical judgment, in which the "that" and the "what" are still in a manner opposed, we may say either that the content of experience is not adequate to its form, or that the form is not adequate to its content. The form, so to speak, is too wide for its content; and the content is too deep for its form. The content seems to have in it, as it were, an irreducible surd of particularity, which cannot be forced into the form of an intelligible system. We may either say that it is too rich to be comprehended under the forms of thought, or that it is too lawless to meet their requirements. Yet the claim that its material shall be capable of being intelligibly grasped, is one that thought cannot willingly abandon—cannot even, without absurdity and suicide, abandon at all. Our thought, then, at this level, contains in itself an ideal which it cannot surrender, but to which its material is inadequate. Now, this ideal may, in one aspect, be described as the ideal of an intelligible object; but, in another aspect, it may equally well be described as that of an intelligent subject. It is to this latter aspect that I refer when I speak of the Ideal Self. When we speak of the material in our ordinary knowledge as being to some extent refractory, we are passing a condemnation not merely on the material with which we are dealing, but also on the manner of thought which seeks to grasp it. However we may characterise the defect of that mode of thought, whether we say that it errs from being merely relational, from separating the "that" and the "what," from distinguishing and yet not distinguishing the subject and the predicate of judgment, or however else we may express the deficiency; we must at least recognise that it is a defect of point of view, as well as of content, a defect that may be said to attach to the subject as well as to the object.¹ It is needless to spend time in emphasising this point; since it is not one on which I find myself in any way opposed to Mr. Bradley. It is, indeed, a point on which he has abundantly insisted. What I wish to urge is merely that, if this is so, then the ideal which our thought involves may fairly be described as that of a higher Self. This Self I would further characterise as ontological; since the world as apprehended in the light of such an intelligence is what we mean by reality. The Ideal Self, we might even say, is simply the point of view from which reality would appear.²

¹ Cf. Caird's *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. I., pp. 428-424.

² It will be seen that the opposition between the Epistemological and the Ontological Self is not ultimate. The difference is one of point of

It seems clear that, in the end, we can attach no meaning to a reality which is not reality for an intelligence ; and if in our ordinary knowledge we do not fully grasp reality, there is implied the ideal of a higher form of apprehension to which the reality would be present. So far, I do not conceive that I am advancing anything which is not implied in Mr. Bradley's own statements ; but as he does not put his doctrine quite in this way, it seems necessary to consider why it is that he has not adopted this precise point of view.

The explanation is partly, I think, as I have already indicated, that he has not taken sufficient account of the work of Kant. Perhaps it may also be not unjust to suppose that he was influenced by a certain antagonism to the "psychological monster"¹ developed by Green on the basis of the Kantian criticism. Now, it is no part of my business here to attempt any defence of Green's "eternal consciousness"; and I am even ready to admit that, if Green's statements were taken literally, there would be a psychological monstrosity involved. But this monstrosity is produced only when the Ideal Self is, as it were, materialised ; when it is thought of as a sort of thing, existing alongside of the material with which it deals. Such a view is no doubt suggested when the Ideal Self is spoken of as reproducing itself in time, and as synthesising the content of the finite consciousness. But there is no such monstrosity involved, if we merely take the Ideal Self as the form of unity implied in the completion of knowledge. It might be objected no doubt that, if this unity is *merely ideal*, it ought not to be described as a Self—a term which seems to imply actuality. But this is an objection which could hardly come from Mr. Bradley ; for no one recognises more fully than he that it is only

view. The former is a point of view from which appearance and reality are not definitely distinguished. All that we think, whether in the end it is to be called appearance or reality, must be brought within the unity of our thinking experience. This thinking experience might, however, be regarded (as by Kant) simply as phenomenal. The categories under which it is brought may be inadequate. By the Ideal or Ontological Self, on the other hand, I mean that form of unity, involved in our thinking experience, which would meet its ultimate requirements. The Ontological Self is what the Epistemological Self aims at being. The "I think" of the Epistemological Self accompanies all our conceptions, and brings them to focus, but does not succeed in mastering them. The Ontological Self is the idea of the content of the Epistemological Self, as not merely brought to focus, but rendered completely intelligible. (Cf. Caird's *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. II., p. 1 *sqq.*) To the particular names that I have here given to these different points of view, I attach no importance.

¹ P. 113. I suppose the reference here to a "timeless self" is intended at least to include Green's view.

in this ideal form that the ultimate reality can be found.¹ An objection that he might perhaps be more ready to urge, is, that this ideal unity carries us, at any rate, beyond the limits of the individual consciousness — *i.e.*, beyond all “finite centres”—and that, consequently, the term “Self” is scarcely applicable to it. It must rather be regarded as standing above the opposition between the *ego* and the *non-ego*. This objection I should, in a sense, be quite disposed to allow. All that I should wish to urge against it is that, however much we may be carried beyond the finite centre of the individual consciousness, yet the reference to an ideal unity, to which we are thus led, is merely a further stage in the process by which we give unity to our experience; and if both the unity of the organism and the unity of immediate sentience may be described as Selves, this ultimate unity to which thought refers may at least equally well be so described. And it must be remembered that though, in a sense, it carries us beyond our finite centre as finite, yet it is the ultimate point of reference for the individual consciousness; the point of view which it ultimately seeks to occupy, and which it partly succeeds in occupying. It is a mere prejudice to suppose that, because our consciousness is in one respect finite, it cannot in any sense identify itself with the infinite. In all real knowledge we do so identify ourselves; we put ourselves in the position of “spectators of all time and existence”. Certainly Mr. Bradley at least cannot deny that, to some extent, it is possible to place ourselves in that position. If it were impossible, his own book on *Appearance and Reality* would also be impossible. The conception of what ultimate reality must mean is only possible at this level. It is obvious that, from the point of view of the mere Sentient Self, such a conception—like any other conception—is altogether impossible; and it is scarcely less apparent that, merely from the point of view of the Epistemological Self—the point of view of ordinary knowledge—such a conception could not be made good. It is only in so far as we can rise above the mere understanding—the merely relational consciousness—to the point of view of reason, that the idea of ultimate truth becomes possible to us. And, in so far as we do this, we identify ourselves with the Ideal Self. In the moral consciousness also a similar identification takes place. The moral attitude is attained only in so far as we set ourselves above the point of view of our merely

¹ Hence, instead of saying that the Self is *merely* ideal, it might be truer to say that any other existence than this is *merely* actual.

individual consciousness, and regard ourselves as third persons, or as objects—as *me's*. And I believe that in the highest forms of art also a similar transference is involved, a transference from the focus of the merely finite centre to that ideal focus at which absolute truth begins to appear.

I am inclined to think, however, that the ultimate reason why Mr. Bradley has not explicitly recognised this higher conception of the Self, is that he has not quite resolutely placed himself at the point of view of thought. He seems to manifest, throughout, a certain lurking preference for the point of view of sentiency. Feeling, he declares,¹ is a whole. In thought, on the other hand, the unity of immediate presentation is broken up.² The “what” is opposed to the “that”; the predicate stands over against the subject. If thought is ever to attain to its own ideal, this opposition must be broken down; thought must come back, somehow, to something like the immediacy of feeling.³ Again, Mr. Bradley seems to hold⁴—following Lotze, I suppose—that it is in sensation that we first come in contact with reality. Thought starts from this point, and erects ideal constructions out from it. But in these constructions we have got out of touch with reality; and thought can never, without “committing suicide,” get back to reality again. Now, that there is an element of truth in this, I do not by any means deny. Sentiency is a sort of whole; but it is a whole simply because it is nothing else, because it is entirely undifferentiated—or, at least, undifferentiated so far as regards any distinction between form and content, subject and object. To set up such an undifferentiated unity as the ideal for thought, is inevitably to lead ourselves astray. And of course this is not really what Mr. Bradley means.⁵ He recognises that the ultimate unity must include the differentiation of thought; but still the empty unity of sense remains to the end the form to which he tends to bring back the ideal of thought.⁶ In this way Kant, whom perhaps Mr. Bradley has unduly neglected, has in the end his revenge; for the undifferentiated identity, into which Mr. Bradley's Absolute has a tendency, in spite of himself, to sink, bears a curious

¹ P. 159, &c.

² P. 162, *sqq.*

³ See pp. 146, 160, 522, &c.

⁴ P. 224, *sqq.* Cf. with this Mr. Bosanquet's *Logic*, Vol. I., p. 77—one of the least satisfactory points, as I think, in that excellent work.

⁵ See, for instance, p. 107.

⁶ Cf. Dr. Ward's criticism in the January number of *MIND*, p. 116.

resemblance to Kant's noumenon. For Mr. Bradley, in fact, as for Kant, reason—the faculty which apprehends the ultimate reality—can do little more than set up the ideal of a barren identity, which can never be realised for thought, because thought can never rise above the form of the understanding. And this view is directly connected with the doctrine that thought can never come into touch with reality.¹ We touch reality only in feeling; the ideal constructions of thought, which branch out from this, are, so far, leading us away from reality. Now, in this also there is no doubt an element of truth. Sentience has a kind of reality. It has, so to speak, all the reality that it wants; but this is only because it does not want reality at all. As Carlyle used to insist, if you “make your claims a zero,” you can easily attain to satisfaction. This is what sentience does. Sentience simply is there for itself, and wants nothing more. It keeps this reality, however, only so long as it is content to remain in its pure immediacy. Sense has for sense all the reality that it requires. But when we are seeking for reality, we are philosophising—i.e., we are thinking—and when we are so engaged, we cannot also be at the point of view of the immediacy of sense. What sense means for us when we are thinking is not what sense is for sense, but what sense is for thought²; and, at this point of view, sense has no longer any special claim to reality. It is now only an element in a totality—the element, if you like so to put it, of content as opposed to form, the “that” as distinguished from the “what”. Sense has now surrendered the reality which it had in its simple immediacy. It now wants to be real, and has consequently lost the reality of self-contentment. It wants to have a place in a systematic world. It has given itself over to thought; and it has no more reality than the thought which uses it to construct a system. We cannot go back to the immediacy of sense. A spark has “disturbed our clod”. The “lightning of subjectivity” has shattered that unreflective unity, which is real only because it does not care whether it is real or not; and it is only in the Witch's Kitchen that we can reach reality by going back to that:—

“Wer nicht denkt,
Dem wird sie geschenkt;
Er hat sie ohne Sorgen”.

¹ Of course I do not attribute to Mr. Bradley the view that reality lies altogether beyond thought. This he has consistently and emphatically repudiated. See below.

² See Caird's *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. I., p. 898, sqq.

For us as thinking beings reality can mean nothing else than going forward to the completed system. And, in a sense, this is fully recognised by Mr. Bradley himself; but the fact that he starts with sentiency, as the type of unity and reality, seems to prevent him from explicitly recognising the way in which the Ideal Self is implicated in the knowledge of reality.

We have now, I think, reached a point at which it is possible to consider how the general content of Mr. Bradley's philosophy would be affected by the explicit recognition of this ideal, which seems to be implicitly present throughout. Of course, any complete discussion of this subject would mean a criticism of his whole philosophic system, and an attempt, so far as is necessary, to reconstruct it. But I believe it would be possible, within a comparatively brief compass, to indicate what I conceive to be the fundamental points at which a change would be required. I may notice these under the following heads: (1) epistemological, (2) dialectical, (3) psychological, (4) ethical, (5) ontological.

(1) As regards epistemology, *i.e.*, the general view of the nature of knowledge, the most characteristic point in Mr. Bradley's doctrine is his opposition between truth and reality¹—an opposition on which he bases certain criticisms² that appear to be directed against the Hegelian view of reality. Truth or knowledge, according to Mr. Bradley, can never be adequate to reality; since truth can only be stated in the form of judgment, and no judgment can comprehend the concrete content of reality. Now, this view seems partly to rest on an inadequate doctrine of judgment—a doctrine which Mr. Bradley himself has done as much as any one to correct. Judgment seems to be regarded as consisting in the attribution of a predicate to a subject,³ instead of consisting in the attribution of a content to reality. No doubt Mr. Bradley means to imply that the ultimate logical subject is in every case reality; but in any particular case he seems to say that the subject is an undetermined particular to which a predicate is attributed; and as thought can never get beyond such an attribution, thought can never be adequate to reality. Now I do not see how this merely attributive view of the logical judgment can be combined with the view (suggested by Mr. Bradley himself, and more fully developed by Mr. Bosanquet⁴) that the essence of judgment consists in the reference of a content to reality. If we take this view of

¹ P. 544, *seq.*, *et passim*.

² P. 168, *seq.*

³ Contained especially in Chap. XV.

⁴ *Logic*, Vol. I., p. 76, *seq.*

the ultimate significance of judgment, then I think we must say that the true subject is never simply a "that," but is from the first the form of an ideal system, within which we seek to place a particular content.¹ And I do not see that it can fairly be said of judgment, so regarded, that it involves an opposition between the "that" and the "what". It is only to the attributive view of judgment that this opposition clings. However, the discussion of this point might carry us too far away from the present subject.² And I suppose that, after all, however fully we might recognise that the ultimate significance of judgment consists in the reference of a content to reality, it would still remain true that, at least in the ordinary categorical judgment, this reference is presented in a form which is inadequate to its meaning. We may readily grant, in short, with Hegel,³ that every categorical judgment, as immediate, must be false—i.e., it necessarily puts the truth in an inadequate form. The only question is—Cannot thought correct this error? Now, even the syllogism might be said in a sense to correct the error of the judgment, inasmuch as it leads us to treat judgments not as isolated statements, but as mutually dependent elements in a system. And any case of concrete knowledge involves a still further correction of the mere abstract logical judgment. Our conception of any object of which we have a real grasp, is not a mere judgment about it, or a mere collection of judgments; but rather, if we are to put it in the form of judgment at all, a nucleus of possible judgments recognised as a totality. Mr. Bradley's book is his own best refutation.⁴ He has succeeded to some extent in conveying to the mind of his readers a certain conception of what he understands by the Absolute; but this conception cannot be unfolded in a judgment, or even in a series of independent judgments,

¹ Of course I do not mean to imply that this is the explicit meaning of the ordinary categorical judgment, but only that this seems to be the ultimate significance of judgment.

² I prefer also not to enter on the discussion of this here; because, I confess, I am a good deal puzzled by the persistent way in which Mr. Bradley regards the essence of judgment as consisting simply in the attribution of a predicate to a subject. It is probable that I do not rightly understand him. At least, if I do understand him, his view seems to depend on the doctrine that the primary reality is found in the undetermined immediacy of sense; and I do not see what ground he has for holding this doctrine.

³ *Logic*, Wallace's Translation, pp. 804-805.

⁴ If the treatment of Judgment and Syllogism in Hegel's *Logic* is not a better one.

but at most only by a number of judgments taken in connection with one another. In this way we transcend the inadequacy of the ordinary judgment, and attain to a certain form of truth which seems to grasp reality. It may be urged, no doubt, that such a form of truth involves a transcendence of ordinary thought, understanding or *διάνοια*.¹ But surely it is still thought. If the art which adds to nature is "an art which nature makes," surely also any ideal of knowledge, however far it may go beyond the ordinary relational processes of the understanding, must still be an ideal which thought makes; and to say that thought must be understood as being limited to its more inadequate forms—even if it be true that these are the only forms that are capable of definite and complete expression in ordinary grammatical speech—is to impose a somewhat arbitrary limitation on the term. Now, this limitation seems to connect itself, naturally and even inevitably, with the corresponding limitation in the view of the Self. If the Self is to be taken primarily as the Sentient Self, then the Self of Thought comes to be regarded as only a more or less unsatisfactory psychological construction from that basis; and the ideal of thought seems to fall outside the Self altogether. I am far from saying that this is Mr. Bradley's last word on the matter. There are many passages in which what seems to me a more correct view is suggested. But too often Mr. Bradley's Absolute is put forth as if it fell, somehow, beyond thought; as if it could not, in any sense, be regarded as the Ideal Self.²

It is here, so far as I can see, that the fundamental difference comes out between Mr. Bradley and Hegel. He does not accept Hegel's identification of thought and reality. Now, a discussion of this subject would again carry us beyond our limits. It is enough to say that Mr. Bradley's recurrent polemic against Hegel on this point seems to depend on the limited view which he takes of the nature of thought. What, indeed, Hegel precisely did mean by his famous *dicta* on this subject, may fairly be a matter for controversy. There has recently been a good deal of discussion about it—a discussion which seems to me to have, to a very considerable extent, cleared away the difficulties by which the subject was beset.³ But he would be a bold man who

¹ Cf. Mr. Ritchie's note in the last number of *MIND*, p. 241.

² The chief passages in which this view seems to be taken, occur, I think, in Chaps. XV. and XXVII.

³ Mr. Eastwood's note, for instance, in the last number of *MIND*, p. 222 *sqq.*, seems to me to have satisfactorily removed several of the common misconceptions with regard to the meaning of Idealism.

should profess to be able to explain satisfactorily all the passages in Hegel that bear upon this matter. This much, however, we seem entitled to say, that it is surely at least a ludicrous misconception of Hegel's meaning to suppose that he refers to discursive thought, the thought of the mere understanding, which is expressed in the ordinary categorical judgment. Hegel was very well aware that this does not contain either truth or reality. It is equally a misconception, I am convinced (though at this point there may be more room for difference of opinion), to imagine, as some do, that Hegel meant to oppose thought to emotion and will; so that Schopenhauer, who took will as the fundamental principle, might be regarded as a sort of complement to Hegel. Hegel's essential point, as it seems to me, was that it is at the level of thought or reason, not at the level of sentiency, or at that of the mere understanding, that we attain to truth and reality. The world as it is for reason—*i.e.*, the world as it is for the Ideal Self—is what we mean by reality; and the knowledge of it at that level is what we mean by truth. To understand what is involved in knowledge at this level is, therefore, the same thing as to understand what is involved in reality. Knowledge is the knowledge of reality. It is in this sense that, for Hegel, epistemology becomes identical with ontology. But for Mr. Bradley it seems not to be so. Truth is something different from reality. Truth can never transcend the form of the understanding, and consequently can never grasp reality.¹ If so, it is hard to see how truth can even be a criterion of reality, how we can even have that general conception of the Absolute which Mr. Bradley allows. Here again, indeed, there seems to me to be, in Mr. Bradley's work, a more adequate and a less adequate point of view. The more adequate view seems to come out, for instance, in his recent reply² to Dr. Ward with reference to our use of the point of view of the Absolute as a criterion of reality. Dr. Ward, he says,³ "asks in amazement how finite spirits are to use absolute Reality, as if finite spirits could possibly use, or could be, anything else, as if outside the finite the Absolute were anything at all". This is excellent. It seems fully to recognise that the Absolute is the Ideal Self, and that it enters into the determination of the finite consciousness. But I find it difficult to reconcile this with the view of thought as being hopelessly involved in the opposition between the "that" and the "what," and consequently unable to grasp reality.

¹ P. 168, *et passim*.² April number of MIND.³ P. 289.

Of course I do not wish to ignore or minimise the difficulties that arise at this point, or to imply that I have established a position from which it is possible to judge between Hegel and Mr. Bradley—or even fully to understand either of them. I only wish to point out that the recognition of the Ideal Self, as implicit in knowledge, would lead us rather towards what I understand to be the view of Hegel than towards what I understand to be the view of Mr. Bradley, in so far as he opposes his view to that of Hegel—i.e., it would lead us to think of both truth and reality as being found only when the ideal object is present to the ideal intelligence. If Mr. Bradley means that at this point object and intelligence would become one, and that consequently such intelligence could no longer be described as a Thinking Self, I would urge that this seems to be an attempt to assert identity without difference, which would be self-contradictory. I suppose, however, that Mr. Bradley might maintain that, as the ultimate Self, or focus of reality, to which I am now referring is only an *ideal* Self, truth and reality are never completely present with us. There is always a gulf between any actually realised thought and the ideal which is implied in it. But this does not seem to involve any ultimate opposition between knowledge and reality. In so far as our grasp of reality is inadequate, our knowledge is incomplete. Knowledge, so far as we have it at all, is knowledge of reality;¹ and unless the complete grasp of reality would mean that subject and object fall together in an undistinguished identity—which does not appear to be an intelligible view—the ideal of the attainment of reality is simply the ideal of completed knowledge. At this point no doubt a serious difficulty remains—the difficulty occasioned by the fact that for our thought at any rate this ideal is always an unrealised ideal. If our Ideal Self is, in any genuine sense, our *self* at all, why, it may be asked, does it always seem to lie in front of us, and even in front of us in such a way that ever to come up to it seems impossible? There is, in short, the difficulty of an infinite ideal combined with a finite conscious-

¹ Of course there is a sense in which Mr. Bradley insists that reality is known, i.e., he rejects the Agnostic position, that reality lies quite beyond knowledge. But he holds at the same time that truth or knowledge is not adequate to reality. It leads up to something beyond itself. To this there would be no objection if Mr. Bradley recognised, with Hegel, that that to which thought leads up is its *other*, its necessary implicate. So soon as this is recognised, the opposition between thought and its other is annulled; but so long as this is not recognised, it is hard to see how Mr. Bradley can make his universe one and intelligible.

ness. Why are we finite at all if this infinite ideal is, in any true sense, constitutive (and not merely regulative) of our consciousness? Now it might be possible to remove this difficulty if we could regard human thought as progressive towards an end in which the ideal would be fully attained; and this is a view which some have taken. But this view involves serious difficulties. Of course if we say that it is a *progressus ad infinitum*, this is merely to repeat the difficulty, not to solve it. On the other hand, if we say that at a certain stage in the progress of the individual consciousness a point would be reached at which all its limitations would disappear, this seems scarcely intelligible.¹ At any rate, I do not feel that I can avail myself of this method of escape. Nor do I think it is necessary for my present purpose. I may at once admit that a contradiction remains in individual personality—a contradiction between the infinite side and the finite side. I would merely insist that the infinite side belongs to us as truly as the finite side. The finitude of our nature certainly seems to belong essentially to the human personality. A human personality is connected with a particular animal organism; and, regarding its life as a process of development, it seems to grow through sentience to understanding, and from that again to advance to the point of view of reason. But since the point of view of reason is that of an all-comprehending unity, it seems impossible that it should be reached completely by any such process. Such a process necessarily starts from the content of a particular experience, focussed at a particular finite centre. This content appears at first in the immediate unity of sentience, or in a form that approximates to that. It is gradually elevated to the form of understanding; and from this we go on to view it in relation to the complete systematisation of reason. But to see it in the last-named form would be to see it in relation to the whole content of the intelligible world; and it seems clear that this whole content cannot come within the experience of any finite centre, or, apparently, within any experience which starts from, and is conditioned by, a finite centre.² Consequently, the point of view of reason remains an ideal. But this does not mean that we do not reach that point of view at all. We reach it

¹ This seems to be the view suggested, for instance, at the end of Mr. McTaggart's interesting paper on *Time and the Hegelian Dialectic*. It appears also, though in a different way, to be the view implied in Green's *Prolegomena*.

² That what is in its nature finite should, at some point in a finite progress, suddenly become infinite, seems inconceivable.

as an ideal, *i.e.*, as a form of which the general conditions can be defined, though the particular filling cannot be fully realised ; and, in the light of this ideal, our ordinary knowledge can be gradually corrected. We can rise above our ordinary knowledge, so as to criticise it, though we can never go so far as entirely to substitute a higher form of knowledge for it. And this does not mean that the ideal of reason is, in the Kantian sense, a merely regulative conception. It is constitutive, in so far as it defines for us the general conditions by which reality must be determined. If this is so, then the form of truth is identical with that of reality ; and we grasp this form as an ideal, though we cannot fully supply the content that is required to give it body. If we could thus fill it in, it would not appear in the form of an ordinary categorical judgment, or as a mere collection of such judgments, but rather as a system of conceptions, perhaps as a dialectic process. Now this view may not be excluded by Mr. Bradley's reasoning. Perhaps it is even the view to which he points. But, if so, it is at least not explicitly brought out ; and his treatment of dialectic seems rather to suggest its rejection.

(2) And this leads me to say a word or two about his dialectic. I have already indicated that this appears to me to have the defect of being purely subversive. I am inclined to connect this deficiency with the fact that it has been taken up by Mr. Bradley, if I may venture to say so, in an uncritical way. His fundamental principle is that of self-consistency ; and of this principle he has no account to give, except that it is "the rule of the game"—*viz.*, the game of thinking.¹ This way of putting it leaves it undiscussed in what sense and to what extent the principle of contradiction is finally applicable. I do not know that Mr. Bradley has anywhere discussed this question with any thoroughness ; and, if the absence of such discussions has not led him astray, it has at least often mystified and misled his readers and critics.² If, on the other hand, we recognise that the fundamental principle of thought is conformity to the requirements of the Ideal Self, this conception seems to give a new significance to the principle of self-consistency or non-contradiction. It will enable us, in fact, to substitute for the ordinary view of self-consistency the higher view of

¹ P. 153.

² If the discussion of such questions as this is what is to be understood by Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge, I certainly think that such discussions ought to come at an early stage in a constructive Metaphysic.

consistency with the Self—i.e., with the general conditions of intelligibility. Mr. Bradley's dialectic consists simply in taking up point after point in the world of our experience, and showing that each point, if taken singly as a self-subsistent reality, breaks down in some sort of inconsistency. He does not inquire whether the aspects of experience which thus break down in themselves may not yet be fitted to form elements in an intelligible system—though, of course, he does affirm that they are so fitted. It may not be necessary for an intelligible whole that the various elements which enter into it should be capable of standing self-consistently by themselves; in fact, it may be necessary that they should *not* be so capable (and this, as I understand, Mr. Bradley himself holds¹). The inner contradiction of the various parts may only show that they must be taken as aspects in an organic whole. Mr. Bradley's dialectic often reminds me of the German proverb, *Aufgeschoben ist nicht aufgehoben*. This means, in its ordinary acceptation, that what is deferred is not necessarily annulled; but I use it to signify that what is set aside is not thereby put in its place. In this respect Mr. Bradley's dialectic may be contrasted with that of Hegel. In the work of Hegel nothing is ever simply *aufgeschoben*, set aside; it is always *aufgehoben*, i.e., taken up into its place in a higher unity. A merely subversive dialectic may be magnificent, but it is not philosophy. Mr. Bradley himself acknowledges that every one of the aspects with which he deals, and which he overturns, must yet somehow be retained in the Absolute; but, except in the highly significant chapter on "Degrees of Truth and Reality" (the kernel of the whole book) there is scarcely any indication of the way in which this is possible; and even that chapter (which comes in almost as if it were an afterthought) is hardly made intelligible, just because the nature of the ultimate criterion has never been clearly stated. As soon as we recognise that the ultimate principle is not self-consistency but consistency with the Self, that our ultimate aim is to see the completely intelligible as it is for the completely intelligent, we perceive that the object of a true dialectic must be not merely that of subverting inadequate points of view, but also that of showing how they are to be taken up as elements in a point of view that is more com-

¹ P. 422. Cf. also *MIND*, Vol. III., No. 10, p. 239, where Mr. Bradley states his view on this point somewhat more explicitly. It is one of the difficulties of Mr. Bradley's book; that his opinions are so often given in the form of comments on the views of others (sometimes vaguely referred to as "popular" views), instead of in that of a definite exposition of his own view.

prehensive. No doubt this is a much more difficult task ; and as Mr. Bradley's work is only an *Essay* in Metaphysics, it is perhaps unfair to demand of him that he should actually have done this : but I think there ought at least to be a more explicit recognition that a dialectic of this kind is required for a complete philosophy. Otherwise the view of Degrees of Reality seems to hang rather loosely together with the rest of the system.¹

(3) On Mr. Bradley's psychology I have not much to say. It strikes me, however, as being a trifle chaotic. He objects to the ordinary three-fold division of the elements in mind ; and what he gives in its place² seems to be merely an enumeration of aspects, which are not definitely brought into relation to one another. What I wish to suggest is merely that, if we recognise three stages in the development of our consciousness, sentiency, understanding, and reason, to which our view of the Self has led us ; the discrimination of aspects at these different levels might lead us to a classification of the elements of mind, which should be more comprehensive than that of the ordinary psychology, and better co-ordinated than that of Mr. Bradley. The ordinary classification—*I know, I feel, I will*—seems to be taken at the level of the understanding ; and no doubt this is the level which we most habitually occupy, perhaps even the only level which we can ever occupy with any permanence and completeness. Sentiency and reason may be said, in comparison, to be little more than what is called, in mathematical language, limiting conceptions. Now, at the level of understanding, intelligence does seem naturally to split itself into three broadly distinguishable elements. We have first thought, involving the "that" and the "what," the particular and the universal, in relation to one another. Next we have emotion, connecting itself on the one side with thought and on the other with activity. Finally, we have activity directed to an end, starting from the impulse of desire and ending in the completed volition. These three aspects are broadly distinguishable, though they stand in the most intimate relation to one another, and cannot really be separated. Now, a similar three-fold division may be reflected backwards and forwards into the stages of sentiency and reason ; and, so far as we can be said to occupy these

¹ This point about Dialectic, as well as several others in this paper, have been partly anticipated by a criticism of Mr. Bradley's book written by Mr. McTaggart for the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, January, 1894.

² P. 458, *sqq.*

stages, we may become conscious of a three-fold movement taking place in them. When we sink back, so far as it is really possible for us to do so, to the level of simple immediacy, we are aware of the three elements of sensation, pleasure and pain, and appetite. Whether in pure sentience, if there is any such thing, these distinctions could still be traced, may be a more doubtful point. The more nearly we approximate to this level, the more entirely do the three aspects appear to coalesce; so that perhaps we may say that, at the limit, they would be identical. Whenever these distinctions appear, we ought perhaps to conclude that "the lightning of subjectivity" has already shattered the simple unity of sense. Similarly, at the stage of reason we may distinguish three sides, which are perhaps best discriminated in their objective aspects as philosophy, poetry, and religion. Subjectively we may describe them by such terms as insight, love, and devotion. The first is the grasp of truth; the second, the appreciation of beauty; the third, the affirmation of goodness. Now, here again, at the limit, or in their highest aspects, these three things seem to be indistinguishable.¹ In their most perfect forms, there is scarcely any difference between philosophy, poetry, and religion. Virtue is knowledge; love is insight: to know is to appreciate and to affirm. The three aspects run inevitably into one another. Yet, on the whole, at any level that we ever actually attain, there remain these three distinguishable aspects. If, however, we were to say that the stage of reason is an unanalysable unity, and that the stage of sentience is also indivisible, this would give us a five-fold division of our mental life, which would to some extent approximate to the division that Mr. Bradley appears to favour—though it would not be quite identical with it.² To what extent the higher stages of mental life may be regarded as being evolved out of the lower, I cannot here undertake to discuss. And on the whole I should be disposed to agree with Mr. Bradley that psychology, as a special science, must be allowed to make those divisions within its material which are most convenient for its own constructions.

(4) With regard to Mr. Bradley's ethics,³ I wish only to

¹ See Chap. XXVI., especially p. 468.

² Mr. Bradley seems to give a certain independence to the æsthetic element in consciousness (p. 458); yet in the end he thinks that the distinction between truth, beauty, and goodness is a vanishing one (p. 468). On p. 465 he seems to treat æsthetic feeling as composite (involving pleasure). I find his views on these points puzzling.

³ Chap. XXV.

refer to a single point, on which I have already incidentally touched. If we accept the view of the Self which I have endeavoured to indicate, it will be necessary to some extent to modify Mr. Bradley's view of the relation between self-assertion and self-denial in the moral ideal. Here, indeed, as elsewhere, Mr. Bradley's purpose is mainly dialectical ; and with most of his destructive criticisms I find myself entirely in accord. Much of his criticism is directed against "popular ethics," by which he seems to mean in the main such ethics as that of Butler or that of Dr. Sidgwick, in which the common-sense distinction between the self and the not-self is preserved, and some external principle of conciliation is sought.¹ But in the end Mr. Bradley seems to maintain that, even from the highest point of view, there remains a contradiction in the moral ideal ; a contradiction between the affirmation of self, the effort after a harmonious self-development, and the denial of self, *i.e.*, its renunciation for the sake of a wider and more objective content. Such an ultimate contradiction, it seems to me, is abolished, in so far as we are able to identify ourselves with the Ideal Self ; and this, I think, we do in the highest moral attitude. It is true, indeed, that we never can so far identify ourselves with this point of view, that the placing of ourselves at it does not involve any self-denial. Just as, in the intellectual life, we cannot attain to the complete truth, and any partial attainment of it is reached by a process in which we sacrifice the inadequate point of view from which we start ; so, in the moral life, the raising of ourselves to the universal standpoint involves a renunciation of those impulses that are at first natural to us. But just as there seems to me to be an exaggeration when Mr. Bradley represents our best truth as being still hopelessly sundered from the grasp of reality ; so there seems to me to be a similar exaggeration when he represents our best moral ideal as still involving a hopeless antagonism between self-assertion and self-denial. It may be maintained, indeed, that it is rather in the religious attitude than in that of mere morality that we reach a complete identification of ourselves with our best ideals ; but, if so, I should say that there is an element of religion in all the higher forms of the moral life. Every great devotion, at any rate, whether to a person or to an aim, seems to involve the placing of ourselves at a point of view that is above that of our merely finite centre. It may not be the point of view

¹ Such as is also sought, in a somewhat different way, in the recent popular work of Mr. Kidd on *Social Evolution*.

of the whole : for a finite being, I suppose, it never can be that. The point of view of the whole, whether theoretically or practically, must always remain an ideal ; but it is an ideal that affects and constitutes the actual content both of the theoretical and of the practical life. In neither case are we confined to the region of mere antagonism. And indeed this is in a manner recognised by Mr. Bradley himself ; but, from the want of any explicit recognition of the presence of the Ideal Self in the human consciousness, he is not able to find in the ultimate moral ideal a rational unity. It splits in two, because the idea of the whole seems to remain hopelessly external to the individual life.¹

(5) Finally, I wish to add a little with respect to Mr. Bradley's general ontological position, i.e., with respect to his view of the Absolute, so far as that is affected by the points with which I have been endeavouring to deal. And here it may be well, first of all, to guard against a possible misapprehension. It might be thought that the conception of the Self which I have sought to introduce would have the effect of giving greater prominence to the element of personality than is allowed in the system of Mr. Bradley ; and, in a sense, no doubt this is true ; but I am anxious to guard against the supposition that anything I have been urging is a defence of finite individuality against the charge of self-contradiction.² Personality seems to involve the contradiction of being finite and infinite at once. This contradiction cannot be removed by a *progressus ad infinitum* ; nor does there seem to be any clear way of removing it at the end of

¹ I have already criticised Mr. Bradley's view on this point in the *International Journal of Ethics* for January, 1894.

² I should not wish, for instance, to press such a criticism as that suggested by Mr. McTaggart in the last number of *MIND*, p. 192, where Hegel and Mr. Bradley are contrasted with regard to their views of the individual. For, after all, Mr. Bradley himself seems to hold that the ultimate reality is an individual whole ; and, on the other hand, surely Hegel's view does not lead to the attachment of any ultimate and independent importance to the reality of the finite individual as such. With regard to Mr. Bradley's view of the individual, I may note here that there seems to me to be a certain inconsistency in his attitude, especially on the ethical side. In a note to p. 481 he seems to insist that the individual has some importance, from the moral point of view, as against society ; yet when he deals with a practical question, as in his recent "Remarks on Punishment" (*International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1894), he seems to subordinate the individual to society in the most extreme way. This seems to me to be simply an illustration of the two lines of thought in Mr. Bradley's work—on the one hand, the negation of the part in the whole, and, on the other hand, the reaffirmation of the part. These two lines of thought appear to run parallel, and never really meet.

a finite process. And if this is true of human personality, it seems also to be true of any other to which we can give an intelligible meaning. Personality, as we understand it, is connected with an animal organism, and seems to be inseparable from the limitations and contradictions of such a form of unity. Hence, when Mr. Bradley urges that the Absolute cannot be thought of either as a person or as persons, though of course it must be thought of as including persons, and revealing itself in persons, I cannot offer any clear and intelligible view of personality which would remove his difficulties ; nor does it seem to me that the conception of the Self, as I have endeavoured to explain it, involves such a view.

Nor, indeed, do I find any reason to dissent from the general view which Mr. Bradley appears to take with regard to the positive content that it is possible to ascribe to the Absolute. Believing, as he does, that the form of truth—i.e., the form of the logical judgment—is, in the end, inadequate to reality, he is naturally unable to give anything more than a rather vague and general account of the nature of the Absolute. His account comes to little more than that the Absolute is experience, brought into harmony with itself, in the form of a single totality. This doctrine is, of course, not incompatible with the view that the Absolute may contain elements which, taken by themselves, are in a state of self-contradiction. This is, in fact, Mr. Bradley's own view ; though, as I have already indicated, the absence of any positive dialectic in his work seems to prevent him from adequately explaining this possibility. Apart from the introduction of such a more adequate explanation, it does not seem to me that it would be possible to add much to Mr. Bradley's account of the Absolute. To add more, it would be necessary for us to be more. All that we can ascribe to the content of the Absolute is what is involved in the conditions of perfect intelligibility for a perfect intelligence. A more positive dialectic might help us more adequately to unfold the nature of these conditions ; but it would not, I think, yield us any positive grasp of the nature of the Absolute. I do not see, indeed, how it could even finally decide as to the applicability or non-applicability of such a conception as that of personality to the Absolute. If, for instance, any one were to maintain—as some have maintained—that the ultimate truth of things is to be found in the conception of a kingdom of concrete personalities, in whom intelligence is completely realised, and who are objects to one another ; I do not see any adequate ground either for the acceptance

or for the rejection of such a conception. It seems to me that we cannot sufficiently realise it to ourselves to be able to say whether or not it is finally intelligible and self-consistent. It is not, then, with regard to Mr. Bradley's general view of the Absolute that I have, on the whole, any quarrel. The points on which modification seems to me to be produced by the conception that I have tried to explain, are mainly two, which I will now briefly indicate.

In the first place, the position which we have reached enables us to attach a more definite significance to Mr. Bradley's view, that the ultimate reality is spiritual; or at least I think it enables us to hold this view with a more rational conviction. As it stands in Mr. Bradley's work, this doctrine is introduced almost incidentally, and impresses us as little more than a pious conviction. It is true, no doubt, that the life of spirit can be shown by him to come nearer to the form of harmonious individuality than any other form of existence. Still, it is self-contradictory; and the ultimate reality seems to take a form that can hardly be described as spiritual. From our point of view, on the other hand, reality can be nothing other than the ideal of our spiritual nature. This is, we might even say, what we mean by reality. We might, however, express the truth still better by means of the "great saying" of Hegel, to which Mr. Bradley refers,¹ but which he declines to accept: "The Actual is Rational, and the Rational is Actual"; which may be interpreted to mean that, in the end, reality can mean nothing but the completely intelligible for the completely intelligent.

In the second place, as I have already indicated, the more positive dialectic which I would wish to substitute for Mr. Bradley's merely subversive one, would lead us to include as aspects in reality many elements which Mr. Bradley seems simply to exclude. I am aware that in Mr. Bradley's work, as in that of Spinoza, there are two lines of thought—one leading to negation and the other to a positive construction. My complaint is chiefly that he does not adequately bring them together, and does not even seem to indicate any way by which they could be brought together. He destroys the finite, and then reaffirms it; but he does not reconstitute it. He does not show how we get back to it. It is here chiefly that the superiority of Hegel is apparent. Hegel assuredly was not blind to the element of negation and contradiction in human experience; but there is nothing in which the greatness of Hegel is more apparent—apparent

¹ P. 552.

even in the eyes of his enemies—than the way in which the great human interests—science, history, morality, art, religion—all find a place as elements in the total revelation of the Absolute. Mr. Bradley, on the other hand, has a certain tendency, to use one of Hegel's forcible expressions, to "trample the roots of humanity under foot". He takes up, one by one, all the leading interests of our life, and throws each of them aside, saying to it, as it were, "Thou hast sinned, and come short of the glory of the Absolute". Hegel, on the other hand, is merciful; and, as soon as any particular interest has confessed its sins, as soon as it has laid bare the contradictions that are involved in it, its sins are forgiven, and it is taken up into the bosom of the Absolute. It seems to me that this is not a small distinction. I cannot agree with Mr. Bradley in the view which he seems to hold¹ that the interest in philosophy is merely an interest in the mystical side of things—that it is merely, so to speak, an effort, for once in a way, to stand on our heads and view things from what is, after all, an unnatural and even, in the end, an impossible position. This mystical interest is, no doubt, an element in philosophy; but it is not the whole. The ideal which it sets before us is not a mere beyond, but a guiding principle in all the concrete interests of life. To believe otherwise is, I think, to be on the verge of that worship of the Unknowable, against which Mr. Bradley himself is ready enough to protest. If this is the best of all possible worlds, every particular thing in it cannot be simply a necessary evil. The particular must be capable of being viewed in the light of the idea of the good. Kant, I think, was wrong in regarding the ideals of reason as merely regulative—if this is to be taken to mean that they do not, in any way, help us to determine reality. But they are *at least* regulative. Part of their interest lies in the way in which they serve as guiding principles in the particular interests of human life—science, art, morals, and whatever others there may be. Mr. Bradley has, indeed, himself thrown much valuable light on many of these particular interests; but on the whole he has a tendency to turn from them, almost with a kind of contempt. The reason is partly, I think, that he does not fully and constantly recognise that these particular interests contain in themselves the same ideal which is explicitly brought out in the effort to grasp the Absolute. What we have in all of them is the Self seeking to realise itself, reason coming to the consciousness

¹ Pp. 5-7.

of its kingdom. This was the truth of which Hegel, more than any one else, seems to have been aware. Mr. Bradley, "der Alles-zermalmende," seems to see it only by glimpses, and in his general attitude towards the particular almost to deny it. In his subversion of all the particular interests of our experience, in their abstract isolation—a subversion which, in itself, is no doubt perfectly just—he does not at the same time bring to light the principle of unity by which they can be reconstituted in a whole; though he does say that they are to be reconstituted. His principle of unity, in fact, is brought in almost as if it were an accident with reference to the particulars of experience—a mere rule of the game, of which we happen to become aware in thinking of them; and then the particulars of experience come to appear, in like manner, as if *they* were accidents with reference to the principle of unity. What I have wished to emphasise is that the ultimate principle of unity is simply the ideal of our nature as thinking beings, or, as I have called it, the Ideal Self. It is a principle which is the fundamental postulate of our intelligence, and which is present as an ideal in that intelligence throughout the whole history of its activity, regulating and constituting its content. In emphasising this truth, I do not conceive, as I said at the beginning, that I am introducing anything new into Mr. Bradley's system; I have only been trying to bring out the idea which underlies his work. It seems to me that he has not himself brought it out with sufficient emphasis, and that his work is on that account less complete and less convincing than it would otherwise have been.