III.—PERCEPTION AND INTERSUBJECTIVE INTERCOURSE.

BY WILLIAM W. CARLILE

"THE common world," says Schelling, "arises by the co-operation of many intelligences". The remark embodies a conception which, unless I am much mistaken, has a great future before it in philosophy. It is that of the transformation that the immediate presentations to the minds of individuals undergo at the touch of intercourse with their fellows. The fact of the transformation has been dwelt on by Dr. Ward in the sixteenth and seventeenth of his earlier Gifford Lectures published under the title of *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. I find his reasoning put in a compendious form well suited for quotation by his reviewer in the *Hibbert Journal*,¹ Dr. Dawes Hicks.

After remarking that within the circle of purely individual experience there emerges no distinction between the real and the phenomenal, the writer goes on to say: "That distinction only comes to have significance when the advance is made from the point of view of individual experience to that of universal experience. When ten men look at the sun or moon, they all, according to Reid, see the same individual objects, whilst according to Hamilton, each of the ten sees a different object. From the standpoint of individual experience Hamilton is right; from the standpoint of universal experience the truth lies with Reid. The transition from the 'immediate' object of individual experience to the 'mediate' object of universal experience is effected mainly through means of intersubjective intercourse, and the various operations to which intersubjective intercourse gives rise. The common knowledge which results is, in reality, a continuation and extension of individual knowledge, but so far as the theoretical knowledge of Nature is concerned, intersubjective intercourse leads, inevitably it may be said, to the omission of that reference to a knowing subject characteristic of the

¹October, 1905, p. 197.

objects of individual knowledge. The *one* sun which is the common object of ten men looking at it, since it is not the peculiar object of *any one* of the ten, comes to be considered as independent of them all collectively, and of consciousness generally. From this fallacy of naive realism to the dualism of matter and mind the step is not great, the mediate object comes to be conceived as a thing in itself, that produces by its action the percepts of individual experience, and the latter are falsely pictured as being subjective modifications of the individual mind."

But is there any fallacy whatever about the reasoning here described as that of naive realism, one cannot help asking with all due deference to so sound and so eminent an authority as Dr. Ward. He likens it to an argument to the effect that a collective body such as the House of Commons might be held to exist even though we suppose each and all of its members non-existent. It is impossible to concede the validity of such an analogy. The fact that causation must be taken account of puts it into another category altogether. The discovery by myself, say, of the simple fact that the sun, or any other outward object, exists for my neighbours in my absence is at any rate one of the facts which operate in taking the presentation out of the temporal flux of ideas and in giving it a place among the things, objects, or substances of the world, which, in a word, convert the feeling into the thing felt.¹ Is there any fallacy, we may ask, in the primitive conclusion of dawning consciousness that an impression known to be the same for me and for my neighbours is an impression caused by something that is still there when both I myself and any number that we please of those neighbours may be supposed as absent, asleep or dead? Or, again, is there any fallacy in asserting that this last conclusion tends to the establishment of the fact that such an impression is not the creation of my own mind working in solitude, but, on the contrary, is something that somehow or other stands apart from it and is independent of it altogether.

When Mill, clinging to his conception of the outward object as "a possibility of sensation," yet has to concede that we must recognise the fact that one possibility of sensation, which we call fire, can, in our absence, melt another possibility of sensation which we call wax, does not the thought

¹ Prof. Stout thinks with Berkeley that "the explanation of the fact that the presentation continuum of the individual is continued beyond itself into a whole of fundamentally like nature which transcends and includes it" is "that presentations which do not exist in my mind exist in other minds" (MIND, N.S., 77, p. 13).

force itself upon our minds that the game is up, as far, at any rate, as his variety of idealism is concerned; and that he, under cover of the clumsy synonym "a possibility of sensation," has really conceded the existence of all that any of us ever meant or mean by the object of the outward world.

Leaving on one side, however, for the moment, the general controversy between realism and idealism, that which it is worth while especially to call attention to at present is the transformation, so clearly realised by Dr. Ward, and Dr. Hicks, that takes place in impressions under the influence of intercourse. Even here, however, one finds some features of the statement to which it seems necessary to demur. We are told that, from one point of view, Reid is in the right, from another Hamilton is in the right also. Reid thinks, as we all do, when we are not philosophising, that ten of us looking at the sun see the same sun, Hamilton thinks, on the contrary, that all of us see a different sun. He goes indeed farther than this and thinks that what we see is not the sun at all but only his image on the retina. Now, of course, the image on the retina—or rather the pair of inverted images—is something that science alone knows anything about, and to say that it is what we 'see' is to put a wholly impossible meaning on to that common word. The truth is that the transformation of impressions into objects takes place at an earlier stage in mental development than either Sir William Hamilton or Dr. Ward has realised. Dr. Ward places Hamilton's product of individual experience and Reid's product of what is described as universal experience side by side as things equally real and tangible. But the truth is that Hamilton's is something that cannot be said to exist for consciousness at all. The colour presentations of vision pure and simple have been already converted into the things seen before the stage of consciousness is reached. Hamilton's view thus does not appear to have any vestige of validity about it whatever.

Dr. Ward looks like getting to the root of the matter when he puts the case thus: "The question (that of the transformation of Hamilton's ten suns into Reid's one sun) naturally presents itself in the form: How does the one sun become an object to ten different men? Yet the proper form rather is—'How and in what sense, do the ten come to know that the actual object of each is the same individual object for all?'" To put such a question rightly is indeed half the battle. It leaves, however, the other half yet to be fought out.

Protagoras, it appears, was the first to grasp the fact that

"When several individuals perceive the same external object each has his own sense presentations, which as such are incommunicable to the others".¹ If they remained, however, from first to last always and altogether incommunicable to others, that is to say, if there were nothing that compelled unquestioning agreement between any two of us as to whether the thing that we were at a given moment speaking about and looking at was in very truth the same thing or not for both of us, if what we may call the intersubjective identification of the things of the outward world were definitely and finally impossible, then, we may ask, how would anything in the nature of objective knowledge be possible at all. None of us really doubt, as James says, that when we are looking at the sun it is the same sun that we all of us see. Whence, however, comes this certainty? How, in other words, is intersubjective identification possible?

Dr. Ward, so far as I have been able to discover, does not attempt an explicit answer to his own question, but contents himself with pointing out the difficulty or impossibility of giving a fully adequate one. To formulate a fully adequate answer may indeed be difficult. At the same time I think that some suggestions are possible that give us a glimpse of the direction in which such an answer is to be looked for.

"Our first investigation into the nature of reality might properly take the form of inquiring, What is it that happens when we first learn the signification of the word 'Real' (say as applied to this pen that I hold in my hand)? In the first place it is plain that there must be intercourse. The solipsist standpoint is wholly inadmissible. The sensations of an isolated being would never emerge into consciousness at all. Certainly they would never have names given to them. As to the nature of the intercourse in this particular case there is at any rate this much that happens. There is a group of muscular and tactual sensations peculiar to me, as I grasp the pen in my fingers, accompanied by an auditory sensation simultaneous for both of us as I say the word 'Real'; then a group of muscular and tactual sensations peculiar to you, and an auditory sensation common to both of us and recognised to be similar to the former auditory sensation, as you take the pen in your fingers and repeat the word to show that you understand and concur. The nature of the muscular and tactual sensations have been perhaps adequately analysed by experimental psychologists. I do not think, however, that this important difference between them and

¹ Prof. Stout, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1908-9, p. 238.

the auditory sensation has been explicitly pointed out, *viz.*, that whereas such sensations as the auditory one are open to the experience of an indefinite number of people at once, the muscular and tactual are confined to the experience of one at a time. You cannot hold the pen while I hold it—the same part of it at any rate—without displacing me. This fact is, I think, the foundation of the distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities of matter. It is that which subsequently becomes elaborated into the thought that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time. On it is based the very possibility of the denotation of words, of pointing out anything. The ultimate meaning of the words, 'The same thing as between you and me,' is 'The thing that I now lay my finger on, and that you cannot lay yours on without displacing mine.' If you could, your finger would occupy the same space that mine occupied at the same time. As vision is a compound of muscular and colour sensations, it holds, in respect of this peculiarity, an intermediate position. I can see a face without displacing you, but not a face strictly in profile while you see it strictly in profile. As a result of this, pointing out, as a means of indicating, comes to be substituted for touching."

The last paragraph, I may remark, is reproduced from an article of my own in *MIND* of January, 1895, some seventeen years ago now. The portion of it that is especially in point in connexion with the present question is of course the contention that the ultimate meaning of the words "The same thing" as between you and me is "The thing that I now lay my hand on, and that you cannot lay yours on without displacing mine". Some view more or less similar to this was evidently running in Lotze's mind when he points to the ultimate contrast between inner states and material things, as lying in the fact that the former cannot like the latter "be separated from their original possessor and passed on as they are from hand to hand" while material things are, in the last resort, the things that can be so dealt with. It is, to quote again briefly from the same paper in *MIND*, "in this capability of being passed on from hand to hand that both 'objectivity' and identity primarily consist. I know that a colour or a sound is one thing to me, and another more or less similar thing to my neighbour. How, on the contrary, do I know that an inch measure is precisely the same thing for him as for me? The explanation does not lie in any peculiarity of the primary sensations caused by the inch measure. I could have no assurance from the nature of the sensations that it produces when pressed against my palm

that they would be, in any sense, the same as those which it would produce when pressed against your palm. Indeed, I might be quite sure that they would not. In what then does the sameness consist? In the fact that the measure occupies the same space for you as it does for me; and that, in its ultimate analysis, means simply this, that you cannot hold it in your hand while I hold it in mine. Once we have got the length of finding things which are the same as between us, measurement becomes possible, and thenceforward all accurate quantitative knowledge."

Intelligence, as M. Bergson acutely remarks, has for its object, in an especial manner, the unorganised solid, and, beyond question, a profound change comes over the whole of our mental experience as soon as we grasp the simple conception of the "Thing," the object which exists and possesses identity for two or more people at once. Among the mental processes and products that then, for the first time, become possible are denotation, naming and language. What may be called absolute position too then emerges, position determined by the intersection of innumerable lines having their points of departure in innumerable human subjects, now, perhaps, at length capable of comparing notes with each other. The "object," an island in space, gives us then also the conception of the "particular," numerically different from other particulars, though otherwise indiscernible from them. It gives us thus the conception of unity, and with it of number, that is of unity indefinitely repeated, and so arithmetic is born. It makes possible too, I think, the conception of substance, the substratum of all qualities, the subject of all predicates.¹ Empty space now also becomes recognisable as the interval between objects, while matter is found in their felt resistance to our motor activity, now moreover for the first time made capable of being compared with the similar resistance experienced, in identical circumstances, by other subjects.

We are led thus to the conclusion that what we call the primary qualities of matter are the products of this intersubjective intercourse while the secondary qualities of matter, on the contrary, can be reached at the stage of simple individual sensation. The former, unlike the latter, thus necessarily contain, even when first recognisable by us, a large element of inference, of thought, of reasoning; and we may, perhaps, now be ready to recognise how wise and how

¹ All nouns of course are not the names of solid objects, but all are, in a sense, modelled on the solid object as their type.

true were the instincts of our great philosopher, Locke, when he placed them in a category of their own, well distinguished from the secondary ones.

We can see in a clear light, I think, the width and the depth of the gulf that separates the two classes if we will but duly consider Hume's famous example of the straight stick that appears as bent in water. The bent appearance is palpably illusion, says Hume; and, following Berkeley, he goes on to argue that all the information that can be brought to us in any shape through the senses about the outside world is something that is precisely similar to it in character. But how is it that we can be so certain that the bent appearance of the stick is illusion? How but by comparing it with the information given us by taking the stick in our hands and feeling it? But if that is so, we plainly assume that feeling the stick, passing it, perhaps, from hand to hand, ends in giving us information about its form that is absolutely valid and trustworthy. We would not, indeed, have the conception even of illusion itself, as Dr. Ward, somewhere, very justly remarks, if we had not in some shape or other something that provided us with a standard of truth and reality with which to compare it.

We find in the Kantian system a remarkable inversion of the nature and function of these primary and secondary qualities. Unity, quantity, extension, shape, position in space; all these and others like them are set down as forms of sensibility, as something miraculously conferred on us at birth. They are *a priori* and subjective; they are the qualities of that which is phenomenal alone as contrasted with the world of reality constituted by things in themselves. What are they, however, but Locke's Primary Qualities of matter? Deduct them from the total of the information given us, apparently at any rate, by sense, and what is left? What can be left but the secondary qualities?¹

Are the secondary qualities then—in Kant's language, the matter of sensation—that which alone gives us any glimpse of reality, of the causality of things in themselves, to which we can conceivably attain? The conclusion, if we are forced to draw it, is certainly an amazing one, and it is not surprising that, in these circumstances, post-Kantian speculation very soon dropped the "matter of sensation" and the "thing in itself" altogether, and fell back on the conception of the whole outward world as being the creation of conscious-

¹ Even touch and the muscular sense yield only secondary qualities apart from intercourse.

ness. With Descartes what corresponded approximately to the primary qualities were the *modi rerum*, to the secondary, the *modi cogitandi*. With Kant, whatever the secondary were, the primary, as we well know, were nothing but the *modi cogitandi*.¹

I have referred above to Mill's conception of the permanent possibility of sensation. The truth is that the use of the abstract noun "possibility," meaning, of course, primarily, the fact of being possible, with an indefinite article prefixed to it as the designation of something conceived of as a particular is more or less of a solecism. What term then, it may be asked, would it come natural for us to use in the circumstances. What other than the term "Cause"? We cannot help thinking of the fire as the cause of the melting of the wax, nor can we help thinking of both the fire and the wax conceived of as things or objects that are the same for all of us as in truth the causes of the visual appearances that they present to each. "The purely hypothetical causes," some one will answer. But is this really so? When we take an example from the sensations of sound it comes perfectly natural to us to speak or think of the waterfall, let us say, as the cause of the sound that we hear as we approach it. To call the rose, however, the cause of the visual appearances that it presents to us does not, no doubt, sound quite so natural. We have probably been thinking of the rose and its appearance as one thing, not as two which are capable of correlation with each other as cause and effect. We think of the reddish or yellow colour as a quality of the rose which we may regard as being itself the substance, the substratum that underlies all its qualities. We are thus led to the conclusion that substance and quality are really at bottom cause and effect under another name. In sound we call that cause and effect which in vision we call substance and quality. The difference lies mainly in the instantaneousness with which the emergence of the secondary quality, colour, follows on the thing behind it, as compared with the comparative slowness with which the secondary quality sound, follows on the thing which is behind it.

If, however, we can quite legitimately ascribe the sound to the waterfall as its cause, what is there that is illegitimate in ascribing the colour of the rose to the rose itself as its cause? Here, however, the objection is raised that the cause referred to in the second case is something non-existent. You

¹ At the same time it must be said that Kant's view usefully emphasised the element of thought in the primary qualities.

have an orange, say; take away its qualities one by one, its colour, smell, roundness, consistency, extension and what is left? Nothing. What then can your rose be which you call the cause or the substratum of its colour?

This reasoning depends for any apparent cogency that it possesses upon the tacit assumption that—as in the case of Hume's stick apparently bent in water—the primary and secondary qualities of matter are things that stand upon the same level with each other epistemologically. We found, on the contrary, in the former case that the primary qualities represented the reality by comparison with which alone it was possible for us to pronounce the secondary ones illusion. Take away, along with colour and smell, *compared* extension and *compared* resistance, and of course no substance is left. But then are not compared extension and compared resistance the very things to which the experience of the race has given the name of substance? In other words may they not be justly regarded as being that which furnishes us with the conception of the "Thing," the outward object endowed with an existence independent of our own, and thus capable of being the cause of our sensations.

As regards this genesis of the concept of the 'Thing' two views are possible, one that it is a process of ideal construction, in other words, of creation, another that it is a process of discovery. The former is, no doubt, the more usual view. The only writer, so far as I am aware, who has given distinct expression to the latter is Prof. Alexander. "The apprehension of things which are not mental," he says, "is a process of discovery and not in any sense of creation".¹ We have called it a process of inference. Let us compare with it other cases of inference. In doing so we must note that it is the more developed type of inference that is the familiar fact and that in conceiving of the co-ordination of the sensations of vision with touch transformed by intercourse as inference we are likening this more primordial but really less familiar and less easily understood fact with developed inference as the more easily understood one.

Take the often-used example of the Island. How do we prove, say, that Great Britain is an island? By sailing round it. We have as our major premise or general rule, implicit rather than explicit perhaps, "sea surrounded lands are islands". Then as we accomplish the voyage and come in sight of the port that we started from, our minor emerges: "This land is sea surrounded". Thence we conclude "This

¹ *Hibbert Journal*, Oct., 1909, p. 58. He regards, at the same time, as not mental much that I cannot help regarding as mental.

land is an island". Again, let us ask, How did we get the conception of an island originally? The answer is again: By sailing round lands which can be sailed round. This operation sufficiently often repeated and reflected on generated the concept of the Island, and in time that name was assigned. We are thus led to conclude that the process by which we prove a fact once a name has been assigned, is *the very same process* as that by which we generate a concept before any name has been thought of. Apply then the same principle to the Thing, the outward object which exhibits the commonplace reality of naïve realism. How do we prove that any appearance corresponds to a reality? By touching and handling the thing to which the appearance corresponds if it is within our reach. But it may be said, the touching and handling as well as the seeing might all take place in a dream. Is there then any further method of proof to which we can resort. There is; we can say to our neighbours, Come and feel and handle this alleged thing also, and tell us how it presents itself to you. If they do this and pronounce it real, that, we conceive, settles the question. But why? Simply because common consent entered originally into the genesis of the thought of reality. Proof and genesis again are found to be one and the same thing. Both are the products of intersubjective intercourse.

Here, however, an interesting point is to be noted. The proof of insularity, as we have seen, is the same thing as the genesis of the concept "Island". Turn again, however, to the primordial inference in regard to the Thing, and we find it commonly alleged that the proof of Thinghood or reality is the same not as the genesis of the *concept* of the Thing, but actually as the genesis of the *actual* Thing itself. No one of course asserts that sailing round land creates the very land itself which we call an island, but many assert that the mental processes through which the concept Thing emerges create the very Thing itself. If they do not create it, however, then plainly they should be viewed as processes of discovery rather than as processes of ideal construction.

"Being and reality," says Mr. Bradley, "are one thing with sentience,"¹ and we know that this view is shared by many writers whose general system of thought is widely different from his. How does it square, let us ask, with the conclusions at which we have arrived?

In the case of the stick apparently bent in water there was, we found, a sort of sentience present which we could not

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 146.

call reality but were forced to set down as illusion, and this conclusion if valid emphasises the divorce between mere sentience and reality. Every illusion, indeed, exists for the moment and on that ground you may, of course, if you please, ascribe to it a sort of reality of its own. But plainly the reality that is in point for us here is the reality that we contrast with illusion. It is reality in what we may call its *primary* meaning. The epithet "primary" is borrowed from jurisprudence,¹ and its unavoidable use points to the important conclusion that we have to recognise gradation in connexion with the meanings of such words. As M. Bergson remarks in a similar case, a class must be defined "not by its possession of certain characters but by its tendency to emphasise them". Mere sentience then plainly does not guarantee to us reality in its primary sense. It only gives us that conception indeed when it is combined with inference, when it is the sort of sentience that verifies an inference.

From Plato to Locke the conception that ruled in the world was that sensation alone gave us no true knowledge; that such knowledge was attainable by reason only. We are, perhaps, tending to come back some way in the direction of that conception in learning that even in the simplest perception of any outward object there is an element of reasoning, that no two of us can see the same sun by virtue alone of sensation pure and simple, and apart from processes of reasoning that are no less truly reasoning because they are so rapid and so early learnt that they seem to present themselves in the guise of immediate intuition. The aptitude for such reasoning has no doubt been born with us, and it is these aptitudes, not the full-fledged knowledge that arises from their exercise, that can truly be regarded as *a priori*.

Reality, in its primary sense, we are thus led to regard as the correlate of truth. Truth itself may perhaps in some sense be used as applicable to immediate feeling *per se* while it lasts, even if the feeling is one experienced in a dream; but it is obviously only in a secondary sense that it can be so used. Primarily it applies to assertions, and as these must be the assertions of our neighbours, it too is plainly a concept of intercourse. If we were alone in the universe assertions would be unknown. From the truth of assertions we take the conception and apply it to the truth of inferences. Whatever else inferences may be they are at any rate something that gives us information just as the assertions of our neighbours do,

¹ Cf. "The primary meanings of words and their extensions," ch. iv. of *Monetary Economics*, by the present writer, pp. 39-51.

information that may be true, or that, on the other hand, may turn out false. The primary conceptions of truth and of reality alike imply the possibility and the necessity of verification; and here we are brought in view of another conception which is also a correlate of reality, though from another point of view, the conception of knowledge. Like truth it is primarily a conception of intercourse, and refers to information given us by speech and subsequently verified by comparison with fact. From such information, as in the case of truth, we transfer the concept to inference. *A priori* knowledge is thus a contradiction in terms. Being knowledge it must be thought of as verified by comparison with fact, but being *a priori* it must be thought of as unverified.

In connexion with verification a point of some interest emerges. It is this, that we can verify nothing in the immediate present. Before we have time for such verification the present has become the past. Verification and with it thus necessarily truth, knowledge, reality and existence, appear all to have a future content. Say that this chair exists, what I really mean is that it will be possible for me or for any one to handle it, and then to experience the sensation of resistance, which ultimately warrants the thought of its existence. Existence thus when predicated in its primary sense means at any rate existence lasting on into the immediate future, and thus existence that is apart from sentience. Existence for the moment in the temporal flux would of course be quite unverifiable. Every assertion that we make about the real world as well as every inference that we draw has, if we look for it, a future reference. M. Bergson's view that the present is a device of conceptual thought, and that reality lies alone with the onward flow of temporal duration, thus seems to embody a truth that we have to reckon with. It seems very emphatically to negative the notion that reality and truth are or can be coincident with immediate sentience and with that alone.

The reality of the outward world is what naïve realism conceives it to be. The substance that underlies qualities, the causes of sensible impressions. It is not sensation only but something that more nearly approaches Mill's notion of the permanent possibility of sensation, the something inferred to be always there that has only to be approached and touched in order to generate sensation. If Hume's theory of causation had any validity we should call the appearances, which always come first whenever we handle material objects, the cause of the sensations of touch and resistance that ordinarily follow them. We do not do this because intercourse and

thought working on the basis of sense data unveil for us a world of permanently existing causes or things that are discovered to have priority to these appearances.

In the instances cited I have confined myself to the very simplest of the effects of intercourse on thought, to its operation in connexion with the genesis or the discovery, as we choose to conceive it, of the solid unit, the ordinary thing of the outward world. I have dwelt little on the use of language, though naming has, of course, always to be reckoned on as being there in the background "objectifying the subjective" as Lotze expresses it or, in Green's words, converting the feeling into the thing felt.¹ When we bring in language and consider its effect in moulding thought, not only in regard to external objects and their qualities, but also in regard to feelings, sentiments and desires, to what Locke would have called "mixed modes," a vast field of investigation and discussion opens up in front of us on which, however, in the present paper, it is impossible to enter.

Of all the philosophers with whose works I have any acquaintance either at first or at second hand Locke appears to me to be the one who was most consistently alive to the true rôle which the spoken word plays not only in registering but also in transforming both feeling and thought. It is noteworthy too that he seems to be always becoming more and more thoroughly awakened to the truth in regard to its action in these respects as his investigation proceeds. He tells us himself that, to begin with, he had no conception of the importance of words and of the part they played in mental operations. In the end, as we know, he finds it desirable to devote one large section of his work, his Third Book, to research in connexion with them. He appears to be always struggling with a fallacious conception, one indeed even at this moment very prevalent and very influential, to the effect that all questions connected with the meaning of words are merely verbal in the sense of being altogether trivial. It is a conception that applies to nomenclature as used in regard to streets or stars or racehorses, but not, I think to the gradually developed words which embody the no less gradually developed ideas of the race. In the later part of his Essay he appears to be reaching a contrary and a sounder view.

As regards the scattered references to the question made by other philosophers we have Berkeley's recognition already

¹ "The moment it is named it has ceased to be a feeling and becomes a felt thing". *Green's Works*, vol. i., p. 264. The reference is to heat or flame.

noted of the effect on our thought of the fact that perceptions identical with our own exist for others. To turn to the Germans, it is worthy of remark that Kant regards his empirical reality within the field of phenomena as "that which is valid for the sensuous faculty of every human being". I opened the paper with Schelling's utterance to the effect that "The common world arises through the co-operation of many intelligences". Perhaps that observation again was suggested by Fichte's remark that "Only of that which others testify to me do I know that it is not my (dream) world but is the real world". Coming to more recent speculation we find Fechner saying "We have no reason whatever for supposing that there exists more of the corporeal world than the combination of phenomena which is governed by laws, and which exists for more than one unit of consciousness at the same time". Fechner too thus appears to hold that the identity of presentations for various minds, furnishes in large measure the basis of all that we can call reality.

The history of the categories since Kant has again some bearing on our general conclusion. We find Herbart maintaining that when rightly treated they coincide with the forms of language, while Trendelenberg contends that the Aristotelian categories themselves were based on the analysis of the sentence. Lotze's view is similar to Herbart's and it is one, as we know, that plays an important part in his system. He alludes playfully to Kant's conception of "thought as standing fronting the impressions as they arrive with a bundle of logical forms in its hand uncertain which form can be fitted to which impression and therefore needing some special expedient to discover how to pair them properly". In his own system, when all is said and done, we find substituted for the elaborate machinery of the categories and their schemata the conception of the presentation continuum as finally articulated into things, properties and events corresponding to the nouns, adjectives and verbs of common language. In other words we find the world of individual experience conceived of as transformed through the exigencies of intercourse into the world of common experience which we call the world of reality.