The above remarks belong mostly to the region of dreamland, but they none the less concern a subject which all who have occasion to speculate on the nature of Observation and Inference ought to be familiar with. Even in the most mechanical employments, and under the strictest confinement to practical aims, a man will never truly understand how his machine is working within its ordinary range and conditions, unless he also knows what it would do under conditions which he will almost certainly never see realised. Even then our knowledge can never be sound and accurate about what does happen under present conditions unless we make it embrace also a good deal about what merely might happen under conditions which do not exist. When therefore we are professedly dealing with speculation rather than with practice, the necessity of thus freely extending our limits of thought and hypothesis becomes quite imperative. Our observation and inference are carried on under certain conditions of space and time. Some of these conditions seem absolutely inseparable from the very nature of our faculties, and I will therefore leave to the metaphysician the discussion of what would come to pass were these tampered with. But there are others amongst these conditions (referred to here, for want of better terms, as 'our control of space and time') some of which are within our power to some small extent to modify and amend. With the nature and consequence of these the logician is bound to render himself familiar, both as they are now and as they may be in the future; but he will never succeed in doing this unless he is also familiar with them far beyond this point, *viz.*, as they are conceivable to the imagination but will in all likelihood never be realised at all in practice.

J. VENN.

III.—M. RENOUVIER'S PHILOSOPHY.—LOGIC.

I.

PHENOMENISM in some shape or other bids fair to be the philosophy of the future. Kant's Critical Philosophy impressed, as is well known, its direction on succeeding thought, and in fact has dominated its development down to the present day. Of the two strains which contended for the mastery in Kant, the

of the machine which inveterate association forbids in the case of our own vocal organs. This, of course, is a perfectly distinct process from that conceived and discussed above. It corresponds (in the case of space) to the physical enlargement of a body already alluded to, as distinguished from its being what we call magnified.

critical seems to have preserved the greatest vigour, the other or absolutist strain having worked itself out in both its branches. The absolute *thought* theory, though still sitting in isolated grandeur on sundry professorial chairs, shows no sign of recovering its ancient supremacy; and the absolute *will* theory, though popular perhaps in the land of its nativity, has abandoned the proper objects of philosophy, the facts of conscious perception and action, to become a philosophy of unconsciousness and the means of attaining it.

It was not till the second half of the present century that M. Renouvier, in his *Essais de Critique Générale*, did for the critical strain in Kant what the German ontologists had done for the absolutist strain, that is to say, produced a complete system of philosophy on its principles, a system based at once on the disproof of noumenal entities, of which substance and substantial cause are the chief, and on the reflective analysis of the phenomena of consciousness as such. M. Renouvier has been the first to produce a complete system of philosophical phenomenism, based on the critical principles of Kant; and it is with his name that the phenomenism of the future will be justly associated.¹ Nevertheless a prior name ought not to be omitted when we speak of a critical philosophy, the name of a younger contemporary of Kant himself, that of Salomon Maimon. He too was phenomenist and criticist, but he did not live to bring his philosophical system to completion. M. Renouvier's originality, too, is in every way beyond question. He can in no sense be called the successor of Maimon. Their ways diverge widely, though it is from a point *within* phenomenism. Both go together up to the point of complete correlation between consciousness and its objects, which is the note of phenomenism; but when they come to the analysis of phenomena within consciousness, then immediately their differences begin, differences which are of a fundamental kind. They diverge as early and they diverge as widely as, in the opposite school of absolutism, Hegel's theory of absolute *thought* diverges from Schopenhauer's of absolute *will*. Equally *irreconcilable*, however, they probably are *not*; though time alone can show. For their differences lie in the analysis of phenomena which are open to the observation of all, and confessedly to be examined in their

¹ Had I been acquainted with M. Renouvier's works when I published the *Philosophy of Reflection* (as I must now confess with shame I was not), I should not have laid claim, in the unqualified way I did, to have been the first to dispense, in a system of philosophy, with the notion of *substance* (Vol. II., p. 189), though basing that claim on my views with regard to time and space. It is equally dispensed with in M. Renouvier's system, though its place is not supplied in the same way; and this retractation, unimportant as it may be, is therefore his due.

character of phenomena, and with the aids derived from physiological psychology. The common acceptance of phenomenist principles is a deeper bond of union than any divergence on points of analysis within phenomena, however fundamental, can disturb. There are facts to appeal to, and what is more, an admitted method of interrogating them. Absolutism, on the other hand, supplies no bond of union at all; it is a name and nothing more. Each absolute system excludes every other absolutely and from the first.

The importance of this fact can hardly be overrated. Phenomenists can hail one another as allies, as co-operators in a common work, notwithstanding the widest divergences of opinion and method within that work. All such divergences, and the discussion to which they give rise, are but the necessary means of reaching a common truth, which when reached is welcome to all, being of the kind which all are alike seeking. In this respect the phenomenist philosophy is the parallel of science; where all truths are welcome, by whomsoever they are won, and whatsoever prior hypothesis they favour or disprove.

A cordial and friendly welcome, then, and at the same time an attentive examination, should be the reception given by phenomenists in this country to the works of the veteran philosopher who has been the first to propound a system of philosophical phenomenism, and who by loftiness of aim and dignity of thought, combined with acuteness and learning, has the most powerfully contributed to command its success.

II.

M. Renouvier's system is contained, up to the present time, in four works, to which he gives the title of *Essais de Critique Générale*, the several names of which sufficiently indicate their subject and scope. The first is the *Traité de Logique Générale et de Logique Formelle*, published in 1854; the second the *Traité de Psychologie Rationnelle*, published in 1859; both which appeared again in revised and enlarged editions, each work being in 3 vols. 12mo, in 1875, to which editions the references in the present article are made. The third is *Les Principes de la Nature*, 8vo, 1864. The fourth is the *Introduction à la Philosophie Analytique de l'Histoire*, of which the first volume, the only one hitherto published, appeared, 8vo, in 1864. The ten years, therefore, from 1854 to 1864, saw the foundation of M. Renouvier's whole system.

But these works have since been followed up by others of no less, indeed in one case as I venture to think, of even greater importance and value, barring always the transcending value of

establishing phenomenism at all. I allude to the next work which M. Renouvier published, his *Science de la Morale*, 2 vols., 8vo, in 1869. Next to this came his *Uchronie*, in 1876, the scope of which will be sufficiently set forth, for the present, by its alternative title "*An historical and apocryphal sketch of the development of European Civilisation, not as it was, but as it might have been*". Besides which, he is continually contributing articles on philosophical, social and political questions, to the Journal of which he is chief editor, *La Critique Philosophique*.

Such is the general map of the Renouvier territory. Before proceeding to explore it, I will venture the remark that, in my opinion, the crowning peak of the whole land, the glorious sunlit summit to which its roads have led him, and from which we obtain no uncertain glimpses of the promised future of humanity, is the *Science de la Morale*. That work gives promise of a better future for mankind, not only because it contains the analysis and establishment of the principles which ought to guide human effort, but also because it exhibits them in a form in which they may be pressed on the attention of practical statesmen. As I propose to examine only those two of M. Renouvier's works which are the foundation of the rest, I confine myself to hailing his *Science de la Morale* as deserving, not merely comparatively with other books, but also in a more absolute and positive sense, the distinctive title (a title devised by Coleridge) of *The Statesman's Manual*.

But it is time to begin with the system itself. It is contained in the four Essays mentioned above, and the *Science de la Morale* is its corollary (barring one important derogation to be mentioned in its place). The two first Essays, the *Logique* and the *Psychologie* contain the establishment of the principles, which the third, the *Nature*, applies to the world of physics and biology, and the fourth, the *Philosophie de l'Histoire*, to the early periods of human society. The two first Essays are therefore theoretically the basis of the whole, and, as we shall see, the *Logique* is the basis of the *Psychologie*. These two contain an analysis of consciousness from two different points of view; the *Logique* regarding its phenomena as a subject-matter to be described and its relations determined, the *Psychologie* regarding the same phenomena as functions or modes of activity of consciousness, as in a given individual, the main classes of which are given in the first instance by the main divisions of the *Logique*. Thus both essays go over the same ground, testing and controlling each other; the mental furniture which the *Logique* analyses as the content, and the *Psychologie* as the functions, of the mind, being also the obverse aspect, the *subjective* aspect as it is commonly called, of the *objective* universe of

existence; though it must be noted that M. Renouvier gives to the terms *objective* and *subjective* significations just the reverse of the usual ones. But this is a question of nomenclature which need not now be discussed.

We may pass lightly over the first two Parts of the *Logique*. They are devoted principally to the establishment of Phenomenism, the exclusion of the Absolute and of noumenal entities, in short, of what M. Renouvier well calls "fetishism in philosophy". The first Part is entitled "Of Representation in general". The most general term, which includes all other phenomena of consciousness within it, is according to M. Renouvier *représentation*. Each representation has a double aspect, on one side it is a *phénomène représentatif*, on the other a *phénomène représenté*, or, in less technical language, a perception and a thing perceived; a distinction, it must be observed, which is a very different thing from that between a state of consciousness and a state of nerve on which it depends.

Farther, just as the noumenal substrates, or things-in-themselves as they are called, are excluded from philosophy, so also the Ego, the *Moi*, or Self, is excluded *as a datum* from the representations considered merely as such in this first Part. It will come in, when we come to the *analysis* of representation in the third Part. Representations alone and in general, not any one or more particular representations, are in this first Part shown to be the proper and total object of the whole inquiry. And every representation must be taken as involving no more than its own elements, the elements composing it as a representation.

The question of method comes next. The great principle by which the nonentity of noumenal substrata is proved, when the case is one where actual phenomena are treated as if they were such substrata, is what M. Renouvier calls the "principle of number," or "principle of the finite". Actual representations, he says, treated as things-in-themselves, must either form a whole or not form a whole. If they do not form a whole, they are things which we cannot consider, under the simple relation of existence, conjointly with other things which exist. But this is incompatible with representing them at all. Therefore they must form a whole. And, if they form a whole, then, with any given whole, a *number* is always given. Everything that can enter into representation *at all*, even to be discussed, must form *a whole* with other things in representation. This, if I rightly apprehend the argument (Vol. I., p. 46), is what is intended by the "principle of number". It seems to require some further support than can be obtained from the consideration of representation in general. The notion of a *whole* must have its

foundation, and consequently the principle of number its proof, in the *analysis* of representation, which is for the present deferred. For my part, at least, I should hesitate to admit, without further proof, what this argument seems to require, that to represent a thing conjointly with others is the same thing as representing them all together as a *whole*. The term *whole* is ambiguous.

This principle M. Renouvier then applies (I. pp. 50, ff.) first to the representations of space, time, matter, and motion; and shows that to take them as things-in-themselves is to take them in a way which contravenes the principle of number, is to take them as realised infinities, either of extension or division, and *vice versa*. Taking the parts of space, of time, of matter, and of motion, as things-in-themselves involves taking them as realised infinities, either in extension *ad extra* or in division *ad intra*, and that is contradictory to the principle of number. The parts of space, time, matter, motion, if taken as infinite, form a number which is *not* a number; and to imagine that such things *exist* is to imagine an object to exist which contradicts the laws of representation, that is, to imagine a thing-in-itself. A discussion of Zeno's paradoxes is appended. Other groups of phenomena are then taken, ending with the largest of all, the Sum of Things, and proof is given that, existence involving relation, a thing imagined to exist out of relation, or in other words *in itself*, is a nonentity.

It will not, I hope, too much interrupt the current of narration to remark, that the proof last mentioned seems to stand on very different ground from that on which the preceding identification of a thing-in-itself with an infinite is based. It is a perfectly general consideration that existence involves relation; but that a thing-in-itself is the same as an infinite thing requires a special analysis of the meaning of *infinite*. And even if an infinite thing were shown by analysis to be a contradiction, still it is not every self-contradictory fiction that is a thing-in-itself, which is a fiction of a particular kind. This last remark applies to M. Renouvier's conception of things-in-themselves generally. He seems to understand the term in an extended and not in the strict sense which Kant gave it, in the section of the *Kritik d. r. V.* on the ground of distinction between phenomena and noumena. (See I. 43 and 91-92.)

The second Part is devoted to an "Elementary Review of Phenomena". It is really a sequel to the first Part, containing more introductory matter, explanatory of the Phenomenist position. Various terms are defined and explained; Reality, which it is shown cannot be opposed to Phenomenon; Truth; Principle of Relativity; Law of Phenomena; Objective and

Subjective Order; Subject and Attribute; Function, a term which is employed in a sense derived from the signification it bears in mathematic, and means, in such phrases as physiological, intellectual, functions, functions of sensation, memory, and so on, a "regular determination of certain phenomena consequent on the determination of certain other phenomena, conformably to a law which is proper to each order and known by experience". Space and time are said to be "general functions of all phenomena so far as subject to the laws of quantity". Consciousness may be called "a function of functions of objective phenomena," *objective* meaning, in M. Renouvier's sense, as *representations*; and nature "a function of functions of phenomena".

The term *être* calls for a special definition. Noumenal substance being banished, what do we mean by *l'être*? What is a *Being*? It is clear that a being, an existent, implies relation and law. And the word is applied properly to all phenomena, to relations as well as to the terms connected by them, to the law as well as to the subject of it. There seems to be a certain double sense in the word, an absolute and a relative sense; "in fact, the absolute is in some sort given in the phenomenon, namely, so far as it is simply *there*, present, or posited; but, so soon as posited, the phenomenon appears in a relation which may well be not *this* or *that*, but is necessarily *some* relation or *other*. Thus the phenomenon is, and the absolute disappears; or the absolute is and remains, and the phenomenon is no more, and there is nothing". . . . "The proposition *the existent is*, which does not go beyond its own subject, empty as a judgment, is equivalent to the exclamation: *être! représentation! phénomène!* It expresses the great mystery which no representation has ever penetrated or ever will penetrate; but would this mystery—if the existent were not a determinate existent, if relations were not—present itself at all?" (I. 140.) Some remarks on existents belonging to the material, vital, and representative or conscious orders, followed by a brief section on science and the sciences, complete the second Part. So much will perhaps suffice to convey an outline of M. Renouvier's position as a Phenomenist, or in other words, with regard to the general question of the nature of existence.

The third Part, which contains the "Analysis of Fundamental Laws," is naturally that to which the greatest interest attaches, at least for phenomenists, inasmuch as this analysis it is which ascertains the distinctive character of the phenomenism expounded in the two foregoing Parts. All representations (we have seen) are in relation to others, order is traceable in all from the very first; they come to consciousness in relation with each other, and thereby also in relation to consciousness as a whole,

and to its centre the conscious person. What are the chief or ruling relations to which they are subject? That is the great question.

These relations M. Renouvier finds to be certain Categories to the number of eight, or nine if we count *relation* itself, each consisting of three members, a thesis, an antithesis, and a synthesis; and these Categories, involved in the *représentations représentatives*, rule our thoughts, so that we find them again in the world of existences, the *représentations représentées*, as the laws of that world. The following is the table of them:

CATÉGORIES.	THÈSE.	ANTITHÈSE.	SYNTHÈSE.
RELATION.	DISTINCTION.	IDENTIFICATION.	DÉTERMINATION.
<i>Nombre</i>	Unité	Pluralité	Totalité
<i>Position</i>	Point (<i>limite</i>)	Espace (<i>intervalle</i>)	Étendue
<i>Succession</i>	Instant (<i>limite</i>)	Temps (<i>intervalle</i>)	Durée
<i>Qualité</i>	Différence	Genre	Espèce
<i>Devenir</i>	Rapport	Non-rapport	Changement
<i>Causalité</i>	Acte	Puissance	Force
<i>Finalité</i>	État	Tendance	Passion
<i>Personnalité</i>	Soi	Non-soi	Conscience

This conception of the Categories differs from Kant's in not requiring any noumenal agent, of whose transcendental actions the categories may be conceived as expressions; for they exist in right of experience, as members of the analysis of actual phenomena. And it differs from Hegel's conception of the laws of thought, inasmuch as the categories are not produced out of each other by a process of negativity, nor any one of them out of nothing by the same process. Time and Space too, it will be observed, which are Kant's forms of perception or intuition as opposed to thought, are here made moments of the two categories, position and succession. The effect of this is, first, to obliterate the distinction between perception and thought, at least as a cardinal distinction of the analysis, by sinking them in one single class of phenomena, *représentation*; and secondly, to subordinate the forms of perception to those of thought (and not *vice versa*), by making the forms of that single class of phenomena, in which the distinction is obliterated, the ultimate laws of consciousness, in which the forms of perception as such are comparatively insignificant moments. The results of this will appear as we proceed.

The Categories of representation being established, the remainder of the *Logique* consists in their development and application. From the first or general category, that of Relation itself, with its three moments, springs the distinction between

analytical and synthetical judgments, and the fundamental law of identity or of contradiction, together with that of "excluded middle," here called "*principe de l'alternative*," which are shown to be one in principle, and to be what M. Renouvier well calls *loi régulatrice des relations constantes*.

The next three categories, Number, Position and Succession, are then exhibited as the source and basis of mathematic in both its branches, calculation and geometry. The discussion of position and succession contains a proof of the irreducible or ultimate character of extension and duration as features of representation. Extension and duration are not deducible one from the other, nor either of them from anything else but from the category of which each is a moment. An excursus on the notion of extension, appended to the chapter on position, and another on the notion of time, appended to that on succession, contain much sound and vigorous criticism on the English Association theorists.

The doctrine next propounded is one to which M. Renouvier attaches great weight, and to which he frequently recurs, the non-existence of infinity in matters pertaining to quantity. "I had no right," he says "to make a category of the infinite applied to quantity, because I demonstrate that this term cannot be used without contradiction, so far as it is taken for a law of representations that are actual. While, so far as it is taken for a law of representations that are possible, the *infinite* is nothing else than the *indefinite*, and the difference between these two words is great. The indefinite belongs to the same category as potency (*puissance*) or possibility." (I. 366.) I shall return to this point before the end of the paper; at present I go on with the *Logique*. My mathematical knowledge unfortunately does not enable me to do justice to the mathematical disquisitions which are a capital feature of the work, with two of which, on the theory of negative values, and the theory of the indefinite and of limits, the first volume closes.

The second volume opens with the foundation of the theory of Formal Logic on the category of Quality, with its three moments of genus, difference, and species. Logical classification accordingly comes from the application of these three moments to the content or matter to be classified, phenomena standing in qualitative relations to each other by virtue of attributes which are predicable of them. The predicable qualities of phenomena add a concrete determination to them, over and above that determination which they get from simply belonging to the first or general category of Relation.

"The category of *quality* answers the question *what (quel)*, declares that *one thing is such and such other thing*. There enters then into every representation of quality an element of distinction and an element of identifica-

tion. But this latter law, which is that of relation in general, receives a wholly new character and development, foreign to the preceding categories, inasmuch as the quality, or thing declared of another thing, is a *genus*; the object qualified a *difference*, and their synthesis, marked by the copula, a *species*." (II. p. 2.)

By calling the object qualified a *difference* is meant, that, in *the rose is red* for instance, *red* being the genus, the remaining qualities of the rose, other than redness, are its difference from other cases of redness. The law or category of quality, then, presupposes that we see differences and resemblances in the content or matter of representation, and that these are the basis of their classification under the three moments of the category. On this basis a complete and in many respects new theory of formal logic is developed, interspersed as before by several vigorous criticisms of various English writers, among others of Dugald Stewart, Sir W. Hamilton, Whewell, and De Morgan.

The next Category, that of *Devenir*, Becoming as opposed to Being, the German *Werden*, brings us into the atmosphere of concrete phenomena in their concrete shape. The preceding categories have to do with those laws of phenomena which are *constant*, as compared to their content; this one has for its object the concrete content itself. It is a synthesis of sameness with difference, of being with not-being; that is to say, it is Change. And this notion of change is then applied to the foregoing categories.

Going on to the *law* of this concrete change brings us to the next Category, that of *causality*. It differs from *devenir* in the introduction of a new notion, that of *force*.

"Every representation of change is accompanied by a representation of force. From this new point of view, potency in its character of the interval of two joined acts which determine it" [act, potency, and force, are the three moments of the category] "gives us *power*, if the second act is not yet posited, and gives us *doing* or production, if it is posited. These are two aspects of the notion of force. Under the first aspect, the force is only *virtual*, and the potency is as yet distinct from the act; under the other, the synthesis is complete, and it is force properly so called which then appears, having an equal share both of the act and of the potency, which are transformed by being taken up into a third conception. In fact, whether we posit the act pure without potency, or the potency pure without act, we neither obtain change at all (*devenir*), nor do we obtain doing at all (*le faire*), and for the same reason. Things are then represented either as actual or as possible, but not as produced. Act and potency, viewed in complete abstraction, are mutually exclusive; force, foreign to each of them separately, is the result of their synthesis. Force is the *act of a potency*." (II. 278-9.)

Such is in outline M. Renouvier's account of the notion of force and causality in general; there is a special category of consciousness to explain it. But this is not all. There is also

another special source from which our knowledge of force is derived, a particular case of force, which serves us afterwards as a type for imagining other cases of causality. This is voluntary or intentional action; a fact of consciousness, of personality; "the only case in which phenomena are known to us beforehand (*d'avance*) as connected by a force". (II. 286-7.) M. Renouvier's meaning seems to be, that the category is of general applicability, but that one class of cases only, that of voluntary action, gives us the exemplification of this category; though other cases are brought under it afterwards by being compared to that original one.

There follows under this category a treatment of the fundamental principles of dynamics, and also of the logical modal propositions and syllogisms, of the possible, and the probable, ending with a thorough-going discussion of the theory of probabilities.

In the next Category, that of *Finalité* or Final Cause, the subjective character is still more strongly marked. We have seen that human acts afforded *one* case of causality and force; here it is found that *all* final-causation is conscious. For to constitute this, there must be "default, want, need," terms which are applicable only in the case of beings who propose ends to themselves. (II. 459.) We find ourselves accordingly in the subjective domain of the *passions*, using this term in a large sense. The analogy between this category and the preceding one is very close. Still there is a difference which is extremely important.

"Tendency (*la tendance*) is an interval between two states (*états*), just as potency between two acts. But a potency includes a number, and often an indefinite number, of possibles; it comprehends contraries at the least, contraries which, whether through ignorance or otherwise, are imagined in the unknown future as connected with a determinate past. But a tendency has one direction only, simple and unique. In both cases there occurs a synthesis of an interval with its two limits; we have seen that two definite acts, limiting a potency, constitute a force; similarly, two definite states, limiting a tendency, form a synthesis which we will designate by the name *passion*." (II. 459-60.)

In this way we are brought to the last of the Categories, that of Personality, the fullest and most particular of all, as Relation, the first category, was the most general and abstract. It is supposed in all the rest, inasmuch as for analysis an analyst, for science a savant is required; and all the forms of knowledge are moulded on the laws of the person, who alone has the representations.

"Like all the categories, personality is determined by the synthesis of a limit and interval to correspond. The limit is the self, a sphere and a

series of phenomena posited as being, as act, as state, in the same way as the common thesis of the categories of becoming, causality, and finality, is posited. The interval, abstraction being made of all limitation by the self, is the not-self, the indeterminate, indefinite, complexus of all other or exterior phenomena, but phenomena connected, under all the categories, with those of self, in regard to which they are determined. The synthesis of self and not-self is *consciousness*, the person." (II. 484-5.)

The way is thus prepared for the subject of the next Essay, the *Psychologie*, which treats of the various functions of consciousness, and (as already remarked) reproduces the categories in an active shape or as functions. Consciousness is not itself relation but a relating, "*relation référente*"; and so also, under the next four categories, it is a numeration, an imagination, a memory, a judgment, all which compose the general function of intelligence or understanding, and (supposing the category of *becoming* to be involved, as it inevitably is) of thought. As subject to *becoming*, too, consciousness is also will and passion, which are the active states of causality and final-causation. The three main divisions of psychology are thus given, understanding (including sensibility), will, and passion. Still in some sort even here we are yet in the kingdom of forms; the categories are forms, the "skeleton of representations," and so also are the functions. We suppose the *matter* in and upon which these forms of both kinds are displayed. This *matter*, consisting of phenomena which do not give but range themselves under the categories, and which the categories do not give but arrange—this matter so arranged is *experience*; and inasmuch as consciousness with its forms is the arranger, experience is a name also for consciousness. (II. 488.)

But we have not yet arrived at the end of the *Logique*. There are certain conclusions to be drawn from the analysis, certain results relating to our conceptions of the frame of things, which the *Logique* by itself is sufficient to warrant. Indeed it is here, in the fourth and concluding Part of the work, which deals with the Limits of Knowledge, that the immediate interest of the whole is found. What are these conclusions? The form which the last Part takes is that of discussing the possibility of an universal and scientific synthesis comprehending the phenomena of the universe at large. "Can science solve the general questions which are posed when she applies the categories to experience, or in other words to the World? *Is an unique and total synthesis of phenomena possible?*" (III. 7, 8.)

The answer, as we shall see, comes briefly to this. No such synthesis is possible for scientific knowledge; but there is possible existence beyond that knowledge, which escapes the reach of synthesis, and is the legitimate object of *beliefs*. There is a region which belief may people with probable phenomenal

existences, enveloping a region which can conceivably (though not so at present) be entirely reduced to the synthesis of knowledge. Now there are two ways in which this conception of a region of the world of existence, beyond the reach of scientific synthesis, may be imagined. Either that region is imagined as infinite, and then the world as a whole is imagined as infinite also; or it is imagined as finite, and then we imagine a finite synthesis of knowledge, surrounded by an unknown region indefinite to us, and the whole lying within a finite universe. Which of these two ways is adopted by M. Renouvier?

The way in which he approaches the subject is the following. There is, he says, a discrepancy in our conceptions of the world as a Total, according as we approach it directly by the categories, or from the suggestions of our actual experience. When we take the latter course, and endeavour to follow up experience as far as it will carry us, we find in every direction, a Beyond; phenomena seem to lead us to an infinite under all the categories; we seem to have a limited experience of an unlimited world. On the other hand, when we apply the categories directly to phenomena, the world is conceived in all directions as a finite whole, with *nothing* beyond it either in space, time, or anything else. Is the world, then, finite, or is it infinite? This is a real antinomy, which must be solved, if knowledge is to be a reality, by showing that one branch is true, the other false, and why.

M. Renouvier's solution is, that the result of following experience, the *infinity of the world*, is attained by means of a generalisation or induction which may be illegitimate; while the result of applying the categories directly, the *finiteness* of the world, not only results from a necessity of thought, but is not contradictory, either in itself, or to the inductions of experience so far as they legitimately go. The infinity of the world is contradictory to its finiteness, but its finiteness is not contradictory to the *indefinite* limits of experience, which is all that experience can legitimately assert. "The theatre of experience is the content of the world, and the world exceeds it." (III. 21.) "In one word, experience does not prove that nothing is possible beyond experience, or limiting the sphere of possible experience. On the contrary, the conception of the Whole perishes, and phenomena drift without anchorage, if the infinite, the true name of which is contradiction, obtains a footing in scientific knowledge." (III. 22.)

The antinomy is thus shown to be real, and at the same time receives a solution in the sense of finiteness. An excursus is devoted to applying the same principles to Kant's Antinomies, with the result (1) of rejecting Kant's solution, founded on his

thing-in-itself doctrine, that the dispute is a dispute about nothing at all, and (2) of upholding the *Theses* in all four cases. M. Renouvier thus conceives the world or sum of things as a finite whole, with no time before it or after it, no space outside it; but as containing within itself an unknown region beyond the reach of scientific knowledge, a region which we know to exist, and to exist in relation to the known region, the categories of representation being applicable alike to both. Experience is satisfied by having a *beyond* assured to it; and the categories are satisfied by that *beyond* being conceived as finite. This *beyond* is the region of possibles and of belief, of reality but not of knowledge, except so far as this, that we know it is subject to the categories.

There is, then, beyond the synthesis of experience, an indefinite and comparatively unknown region, which is marked out by the categories, the laws of all representation. This region as a whole is determined by the categories, that is, not by extrinsic but by intrinsic conditions. And no synthesis of *experience* of the world as a whole is possible, because experience implies relation of one fact or phenomena with others beyond it, whereas the world has nothing either beyond it or beside it. (III. 10.) But since we have a general knowledge of the world as a whole, having the categories which determine it, the question occurs whether we have not also, in the categories, data for *deducing* the phenomena within our experience, and so in a general way arriving at a *scientific* synthesis of the phenomena of the world, including the unknown region; a synthesis which would be a deductive and scientific synthesis of general laws, though one with great lacunæ, and not to be called a synthesis of experience. "In order for such a science truly accessible to exist, we should necessarily have to conceive the unique and total synthesis as attained and possessed, at least in hope, so that analysis should find its mission in developing by deduction from this function of all relations" [*viz.*, the idea of the world as an anticipation of the synthesis] "a result adequate to its content" [*viz.*, the world itself]. (III. 22.) It remains, then, to show that we have not, in the idea of the world given by the categories, such an anticipation of synthesis or "function of all relations" as would furnish data for the required deduction; that is, that we have not, even in hope, the unique and total synthesis in question. And this M. Renouvier proceeds to do, by taking the categories in detail, and comparing them with the results obtained or obtainable by following up the line of experience.

In the three categories of number, position, and succession, the world as a whole is subject to the categories, that is to say,

it consists of a finite number of phenomena, a finite extent in space, and a finite duration in time. But then we do not know what these finites are; they are known to us only as indefinites. On the other hand, the question, *Why* this number, this extent, this duration, and not others, is a question we have no right to ask. Divisibility in phenomena is also shown similarly to be finite and not *in infinitum*; the problem of several similar worlds is discussed; the *vacuum* is maintained in opposition to the *plenum*. In this part of the work, again, powerful criticisms are interposed on Hamilton, Mill, Mr. Spencer, and M. Vacherot. (III. pp. 35 to 114.)

When we come to the category of quality, the result is somewhat different. The world clearly falls under the categories of number, position, and succession, that is, it is a finite number, extent, and duration, of phenomena. But it does not fall in the same sense under the category of quality. It is not a *species* at all. We must indeed say that it is a genus with regard to its internal species, or that it is a species of species, all differences included; but this is not to determine the world as a species; it is merely to define it in the technical terms of the category. Its determination analytically or *a posteriori* is impossible, because here we are debarred from using the moment of *difference*, all differences being already *included* in the Whole. It is therefore no datum for a synthesis. Again, to determine the world as consisting ultimately of one or of several species would be to refer it to so many *substances* out of which, or *causes* by means of which, it has become what we see it. We should in this way pass out of the category of genus and species. (III. 116.) An excursus is devoted to the subject of transformations of force, and a chapter is given (after examining the next category, that of *becoming*) to show that the evolution theory cannot carry its subsumption of species under the head of development to the point of abolishing species altogether, without at the same time abolishing all knowledge whatever. In other words, the category of quality, with its moments of genus, difference, and species, is a necessity of thought. At the same time it gives us no hint what, or how many, are the separate existences with which the world begins.

The case with the category of Becoming is the same as with those of number, position, and succession. The general conclusion applicable to all alike, as well as to that of quality, is, that representation by the categories is the *rule* of experience, and consequently extends by anticipation to the totality of its phenomena. But the extreme limit, which we are thus compelled to posit, is not a thing which can itself be limited. It cannot therefore be defined; and is no datum for the total

synthesis. In other words, the categories are the alpha and omega of knowledge and of existence; they present us with a finite world, the limits of which are fixed, but cannot without contradiction be defined, by representation. (III. 152.)

The three last categories hang closely together; questions raised under the first are referred to the second, and thence to the third, for an answer, and only under the third is a perfect synthesis shown to be impossible. To begin with the first of the three. The notion of an uncaused cause or causes is forced upon us by the category of number applied to that of becoming; we are compelled to assume one or more causal phenomena, or rather *forces* (since potency and act are never isolated, but always combined into *force* as already shown). These are posited as existing without antecedents, and as the conditions of existence of subsequent given relations. (III. 181, 187.)

Nor is this spontaneous existence to be confined to the beginning of the world. "We are ignorant," says M. Renouvier, calmly, and without betraying any sense of the insecurity which such a fact would introduce into all sequences, "whether phenomena entirely new and independent (without any bond with those which now are or have been), can or can not supervene". (III. 181.) In discussing the question whether there is a law of universal pre-determination of phenomena, or whether there is a *real* contingency in nature (which great question is passed on to the succeeding categories), M. Renouvier says, that, if all or any future events are in fact uncertain, ambiguous, unforeseeable by any consciousness whatever, then the determination of one possible event, to the exclusion of others, is a title of real individuality for the forces by which the determination is effected; they are *free forces*, and to the extent to which they determine possibles are veritable first forces. (III. 194). Reserving however for the moment this question, he concludes, after an elaborate discussion (III. 191-192), that the probabilities are in favour of more first causes than one, but in interdependence on each other. Clearly, however, no complete synthesis of the world is hereby placed within our reach.

The category of final cause leads us to attempt the synthesis of the world by positing an ultimate final cause or causes of all phenomena, which would be a closing limit, as a first cause is a commencing limit, of phenomena as a whole. The necessity, however, of an ultimate end, in time, of phenomena is not so certainly established as that of a first beginning is; for it is not, like that, established directly by the principle of contradiction. The events to which it relates are *ex hypothesi* future; and the contradiction which lies in an *actually realised infinity* is there-

fore avoided by the notion of an endless succession into the future. But it is none the less *incomprehensible* on that account. (III. 198, 199.) We are therefore led to assume the more comprehensible view of a final limit to the world in time. (*Ib.* 198-201.)

Here we are again brought to the question of indeterminism or real contingency. Seeing that the first cause must be regarded, when we bring in the notion of *passion*, that is, of conscious desire, as existing in virtue of an *end*, the question arises, whether the whole order of events originated by the first cause, in view of the ultimate end, is predetermined by its cause and its end together; or may the end be missed? How is the cause determined by the end, and are the ends one or several, acting together or acting apart? (*Ib.* 201-204.) It is clear that we can get no total synthesis from this category, but must have recourse to that of Consciousness.

But even under the category of consciousness, our hopes, if we ever had any, are doomed to disappointment. M. Renouvier shows by a series of subtil reasonings, which cannot be condensed or summarised without grievous loss of their weight and vigour, and which take us deep into the questions which cluster round the conceptions of cause, creation, *causa sui et mundi*, fate and free-will, foreknowledge absolute, and others of similar profundity, that neither the hypothesis of one, nor that of several, conscious beings can enable us to attain the desired synthesis of the world of phenomena. He himself prefers the hypothesis of several, for "we cannot hold our footing in that of unity, and so soon as we succeed in rendering it intelligible, we find that we have passed over into the other hypothesis".

Though we must admit that a synthesis exists, it is a synthesis inaccessible to us. Still M. Renouvier goes so far as to say that

"Leaving in its inaccessible obscurity the question of pure origins, we affirm that the first datum for science is a plurality of consciousnesses; and this might, in strictness, pass for a solution of the problem which philosophy pursues. We reject the pretensions of metaphysic. We affirm a first commencement of all things; but then that is to posit a limit, not to open the field to absolute knowledge. We declare for the impossibility of conceiving, either in their unity or in their plurality, the primitive terms which are imposed by logic on the development of the facts of existence. It is thus and in this sense only, that the law of the multiplicity of consciousnesses can offer itself as a solution—a solution which has nothing in common with that universal synthesis, the conditions of which we set out to seek." (III. 241.)

The whole chapter concludes thus:—

"We come to this as our definitive conclusion: The total synthesis of phenomena, so far as it is a first datum, is withdrawn from knowledge and from science. It existed nevertheless, it existed determinately under all

the relations, in its own nature, conformably to the category of number, without which neither speculation nor thought is possible.

"The actual synthesis, which embraces past phenomena in its sphere, is determined for the same reason ; it is a datum, but it is not a datum for science, nor can it be so. It admits of a plurality of consciousnesses, and that is all we know of it.

"The synthesis bearing on the future could only be a datum so far as phenomena, of whatever kind, should be in strict dependence on antecedent phenomena, which is their pre-determination. But we know not whether the world is subject to such a law, and if it is not, we must then say that the total synthesis, in respect to the future, is, and has been at every epoch, an idea without foundation for every possible consciousness." (*Ib.* p. 245.)

Courage, reader ! There remain but two and twenty pages duodecimo to compass, and those few pages contain the harvest of all that has gone before, and will give us a broad outlook over the whole field of philosophy and its divisions, as conceived by our author. M. Renouvier has fully attained his purpose in the whole preceding discussion on a total scientific synthesis, though I am painfully aware of the inadequacy of my brief rendering to represent its power and completeness. But why is M. Renouvier anxious to show that no scientific synthesis is possible ? It is to break with *absolutism* in philosophy once and for ever ; to show how and why it is that he has no part nor lot with *a priori* constructions of the universe, overriding experiment and induction, whether of an idealistic or materialistic type ; in short, to prove himself a genuine phenomenist. The need for this, I will add, was the greater because he adopts the theory of categories, or laws of thought as opposed to perception, which had already led, in Germany, to an idealistic absolutism. That, I take it, is the main purpose of the long disproof of a total scientific synthesis.

But this being done, there remain the questions relating to the indefinite unknown region beyond experience, but within the categories. These questions have now to be treated. We do not get rid of this region of the world, or of the questions relating to it, by showing that the scientific synthesis of the world as a whole is impossible. Indeed these questions are the specially philosophical ones in a phenomenist system. The purpose of philosophy, says M. Renouvier, has always been defined, by its necessary practice, as an inquiry concerning God, man, liberty, immortality, and the first laws of the several sciences, all questions which hang closely together, and which, even if no science of them were possible, would still offer a field to *criticism*, in order to prove that it was not. For this reason he has excluded the word *philosophy* from the title of these Essays.

The sciences differ from philosophy (still it is M. Renouvier who speaks) in that each of them places its own principle or first law *beyond* the field of its own researches; whereas philosophy has principles, and its own among the rest, as its proper object of research. There is thus a *circle* in philosophy, seeing that it must employ the very principles which it seeks to establish in the act of establishing them. It replaces the vague and confused syntheses, which serve as its data, by definite syntheses which are its results. If it can, so to speak, make both ends meet, by showing that its definite results are the harmony of its vague data, then it is entitled to *postulate* the assent of mankind.

Uncertainty to some extent there must always be in human speculation, but both its kind and its degree are to be determined severally for different problems, and in the first place by the division of knowledge to which they belong. The limits of knowledge as a whole are disclosed by finding its general laws, which has been done in the present Essay; and this branch of knowledge, a work of *criticism*, now takes the place of the old and untenable universal science which used to be called philosophy. Under this come the several special sciences, some logical, some of observation or experiment; but all limited by the data which are proper to each, on the one hand, and by the verifiability of their inductions on the other. Criticism again will have its place in the interval between their results and the extreme limits of existence defined by the categories. (III. 246-250.)

Such are the negative results of our analysis; results which are by no means negative in their consequences. The old schools and the old theories vanish—spiritualism, materialism, pantheism, the idols of the infinite, of substance, of substantial causes. "Mind (*esprit*) and matter are but names applied to a classification of phenomena in the rough (*grossière*). The determination of facts of every order, and of their laws, replaces the search for entities. Existents (*êtres*) are laws." (III. 251.) Things-in-themselves, too, are no more. On the other hand, "it is no longer allowable to affirm deliberately that the individual has no durable existence; that personality is a transient illusion, not a constant law; that man is swallowed up in nature, and humanity with him; or that this present and perishable humanity is the culminating product of the world's development." (*Ib.*)

Thus we find that, according to M. Renouvier's theory the immortality of living beings is no longer an impossibility, though, or rather because, it is no longer made to depend on the notions of *soul* or of *substance*. The unknown region of thought beyond

the actual synthesis of science guarantees at least its possibility. We can now, too, see the true and the false senses in which the term *Atheism* has been and still is so often applied. God, as conceived under the terms of an antiquated theology, can no longer be the object of our belief. That *shell* of the divinity is broken. But the same unknown region of thought, which is the field of legitimate beliefs, recognised as such by science, and which makes a future life possible to thought, is also the ground on which we can securely seek the divine author, or authors, of the world as known to us.

In brief, "an order of possibles, objects of the belief which reason authorises, remains secure, and exists beyond the laws which reason imposes or science determines. We now know what criticism forbids, what pretensions it ruins, what hopes it permits. We have next to ask, whether criticism has not a part to play on the stage thus reserved for speculation; whether, in the intermediate region between the special sciences and the analysis of first principles, there is not a place for a General Science in a new and legitimate form." (III. 258.)

This last question introduces M. Renouvier's special doctrine concerning the articulation, if I may use the word, of philosophy. A new career is to be opened for a general science, without encroaching on the special sciences, and in dependence on the abstract science of the *Logique*. Where and how will this new territory be carved out? We have seen that there is an unknown domain of thought beyond the reach of science; we have now to remark that there is a certain set of problems, belonging to phenomena *on this side* science, which no special science as yet undertakes to treat. These problems are all of a practical character, and relate to matters which, though not lying wholly in an unknown domain, are yet equally matters of probability and of belief rather than of demonstration. We may consider them as marking out a domain in the phenomena of actual life. Join the two domains, and we have the field of M. Renouvier's new general science; lying, as it were, astride of the barrier between science and belief. The problems which he speaks of are these, and they are italicised in his pages:

"What are we to think of the proximate origin and proximate destiny of the special phenomena manifested in a consciousness?" [Immortality]. "More generally, can we admit a certain order of the world as referred to consciousness?" [Moral government of the world]. "Is it allowable to suppose a human individual destiny, a law of development of personality, and under what conditions?" [Nature of the future state]. "Up to what point are the principles of ethic and of the foundation of States involved in the solution of these questions?" [Dependence of moral and political practice on the unknown domain]. (III. 260.)

The foregoing amounts to nothing short of sketching out a scheme, and that on a philosophical basis, in which the questions

that concern man individually and socially are to be treated *in connexion with the invisible world*, instead of being left, as they now are, to be fought for by theologians on the one hand and those who deny, or at least abstract from, the existence of the invisible. In this consists its immense practical importance. We have here a philosophy which has special practical results. Two things are gained by this distribution: (1) morals, including social and political practice, are brought under the *sanctions* of the invisible world; and (2) we judge the nature and character of the invisible world chiefly by our own *moral* nature, and no longer solely by our intellectual faculties and acquirements.

At the same time it must be admitted, I think, that philosophy is brought into possible collision with special science in one part of the field, on which it would not be in collision with it if a stricter limitation of the province of philosophy were adopted. I mean the domains, not of morals, for they are clearly a dependency of the analysis of consciousness, but those of physical science on the one side and of the philosophy of history, including the origins of civilisation, on the other; in short, the two fields covered by M. Renouvier's third and fourth Essays. On his view of the new general science he is bound to have theories in these domains, and thus comes into collision with other theories, for instance, with Mr. Spencer's Evolution theory; which on a stricter view of what pertains to philosophy would be avoided, philosophy being then conceived as indifferent to questions of history, whether physical or human.

Turning to this new general science, the question is, what are the first steps towards taking possession of the new domain. The first necessity, says M. Renouvier, is to study consciousness *in action*, "man as a function of the categories," man no longer as a content of thought and feeling, but as thinking, feeling, acting; the microcosm not the macrocosm; in short to enter on a Psychology which shall be the complement of the *Logique*. We shall then have before us, as our object of research, an individual human consciousness, but one taken as a representative of all; and this, the first step we take, is the step from the general science of the *Logique*, the method of which is demonstrative and analytic, to the most general branch of the new science, which must proceed by the method of hypothesis and induction. The generalisation of the phenomena of the inquirer's individual consciousness is in fact the first step into the domain of beliefs and probabilities.

And here it must be noted that, if the *Logique* had succeeded in establishing what it is the tendency of philosophy to aim at, a complete total synthesis, no need and at the same time no room would have existed for such a science of probabilities as

we now must descend upon. Every result that followed would then have followed as a deduction from that synthesis. There would have been an absolute system of philosophy embracing and determining the phenomena of all the special sciences. This pretension being abandoned, the only course open is a scientific but not absolute psychology; and the first question to occur in that psychology will relate to the nature and conditions of certitude.

But it will also be remembered that one problem remains over from the *Logique*, which has been passed on from category to category, and has never met with a solution, the problem of determinism: Is there *real* contingency in the world, or is everything that occurs or will occur governed inevitably and universally by antecedent laws, without the possibility of modification? The question of certitude depends on this problem, says M. Renouvier, more than is generally imagined; and a new light will be thrown upon both questions by the new psychology, the *Critique de l'Homme*. In fact we shall find, that the two main problems treated in the *Psychologie Rationnelle* are those of Liberty and Certitude; "for the question is" (and these are the concluding words of the *Logique*) "to know how a man can attain and ascertain truth independently and beyond the limits of his own actual and individual consciousness."

III.

Such are the outlines of a philosophy, or rather of the basal work of a philosophy containing an outline of the rest, which will, if I mistake not, and so far as it founds a system of Phenomenism, impose its law and its direction on the next epoch of philosophic thought. I say only so far as it founds a system of phenomenism, for the work which we have just gone through falls into two very distinct portions, the phenomenism of the first two Parts having no necessary connexion with the analysis of the phenomena of consciousness by Categories, which occupies the third Part, and is applied to the interpretation of phenomena generally in the fourth. The phenomenism may stand, and the analysis fall.

The analysis seems to me open to serious objections, objections which looked at solely from an analyst's point of view appear enormous, fatal to the system, but which yet, from a practical point of view, sink into utter insignificance. I mean that they are insignificant when we consider how independent of that analysis phenomenism really is; how independent of it also that doctrine of phenomenism is which maintains the existence of an Invisible World in relation with our own; and, moreover, when we take

into account the possibility of replacing it by one more searching, not only without weakening but with positive addition of strength to the general phenomenist theory. The question of analysis by categories is a question *within* phenomenism, and may be answered in different ways without destroying the union of phenomenists in developing that general theory.

From this point of view I will venture with diffidence to state my objections to that analysis, not purposing to examine it at length, still less pretending to refute it. I wish rather to call attention to this great work of M. Renouvier's, to claim for it due recognition and careful examination by others, being convinced that in this way alone the interests of truth can be served. Besides it is necessary for phenomenism that its analytical portion should be placed on a perfectly secure footing, beyond the reach of scepticism and of atomism. For by phenomenism I mean, of course, philosophical phenomenism, not that rope of sand, that psychology in masquerade, and negation of philosophy, which regards consciousness as consisting of isolated atoms of thought, Humian impressions and ideas, bound together by the Laws of Association. If this is phenomenism, it is certainly not philosophy; and even phenomenism it appears to be only because it makes *no use* of the notions of noumenal substance and efficiency, not because it disproves their existence.

What then are the objections? In the first place, what M. Renouvier calls an analysis into categories is not analysis, but an arrangement of the facts under heads which are, it is true, well known notions in actual use, but none of which are ultimate elements of thought. It is an arrangement of a double kind, first of phenomena under the nine categories, secondly of three mutually relative conceptions under each category; and this certainly simplifies the phenomena by classifying them in an easy and convenient order. But the categories themselves are as much in need of analysis, as the phenomena are when not so arranged. There is not one of the categories, or of the conceptions composing it, which is not resolvable into simpler elements; these elements being some mode or other of feeling or sensibility, some duration of time, and, in the case of feelings of sight, touch, and sense of resistance (whether separately or combined), some extension in space, together with that particular feeling, or sense, of effort in attention, which is the mark of what we call volition. The formal elements in the categories, abstracting from their content of feeling other than the feeling of effort—and it is as purely formal that M. Renouvier regards them, calling them for instance the “skeleton of representations”—are thus reduced to three kinds, that of space, that of time, that of volition. And of these the modes of time and the

modes of space are formal elements in states of consciousness *before* volition modifies them; are elements of perceptions, before these perceptions are modified by volition into *thoughts*.

If this conception could be carried out, we should have a real and, so far as it went, explanatory analysis of consciousness; real, because into constituent parts more elementary than the things analysed, and explanatory because an approach to determining the primary springs of consciousness, at the point where it issues from its conditions of existence, the properties and powers of nerve-substance, before its development into distinct functions and faculties. But no such approach is made by M. Renouvier's analysis.

Take for instance the category of Causality, which is the name for the three conceptions, act, potency, force, taken together. This is an arrangement, not an analysis into elements more elementary than the thing analysed. To begin with the included conceptions. Force is not analysed by saying that it consists of the combined notions of act and potency, for these require the notion of force for their own intelligibility; each of them includes force, just as much as force includes them; act also is a relative term to potency, and each must be understood *pari passu* with the other. But this is not an analysis of the relation between them; it is a mere statement of it. So neither is the relation between the three terms an analysis of causality, but a statement of the relation to be analysed. Putting forward such statements as *an analysis* of phenomena amounts to admitting that the relations entitled categories cannot be analysed; whereby they come back again into objective nature as *entities*, just as much as if they were called by that name.

Unfortunately M. Renouvier makes no distinction between perception and thought. He calls both, taken together, by the common name of *representation*. And the consequence is, that he does not distinguish the two kinds of formal elements in *thoughts*, but only inquires what are the ultimate modes which are assumed by *combinations* of the three kinds; a category being the combination of some formal element or elements of perception with attention, which is the formal element turning perceptions into thoughts. The categories are thus not an analysis of consciousness in its formal element, but a classification of the combinations of the formal elements in thought, which are in actual use in reasoning. They have consequently no title to be the foundation or criterion of truth in philosophy or criticism.

Consequently, too, they are no sufficient reply to the Associationists. That theory cannot be answered by pointing to the inseparability of relatives in thought, but only to that of the ultimate elements in pre-volitional representation. For it would

still be open to them to urge, that the law of inseparable association had been employed in producing the apparent inseparability of relatives in thought, namely, by supposing them to have been originally isolated in perception; whereas they are precluded from this, if it can be shown that the smallest and simplest *perceptions*, at the moment they cross the "threshold" of consciousness, are states of consciousness containing distinguishable but inseparable elements, some of which (the formal) are carried on into the adjacent perceptions, so as to bind them all into a single chain from the very first. The Association theory requires the assumption, that perceptions are originally isolated; then and then only is there room for the theory. This assumption it is which a philosophical phenomenism is challenged to overthrow.

M. Renouvier seems to have a remarkably firm grip of the truth of phenomenism, but, were it not so, his theory of the categories as an ultimate analysis of consciousness would seriously endanger it. It is in fact the very route out of Kantianism followed first by Fichte and then by Hegel. I do not mean that they framed a theory of Categories, but that they adopted the form of thought instead of the form of perception as their guiding principle. *This is common to them with M. Renouvier.* In speaking of Being, too, he sometimes speaks Kant's and Fichte's language. "Être c'est poser," he says at one place (III. 200); and in the *Psychologie* we find him showing that *being* is *affirmation*, which is thoroughly Fichtean. Taken in a full unlimited sense, uncorrected by the co-existing fact that we cannot posit or affirm, nor yet abstain from positing or affirming, at our pleasure, such phrases as these are sheer idealistic absolutism. It is true that to the perception of existence there goes attention; but that is far from being the whole of the perception. And in fact we abstract from this attention when, after it, we assert that the perceived thing exists. It is what we *cannot help* seeing, touching, hearing, and so on, that we say *exists*. Our affirming it does not make it. Existence is a perception. The affirmation of an existence which is not *forced* on the perception is a *belief*.

There is another doctrine also of prime importance which M. Renouvier shares with the post-Kantian absolutists, one which strikes still harder at the root of phenomenism than the analysis already criticised, and is a consequence of it. He holds that self-consciousness is a necessary element or condition of sensibility; which is a consequence of the category of personality. It comes out first clearly in the *Psychologie* (Vol. I. p. 6), where he says, speaking of this category, "without personal representation, no sensible representation would

subeist". Were it not for his combining, somewhat incongruously as it seems to me, a system of thorough-going phenomenism with this absolutist analysis, he would occupy much the same position as Ferrier of St. Andrews, whose *Institutes of Metaphysic*, published in 1854, the same year as M. Renouvier's *Logique*, gives a complete correlation of objective and subjective aspects, but includes the same absolutist notion, namely, of self-consciousness being a condition of consciousness and not *vice versa*. Ferrier never worked out his *Institutes* into a complete system, so that we cannot tell what the effect of this notion would have been in his case; M. Renouvier has managed to frame a phenomenistic system in spite of it. Still it seems to me, that the stability of the system is seriously endangered thereby. And after all the chief point is, not so much to have a phenomenistic system, as to have a logical and impregnable one.

Changes like those suggested in ultimate analysis, especially if our views on Being and Self-consciousness altered conjointly, would involve further changes of great importance for a phenomenist system. In the first place, what shall we think of Infinity? And here I am in part replying to a criticism which M. Renouvier did me the honour to make in *La Critique Philosophique* for Nov. 30, 1876. M. Renouvier seems to have no other notion of the infinite than as a *realised infinite*, which he rightly says is a contradiction. But there is something between this and the *indefinite*, the validity of which notion he asserts. He seems to think that we can affirm nothing to exist which we cannot in thought see all round, as it were, or which is not conceived as a whole. Consequently his indefinites all lie within the universe conceived as a vast but finite whole. The reason of this is, that his categories are forms of thought, not perception, and all thought is limitation.

But if we take the forms of perception, time and spatial extension, as our ultimates, then we shall find that infinity is involved in all perception. Every perceived thing, which is a portion of time or of space, has time or space beyond it. The perception that this happens always, wherever you have a perception, *this* is the infinity of time and space; it does not involve a process, or going on to see whether, or where, you will be brought to a stop; it is not, as M. Renouvier says, a result of an induction which may turn out invalid; but it is the perception that time and space have and can have no final boundary, that is, one without time or space beyond it. This is a perception which, so far from involving, entirely excludes the thought of a *realised infinite*. Yet it is not an *indefinite*. That *is* the product of the process in *infinitum*; you go on without

knowing whether or when you will come to an end; and this is only possible in concrete cases, not with time and space *in abstracto*. Yet time and space are not thus treated as things-in-themselves; they are merely treated as forms of perception, instead of forms of thought. The term *indefinite* may be defined as that which has *no known* end; the term *infinite* as that which has *no possible* end. Just as the *finite* is that which has and must have an end; the *definite* that which has a known end.

Applying this to the Invisible World, those who take my view of ultimate analysis would adopt the first of the two ways, mentioned above, of imagining the unknown region beyond the synthesis of science, that of imagining it infinite *ad extra*, and not in M. Renouvier's way of conceiving it as vast but finite. This, however, gives rise to no practical difference, since we cannot practically treat the imagined infinite but by employing thought upon it, that is, conceiving limits ever farther and farther off, thus turning it into an indefinite. The ideal existences, which we imagine as belonging to it, must be made indefinites by the mere circumstance that we try to conceive them; of which effort to conceive, the imagination of the infinite is a condition.

But M. Renouvier's finite world, that world which we may picture as a vast but closed and hollow sphere, the surface of which is defined by the categories, threatens to be too small for him at one point. It *bulges* at the Possibles. If he holds, as we know from the *Psychologie* he does hold, the doctrine of a real indeterminism as the basis of a real liberty of will, then the closed circuit of the categories bursts at that point. *Real* contingency is the ἀπείρον, has no bounds, and cannot be imagined to exist in a finite world. Indefiniteness, which is merely the absence of *known* bounds, is no satisfaction to the claims of *real* indetermination. Beyond that indetermination which depends upon our ignorance, there *is*, it is held, a *real* limit; and yet in the world, so limited, there *is* *real* indetermination. How can this be made to harmonize?

Not that the imagination of an infinite world shows real indetermination to be true. Far from it. It gives scope for it only, if it should be held true on other grounds; whereas a finite world gives no scope for it at all. The infinite gives scope also for an infinite determination; but it does not decide between the two. It sets indeterminism free, and the gift of infinity is not to be despised.

The analysis of ultimates proposed above, in lieu of the categories, will also be found to have a direct bearing on the questions of certitude and liberty which are treated more fully

in the *Psychologie*. Indeed there is no part of philosophy where important differences do not result, according as we adopt the one or the other view of ultimate analysis. It is not here the place to enter on these questions. One word, however, on another point connected with the unknown region, before bringing this paper to a close, I mean M. Renouvier's rehabilitation of polytheism.

It is in the unknown or intermediate region of thought, limited *ad extra* by the categories, and lying between that external limit and the still more limited interior sphere of scientific synthesis, that the great problems of philosophy are met with, which, according to M. Renouvier, are Kant's well known three—Liberty, Immortality, and God. Regarding the third, the question is—One or several? And here we see at once that the hypothesis of several harmonises perfectly with that of several *causes* of the world, and that several causes are more favourable than one alone to our hopes of completing the scientific synthesis of known phenomena. The vast variety of phenomena and their laws would sooner reach their explanation, if they really reached it by arriving at several causes, than if these had again to be referred to a single cause.

But this consideration is, of course, a mere preliminary. The phenomena of the unknown region are to be judged, not so much by logical needs and intellectual processes, as by the moral nature of man. Final causes, desires, purposes, volitions, which are all phenomena of personal consciousness and subject to the moral law, are the considerations of decisive importance in framing our conceptions of the unknown region, and not scientific conceptions of causality alone. The category of causality is included under and dominated by those of *finality* and *personality*; and these are the categories which give its final complexion to the unknown, as indeed they do also mediately to the known region.

M. Renouvier insists very strongly and very rightly, in my opinion, on the necessity of employing the moral or practical, not only the speculative, reason in ascertaining the nature of the Divinity. In the *Psychologie*, where all these questions are treated at length, he represents God as the God of the moral reason, and rejects every attempt to ascertain his nature by identifying him with the "law of laws or the aggregate of laws which compose the universe". Such a method could lead only to a "certain totality of unknowable functions," a conception belonging either to a materialistic or a pantheistic or a scholastic atheism. But "to attach oneself, by belief, to the existence of an order of Benevolence (*Bonté*) which saves the person and

assures the victory of the Just, this is to affirm God, without knowing anything else about him." (*Psych.* III. 191-193.)

Such being what I must consider the just and profound views of M. Renouvier on the nature of the Divine, and of our means of ascertaining it, what are the considerations which lead him to give the preference to a conception of it as composed of a number of Gods? Again I must have recourse to the *Psychologie*, where all the questions of this series are expressly treated, the foundation only being laid in the *Logique*. I bring forward the question here, because it can only be handled properly in connexion with the Infinite; but in M. Renouvier's treatment it is closely connected with the two others of the same series, liberty and immortality; and his doctrine on these two enters largely as a determinative into that of polytheism.

His train of thought is this. God, we know, is a limited Being; for, in the first place, he must be construed to thought under the categories; secondly, his power and his knowledge are both limited by human *freedom* of thought and action. (*Psych.* III. 251, 252.) This is one set of considerations. But, in the next place, this relative independence of other *persons*, in regard to God, involves of itself their probable immortality. God "will dispose of the causes and ends of our world so far as the liberty and individuality of persons, who are not he, and the general laws which he represents as enveloping his own existence, allow it". (*Ib.*) These other persons, in short, treat the Divinity as Hamlet treats the Ghost:

"And for my soul, what can it do to that,
Being a thing immortal as itself?"

Now, not to mention the probability of other celestial persons in the unknown region, "our speculations in moral belief, by leading us to the thesis of the immortality of persons, have beforehand and necessarily opened to us the way to polytheism, by means of apotheoses. The progress of life and virtue peoples the universe with divine persons, and we shall be faithful to an ancient and spontaneous religious sentiment if we call those among them Gods, whose nature we think we can honour and whose works we can bless." (*Ib.* 254.) Besides which, a hierarchy of Gods is in greater accordance with republican, monotheism with monarchical, sympathies; though this is not put forth as a reason for belief, but only as a recommendation of it, if it should be accepted on other grounds. (*Ib.* 259 ff.)

These views are farther confirmed, when we come to examine them in the light of history critically treated, as may be seen by turning to the Fourth Essay, pp. 761 to 768. At the same time it is only fair to say, that M. Renouvier must not be regarded as

doing more than saying what can be said for polytheism, and that he expressly guards himself against being supposed to be making a personal confession of faith (*Psych.* III. 268). Still it is clear that his sympathies lie in that direction. As far as sympathy goes, I think, we shall find the determining circumstance to be this,—do we lay most stress on the belief in God, or on the belief in Immortality? “Immortality,” says M. Renouvier, “is the grand moral faith of this doctrine,” namely, of polytheism. (*Ib.* 262.) There is the real watershed between Monotheism and Polytheism, when both are taken alike as consequences of the moral law. But sympathy alone need not, as most certainly it ought not, be made the criterion of questions like these.

Let us go back to the *intellectual* root of the whole question. M. Renouvier requires to have the Divinity construed to the logical intellect before he will consent to believe in it. His intellectual conception and his moral affirmation must strictly coincide. God must be thought under the categories. The categories, as the be all and end all of consciousness, are at the root of the polytheistic conception. For, since they compel us, in any case, to conceive the Divinity as finite, the hypothesis of several finite Divinities, like that of several finite causes, satisfies the imagination at less cost of thought than the hypothesis of one only.

The very same requirement of having the Divinity construed to the logical intellect, before consenting to believe in it, is the ground of the Scholastic unifying conception of God; only that here infinity is thought to be embraced, a *realised infinity*, which, as M. Renouvier says, is a contradiction.

One side denies the infinite, the other defines it. But the infinite can neither be denied nor defined. It is a fact which must nevertheless be reckoned with. It disposes of theorists, not they of it. The infinite, I have already tried to show, is a fact of *perception*, and not a fact of thought. It can only be *partially* conceived, by entering on a *processus in infinitum*, and conceiving one ideal beyond another in succession, the last of which still has infinity, undefined, beyond it, of which it falls infinitely short. There is an indefinite approximation to the infinite, and each stage of this approximation, in matters of religious belief, is an intellectual conception taking in so much and no more of the Infinite Being.

Now what I say is this, that the moral affirmation of the existence of the Divinity attaches to the Infinite, the intellectual conception to the Ideals carved out of it successively in the indefinite approximation. The highest ideal conception which we can form is thus an imperfect image of the infinite, the nature

of which we can know in no other way than by successive more and more perfect ideals, or partial conceptions of it. The existence of the infinite is a fact shown by analysis; no *belief* in the strict sense is possible of this, but only knowledge; but the moral affirmation, that the infinite, in matter of religion, is represented (though imperfectly) by, and exists including, our highest ideal conception,—*this* is an act of religious belief, an act of faith. It affirms the existence of something not only not forced upon it, but of something which, (not being like the infinite alone an abstract element, but a concrete object), yet cannot be logically conceived as or for itself, but only in its representative approximation.

I accept as fully and as frankly as M. Renouvier the necessary anthropomorphism of all religion. "All theism, in the eyes of a man of sincerity, is entirely anthropomorphic." (*Phil. de l'Hist.*, p. 767.) But I hold that the only possible escape from the narrowness of anthropomorphism, from the false sense of πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος to the true one, lies in the fact, which analysis reveals, that the infinite both exists and escapes logical definition. This fact it is which keeps the universe from being dwarfed to the measure of human powers, as the categories dwarf it when they are taken as the measure of existence.

But does this alone prove either monotheism or polytheism to be true? Certainly not. But it leaves the field open for monotheism, which the narrower conception of a world limited by the categories would close. It leaves scope for the moral motives, which tend to unification, to operate. And this being so, then, to my mind, one consideration is of decisive weight. It is this. If the Divinity is to be conceived, as M. Renouvier contends in a passage already quoted, as the God of the moral and practical reason, that is, as the God of all men's consciences; and if the conscience of men is formed everywhere on the same model, namely, on the ideal of Justice fulfilled by Benevolence, which is also M. Renouvier's doctrine; it follows that every one, so far as he approximates to his own ideal, approximates to the ideal of all. The ideal is the same, though approached by divers paths, and in different degrees. That which we represent to ourselves as the union of justice and benevolence, the infinite object of that approximative ideal, that and that only is the adequate object of religion.

SHADWORTH H. HODGSON.