

he is the Mystic *par excellence*. And what makes his Mysticism more important is that he presents it as the ultimate result of the whole development of Greek philosophy. Further, if we look to the development of thought after Plotinus, we shall see that it was mainly through him, and through St. Augustine as influenced by him, that Mysticism passed into Christian Theology and became an important element in the religion of the middle ages and of the modern world."

It would be interesting to reproduce here the substance of Caird's exposition and criticism of the philosophical and religious thought of this remarkable man, and especially of his very instructive comparison of Mysticism with Pantheism. Here more than elsewhere in the work the author gives us a satisfactory insight into his own idealistic system of philosophy in its application to Christian theology, which it would be easy to criticise. But the notice has reached its proper limit.

It may be remarked in conclusion that those who have given little attention to Greek philosophy in its relation to Christian life and thought will find in Caird's lectures a most lucid and interesting source of information; while those who have given most attention to the subject will find in his exposition and criticism many fresh interpretations and points of view that will make the reading pleasant and profitable.

ALBERT HENRY NEWMAN.

Principles of Knowledge. With remarks on the nature of Reality.

By Rev. Johnson Estep Walter, Author of "The Perception of Space and Matter." Vol. I, 1901, pp. 302. Vol. II, 1904, pp. 331. \$2.00 each volume. Johnson & Penny. West Newton, Pa.

The official notice of this work is written with care and definite accuracy: "A discussion, by the *a posteriori* method, of the fundamental Principles of Knowledge, and defence of the primary positions of Dualistic Real-

ism. The work assumes that, since the idealistic diversion from Locke, led by Berkley and Hume, there has remained an unfilled space" for an *a posteriori* dualistic theory of *a posteriori* dualistic epistemology and realism, and attempts to supply a satisfactory theory. A positive stand is taken * * * against what is deemed to be the greatest and most far-reaching philosophical error of the times—namely, the doctrine of Ideality of Space." Following the outline thus set forth, but in our own order, we remark:

1. The author is right in saying that there has "remained an unfilled space" for an *a posteriori* dualistic epistemology since Berkeley and Hume. A good deal has been written on the subject from various standpoints. Many writers have assumed, as they have a right to do, the validity of human knowledge and have not sought to formulate any defense of the assumption. Others—very many—assume or affirm "the relativity of knowledge," and to the justification of this attitude the whole agnostic temper of the past century has directly contributed, whatever the origin and phase of the agnosticism. That the agnostic theories of the relativity of knowledge, the phenomenal character of our concepts, has never hindered the progress of scientific investigation nor practical application of knowledge, not even hindered the metaphysician from proceeding to elaborate his systems which involve either validity of human knowledge or an indefinite, extensive and perfectly symmetrical order of phenomenal misrepresentation; all this is due to man's ultimate confidence in his consciousness and is proof of the subjective ideality of all theories that phenomenalize the universe and make man the creator of his categories.

2. That Berkeley and Hume are to be charged with the modern uncertainty in the realm of epistemology is only partially true and it is even less true that they originated and represent an "idealistic diversion from Locke." Our author holds that "their philosophy pro-

ceeds not from the principles, but the defects of Locke's; * * * and is therefore in relation to Locke's, rather a *post hoc* than a *propter hoc*." Now, it is true that Berkely and Hume and others of that school represent a development of the defects of Locke's philosophy, but of defects as compared with truth and not as compared with the Lockeian principles. The author, as it seems to this reviewer, attributes too much to Locke and goes too far toward making him a standard.

3. "The doctrine of Ideality of Space" is too subtle and evasive a view to deserve condemnation as "the greatest and most far-reaching philosophical error of the times." This teaching is fundamental and fundamentally wrong, but it is practically too inapplicable to be so intensely disastrous as is here implied. History does not justify the prominence given the error.

4. But the main point is that the author "attempts to supply a satisfactory theory," and on the assumption that this must be done "by the *a posteriori* method." He lays the foundation for this in an extensive psychological criticism that is discriminating, incisive, and done in a remarkably clear style. His work is in four "Books;" I. Cognition of Mental States, and of Real Mind; II. Intellection, or the Great Constructive Processes of Knowledge; III. Cognition of the External—Matter, Space, Spirits; IV. The Extremes of Knowledge, including the Notions of Infinity and Perfection, Universality and Certainty of Knowledge.

Now all this were well enough were premises demonstrable or strictly axiomatic. But with all the elucidation and analysis, with all the clearness and courage of the argument it remains that intuitionism is at the foundation of all our certainty and that belief in the validity of our consciousness is a presumption in all our knowing. Our author really comes to this in the end, but seems to conceal from himself that he does so.

The work is not a demonstration *a posteriori* of the reality of knowledge, but it is a strikingly lurid and con-

vincing confirmation of our confidence in our knowledge. Its psychology possibly takes too little account of the physiology of this subject under current methods of study and one would take issue with some positions. The argument is cogent, sustained and clear. Its very clearness makes its defects the more evident. One who wants to study epistemology should by all means make use of this work.

W. O. CARVER.

II. THE NEW TESTAMENT.

Studies in the Teaching of Our Lord.

By Henry Barclay Swete, D. D., Litt. D. — Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. Second Edition. London. Hodder & Stoughton. 1904. Cloth, pp. 186. \$1.00.

These studies are "reprinted with a few changes, chiefly verbal, from the *Expositor* of 1903." "The aim of the writer will be attained if any reader is led by these chapters to examine with greater interest the Master's words as they are reported in the Four Gospels."

The plan, scope, and, to some extent, the critical complexion of the work is indicated by the order and titles of the six chapters: "The Condition and General Character of the Teaching;" "The Teaching in the Marcan Tradition;" "The Non-Marcan Teaching in St. Matthew;" "The Teaching Peculiar to St. Luke;" "The Teaching in the Gospel of St. John;" "The Teaching Considered as a Whole."

We have here *multum in parvo*. Would that others—especially our German friends—were equally kind!

The author's starting point is given in this sentence: "The gospels reveal our Lord as exercising the office of Teacher under the conditions of human life, and they place the teaching in relation with human history."

The first chapter may be thus summarized. Christ takes his place among the rabbis, but the differences between him and other rabbis are accentuated and gathered up under training, method and authority. He ex-