THE INFLUENCE OF MILITARISM IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT.

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WAR is a condition of Nature, and is no violation of Nature's laws. All animals fight, and beasts and birds of prey live on the death and destruction of their fellow-creatures. The natural man is a fighting animal; in the earliest stages of human society the men gain their livelihood by hunting and fishing, and fight to defend the interests of their family or their tribe against encroaching neighbours, while the women do what work there is to be done: the normal life of the savage man is war, and peace is to him an unnatural state of existence. When man first began to commit his experiences to writing his earliest records treated of war; the *Iliad*, the *Mahabharata*, the *Book of the Wars of Jehovah*. As civilization progressed, as the tribe embraced the family, and the nation absorbed the tribe, and communities passed through the various stages of pastoral, agricultural, and commercial development, men became absorbed in other occupations besides war and the chase, and found other means besides fighting for adjusting their differences. But war continued to be the principal factor in the distribution of territory and the consolidation of peoples. The military nations gained possession of the most fertile lands and subjugated and enslaved their neighbours. "Arms and valour" were said to be the most precious possessions of ancient Rome, and were the chief factors in the extension of her Empire. During the first seven hundred years of her history the gates of the temple of Janus, which remained open in time of war and closed in time of peace, were shut only three times. But wealth and ease led to the decay of military efficiency; the civilization of Rome was overthrown by the irruptions and invasions of hordes of warlike barbarians, and the *Pax Romana* was succeeded by the universal internecine warfare which inaugurated the establishment of the feudal system in Europe.

This system resuscitated the Roman trust in arms and valour as the most precious possessions of a people. It made war the chief object of human endeavour, and its pursuit the only profession worthy of the attention of men of rank and honour. All sports, games, and amusements were devised as training for the battlefield. Land was held by the tenure of military service. Even the Christian religion was pressed into the service of Bellona, and the ordeal of battle, which decided a private quarrel, was blessed by the sanction of the Church. Disputes of all kinds were settled by the arbitrament of arms, and priests and prelates sometimes mingled in the fray. But, with the

gradual spread of science and education, conditions changed for the better. Right began to take the place of Might in the adjustment of the claims of individuals, till at last, in course of time, private war ceased altogether, and cases were decided in a court of law instead of in the lists of a tournament. War continued to be resorted to for the settlement of international disputes and religious controversies, and at the present day the arbitrament of arms still decides the destiny of nations.

But with the progress of the arts of peace in the course of centuries, war has come to be regarded by the civilized nations of Europe in a very different light from that in which it appeared to the ancient and mediæval world. It was once esteemed a noble adventure or a sacred duty; later ideas excused it as a necessary evil; modern sentiment generally condemns it as both wicked and wasteful, and some optimists cherish the hope of abolishing it altogether, and replacing it by International Courts of Arbitration. They argue that private war between jealous barons and rival clans was once common in Europe, and the practice of duelling, which still lingers in the more backward countries, was once a universal custom: this state of things has passed away and given place to the arbitration of civil courts of justice: it is, therefore, within the bounds of possibility that the same causes may produce the same effects in international relations as in ordinary society, and that public war may suffer the same fate as has already overtaken private war. The number of people holding this view increases with every new generation, and its outcome is seen in the recent Covenant of the League of Nations adopted at the Paris Peace Conference. The effect of the elimination of its warlike activities on the future development of the human race it is difficult to estimate and impossible to foretell.

Military organization has played a considerable part in political evolution, particularly among the civilized peoples of Aryan extraction. In the free republics of Greece and Rome the privileges of citizenship included the obligation of military service. Among the nations of Asia the ordinary form of government was autocracy, under which the civil administration was entirely subordinated to, or absorbed in, the military. In the Mogul and Turkish Empires the government was organized on a purely military basis, and the primary function and official designation of the governor of a province was that of commander of the militia, who exercised civil jurisdiction in virtue of his military rank. In barbarian Europe the King was the Captain-General (*Heer-Furst* or *Ariovistus*), elected by the people to be their leader in war. The lands of the tribe or nation were communal property, for Socialism and Communism are no modern discoveries, but are found among the most ancient forms of social life which have been gradually discarded by advancing civilization, and of which the traces may still be seen in the Slavonic *Mir* and the Indian village community. The King, as head of the nation, made grants of the national land to such of his captains as he thought fit, for the purpose of enabling them to maintain a military force for the defence or aggrandisement of the kingdom; and thus originated the feudal system which dominated

European politics during the Middle Ages, and of which the traces still remain among us. Indeed, the last and greatest of wars, forced upon an unwilling world by the greed and ambition of the German autocrat and the military aristocracy of Prussia, was in one aspect of it the last expiring effort of the old feudal system of Europe to stem the rising tide of modern democracy. But, though the foundations of the feudal system were based on militarism, the improvements in military science and methods of organization were a contributory cause of the overthrow of that system. Under it the monarch was only *primus inter pares*; his authority was shared by his great vassals, the lords and barons who controlled the military forces of the nation, and without whose support the Crown was powerless. The institution of standing armies in the fifteenth century entirely altered this state of affairs and gave a new complexion to the political system of Europe.

The formation of bodies of military monks during the Crusades, the Knights Templars, Hospitallers, and Teutonic Knights demonstrated the superiority of trained and organized bodies of troops over the feudal levies, and by the end of the twelfth century mercenary bands of professional soldiers, under the name of Free Companies, Black Bands, Condottieri, etc., were playing a conspicuous part in all the wars of Europe, hiring out their services to the highest bidder. The invention of firearms greatly enhanced the advantage which the professional soldier possessed over the militiaman, and in the fifteenth century kings began to raise and employ companies of regular soldiers to guard their persons and defend their thrones. The first companies of these regular soldiers, raised in England towards the end of that century, still exist as our King's Honourable Bodyguard of Gentlemen-at-Arms and the Yeomen of the Guard, which hold the place of honour in the British Army. The King of France had already provided himself with an escort of companies of Gardes-du-Corps and Gendarmerie, and with French and Swiss regiments of footguards. Spain, whose national existence was, as Macaulay says, one long crusade, was first in the field with a standing army of regular soldiers, which long served as a pattern for the rest of Europe, and by the end of the sixteenth century nearly all the nations of the Continent had equipped themselves with a similar force. Russia and Poland were the exceptions: the former country was provided with a standing army by the genius of Peter the Great early in the eighteenth century; the Poles continued to rely on the undisciplined valour of their warlike nobility and gentry, which, however, could not save them from the fatal consequences of their own neglect.

The immediate effect of the institution of standing armies in Europe was the transference of power from the hands of the nobles to those of the Sovereign. Autocracy replaced aristocracy as the form of government in most States. Louis XIVth was empowered to declare "*l'État c'est Moi*." Cardinal Ximenes led the deputation of protesting nobles to the window of his palace and showed them the troops—horse, foot, and artillery, drawn up in the courtyard. "With these," he said, "I govern Castile." The nobles and great landowners, on their part were reconciled to the loss of their power by

the saving to their purses; for the burden of maintaining forces for the national defence was now shifted from their shoulders to those of the general tax-paying community. The lands which had been originally granted to them to enable them to maintain a military force had become their private property: the feudal tenure by which they held them had in the lapse of centuries, by a natural process of evolution, become hereditary, as had the regal dignity from which it was derived: and the new institution relieved them of expense and responsibility, while it still assured to them the exercise of the profession of arms, which they now followed in the cadres of the corps of officers of the new armies.

The change of the military system from feudal levies and a national militia to a royal standing army was thus effected gradually, and excited little opposition; but political effects soon made themselves felt.

The Sovereign now controlled the whole military power of the State, and was not slow to take advantage of the opportunity afforded to him of turning a limited monarchy into an unlimited despotism. The first use made by Charles Vth of his splendid standing army was to crush every vestige of popular liberty that still survived in Spain; and he proceeded in the same way to suppress the privileges of the free cities in Flanders and Italy. The armies of Tilly and Wallenstein in the Empire destroyed the freedom of worship which had been with difficulty extorted from Charles Vth by Maurice of Saxony. Everywhere on the Continent of Europe the new military organization became the instrument of despotic power.

Curiously, the converse happened in England, where the first standing army was raised in defence of the popular liberties. It owed its creation to the genius of Cromwell, and it eventually became the support of his arbitrary power. After his death it was disbanded, and the English Parliament and people, taught by their own experience and by the example of the Continent, long nourished a violent and not unfounded jealousy of the institution of a standing army. This jealousy was hardly dispelled by the adhesion of the army to the popular side in the revolution which dethroned the last of the Stuart sovereigns. The army with which William of Orange landed at Torbay included regiments of Swedes, Danes, and Germans, lent or hired out to the invader by the Protestant princes of the Continent; and among them was a corps of Brandenburgers, whose Elector had not yet assumed the title of King of Prussia. His little army had already distinguished itself by its victory over the Swedes at Fehrbellin, and had covered itself with glory in the campaigns which expelled the Turks from the Kingdom of Hungary. It was the grandson of the Great Elector, King Frederick William of Prussia, the Royal drill sergeant, who first devised the scheme of conscription which was finally adopted by all the nations of Europe. Up to his time the standing armies had been recruited by voluntary enlistment, supplemented in time of war by the King's press, crimping, and the hire of foreign mercenaries. Frederick William, who placed military efficiency above all other political considerations, decreed that every parish in his dominions should furnish a quota of recruits to the army

proportional to its population, and he was thus enabled to muster an army which could meet those of France and Austria on equal terms, and which raised Prussia at once to a place among the Great Powers of Europe. His son, Frederick the Great, made full use of the instrument bequeathed to him by his father, and from his time onward the Prussian succeeded to the rôle of the Swedish army as the model for all Europe. Every modern development in army organization, from voluntary to compulsory, from long to short service, the reserve system, universal liability to military service, have all in turn emanated from the bureaux of the General Staff in Berlin; and all have been faithfully, though often reluctantly, imitated by the other European nations, under penalty of falling hopelessly behind in the race for military supremacy. In matters of equipment the Prussians have been no less ingenious, and their inventions of the steel ramrod and the breech-loading rifle have met with a deserved reward in two victorious wars. In this field, too, other nations have been slow to follow their lead until forced to do so by stern necessity, and the Prussian Army was already equipped with the breech-loader at the time of the Crimean War, while the military experts of other States refused to adopt the innovation until converted by the incontrovertible logic of facts. Though conscription had been in force in Prussia for sixty years, it was not generally adopted in Europe until the wars of the French Revolution, so that Carnot is usually credited with the inception of the system. It was adopted by him under the stress of sheer necessity as a means for meeting the formidable coalition formed against republican France by Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Spain, and Savoy; and by it France was enabled to raise such large armies that she could successfully cope with the numbers of her enemies on all the various fronts. Her example was speedily followed by all the nations, and the armies that had hitherto been reckoned by tens of thousands now ran into hundreds of thousands. The army of 400,000 men which Napoleon led to the invasion of Russia in 1812 was the largest that had ever been mustered in Europe; and on the fall of Leipzig, in 1813, half a million of combatants fought on both sides in a battle that lasted for three days.

The limitations imposed by Napoleon on the military strength of Prussia after his victory at Jena led to the invention of the reserve system, designed expressly to evade those limitations. This system was devised by the Prussian General, Scharnhorst, who annually dismissed one-third of the number of trained soldiers under arms to their homes under the obligation to rejoin when called upon, and filled their places with raw recruits, who, after serving for three years with the Colours, were in their turn passed into civil life as reservists. Prussia was thus enabled, when she threw in her lot with Russia, in 1813, to quadruple the strength of her standing army of trained men by calling up her reserves. And she continued to maintain this system, though during the long period of profound peace in Europe that followed on the victory at Waterloo its obligations were not very strictly enforced.

During the nineteenth century the British Army was the only one that adhered to the old system of voluntary enlistment. All the others were recruited by conscription, the men attaining military age annually drawing lots to decide their inclusion or exemption from military service.

The Russian Army was the largest in Europe, mustering in round numbers 700,000 sabres and bayonets: the armies of France, Austria, and Prussia respectively, did not exceed half a million of men each.

The next step forward in military organization was again taken by Prussia. Bismarck's plan for uniting the loosely-knit fragments of the German confederation into a national empire by means of blood and iron demanded a vigorous military policy, most congenial to the ideas and temperament of his royal master, King William Ist. The Dane, Von Moltke, as expert and as diligent a creator of armies as Carnot, not only renewed and perfected the system of that great organizer of victory, but made the hitherto partial conscription universal, and so passed the whole male population of Prussia through the military mill. As the volunteer armies had been succeeded by conscript armies, these now were developed into national armies. The resulting victories gained by Prussia over Austria and France led to the re-establishment of the German Empire under the hegemony of Prussia and the introduction of the Prussian system of universal liability to military service into all the countries of the European Continent.

Field-Marshal Von der Goltz wrote an eloquent panegyric on "The Nation in Arms," and the new departure was generally hailed as the cheap defence of nations. It combined economy with efficiency; a combination of which we often hear much but see little. Under it Germany was able to maintain an army of four millions of men at a less cost than Great Britain incurred for half a million of heterogeneous fighting men, Regulars, Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry. A writer in the *Morning Post*, describing the German military system, as perfected by the Emperor William Ist and Von Moltke, said: "By far the most powerful and efficient military force in Europe is that of Germany. Exposed as she is to attack on three sides, perhaps to sudden and unexpected attack, she has been compelled, in order to protect her national existence, to carry the science of organization to a remarkable pitch. Every soldier in Germany is there; these are no paper totals as in England, France, and Russia; and the machine may be trusted to work with unexampled ease and success when the day of battle comes. On the peace footing she has 600,000 men under arms; the recent addition of two new army corps" (this was written in 1899) "will enable her to place in the field, on mobilization, nearly four million trained men, two million on each of her two most exposed frontiers. This is almost four times the force of which she disposed in 1870. Her military outlay is only £30,000,000 annually, in spite of these vast results."

In the Prussian Army there was no division of authority, nor evasion of responsibility. The general did not interfere with the colonel, nor the colonel with the captain, in the management of his

command. There were no seconds-in-command in the army; every commander of a unit exercised despotic control and accepted full responsibility. "A German corporal," said a repatriated English prisoner of war, "has more authority than an English captain." When the United States' Ambassador at Berlin urged upon the German War Office the need for investigating the condition of the camps for prisoners of war in Germany he was told that it was not customary to interfere with the authority or the discretion of the General Officers Commanding Districts. There was no weak link in the iron chain of military discipline. The success of the system was largely due to the corps of officers, scions of a poor and proud aristocracy, descendants of the Teutonic knights and the *Schwerdtbrüder*, whose swords had won the lands of Prussia from the heathen bands in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The Prussian officers formed a military caste within the kingdom which admitted no outsider to share its duties and its privileges. The cadet who aspired to enter a regiment had to secure the suffrages of his future brother-officers before he could be admitted to their society. In the rare instances where a *bourgeois* candidate passed this ordeal his lot in the Army was not a happy one. Promotion from the ranks was unheard of. But the Prussian Junker's pride of birth was equalled by his pride in his profession and by his devotion to his duty. "The day has twenty-four hours of duty, and it is possible to make use of the night also" was his favourite maxim. The Prussian system was extended to the whole of Germany when the Empire was reconstituted in 1870 with progressive and Protestant Prussia at its head in the place of conservative and Catholic Austria. Officers were provided for the enormous reserves of trained soldiers available, by the class of *Einjahr Freiwilliger*, or one-year's volunteers—young men who were allowed to limit their service with the Colours to one year on condition of serving at their own expense. At the end of the year's service, after passing a qualifying examination, they were drafted as officers into the reserve. This privileged class of volunteers did not exist in the French Army, as it offended against the republican doctrine of equality; but in the German Army political considerations were never allowed to interfere with military efficiency.

This perfect military machine had unfortunately fallen into the hands of a set of unprincipled and unscrupulous men who used it for the furtherance of personal and national ambitions without any regard to the legality or the morality of the means which they employed. The Emperor William II and his gang cherished and promulgated the doctrine that baseness and falsehood are excusable, even commendable, when employed to further national interests, and Prussian officers were degraded by being encouraged to act as spies in friendly foreign countries. The German military attachés were expected to exercise the dishonourable calling of a spy at the Courts to which they were accredited. The German delegates at the Hague Convention signed the agreement with their tongues in their cheeks, knowing that its provisions were flatly controverted by the instructions issued to their Army by the General Staff. But, in fact, the mind of the German

nation as a whole had been hypnotized by the military successes of Prussia over Austria and France. The people were easily persuaded that the road to power and fortune lay through the battlefield. Historians and philosophers like Treitscke and Nietzsche proved that victory was on the side of strong battalions, and that States were strengthened by war and enfeebled by peace. There was no alternative but *Weltmacht oder Niedergang*. The insidious doctrine that the State could do no wrong was inculcated to disguise the old assumption of the Divine right of Kings. Reventlow and Bernhardt pointed out the paths to victory and the glory that would crown and the spoils that would enrich the victors. The policy of the Government was expounded and applauded by a servile and venal Press, by the professors in the universities, and the pastors in the pulpit.

But to maintain an enormous Army, and also a powerful Navy, at the highest pitch of efficiency and in immediate readiness for active service strained the energies and the resources of the nation to the utmost: and the impatience of the people under the ever-increasing financial burden was one of the contributory causes of the war.

The Emperor William Ist and his Chancellor, Bismarck, had succeeded in practically restoring autocracy in Prussia while preserving the forms of constitutional government. But William Ist was an honest despot, and Bismarck was a wise statesman, and neither of them would have embarked on the perfidious policy and wild-cat schemes which were pursued by Kaiser William IInd to his own and Germany's undoing. His father, the Emperor Frederick, cherished liberal ideas, and, had he lived, he might have saved the German nation from itself; but his reign was all too short, and his unworthy son and successor nourished very different ideals. He was a reactionary, and he flattered himself that, with the vast military and naval force that he had at his command, he could restore the old order of things in Europe and bring back the rule of kings and priests.

Neither he nor any of his associates and advisers could discern the signs of the times nor gauge the strength and direction of the political world currents: they could not see that the methods of the tenth century were no longer practicable in the twentieth, and that falsehood in diplomacy and frightfulness in warfare only aroused indignation among civilized people instead of ensuring submission. It would be difficult to say whether the blunders of the German Foreign Office or the crimes of the German General Staff were the most effectual causes of Germany's downfall.

When the Emperor William Ist imposed universal liability to military service on the people of Prussia and Germany he little realized that he was forging a most powerful weapon for the hand of democracy and signing the death-warrant of his own dynasty. The old standing armies of the Continent of Europe had been the support of the Monarchy and the bulwark of the throne, on which they depended for their pay and promotion, and which they looked upon as the source of their privileges. They constituted a separate class within the nation, and could generally be depended upon to enforce the will of their sovereign master upon a recalcitrant people. In the revolutions

of 1848 the armies of Prussia and Austria remained faithful to the Crown, and it was by their efforts that its authority was finally re-established. Louis Napoleon used the French Army in 1852 to destroy the second republic and to establish a second empire.

But when military service was made compulsory on every citizen the situation was entirely changed. The Nation in arms became the National Army, and it was evident to far-seeing men that, in the event of a difference of opinion between the nation and its rulers, the latter would no longer be able to rely on armed force, for all the arms would be in the hands of the people. The inevitable result has followed; the Hohenzollern dynasty has been hoist with its own petard, and in its fall has dragged down with it the moribund empires of the Hapsburgs and the Ottoman Sultans, its dupes and victims.

But if the military aristocracy of Prussia failed to realize the possible consequences of universal conscription, democracy has been equally slow to recognize the advantages accruing to it by this transference of power. The Radical and Socialist parties in all countries cannot appreciate the change that has taken place, and continue to look upon military organization as a formidable obstacle to popular liberty. They always resist the extension of military service and fail to appreciate the difference between the old system and the new. They might learn a lesson from the example of Switzerland, the freest country in the world, and the first garden of liberty's tree, where the people really govern themselves, and are not led by the nose by professional agitators nor blinded to their own interests by the special pleading of party politicians.

Every Swiss citizen, be he landowner, labourer, or mechanic, has his uniform, his rifle, and his sealed packet of cartridges in his lodgings, and is ready to turn out armed and equipped at a moment's notice to defend his country and its liberties. The Socialists, who are now the rulers of Russia, denounced militarism and disbanded the National Army, and have now raised another army by the aid of which they govern despotically, and which they maintain by plundering the rest of the nation. Whatever form of government may exist, an armed force is absolutely necessary to maintain it, and to restrain the spirit of lawlessness which always incites the strong to prey upon the weak and defenceless.

When universal liability to military service became general in Europe half a century ago, many there were who predicted that Europe would become a vast camp, and that a succession of devastating wars might be expected to desolate the civilized world.

Another school of thinkers and writers, among whom M. Bloch and Norman Angell were prominent figures, maintained that the new departure had made war impossible, because the dislocation of industry and commerce that it would involve, and the financial burdens that it would impose, would deter any nation from embarking on it.

There was some reason in this argument, for, with national armies, war was no longer the exclusive business of governments and armies, but affected the whole life and work of the nation; and certainly the

introduction of universal service did not bring about universal war, for Europe remained generally at peace for forty years thereafter.

But, unfortunately, there were many people who believed that war could be made to pay; and among them the Germans, who had gained Alsace and Lorraine and a huge sum of money as the result of their last war with France: and Serbia and Greece both gained increased territory and population in the Balkan War of 1912. So Germany plunged the world into war in the summer of 1914, and falsified the predictions of M. Bloch and refuted the arguments of Mr. Angell. But the war seems to have demonstrated that the institution of national armies, recruited from the whole population of the country, is not only a change favourable to the interests of democracy, but also favourable to the maintenance of peace.

Under the feudal system, and in the later stages of standing armies, soldiers loved war for its own sake. An army flourished in war and rusted in peace. War gave the soldier a chance of exercising his profession and held out to him the hope of promotion and the prospect of plunder. The longer the war lasted, the better for him. The modern conscript hears the call to arms with very different feelings. He is taken from his trade, from his wife, from his home, to take up arms that he has grown unaccustomed to, and to face danger and undergo hardships and privations for which his age unfits him. Under the stress of duty and discipline he supports his misfortunes for a time, but when they seem to extend indefinitely, without prospect of relief, he can stand the strain no longer and demands his release.

This is what has happened in the present war, the first great war waged under the new conditions of universal conscription. The Russian was the first army to collapse, after two years and a half of war conditions. Some forewarning of such an occurrence might have been seen in the events of the Russo-Japanese War ten years previously, when the Czar was forced to conclude a premature peace by the war-weariness of his people and his Army. The political revolution which had become inevitable in Russia was doubtless precipitated by the sufferings of the people from the suspension of industry and the scarcity of food: the soldiers refused to fight, deserted their Colours, and in some cases murdered their officers and demanded to return to their homes. The Bulgarian Army was the next to break up: the news of the collapse of the Turkish defence in Asia, combined with an advance of the Allied enemy troops on their own front, decided them to abandon the struggle that they had maintained for three years. The Austrian Army followed suit; that heterogeneous host of Germans, Hungarians, Slavonians, and Italians, held together by the ties of tradition and of discipline and the bond of loyalty to the Imperial dynasty, dissolved into its constituent nationalities. One-half of it at least was composed of Slavs, including Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs, Croats, and Slovenes, who sympathized with their Serbian and Russian kinsmen rather than with their German and Magyar comrades; for in this present era of nationality racial affinity is a far more attractive political magnet than dynastic loyalty or religious conformity. Last of all the great German Army abandoned its War Lord and his war

without having been fairly beaten in the field, though it may be claimed that it only averted a supreme disaster by its prudent and timely suspension of hostilities. The finest army in the world, that four years before had jubilantly set out on its triumphant march to Paris amid the acclamations of the whole German nation, now hailed with joy the conclusion of an ignominious peace.

So we may assume, from the experience of this war, that the substitution of nations in arms for the old standing armies of professional soldiers has had two most momentous political results: it has immensely increased the power of democracy, and it has diminished the influence of militarism in politics: for, though it ensures the cheap defence of nations, its conditions unfit the army for undertaking and waging a war of aggression. A citizen army will not serve as an instrument of domestic oppression, nor is it likely to allow itself to be made use of in a war of aggression. A thirty years' war, or even a seven years' war, would be impossible nowadays. The terms of the Peace Treaty lately imposed on Germany stipulate not only for the reduction of the numerical strength of her army, but insist that the reduced force shall be recruited by voluntary enlistment instead of by conscription. The statesmen of the Allied Powers probably think that by this provision they have struck a blow at militarism in Germany, but a standing army of professional soldiers is more likely to foster a spirit of militarism than a national militia. In the latter the association of all classes of society in a common brotherhood of arms fosters a feeling of national unity and fraternity, and the military training for a period of six or even of three months has a beneficial moral and physical effect on the youth of the nation. The efficiency of the Germans in the domains of commerce and industry is due not altogether to their national character, but partly to the habits of order and method acquired in their military training. "*Fas est ab hoste doceri*," and the establishment of a national militia on the Swiss model as advocated by our National Service League, would be a great benefit and a light burden for any nation. The League of Nations is an admirable experiment, and it may be hoped that it will succeed in preserving the world's peace; but it may happen that to enforce peace the nations will have to resort to force of arms; and the maxim of the wise old Romans, "*Si vis pacem para bellum*," still holds good in the modern world. Universal military training is the best national insurance against the risks of the outbreak of war.