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A CRITERION OF VALUES IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

*(A Paper read on August 8th, 1922, to The Institute of Politics,
Williamstown, Massachusetts.)*

IN my previous lectures ¹ I did my best to present two national problems of which I happened to know something at first hand. I shall now try to state certain more general conclusions on the international problem to which these experiences have brought me. As these conclusions have to be compressed into one lecture I may seem to be more dogmatic than I really am. I take that risk and ask you to discount it.

Civilisation is society organised in states. In our studies here we are treating the relations of states, and as the world is now practically organised into states, they cover the whole of human society. States, as distinguished from nations, are composed of the people inhabiting definite areas of the earth's surface, who are all expected to obey one common direction.

The first question to be considered may be stated in various ways.

How is it that masses of men, usually amounting to millions, can be brought to obey a common direction?

By what authority is that direction exercised?

What is the sentiment which unites such a number of persons in obedience to a common authority? Is self-interest, as commonly assumed, the ultimate motive of this obedience?

¹ On South Africa and India.

This assumption is contrary to evident facts, because individuals are willing to face torture and death in response to the dictates of the state. It is only in so far as citizens are willing to sacrifice themselves that states can exist. Self-interest may afford a motive for common action at a given moment. But it cannot supply a basis for continuous co-operation, because the interests of individuals are constantly shifting. Compact is no more the basis of the state, than settlements of property are the bases of marriage. The ultimate bond is sacramental, or, to use the words of President Lincoln, is of the nature of dedication.

In the last analysis states are united not by self-interest but by moral ideas. Their foundations are laid, not in the flesh, but in the spirit of man.

This conclusion confronts us with a further question.

From what source is the guidance which a state gives to its members derived, or thought to be derived? I will illustrate my meaning. The Moslem believes that the laws he is called upon to obey were communicated to Mahomet by God. The ancient Israelite believed that King David's commands were divinely inspired. On the other hand, you and I do not believe that the acts of Congress or Parliament, or the policies of Mr. Lloyd George or President Harding are divinely inspired. But the process by which they are formulated is of vital importance to this inquiry.

To those who have studied the East the idea by which states in their primitive form are united is clear enough. The ruler is a person clothed with divine authority. The motive which induces obedience to his dictates is essentially religious. The ruler of an Eastern state is either God, like the Lama of Thibet, or the spokesman of God, like Mahomet. Actual power to enforce obedience is accepted as evidence of divine authority, and may override the limits of national sentiment. When the present king of England visited India as its Emperor he was treated by vast multitudes with a veneration which showed that they regarded his authority as divine. I have seen a letter to the Government from a powerful notable in India at the time of the reforms, in which he said: "I do not understand the meaning of these proposals to transfer the King's authority to a public assembly. I have always obeyed His Majesty because I believed that he was the representative of God. I wish to be told where I am."

To men in this state of society, the orders of Government are not regarded as the product of human intelligence, but are held

to be inspired by divine wisdom. Hence the familiar saying in the Old Testament: "Rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft," the product of obedience to Satan instead of to God.

Until little more than two thousand years ago the whole of civilised society was possessed by these ideas. They still prevail with a vast majority in the East, and are to some extent the key to Mahatma Gandhi's immense influence in India. Up to our time they have continued to exercise a vast influence in Europe. Their effect on the masses who entertain them, and on their institutions, cannot be ignored.

Monarchy is the product of these ideas. It is natural to suppose that God would communicate His wisdom to a single mind, and announce His commands through the lips of one, and not through the findings of a public assembly.

But the king cannot count on universal obedience, because there are impious people. He must therefore have an army to enforce obedience. The success of that army in extending the king's authority is evidence of his divine mission. Autocracy thus naturally leads to conquest.

As Lord Bryce pointed out to you last year, the consequences of this view were less serious while the world believed in a multitude of gods, and each nation felt that its obedience was due to separate gods of its own. If there is room in heaven for a number of deities, so there is room on earth for a multitude of states obeying their various commands. But when men began to conceive God as one, the political results were terrific. Christendom was in mortal conflict with Islam. To the pious Moslem there were and still are no logical limits to the duty of conquest.

The effects of this idea on the individual are of even greater importance. In a state where the bond of union is simply the common duty of obedience to God there is little to exercise and develop men's sense of duty to each other. And where public policy and law are regarded as the product of divine inspiration, the individual is not to be expected to examine their wisdom. Their mutual relations are not a subject on which men are asked to reflect. Laws, if recorded like those of Moses or Manu, are regarded as divine. Scriptures like the Vedas or Koran are treated as the only source of recorded wisdom. To the scholars of Alexandria who besought their Moslem conqueror to spare their library he replied with a dilemma. Either their books agreed with the Koran or else they did not. In the first alternative they were unnecessary; in the second they were impious and untrue. And so the library was given to the flames.

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Oppressed by the weight of these ideas, men's characters and minds develop slowly. Growth is arrested and social conditions become static. Hence the fact that Asia, the home of civilisation, is also a place where civilisation has scarcely advanced for thousands of years, and has now begun to move only in response to an impulse received from Europe.

In the words of Bryce, the ideas which inspire autocracy are an illusion. Rather let us say they are half-truths. In so far as they have taught the great majority of mankind the habit of obedience to a common authority, the debt we owe them is not to be ignored. They are broken lights by which men grope their way to a certain point and no further. They cannot advance beyond autocracy until they learn to interpret their duty to God in terms of their duty to their neighbour. That is, in truth, the transition from the old dispensation to the new, from the law delivered in the thunders of Horeb to the sermon preached on a hill-top in Galilee.

The real bond which unites society is not fear of God but the duty which men owe to each other. In the long run, society will grow more stable only in so far as this sense of mutual devotion is developed by exercise. Men love each other in so far as they are conscious of serving each other. The real sources of wisdom are not miraculous revelations; nor is ultimate truth embodied in Scripture. The elements of truth expressed in sacred laws and writings were the fruits of human experience. The only genuine oracles are those revealed to human intelligence guided by conscience. The facts of life are the only Scripture in which the eternal truths are written. A political system is sound in so far as it operates to keep men in touch with the facts of life, to practise them in reading their meaning, and to make them responsible for giving effect to the lesson. Nature is the only school where discipline can teach the one cardinal virtue of self-control to men in the mass.

Such a system will germinate only in a soil where self-control, devotion to others, and clearness of mind are present to a certain degree. But once established it impregnates the soil with the spiritual foods drawn from the light and the air that nourish its roots. Its life fosters the virtues on which it depends. As the principle of autocracy tends to stagnation and decay, so that of the commonwealth tends to indefinite growth destined in time to embrace all human society. The least of all grains, it grows till its branches cover the whole earth, and the fowls of the air lodge therein.

The seeds of this principle first made their appearance in Greece, and the literature of Athens enables us to examine its earliest growth under a microscope. It shows to us a miniature commonwealth containing some thousands of citizens united by a sense of loyalty to each other. The strength of that mutual devotion is expressed for all time in the speech which Pericles delivered at the funeral of some of its citizens who had given their lives for the city, a speech destined to find its echo in the words uttered by Lincoln on the field of Gettysburg. In both these speeches we are conscious of a system in which men rejoice to live and die for each other.

The final authority to which the Athenians bowed was public opinion as expressed in laws framed by themselves in open discussion. Their word for obedience was *πειθόμενος*—being persuaded. But you have only to turn to the pages of Plato and Aristotle to see that the law was regarded with a reverence never accorded to the decrees of a monarch. Socrates claimed no rights from the state, but saw no limits to the duty he owed to the state. He once refused to obey its commands, but only when he thought they were fatal to the state itself. In his philosophy there might be a duty of rebellion but never a right. He died a rebel, but his death was an act of devotion to his fellow-citizens, as Christ's was an act of devotion to all mankind. A man must face death if he feels it his duty to break the law. The words, "Though freedom slay me I will trust in her," might well have been written on his grave. He recognised that as men are wanting in public spirit and as there is a point beyond which the most unselfish of men cannot be persuaded, so the law must, in the last instance, be enforced. The saying that force settles nothing is in open conflict with facts. No state can ever dispense with force until every citizen is all-knowing and wholly unselfish. The wisest thing ever uttered on the subject was written by your own Admiral Mahan: "The province of force in human affairs is to give moral ideas time to take root."

This tremendous respect for the laws, however, was based on reason and not superstition. If anyone thought them bad he was free to say so and give his reason. They could always be changed by persuading public opinion. The appeal to experience as interpreted by reason was open. The state was themselves. Its decisions were their own. For the consequences they had only themselves to thank or to blame. They reaped as they sowed. Their system was one which kept them in intimate contact with the facts of life. They were disciplined by nature to self-control.

Thus in Athens was developed a system in which the relations of men to each other are determined by laws framed in accordance with the experience of those who obey them. Its distinguishing mark is the rule of law. The loyalty which it claims from its members is unlimited. And in that loyalty is included the obligation not only to obey the law but also to enforce it. The use of force in a commonwealth is the necessary consequence of the claim which it makes on its citizens. And this claim is from its nature unique. The commonwealth cannot allow in its citizens an equal devotion to any other kind of organisation. This claim to a loyalty overriding all others is sovereignty, and on occasion is exercised to the full. You and I belong to commonwealths which a few years ago claimed and exercised the right to send millions of citizens without question to face torture and death.

The justification of these principles is that they do, in fact, promote the development of human character and mind. They move society from stagnation to growth. They tend, in a word, to the making of men.

How came it that the Greek communities which first conceived these principles of society, and also applied them to the facts of political life, themselves so quickly perished? The answer to this question must be sought in the limits imposed on their application. The citizens of Athens were limited to a number small enough to listen to the voice of a single speaker. The only relations which could thus be brought within the realm of law were those which affected the people of one city. Methods whereby the relations of that city to all the other cities of Greece could be brought within the rule of law, and included in one national commonwealth, were never conceived by the Greeks. To adopt the admirable phrase which Bryce used in this place, of the great nations of the world to-day, the cities of Greece remained in a state of nature to each other. The devotion which they felt for each other as Greeks went unexercised and unbreathed, and never became the bond of a national commonwealth. And so freedom perished in Greece, and fifteen centuries had to pass before the principle of the commonwealth could be realised in terms of a national state.

Rome survived by exchanging the principle of the commonwealth for that of autocracy. It is, as I have said, in accordance with the nature of despotisms to embrace any number of subjects. The Roman Empire was expanded to include the whole of the countries surrounding the Mediterranean. The Greek commonwealths were smothered in the process.

It was by the expedient of representation that England succeeded where the Greeks had failed. The principle of basing government on the experience of the governed was thus applied to a country far too large for its people ever to assemble in one place. Protected by the seas there emerged a commonwealth strong enough to resist the great autocracies of Europe. By the enterprise of its merchants and the prowess of its sailors, above all by the devotion of some of its children to the essential principles of the parent community, a second nation organised on those principles was firmly established in America. But those two nations were not destined to solve the problem which had baffled the genius of the Greeks. The principle of representation could not of itself avail to unite under one rule of law two nations divided by 3000 miles of sea. They fell apart, and to-day stand to each other in a state of nature.

It must, however, be held in mind that the eastern shore of the United States is separated from its western shore by a distance approximately equal to that which divides Cornwall from Maine. The people of California and those of New England could not have been united in one commonwealth merely by virtue of representation in a common assembly, if only for the reason that one government would never have been able to discharge all the business necessary for the number of people destined to occupy so vast an area. The problem was solved by a device no less momentous in the history of freedom than that of representation. It was the device of leaving to provincial communities, which for historical reasons you have misnamed states, every possible function of government which those communities can discharge for themselves. It is only matters too great for those communities to handle that the assembly of the nation at large is asked to control.

I speak of America as a nation, but if you will turn back to the writings of 140 years ago you will find that your forefathers constantly referred to the thirteen parent states as "these nations." You would never think of calling Massachusetts a nation to-day. But a million lives were sacrificed in order to establish the principle that the United States was the commonwealth to which the ultimate loyalty of its citizens was due. The possibility of a commonwealth embracing any number of people included in one territory, however large, was demonstrated thereby. The principles which have enabled Canada, Germany, the Argentine, Australia and South Africa to apply self-government to their vast areas was first reduced to practice at Phila-

delphia. It is that model which inspires countries like India and China with hope. But Gettysburg was needed to assert those principles. If you think of your own civil war, you will see what Mahan meant when he said that "the province of force in human affairs is to give moral ideas time to take root."

To Greeks so fearless in mind as Plato and Aristotle a commonwealth larger than a single city was inconceivable. They were unable to foresee the two great political inventions of the Anglo-Saxon race, representation and federation. I point to this warning, because to-day practical statesmen assume, and act upon the assumption, that commonwealths on the scale of the United States are the largest units of mankind to which the rule of law properly so called can ever be applied. That nations on this scale are for ever to remain in a state of nature to each other, that the widest and most important of human relations are always to remain in the realm of anarchy, are accepted as axioms by rational minds. The vision of a world commonwealth may serve as the theme of a peroration; but a public man suspected of using that ideal as the practical criterion of policy in international affairs is in real danger. I am not referring to those whose outlook is purely national. To them a policy is right or wrong only in so far as it tends to the material loss or gain of their country. But to those who have risen to a point of view which deserves to be called international, the test usually applied to policies is simply whether they make for peace or war. Now for nations to accept peace as the criterion of policy is exactly as though men were to seek physical health as the criterion of conduct. People whose lives are regulated mainly by physical health become hypochondriacs, and miss the very object they seek. "He that seeks to save his life will lose it." Amongst people whose conduct is guided by the aim to live rightly the general level of physical health will be far higher. And so with states. To nations the state of peace stands in much the same relation as physical health to the individual. But health is only one element, and by no means the chief one, in well-being, which is best described in the trite phrase, *mens sana in corpore sano*—a sound body regulated by a well-ordered mind. The right system of society is one composed of such men, and therefore one calculated to reproduce them in a higher degree and in greater numbers.

As health is worth risking for right living, so is health a product of right living. And as peace is worth risking for freedom, so peace is a product of freedom. "He that seeks to lose his life shall save it." The principle I have to submit for your serious

consideration is that the test by which all policies should be proved is not whether they tend to maintain peace, but whether they tend to advance freedom amongst men.

It is from this point of view that I ask you to consider the union which in this continent embraces your forty-eight states. The authors of the *Federalist* saw clearly enough that unless the union were effected, the separate states would inevitably drift into internecine war. But avoidance of war was not the motive which mainly actuated the fathers of your constitution. The object to which they looked was national self-control, the verities of responsible government. In achieving that object they actually made the greatest contribution to the peace of the world which had ever been accomplished. I ask you to consider what the effect on the international situation would be, if in America to-day there were forty-eight separate republics, each with a foreign department, an army and a general staff of its own. Do you blame us if we draw our own conclusions from the lesson taught by yourselves?

I have dared to suggest that the growth of freedom will not be complete even when groups so large as those contained in India, China or Central Africa have, like the United States, each been rendered amenable to law made by themselves. The view to which South Africa and India have led me is that all policies in the last analysis now turn on the mutual relations of the white races of Europe, America and Australia to those of Asia and Africa. If this view is right, then there can be no final achievement in human affairs until these relations are made subject to law controlled by all the people concerned, in so far as they are fit to exercise such control. And before you set this view down as an idle dream, I ask you to reflect that I belong to an international state in which vast sections of all these continents have, in fact, been brought within the jurisdiction of the rule of law. It is true that that law is alterable only by a parliament responsible to the electorate of Great Britain. And by reason of this glaring defect this vast international state, including one out of every four living men, has rightly been called an empire. It is just because some of us believe that this state must perish unless it labours to cure this defect that we have sought to change its name from empire to commonwealth.

If we are not as yet concerned to give Indians a voice in making the laws which determine their relations to Europe, it is merely because they have not as yet achieved control of their own relations to each other. I say this without imputing the

slightest blame to Indians themselves. Their ancestors attained a civilisation long before ours had emerged from barbarism, and I have tried to explain why they in common with the rest of Asia have allowed us to outstrip their political development. Under British rule they have made a notable advance in the arts of life, in learning and in physical equipment. And if a similar advance has not been made towards self-government the fault has been ours rather than theirs. Like South Africa, India is a microcosm, though on an immensely larger scale, for it contains upwards of 300,000,000 human beings, a sixth part of the whole human race. It is a continent rather than a country, including a welter of religions and languages, castes, tribes and races at all the stages of barbarism and civilisation. The enforcement of law and the establishment of order was the first condition of future progress, and it was this inestimable boon which British rulers have given to India. The mistake has been in continuing to concentrate on the maintenance of order as if order were an end in itself. Measures to create the foundations of order in the character of Indians themselves involved the taking of risks, and we did not take those risks in time. We ignored the fact that responsibility is the only sure foundation for law. To live, freedom must live dangerously.

The foundations of responsible government in India ought to have been laid years ago in local government. Lord Ripon essayed the task in 1880. In districts and municipalities representative councils were instituted, but their educational effect was largely sterilised by the British officials entrusted with their organisation; though not for any unworthy motive. So high was their own standard of honour and efficiency that the officers could not bear to see the public interest suffer at the hands of the Indian councils. With tireless energy they guided their proceedings, and so succeeded that the British officers in fact became the mainsprings of the local administrations. Protected from the worst consequences of their own indolence and mistakes, the local electorates learned little or nothing. But meanwhile the schools and colleges were at work, and the educated classes were gradually losing the primitive beliefs upon which government in the East has rested. They were ceasing to believe that the power of rulers to rule is evidence of divine authority, and with that belief the power to rule inevitably crumbles. In seeking to maintain order, and that alone, we have not considered enough whether the foundations would sustain the ever-increasing burden of the structure raised on them. Here again "he that

seeks to save his life shall lose it." To neglect freedom and pursue peace as the aim of human endeavour is to end by destroying both ; for anarchy is the negation not only of law but also of liberty. The true lesson to be learned from Russia is less the folly of neglecting order than the unwisdom of failing to found it on responsibility. To study India as a microcosm is also to understand the peril of treating peace as the test of policy in international affairs.

Do not understand me, however, to depreciate the work which England has accomplished for India. It is just because I believe so intensely in that work that I dwell on the mistakes. The most perilous task which a commonwealth can undertake is to attempt to govern other races. It cannot be done without the gravest risk to the principles upon which its own institutions are based. Athens and Rome are both warnings on that point. I am infinitely proud that my own countrymen did not shrink from the perils involved. In order to grow, freedom must live dangerously. Right principles of action will only be discovered by those with the daring to act. In the last analysis, men learn only by making mistakes, and dwelling on them ; for mistakes can be remedied if recognised in time, and I think that we have recognised our mistakes in India in time. Frankly, I believe that the cause of freedom in the East has gained immeasurably by the inclusion of India in a commonwealth which centres in the West. I believe that so India will travel faster and more easily towards the verities of responsible government than countries left in the position of Persia or China.

Throughout these lectures I have spoken of the principle of the commonwealth and of responsible government. I have dwelt on the need and the duty of men to govern themselves, and not on their right to do so. The term " democracy " has scarcely crossed my lips, if at all. The principle of the commonwealth and that of democracy are two distinct though closely connected ideas. A commonwealth presupposes a certain capacity in a certain number of its citizens to govern themselves. It is a polity founded on the will of those who are in some sort capable of political judgment, that is to say, of the citizens who are able to put public interests before their own. The English polity in the time of Cromwell was, I think, entitled to the name of commonwealth, though the voters in whom political decisions were vested were the merest fraction of the whole population. Universal suffrage has never existed and never will. Infants and criminals and aliens are always excluded from the franchise : infants because they have yet to

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learn to put the public interest before their own, criminals because they have proved their incapacity to do so, and aliens because, although they may live in the country and are amenable to its laws, their loyalty is due to another community. In the most advanced democracies like those of New Zealand, the voters include scarcely more than half the population.

In the view of Plato and Aristotle the idea of a commonwealth was an aristocracy, a system in which the franchise was invested in the *ἄριστοι*, in the best of the citizens, or, in other words, in those who are fit for political power. To them democracy implied a premature extension of the franchise to citizens not yet ready for the burden, and they abhorred it as such. They viewed democracy as a step towards anarchy, not leading back to a monarchy based on divine right, but to tyranny based on no principle whatever but that of organised force. The first French empire and the recent history of Russia and China illustrate the process.

Plato was always in search of an *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*—an idea of the good, an ultimate goal towards which the commonwealth looks. Scholars dispute how he conceived this goal. What matters to us is not how Plato conceived the goal of freedom, but what it is. To you I hazard the suggestion that the end and object of all policy should be to make more men more fit for the exercise of political responsibility. The commonwealth is not an end in itself, but exists only to propagate freedom in the souls of men, which, rightly understood, is a sense of responsibility in themselves for others. In so far as it succeeds in this object the commonwealth will flourish, but its visible success is to be valued only as a sign that its function in promoting the growth of human souls is in active process. A commonwealth which is not progressing towards democracy is in danger of losing sight of its ultimate goal.

There is, however, another principle of psychology which the Greeks could scarcely discern as we do now. It is the elementary principle that human faculties will grow only by exercise. In India I was constantly told that it was idle to think of beginning responsible government until a large body of the people were educated. My answer to this argument is that it involves a misconception of education, and of the object it seeks to attain. In schools and colleges you can teach knowledge, but not wisdom, which is the end of education rightly conceived. Wisdom imports something more than knowledge. It involves the power not only to see the course which is right, but

also to follow it when it runs counter to our own interests. And this wisdom comes only from contact with facts. Wisdom is taught only by Nature herself in the school of responsibility. Professors will never create electorates fit for political decisions. That fitness will not begin to develop until men are called upon not only to decide public questions, but also to experience the consequence of their own decisions. Men must be given scope to hurt themselves without destroying themselves. The problem you have to face in the Philippines and we have to face in India, is how much scope you can give the people to hurt themselves without destroying the fabric of government altogether.

The danger and difficulty is always greatest at the outset; and both diminish if the start succeeds. In a state where a large body has already proved its fitness for responsible government it is easy and safe to extend the franchise. In the Cape Colony, for instance, where one-fourth of the population was European, it was comparatively safe to extend the franchise to the natives. In Natal, where only one-eleventh was European, the first step to a native franchise was incredibly difficult.

You cannot establish responsible government if in the process you destroy government, because government is the only foundation of responsible government.

It is, however, the most dangerous fallacy to suppose that the principle of the commonwealth, or in other words freedom, depends only on giving the vote to more people. The whole upshot of what I had to say about South Africa was that the verities of responsible self-government may be destroyed if the interests common to a whole community are parcelled out between two or more electorates. And exactly the reverse may happen in a great community if it fails to devolve the control of local interests on local authorities, simply for the reason that there are not enough hours in the day or days in the year for the central government to meet the multifarious needs of the people. It is exactly this evil from which the British Isles are suffering to-day. In America the verities of responsible government would perish if you destroyed the forty-eight state governments and transferred their functions to Washington. They would perish no less if you destroyed the federal government on the assumption that its functions could be left to the forty-eight states. I have urged that all policies and political systems should be judged by their fitness to advance responsible government. But the test is far from easy to apply, and certainly does not consist merely in gauging the proportion of voters. From the path to freedom there are many byways

which lead only to the castles of despair. There is many an arbour tempting the pilgrim to enchanted sleep. His one security is to glance now and again where the glow in the sky marks the place of the golden city. "The price of freedom is eternal vigilance." Here surely for one short hour we may lift our eyes to the far horizon.

The relations of the peoples of Europe and America to those of Asia and Africa is, I have submitted, the ultimate problem of politics. The real question is how to bring those relations within the realm of law properly so called. The solution of that problem involves the creation of a commonwealth large enough to include not merely cities, districts or provinces, but whole nations, each with a national government of its own. And before you reject this conclusion as the dream of a visionary, I ask you to reflect that nations together equal to a fourth of mankind have already been brought within the scope of one paramount law. The international state miscalled the British empire is a genuine commonwealth of nations in the making. The democracies of Great Britain, of Ireland, of Canada, Australasia and South Africa, that immense section of Asia contained in India, vast areas of Central Africa whose peoples are slowly emerging from savagery, together with a large number of islands scattered over all the seas, are no longer in a state of nature to each other. They are, in fact, governed by law, a law which in practice does maintain between them a peace such as could not exist under any other condition. But that is not all. This vast congeries of nations in matters of peace and war stands to all other nations outside their circle as one international state. They are all at peace or at war together. Germany ignored this fact to her ruin. She never foresaw that forces from Canada, India, Australasia and South Africa would throw themselves into the struggle. Yet without these forces the line could not have been held till America entered to turn the scale. Have you ever thought what this international commonwealth means to the peace of the world?

China, the only other state comparable in size, is a wing of the human edifice. Its destruction might shake but would scarcely destroy the whole fabric of society. But this commonwealth of nations is a steel frame spread through the whole structure, and were it to collapse the peace of the world would fall in unspeakable ruin. The five continents are poised on its arches. But I weigh my words when I say that unless the principle of the commonwealth steadily replaces the principle of empire in its structure, those arches will collapse. The development of this commonwealth on the principles which inspire it, and a right

understanding of what those principles mean, is of vital importance to the whole world.

It has always seemed to me strange that cosmopolitans who dream of a world government and a parliament of man go out of their way to condemn any institution which is, in fact, a practical step towards their ideal. They are blind to actual achievements, and have eyes only for their failures and defects. If we had but vision the figure of our dreams is about us in the making. Its substance is here to be handled and seen.

“ The angels keep their ancient places ;
Turn but a stone to start a wing.
'Tis we, 'tis our estrangèd faces
That miss the many splendoured thing.”

The incorporation of great sections of Asia and Africa in one world commonwealth affords the best conditions under which those races can attain to the verities of responsible government ; provided always that those in whom political power already rests continue to realise that the growth of responsible government, and not peace, is the ultimate goal in view. The basic problem of the world, that of bringing the peoples of Europe, Asia and Africa into some stable relation with each other, is destined, I believe, to be solved only in terms of the state inspired by the principles of the commonwealth. We are fatally inclined to think of liberty as something opposed to the rule of law, and to see in the state the negation of freedom. The rule of law is coincident with the state, and men achieve freedom only in so far as more communities can be gathered in the circle of a single polity.

A time has arrived when a further extension of freedom depends on our power of solving the problem—how to include in one commonwealth, without destroying its character as such, whole nations in varying stages of progress. The essence of freedom is self-discipline. Her sternest aspect is the state, and through all the ages men have fled her approach, in their blindness avoiding the refuge they desire. Some of you may have read a religious poem called, “ The Hound of Heaven,” in which the poet tells how he sought to escape his divine pursuer :

“ I fled him, down the nights and down the days ;
I fled him, down the arches of the years ;
I fled him, down the labyrinthine ways
Of my own mind ; and in the midst of tears
I hid from him, and under running laughter
Up vistaed hopes I sped ;
And shot precipitated
Adown Titanic glooms of chasmed fears,
From those strong feet that followed, followed after.”

So, outlaw-wise, man seeks for refuge in pleasure, in nature, in knowledge, till at last he falls and is overwhelmed by "this tremendous lover."

"Halts by me that footfall;
Is my gloom, after all,
Shade of his hand outstretched caressingly?
Ah, fondest, blindest, weakest,
I am He whom thou seekest!
Thou dravest love from thee, who dravest Me."

Religion and politics are but two aspects of life; to ignore one is to miss the meaning of the other. The principle of the commonwealth is love, and the sense of duty to each other which love inspires in men. And so it has moved down the ages, clothed in the stern attributes of the state, bursting the walls of cities, effacing the frontiers of nations, transcending the oceans and bridging their coasts. And so it will move until it has breached the barriers which divide the races of men and continents of the world, till freedom shall cover the whole earth as the waters cover the sea.

L. CURTIS.