purpose of deciphering the experience; and finally he distinguishes rational attention (deduction and induction)—a tri-conceptual act which consists in subsuming a minor term (a single object) under a major term capable of interpreting it. The author explains why logicians for so long a period overlooked the importance of the schemas and their nature as forms of intelligence, failing to see that the silhouette furnished by the shadow aids us to understand the object, as the rude horse carved in wood, or the outline on paper helps the child to understand the horse which draws the carriage. No object is deciphered until we possess a schema or schemas to apply to it: it is by means of our familiar schemas that we recognize single beings, thus assimilating them with others, or distinguishing them as separate, it is by means of veritable motor schemas, residues stripped of former tentatives, that we become skilful, that we have at our disposal various ways of manipulating things. So far as the author knows, Bergson alone renders full justice to schemas—dynamic schemas, he calls them, and defines them as intellectual attitudes, presenting in terms of becoming, *i.e.*, dynamically, that which the image gives in completed and static form. Attention should never be confounded with effort. Voluntary attention is often accompanied with effort, but should always be distinguished from it and often occurs without it. In attention a representation is isolated from all others because the organizing schema rejects the images which are incompatible with it and thus confers a veritable individuality to the actual content of consciousness, but this operation should in no way be confounded with mental effort; it is always performed without effort when unimpeded by insufficiency of quality of material and quantity of force to make combinations. For this reason the author does not agree with Bergson that there is a feeling of effort in proceeding along the path from schema to image. Attention is a mode of schematization, but it is not a mode of effort. [J.]

Kahn, Eugen. PSYCHOPATHS AS REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS. [Zeitschr. f. d. ges. Neurol. u. Psychiat., 1919, Vol. LII, p. 90.]

Psychopathic types among leaders of revolutions in the past are found by Kraepelin, Marx, Stelzner, Lombroso, and others. The author describes cases of this sort met with in the present political upheaval. He endeavors, from a small number of psychopathic revolutionary leaders (fifteen) who fell under his observation, to give an idea of the manner in which these psychically abnormal individuals become revolutionists and leaders of the masses. Four of these were cases of moral inferiority; four more hysterical cases; four fanatic psychopaths; and three manic depressives. The impulses leading to revolt in these different types varies. In the morally inferior type, it is vanity and greed; in the hysterics, the desire to play an important rôle; in the psychopathic fanatics, the obsession to put through an idea with themselves in

the center of the stage; in the manics, the necessity of being active in a way to gain notoriety. These cases show, notwithstanding good, sometimes very good, mental endowments, lack of critique concerning their own personality and the task they are undertaking, as well as affective instability and volitional insufficiencies. The psyche of the real leader of men, the author states, is characterized by surpassing creative and critical intelligence, by indomitable will, and by complete control of emotion. Though ambition is often present in the true leader's character, it is held in check by his insight into his own character and the realization of his task. If the psychic qualities of the masses are contrasted with those of the true leader, it is found that two extremes are represented—the highest intelligence, controlled emotion, strong will, on the one hand; low intelligence, primitive, unchecked affectivity, blind appetite, on the other. Psychopaths such as the author describes stand psychically in close relationship with the masses. As true sons of the people, they know the coarse emotional effects which appeal to the masses whose suggestibility is so great that when these psychopaths utter the first cry it is followed blindly. This is particularly the case under the present conditions, the people being weakened by undernourishment and enervated by grief. If the new order of things results in a long-needed reformation of the laws, the author is anxious that the lessons which psychiatry has learned from the revolution should be taken into consideration. [J.]

Reichmann. TREATMENT OF HYSTERICAL SEIZURES. [Neurol. Centralbl., 1919, May 1, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 9, p. 298.]

The war has shown that there is a much greater tendency in the German people to hysteria than was previously supposed, and also that the signs which have hitherto been considered as exclusively characteristic of hysteria in differentiation from epilepsy cannot always be relied upon. The author suggests tests which permit the true character of the disease to be recognized. The patients are asked in their normal condition what caused their attack. They were then placed in an hypnotic state and the same question is put to them after it had been forcefully suggested that they should remember the exact conditions of their former seizure. The patients are then placed again in the situation of the first attack, and if the attack again occurs, the hysterical reaction may be overcome, with consequent recovery. An epileptic seizure cannot be produced by suggestion, and if, after attempts by various physicians, it is found impossible to reproduce the attack, it may be assumed that the affection is epilepsy. [J.]

Kretschmer, Ernest. HYSTERICAL DISEASE AND HYSTERICAL HABIT. [Zeitschr. f. d. ges. Neurol. u. Psychiat., Vol. XXXVII, p. 84.]

The author discusses hysterical disease, hysterical habit, and malin-gering. Under hysterical disease he understands disturbances not directly